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The study of Non-Governmental Organisations’ (NGOs’) accountability has lagged 
behind that in the private sector in the areas of empirical details and theoretical 
foundation.   This thesis analyses the research question: How do NGOs practice 
accountability and what is the theoretical basis for this practice? To answer this 
question, the study develops a descriptive framework that  classifies accountability 
practices along two broad dimensions: one based on the form of giving accounts 
(which could be process or performance) and the other based on the form of holding to 
account (which could be contractual or communal). The resulting four possibilities 
were built into a framework around which a theory was developed and used to guide 
the empirical investigation in 6 NGOs, 3 in the UK and 3 in Africa. The study rejects 
the rigidly structured research approach of the rationalist school and the completely 
unstructured approach of the phenomenological school. In regard to the exploratory 
nature of the research question, it adopts a ‘middle range thinking’ approach 
proceeding with a partly structured process and a prior theory in ‘skeletal’ form 
‘fleshed out’ with the findings as the study progressed. The research finds that the bulk 
of the resources utilised by NGOs are derived from the global north while the bulk of 
the needs for NGOs’ services are in the global south, and that this influences 
accountability practices across both sides of the hemisphere. Because of the nature of 
NGO’s objectives and activities, it is argued   traditional accounting’s capability to 
provide a full account of NGOs’ performance is severely limited.  This, coupled with 
the involvement of multiple stakeholders with varied needs, has resulted in the use of 
multiple systems of accountability. In total eight practices were identified, spread 
across the four possible approaches in the theoretical framework with practices aimed 
at the needs of the statutory authorities and the Institutional donors dominating in the 
UK NGOs. Where southern NGOs have a large part of their income supplied by 
northern hemisphere Institutional donors only the accountability needs of these donors 
dominates as the local regulatory frameworks are weak. The insights from the thesis 
raise a range of policy issues about the form and regulation of accountability by NGOs 
and the role of the Institutional donors in it. 
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The global growth of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) over the last six 
decades has been phenomenal. The term NGO was first used in 1945 by the newly 
established United Nations, in Article 71 of its charter, to refer to a range of 
organizations with no governmental affiliations with which it aimed to consult in 
carrying out its economic and social work. Since then NGOs have grown in number 
and in importance, delivering services to a larger number of the world’s population, 
addressing plenary meetings of UN member states, contributing alternative reports and 
strategic information to treaty bodies and attracting substantial amount of funding 
(Korten, 1990; UN, 2003).  The significant growth of NGOs could be attributed to two 
major events. The first is the end of the cold war in 1989 and the decision of the 
developed countries to channel Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the less 
developed countries through NGOs who are believed to be more cost-effective than the 
governments of the less developed countries (Robinson, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 
1996). The second was the millennium declaration in 2000 whereby the developed 
countries committed to increasing their spending on ODA to 0.7% of their GNP. Both 
events witnessed a rise in funding to NGOs as the global funding for humanitarian 
assistance rose from $10bn in 2000 to $18bn in 2005 (Development Initiatives, 2006).   
 
The growth of NGOs and the increased funding available to them has led to a focus on 
their role and the call for them to demonstrate more accountability (Najam, 1996). But 
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assessing NGOs’ accountability is faced with three main challenges. The first is the 
difficulty in defining the boundary of what constitutes NGOs. The second is in defining 
the scope of what constitutes accountability. The third is the particular nature of NGOs’ 
activities that makes the measurement of their outcome a very complex exercise. Each 
of these are explained in more detail below. 
 
The difficulty in defining NGOs is traceable to the proliferation of the types of 
organizations that have come to be described variously as NGOs such as Not-for Profit 
Organizations (NPOs), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) and Charities. These 
terms have been used interchangeably (Salamon & Anheier, 1992a; Vakil, 1997). A 
common feature of these organizations is that their activities are not aimed at profit-
making. While the bulk of these activities are mainly in providing welfare services for 
poorer people and in development and advocacy work, it often extends beyond this 
core area depending on which term is used and how it is defined. In the UK, a range of 
organizations engaged in various forms of activities have sought to operate as NGOs or 
charities. This has prompted UK law to respond by statutorily clarifying what 
constitute charities. The Charities Act 2006 lists 13 qualifying charitable purposes. 
These were a considerable expansion of the initial 4 charitable purposes, recognised in 
the statute of 1601, which centre on the relief of poverty, the promotion of education, 
the promotion of religion and other purposes beneficial to the community (Hind 1995). 
The 2006 Act’s definition pushed the boundary of charities well beyond these original 
four charitable purposes. The term now includes a larger number of organizations that 
were not part of what was originally described as NGOs. This study focuses mainly on 
 18 
NGOs which, whilst similar to charities as legally defined in the UK, excludes those 
organizations not involved in the provision of welfare services, development or 
advocacy work. These latter activities were originally identified to be conducted 
through NGOs (Vakil, 1997) and for the purpose of this study, this will continue to be 
the main focus. 
 
Concerning the second challenge, accountability is a very subjective concept that has 
been described in different ways in different organizational settings (Sinclair, 1995). 
Researchers on accountability have used different theories or frameworks with some of 
them overlapping but very few gaining widespread use. While in some sectors, 
particularly in the private sector, accountability has been viewed mostly in terms of the 
rendering of financial accounts, in others, it has been expanded to include qualitative 
assessment of the achievement of objectives and responsiveness to stakeholders’ needs. 
Many of the theories or frameworks are not embracing enough to explain the concept 
across all sectors. Accountability can, therefore, not be discussed independent of the 
context. 
 
The third challenge relates to the difficulty in measuring the outcome of advocacy and 
development activities in which many NGOs are engaged. The efficient delivery of an 
NGO’s activities does not guarantee that its objectives or expected outcome will be 
achieved. A lot of the challenges in NGOs’ accountability are therefore in the area of 
the attempt to measure the outcome and impact of their work and the achievement of 
their objectives. But the nature of advocacy and developmental activities is such that 
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their achievements and impact are difficult to measure objectively and the appropriate 
timeframe for any such measurement extends well beyond the annual reporting cycle 
that most accountability frameworks adopt. 
 
The literature on NGOs’ accountability reflects these challenges. Accountability has 
been described more generally as a relationship between one party that gives account 
and another party that holds to account (Robert & Scapens, 1985). Various streams of 
research have studied accountability either from the way the accounts are being 
rendered (Avina, 1993) or from the exercise of the power to hold to account (Najam, 
1996; Edwards & Hulme, 2002). Other streams of research have taken the giving of 
account and the holding to account as two distinctive strands that together constitute 
accountability (Roberts, 1991; Laughlin, 1990; Stewart, 1984).  
 
The most widespread framework, the Principal–Agent model, used mostly in private 
sector accountability, views accountability in terms of the rendering of accounts to a 
dominant stakeholder, the shareholder, who has the power to hold the agent to account. 
Accountability is rendered by the Agent to the Principal-whose main objective is 
assumed to be the maximization of the Principal’s wealth- by reporting on financial 
performance. This framework ignores the existence of other stakeholders whose 
interests may be different from those of the shareholders but may not have the power to 
hold the agent to account (Laughlin, 1990). Other researchers have highlighted further 
shortcomings in this framework. For example, the framework is unsuitable in the public 
sector where there is no single dominant ‘shareholder’ and where the organizational 
 20 
objectives are much broader and more qualitative than maximising the wealth of a 
single stakeholder (Mayston, 1993). Elements of the stakeholder theory and other 
frameworks have been used for researching accountability in these other settings but no 
single coherent framework of analysis has gained widespread applicability.  
 
None of these frameworks or theories has been widely used in research on NGOs’ 
accountability. As in the public sector, the Principal-Agent model is of limited use in 
NGOs’ accountability research. NGO’s objectives are not related to maximising 
financial returns.  The ideal of humanitarian principles that NGOs subscribe to suggests 
that no services for the benefit of a suffering human being may be dismissed out of 
hand. This ideal has limited the importance of economic rationality in the delivery and 
accountability for NGOs’ services. Also, NGOs have several stakeholders rather than a 
single dominant stakeholder. While the stakeholder theory may have some relevance, 
the nature of the stakeholder relationships involved is far too complex to make it a 
sufficient framework of analysis. One of the complexities is in relation to the position 
of the beneficiaries of NGOs’ work. These are an important stakeholder group on the 
basis of whose needs NGOs are founded and derive their legitimacy. But they have no 
power to hold NGOs to account. NGOs have devised various means of accountability 
to the beneficiaries and the community (Khan, 2003; Dixon et al., 2006; O’Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2007).  While some of these methods have been researched, further research 
in this area is yet required. 
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Due to these challenges, research on NGO accountability has adopted various 
frameworks for analysis. Some of the frameworks focus on the dimension of the form 
of rendering accounts. Amongst the most widely used here is Avina’s (1993) 
Functional-Strategic accountability framework. It uses functional accountability to 
represent accountability for the use of resources and strategic accountability to 
represent accountability for the impact of NGOs’ activities on others.  
 
Other frameworks focus on the form of holding to account. Najam’s (1996) framework 
focuses on the various stakeholders to whom NGOs are accountable, mainly their 
patrons (the donors), their clients (the beneficiaries and the community) and themselves 
(their mission and values). Edward and Hulme (1996) built a framework based on the 
inequality in the power of these stakeholders to hold NGOs to account. They described 
as ‘upward’ NGOs’ accountability to those stakeholders that have the power to hold 
them to account and ‘downward’ their accountability to those who do not have such 
power. Insights into how NGOs render accountability, both ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ 
and the contradictions involved,  have been further developed in Godard and Assad, 
2006; Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006; 2006a; Gray et al., 2006; Dixon et al., 2006; 
Agyemang et al, 2011 
 
This thesis develops a framework of analysis that combines the perspective of holding 
to account and the perspective of rendering accounts to define the range of possible 
approaches to accountability that it calls the ‘accountability space’. It identifies how the 
various frameworks in the literature fit into this broader framework highlighting the  
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concentration of existing research around a limited area of the ‘accountability space’ 
and the gaps in research and empirical details in other areas. It also highlights the lack 
of an embracing theory that underpins the existing frameworks or that explains 
accountability practices across NGOs. This thesis addresses these concerns and tries to 
fill these gaps in knowledge. 
 
1.2 The aim of the research 
This thesis sets out to investigate what accountability in NGOs entails and how it is 
practiced.  Researchers and practitioners have debated the issue of NGO accountability 
for almost two decades but there is yet insufficient clarity in its meaning and scope 
while empirically grounded research on actual practices in NGOs remain sparse. The 
thesis begins by critically examining the literature on accountability in general and as it 
relates to NGOs in particular. The thesis aims to establish a theoretical basis for 
understanding what NGO accountability entails and empirical details of how it is 
practised in particular NGOs. Through this, it aims to establish a basis for assessing the 
extent to which NGOs are accountable and how practices can be improved. The thesis, 
therefore, addresses the following research questions:  
1. What theoretical model should inform the description and analysis of 
accountability practices in NGOs? 
  
2. What is the nature of accountability practices in actual NGOs? 
 
3. What theoretical, policy and practical implications and recommendations can be 




By seeking answers to these questions this study aims to provide a theoretical 
understanding of NGOs’ accountability as well as empirical details on how it is 
implemented in particular NGOs. This is crucial in assessing the state of NGOs’ 
accountability and identifying the areas needing further improvements. 
 
1.3 The research approach 
 Because the body of knowledge involved in NGOs’ accountability is not fully 
developed, the study is partly exploratory requiring an appropriate research approach to 
reflect this. It rejects the rationalist approach, with its use of prior defined theory and 
rigidly structured investigative process, as unsuitable in an exploratory study of this 
nature. It also rejects the fully inductive approach of the phenomenological school that 
rejects the need to start with a prior defined theory to explore the nature of actual 
empirical situations. It settles for  ‘middle range thinking’ approach (Laughlin 2004) 
that allows the study to commence with a loosely defined or ‘skeletal’ theory 
developed from what is known but leaving room for it to be fleshed out or modified 
based on particular details of insights gained as the study progressed. It justifies this 
approach because part of the issues involved is known from the literature and previous 
research though considerable empirical details are yet missing.  
  
Consistent with the research approach, the study adopted a case study approach using 
three NGOs from the UK and three from Africa with areas of activities spread between 
welfare/emergency, development and advocacy. More extensive data collection was 
carried out in the first of the three UK NGOs which effectively served as the lead case 
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study. Data collection primarily involved the use of documentary analysis in all the 
case studies but extended to include participant observation in the lead case study. 
Interviews were conducted as an additional form of data collection in all the six cases. 
The data from the lead case study was analysed and the theoretical model used was 
modified with the findings and used to guide the data collection and analysis in the 
remaining five cases.  
  
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
This introductory Chapter presents the background to the thesis, the justification for the 
research and the approach adopted. It also gives an overview of the structure of the 
thesis. 
 
Chapter Two presents a critical review of the literature on accountability in 
organizations in general and in NGOs in particular. It notes the dominance of the 
private sector and the public sector practices in the literature and the paucity of research 
on accountability practices in NGOs. It critically examines the strengths and limitations 
of the existing theories and approaches to accountability found in the literature and 
their relevance to NGOs. It proceeds to develop a framework of possible approaches to 
accountability and uses it to categorise the existing literature on NGO accountability. It 
observes a concentration of the literature around a limited area of practices and major 
gaps in other areas. It fits the existing research on NGO accountability within this 
framework drawing linkages between them. This framework forms the core of the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 4 for investigating and explaining the gaps.  
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Chapter Three presents the research approach used in the study. It begins by examining 
the existing approaches to research and the role of theory in relation to the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions. It examines the benefits and limitations of the 
rationalist and the phenomenological approaches and settles for a ‘middle range 
thinking’ approach that commences with a loosely defined or ‘skeletal’ theory leaving 
room for particular details of insights gained to be used in modifying it. It justifies why 
this approach is suitable for this research where the strategy was to start the 
investigation from the basis of the existing knowledge and add new insights. A major 
area of gap in the existing literature is the lack of an embracing theory for analysing 
NGO accountability. Part of the aims of this research is, therefore, to develop a theory 
for analysing accountability across NGOs in order to fill this gap in the literature. The 
flexibility of this research approach makes it suitable for theory building.  
 
Chapter Four develops the skeletal theoretical model used to commence the 
investigation. Towards this, it examines the relevance and limitations of existing 
theories of accountability and goes on to develop a ‘middle range’ theory of alternative 
forms of accountability. It begins with the framework of possible approaches to 
accountability developed in Chapter 2 to conceptualise accountability practices as 
involving one or more of four possible approaches in the ‘accountability space’. It then 
develops two models to link certain organizational variables to certain types of 
accountability practices and incorporates structuration theory to explain how the 
dynamic interaction between the variables shape the form of accountability practices 
that evolve in organizations. This theory was used to commence the analysis and is 
 26 
developed iteratively using the empirical cases. This chapter effectively moves towards 
providing a theoretical basis for analysing NGOs’ accountability and attempts to fill a 
major gap in the literature. 
 
Chapter Five presents the data on the lead case study- a UK based human rights NGO. 
The data collection was structured in line with the variables in the theoretical model. 
Data on the systems of accountability in use were also collected.  The chapter goes 
further to present an initial analysis of the data. The analysis reveals the concentration 
of the practices in the lead case study around particular areas of the ‘accountability 
space’ with minimal practices in other areas. The observed pattern is consistent with 
the results obtained when the data on the organizational variables collected were 
analysed using the theoretical model. Some key findings relating to the influence of the 
regulatory authorities and the Institutional donors in shaping the observed pattern 
emerged. The initial findings were used to modify the skeletal theory before proceeding 
to the data collection and analysis in the remaining five case studies. 
 
Chapter six presents the data collected in the remaining 5 case studies beginning with 2 
UK based NGOs and then 3 NGOs in Africa. It uses the variables in the theoretical 
model to structure the data collection. Each case study begins with a background on the 
NGO, then data collection on the organizational variables in the theoretical model.  
Data was then collected on the forms of accountability practices in each case study. 
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Chapter Seven presents the analysis of the 5 secondary case studies building on the 
theoretical and empirical insights from the lead case study. It examines how far the 
findings in the lead case study repeat across the other 5 NGOs. It finds that the 2 UK 
NGOs have similar organizational variables to those in the lead case study and their 
accountability practices are similar to those in the lead case study. But it found in one 
of the 2 NGOs, additional forms of accountability practices not previously observed in 
the lead case study. The theoretical model was used to both explain and at the same 
time, developed through this slight variation caused by a difference in one of the 
organizational variables.  The findings in these 2 cases validate those from the lead 
case study and add more insight into other practices not found in the lead case study.  
 
The organizational variables in the African NGOs studied are similar to those in the 
UK NGOs in certain areas but different in others. Some similarities and differences in 
accountability practices were therefore observed. Some of the NGOs cooperate with 
their UK counterparts, who operate as International NGOs (INGOs), in the areas of 
funding and programme delivery. The analysis finds that this relationship influences 
the pattern of accountability particularly in the African NGOs. Analysis of the data 
from the three African NGOs adds new insights into practices not found in any of the 
UK NGOs. The additional insights were used to further refine the theoretical model to 
give a fuller descriptive analysis of NGOs’ accountability practice. This descriptive 
analysis, together with the policy implications, is discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Eight concludes the thesis beginning with a review of the initial research 
objectives and how these have been met. It uses the empirical insights gained from all 
the cases to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of NGOs’ accountability 
practices. It then goes on to highlight three important areas of contribution of the thesis 







































NGO accountability in Context 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the study of accountability in NGOs poses some major 
challenges. Two of these relate to the issue of definition and scope. First, the term 
NGOs has been used to describe a whole range of organizations but there is no 
consensus on its precise definition. Second, the term ‘accountability’ is used in a broad 
sense and its meaning changes with the context in which it is used. As a result, the 
literature on accountability is extensive, covering several disciplines. 
 
Section 2.2 examines the evolution of NGOs within a historical context identifying 
three important eras in their development. It attempts to define NGOs and to classify 
them according to the type of activities they engage in and their level of operation. 
Section 2.3 examines the current thinking and regulatory requirements around NGO 
accountability. It identifies the significant influences on NGO accountability and the 
framework used in previous research and suggests that a fundamental rethink of NGO 
accountability is needed. Section 2.4 examines the existing theories of accountability, 
their relevance and limitations, and identifies the two essential elements at the core of 
the concept of accountability. Section 2.5 explores the nature of these core elements of 
accountability in developing an analytical framework for categorising the existing 
approaches to accountability. It attempts to link the diverse literature on NGO 
accountability and situate them within this framework. It highlights the concentration 
of the literature in particular areas and the gaps in the other areas. Section 2.6 identifies 
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knowledge gaps in the literature. It raises the research questions and clarifies the 
intended contribution of the thesis. 
 
2.2 Understanding the Nature of NGOs 
The term Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has been used to refer to a broad 
range of organizations but there is no general consensus on what NGOs are. The term 
came into use with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945.  Article 71 of 
Chapter 10 of the United Nations Charter makes provision for the Economic and Social 
Council, one of the body’s main organs of decision-making, to consult with NGOs:  
‘The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with 
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations’ 
(UN Charter Chapter X, Article 71) 
 
The United Nations was established at the end of the Second World War as an 
international forum for addressing a wide range of global concerns. The UN has six 
Charter bodies. These are the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, 
the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC). Of these, the last three are the principal decision making 
bodies of the UN. NGOs have no formal role in the Security Council decision making. 
They have no official consultative status with the General Assembly, although they are 
sometimes invited to participate in its activities. Their main participation is at the 
ECOSOC, the principal organ established to coordinate the economic and social work 
of the UN (UN, 2003: 4-13). In fulfilment of its mandate, in Article 71 of the UN 
Charter, to ‘make suitable arrangement for consultation with NGOs’, the ECOSOC 
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passed Resolution 288B (1950), revised by Resolution 1296 (1968) by which 
consultative status was granted to mainly international NGOs. These resolutions were 
subsequently replaced by Resolution 1996/31 (1996) that opened the door for the 
accreditation of national NGOs including those in the developing countries based on 
specified conditions. Initially, 41 NGOs were granted consultative status in 1948 but 
this increased to 2,350 by October 2003 (UN, 2003: 8). These NGOs address plenary 
meetings of UN member states and contribute alternative reports and strategic 
information to treaty bodies. NGOs have come to be seen as sources of expertise that 
can inform the UN’s decisions and as partners that help carry them out (UN, 2003: 3) 
 
Over the last six decades, the role of NGOs has evolved. Three main eras in this 
evolution can be identified. The first era predates 1945 when the term NGO was 
created and extends to the late 1980s. In this period, many NGOs were initially 
involved in ‘care and welfare’ activities inherited from the charitable activities that had 
been part of many developed countries for centuries (Korten, 1990: 115) until their role 
became formally recognised by the UN. In this era their impact on decision making in 
the UN was still very limited. Hill (2004: 1) attributes this to the effect of the cold war 
on deliberations at the UN that made the environment non-conducive to NGOs’ 
participation. But this may also have been due to the limited funding available to 
NGOs, their traditional focus on care and welfare activities and their yet limited skills 
in campaign and advocacy related activities for which the UN is an effective platform. 
In this era, the accountability of NGOs was mainly to their members who provided 
most of their funding. 
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 The second era is the period from the end of the cold war in1989 up to 2000. During 
this era, bilateral and multilateral donors pursued a ‘new policy agenda’ that gave 
renewed prominence to the roles of NGOs (Robinson, 1993).  This was based on the 
belief that NGOs are more efficient and cost-effective than states in providing welfare 
services (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Official development assistance began to be 
channelled through NGOs rather than through the governments of the less developed 
countries. Also in this era, ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 was passed in 1996. This 
paved the way for the accreditation of national NGOs and the expansion of operational 
relations between NGOs and the UN agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR, and UNDP. 
These agencies started financing programmes in developing countries through direct 
collaboration with both national and international NGOs. The era witnessed significant 
growth in the activities and numbers of NGOs. The calls for greater accountability 
started in this period as practitioners and scholars in the field challenged the notion of 
NGOs’ cost-effectiveness (Najam, 1996: 340). 
 
The third era began in 2000 when member states of the UN adopted the ‘millennium 
declaration’ aiming to half world poverty by 2015. Towards this, the developed nations 
committed to spending 0.7% of their Gross National Product (GNP) on Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) to the less developed nations. This era witnessed a 
significant increase in the funding of NGOs as the global humanitarian assistance 
funding rose. As an illustration, global funding for humanitarian assistance rose from 
$10bn in 2000 to $18bn in 2005 (Development Initiatives, 2006: 10). Concerns about 
the preparedness of NGOs to manage this increased level of funding became topical.  
 33 
2.2.1 Defining NGOs 
Since the term Non-Governmental Organization was created by the United Nations 
many have used it interchangeably with Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO), Not 
for profit organizations (NPOs), Charities and Civil Society Organizations (CSO). To 
delineate the scope of the study, it is important to distinguish NGOs from these other 
organizations. 
 
Gorman (1984: 2) defined PVOs as ‘non-governmental (private), tax-exempt, non-
profit agencies engaged in overseas provision of services for relief and development 
purposes’. Other authors have identified shortcomings in this definition such as the 
inclusion of tax status arguing that tax regimes vary by countries (Salamon and 
Anheier, 1992). In addition, reference to overseas activities in the definition excludes 
those PVOs based in third world countries that may not work overseas (Vakil, 1997: 
2058).  
 
In defining Not for profit organizations (NPOs) Salamon and Anheier (1992: 11-12) 
identified five distinguishing features of NPOs. They are: 
 
 Formal 
 Private (unaffiliated with government) 
 non-profit distributing 
 self governing (autonomously managed)  
 voluntary organizations 
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This definition of NPOs is broad and the authors consider NGOs as a subset of NPOs 
describing them as those NPOs ‘engaged in economic and social development’ 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1992: 5). 
 
Vakil (1997: 2059) sees the core distinguishing features of NGOs as mainly two of 
Salamon and Anheier’s five distinguishing features of NPOs: the private (unaffiliated 
with government) and self-governing (or autonomously managed) nature of the 
organisations. She thinks that the inclusion of ‘formal’, in Salomon and Anheier’s 
definition, excludes the informal and community based organizations in the third 
world. To distinguish NGOs from NPOs, Vakil (1997: 2058-2059) used the historical 
association of NGOs with development thereby excluding NPOs such as unions, 
professional, cultural and religious organizations whose aims are not development 
oriented. She defined NGOs as:  
self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving 
the quality of life of disadvantaged people (Vakil, 1997: 2059) 
 
 
The difficulty with this definition is in defining development. Development is a broad 
concept encompassing a range of activities. Elliot (1987: 57-59) identified three 
positions that NGOs can occupy along a continuum that constitute the nature of 
development. These are:  
1. Welfare: delivering services to specific groups 
2. Developmental: improvement in the capacity of a community to provide for its 
own basic needs and  
3. Empowerment: enabling or training a community to enter the political process 
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 But delivering services to communities may encompass other activities such as 
emergency and distress relief which some see as falling outside the scope of what could 
be defined as development. The OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) 
Statistical Directive, in an attempt to distinguish ‘emergency and distress relief’  from 
‘development’ defines the former as ‘an urgent situation created by an abnormal event 
which a government cannot meet out of its own resources and which results in human 
suffering and/or loss of crops or livestock’ (DAC, 2010).  
 
Gray et al., (2006: 322-323) describe NGO as an element of the civil society. They 
define civil society as occupying the space that exists between the state, the market and 
the family. They admit that this definition based on ‘what it is not’ is as a result of the 
difficulty in defining the other elements of society from which civil society emerges.  
 
NGOs can also be identified by how an organization is registered under the law of a 
particular nation but this approach is severely limited as exemplified in the UK where 
an organization’s status as a charity is not accepted as sufficient justification for 
classifying it as a NGO (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006:309). 
 
In the UK, NGOs are registered as charities and their activities are regulated by the law 
and, in England and Wales, the Charity Commission.  But the definition of charities 
under UK law embraces not only NGOs but other organisations established for 
charitable purposes. What constitute charitable purpose is subjective and its definition 
has evolved over time. The earliest attempt to define charity was from an Elizabethan 
 36 
statute of 1601 which contained a list of purposes which were then considered to be 
charitable. This was formalised by the judgement of Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel’s case 
of 1891(Hind, 1995: 385), where charitable activities were classified under four 
headings:  
 1. The relief of poverty,  
 2. The advancement of education,  
 3. The advancement of religion and  
 4. Trust for other purposes beneficial to the community.  
 
Over the years, the term has been broadened to include several other organizations 
serving different purposes. Because of the tax and fundraising advantages, the tendency 
is for some organizations to attempt to register or operate as charities. The Charities 
Act 2006, in an attempt to streamline this, provides a statutory definition of ‘charity’ as 
‘a body or trust that is established solely to promote for the public benefit, one or more 
of thirteen charitable purposes’ (Charities Act 2006, c.50:2). These are listed in the Act 
as: 
1. the prevention or relief of poverty 
2.  the advancement of education  
3. The advancement of health or the saving of lives 
4. The advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the 
promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity 
5. The advancement of animal welfare 
6. The advancement of environmental protection and improvement 
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7. The advancement of citizenship and community development  
8. The advancement of arts, culture, heritage or science 
9. The relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, 
financial hardship or other disadvantage 
10. The advancement of religion 
11. The advancement of amateur sport 
12. The promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the crown; or the 
efficiency of the police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services 
13. Any other charitable purpose in law 
 
The key qualifying criteria is that an organization needs to show an identifiable public 
benefit before it can be registered as a charity under the Charities Act 2006.  
 
But not all organizations that qualify as charities under the law can be described as 
NGOs. For example, religious organizations and amateur sports organizations, though 
qualifying as charities under the law, cannot be described as NGOs based on Vakil’s 
(1997: 2059) association of NGOs with development activities. For the purpose of this 
study, this association with development (including welfare) activities will be used in 
identifying NGOs. Organizations that fit this definition will also qualify as charities 





2.2.2 Classifying NGOs 
As the above demonstrates, the term NGO covers a diverse range of organizational 
types. In defining the unit of analysis it is important to classify NGOs. Several 
researchers have proposed different classification frameworks but they have been 
tainted by the purpose and the disciplinary perspective of the researches. NGOs have 
been studied from different social sciences disciplines making it difficult to obtain an 
overall view: 
‘…multiple parallel discussions about NGOs have tended to take place within 
the confines of individual disciplines and areas of study making it difficult to 
construct an overall framework’ (Vakil, 1997: 2060) 
 
Vakil (1997) grouped the various bases on which earlier writers have classified NGOs 
into two categories:  
1. Essential or primary descriptors based on the orientation of NGOs’ activities 
and their level of operations   
2. Contingent descriptors based on sectoral focus or evaluative factors such as 
the level of accountability or participation.  
She suggested that a classification framework for NGOs based on essential descriptors 
is more useful in sorting out broad theoretical and empirical issues related to improving 
understanding of NGOs. This approach will be adopted in this study. NGOs will be 
classified first according to their orientation and then according to their level of 
operation. 
 
Orientation refers to the type of activities in which NGOs engage.  The three principal 
orientation within Elliot’s (1987: 57-59) development continuum will be adopted but 
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modified by the OECD’s (DAC, 2010) distinction between ‘emergency and distress 
relief’ and ‘development’. NGOs with ‘welfare orientation’ are those involved in the 
delivery of services, mainly the basic needs of poor populations (Elliot, 1987: 58). This 
category includes both development and emergency oriented NGOs. ‘Emergency or 
distress relief’ oriented NGOs deliver welfare services but in ‘emergency’ situations 
that involve widespread suffering or risk of loss of lives usually following a natural or 
man-made disaster such as earthquakes and violent conflicts. ‘Development’ oriented 
NGOs include mainly those that deliver services that have as their ultimate goal 
improvement in the capacity of a community to provide for its own basic needs (Elliot, 
1987: 58).   In the third category, Empowerment, are ‘Advocacy’ oriented NGOs who 
aim to influence policy or decision-making related to particular issues.  Vakil (1997: 
2063) identifies ‘Development education’ as another orientation where NGOs focus on 
educating the people on major development issues such as global inequality, debt, 
climate change etc. But this could be seen as a first step towards an ‘advocacy’ 
orientation as many organizations involved in development education eventually end 
up campaigning for change. This may therefore be left within the broad category of 
‘Empowerment’ or ‘Advocacy’ orientation. 
 
The distinction between emergency, development and empowerment (or advocacy) 
activities is not very clear-cut and many NGOs are involved in more than one of these 
activities. Categorising NGOs on the basis of the type of activities they are engaged in 
does not produce clear-cut categories. Such categorizations tend to place NGOs 
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according to the most dominant areas of their activities. This is considered sufficient 
for the purpose of this study. 
 
Concerning classification based on the Level of operation, there is a reasonable level of 
agreement among researchers as most identify ‘international’, ‘national’ and 
‘community based’ organizations as the main ‘levels of operation’. Many of them link 
this description to geography: ‘International’ NGOs are mostly in the wealthier 
northern hemisphere, ‘National’ NGOs are based in the countries of the third world 
while ‘Community-based’ NGOs are based in the local communities of the third world 
countries. This link to geography may no longer be valid as some International NGOs 
have relocated to the southern hemisphere to save cost and for other strategic reasons. 
For example, Action Aid (an international NGO) has relocated its headquarters from 
the UK to South Africa. It says of the move: 
‘it helps to further strengthen our accountability to the people, communities and 
countries we work with and make us more effective in fighting and eradicating 
poverty’ (Action Aid, 2008) 
 
On the other hand, more ‘national’ and ‘community-based’ NGOs are springing up in 
the industrialized countries of the northern hemisphere. The classification framework 
adopted in this study will be based on: 
1. Orientation (classified as Emergency/welfare, Development and Advocacy) 
and  
2. Level of operation (classified as International, National and Community based 
but without any link to geography).  
The aim is to study NGOs selected from across the various categories. 
 41 
2.3 NGO Accountability: Current Thinking and Regulatory Requirements 
Accountability has been defined in various ways by different researchers. Because it 
covers a broad range of human activities, its meaning and scope tend to vary with the 
context in which it is studied. Sinclair (1995: 219-231) highlights this complexity by 
describing it as a ‘chameleon’ existing in different forms and given different meanings 
by its context. Because of this, accountability has been studied using different 
approaches. To study the practice of accountability in the context of NGOs it is 
important to understand certain common set of principles and values by which NGOs’ 
activities are guided. At the centre of this is the Principle of Humanity which implies 
that no service whatsoever for the benefit of a suffering human being is to be dismissed 
out of hand (ICRC, 2002:4).  Many NGOs have translated this principle to specific 
statements of action that guide their work. For example, based on it, the International 
Red Cross and Red Crescent movement made a declaration of seven principles that 
form the framework and the means for attaining its objectives (ICRC, 2002: 9-30) 
 
Adherence to humanitarian principles is taken by NGOs to be of central importance. 
Slim (1998: 28-48) argues that these fundamental values should be at the centre of 
accountability in humanitarian assistance and should be reported. But the method of 
demonstrating accountability to these values is not very well defined. It may involve 
various means of engaging with stakeholders and measuring the impact of NGOs’ 
activities on the achievement of objectives. But there are no standards to guide this 
form of accountability and NGOs have been free to implement it in ways that suit them. 
This was the main form of accountability in the first era of NGOs’ development when 
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their source of revenue was mainly from individual supporters and members who give 
mainly towards NGOs’ work and do not demand any formal accountability.  
 
From the second era of NGOs’ development, with the increased inflow of official aid, 
NGOs became more dependent on funding from the larger Institutional donors and 
governments. In 1994 up to 52 per cent of the income of the UK’s five largest NGOs 
came from bilateral donors (Edward and Hulme 1996: 962). This funding is usually 
accompanied with accountability demands from the recipient NGOs by the donors 
whose concerns have been mostly around the use of resources. The implication is that 
NGOs’ accountability has shifted towards focusing on the short-term objective of 
accounting for the use of resources (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 962-968). This form of 
accountability is formal and relies to a great extent on accounting methodologies. But 
formal accountability of this nature does not take into consideration the very important 
issue of accountability for the outcomes and impact of NGOs’ work. This is 
particularly crucial for those NGOs involved in development and advocacy work 
whose activities have wider social impact (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006:369-370). 
More recent researches have attempted to include this important dimension of NGOs’ 
accountability.  Various alternative frameworks of analysis have therefore developed in 






2.3.1 NGO Accountability: Some Alternative Views 
Approaches to NGOs’ accountability have been described by different researchers 
using various frameworks. Avina (1993) sees accountability as consisting of two main 
components: ‘functional accountability’ involving accounting for resources, resource 
use and immediate impacts and ‘strategic accountability’ involving measuring the 
impact of NGOs’ activities on other organization and the environment.  Beginning 
from the second era of their development, much of NGOs’ accountability practices 
have been around functional accountability focusing on the use of resources. This is 
because of the increased dependence on funding from Institutional donors whose 
concerns have been mostly around the use of resources (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 
962-968; Ebrahim, 2003).  
 
Najam (1996) built a framework from the perspective of identifying those stakeholders 
to whom NGOs are accountable. He identified three categories of accountability which 
he declares ‘virtually cover the full universe of possibilities so far as NGO 
accountability is concerned’ (Najam, 1996: 341). These are: accountability to patrons, 
accountability to clients and accountability to themselves. Accountability to patrons 
includes accountability to donors, both the small individual givers and the large 
Institutional donors. This, particularly for the large Institutional donors, usually covers 
both accountability for the use of resources (described by Avina as functional 
accountability) and accountability for the implementation of policy (described by 
Avina as strategic accountability). Najam (1996: 342) argues that the distinction 
between the two is only a matter of elegance and reasoned that since policy 
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accountability is difficult to put into operation, fiscal accountability can be a de facto 
means of achieving policy accountability.  Najam (1996: 345) defines the clients as the 
direct and indirect beneficiaries of NGO’s activities and includes the community and 
the state in this group. He identified ‘participation’ as a way by which NGOs render 
this accountability and argues that the concept is largely undefined, often misused and 
has not worked in practice. He suggests that this is because the ‘impoverished 
communities lack mechanisms for holding NGOs accountable’ and that in establishing 
the communities’ aspirations, NGOs ‘tend to hear only what they want to hear....(so) 
community aspirations tend to mirror prior NGO priorities’ (Najam, 1996: 345). 
Conceptually, accountability to beneficiaries and the community overlaps with Najam’s 
third category- NGOs’ accountability to themselves which he defines as NGOs’ 
accountability to their goals and vision (Najam, 1996:348).  This overlap is not 
unexpected if Najam’s suggestion of ‘aspiration manipulation’ (Najam, 1996:345) is 
true.   
 
Later research has provided some insights into how NGOs demonstrate accountability 
to beneficiaries and the community, and the mechanisms used in actual NGOs (Khan, 
2003; Dixon et al., 2006; Gray et al., 2006; Goddard and Assad, 2006; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer,2006a; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007; Wellens and Jegers, 2011; Agyemang 
et al.,  2011). The various mechanisms used revolve around involving beneficiaries and 
the community in policy-making, project implementation, and including their 
perception in measuring NGOs’ effectiveness (Wellens and Jegers, 2011: 175). Gray et 
al. (2006: 334-335) identified transparency and engagement with the communities in 
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which NGOs are embedded as ways by which NGOs render accountability to this 
group, and argued that NGO’s accountability ‘will naturally occur through some 
combination of personal contact and the visibility of the activities undertaken by the 
NGO’. Dixon et al. (2006) shows how this form of accountability is implemented in a 
micro-finance NGO by way of informal, trust-based accountability relationships but 
noted that the vertical, hierarchical form of accountability practised alongside it stifled 
this practice. 
 
In a case study research of seven Bangladeshi NGOs using Najam’s framework, Khan 
(2003) identified some of the ways by which NGOs render accountability to 
beneficiaries as participation in programme planning and transparency: 
‘Beneficiaries are encouraged to involve themselves in BRAC’s 
programmes...In ASA accountability mechanisms combine principles of 
participation and transparency. The general body which approves all policy 
decisions is composed of sixty members half of whom are chosen from among 
the beneficiaries. BNPS develops its programmes after organizing group 
meetings of stakeholders at the grassroots level....In NUK beneficiaries are 
involved with management in the participatory planning process’ (Khan, 2003: 
274) 
 
Agyemang et al. (2011:13-17) identified three forms of ‘Participation and Beneficiary 
involvement’ and found significant variations in NGOs’ approach to the practice: 
‘Participatory reviews are held with beneficiaries...but they tend to vary in 
form. Some NGOs have developed a very sophisticated approach to 
participatory reviews but others use approaches that are not so well developed 
and tend to be  more informal. Between these two extremes...we observed 




Bringing all these together, one may conclude that accountability to the beneficiaries 
and the community involves participation of this group in decision making relating to 
the identification of the needs of the group; the design, implementation and directing of 
programmes aimed at meeting those needs; and the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
those programmes. The mechanism by which this accountability is rendered includes 
personal contact; transparency and visibility of NGOs’ activities; development of 
relationship of trust; beneficiaries’ representation on governing or policy making 
bodies; needs assessment and participatory reviews.  
 
Other scholars have further developed the idea of identifying the stakeholders to whom 
NGOs render accounts and the nature of the obligation to render such accounts. 
Edwards and Hulme (1996:967) used ‘Upward accountability’ to refer to NGO’s 
accountability to donors and stakeholders who have the power to hold them to account 
and ‘downward accountability’ for accountability to those stakeholders who do not 
have such power.  The various means of accountability to the beneficiaries and the 
community discussed above could therefore be categorised as downward 
accountability.  There are very few empirical studies of the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms: 
 ‘Despite the fact that numerous researchers indicate that beneficiaries’ 
 involvement can be implemented in different ways.....the effectiveness of  these 
 mechanisms is rarely investigated’ (Wellens and Jegers, 2011: 176). 
 
Khan (2003: 275) in his conclusion cast some doubts on the effectiveness of the 
practices he observed: 
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‘Beneficiaries’ participation is usually restricted to putting questions to 
management. Policy making and agenda-setting remain the exclusive domains 
of top-management’  
In the last few years, there has been growing talk amongst development actors and 
agencies about a ‘rights-based approach’ to development. One of the key elements of 
the approach is to enable those whose lives are affected the most to articulate their 
priorities and claim genuine accountability from development agencies (Cornwal and 
Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; O’Dwer and Unerman, 2010). O’Dwer and Unerman (2010) 
suggest that this accountability mechanism should involve establishing participatory 
partnership arrangements with beneficiaries that will enable beneficiaries to design, 
develop and implement programmes in conjunction with development NGOs and 
concluded that this ideal was not yet realized in practice.   
 
Most of the literature categorise NGO’s accountability to their main funders as ‘upward 
accountability’. The system of accountability to the regulatory authorities may also be 
considered to belong in this category since they have the statutory rights to demand or 
enforce it.  The literature on stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory gives 
some insight into what gives one party the power to hold another to account- mainly 
the supply of economic resources and its influence on the stakeholders’ relationship 
with the organization.  Ebrahim (2003: 814) traces the challenges of NGO 
accountability to their excessive dependence on donors and the ‘asymmetries in 
resources that have resulted in excessive conditionalities or onerous reporting 
requirements being attached to funding’.  This may have resulted in the increased 
attention paid to upward accountability at the expense of downward accountability. 
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While upward accountability encompasses elements of both functional and strategic 
accountability, the literature has focused more on functional accountability and the role 
of the funders in creating this dominance.  But the role of the government and the 
regulatory authorities in NGOs’ accountability is an increasingly important factor in the 
dominance of the functional approach. In the UK, until the 1990s, the government was 
rather passive with respect to charity accounting and the literature on functional 
accountability focused more on the role of the Institutional donors. But certain changes 
in the relationship between the government and the charity sector have made the 
government become ‘a much more vigorous stakeholder .. exert(ing) significant direct 
and indirect influence on the evolution of charity accounting’  (Hyndman and 
McMahon, 2011: 169). This influence is most visible in the current framework of 
regulation of charities in England and Wales. 
 
2.3.2 Current Regulation Requirement for NGO Accountability 
The regulation requirements for NGO accountability varies from one country to 
another. This section examines the regulation requirements in the countries from which 
the case studies were drawn mainly England and Wales, Uganda and Nigeria.  
 
In England and Wales, the regulation of NGOs is vested in the Charity Commission.  
The Commission was established under the Charitable Trust Act of 1853 but given 
wide ranging powers by the enactment of the Charities Act 1960. The 1960 Act  
required the Charity Commission to maintain a register of charities, receive accounts to 
be made available for public inspection, investigate abuse and take action to protect the 
properties of charities where necessary (Hind, 1995:385). The law remained unchanged 
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for the next three decades while the environment in which charities operate changed 
significantly. In 1985 there were 150,000 registered charities in the UK (Hind, 
1995:386). By 2008, the number had risen to an estimated 171,000 with total income of 
£35.5b (National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2010) 
 
As a result of the rapid growth of charities, the Commission lost the capacity to 
adequately regulate the sector. The National Audit Office Report (1987) entitled 
‘Monitoring and Control of Charities in England and Wales’ found that the register of 
charities maintained by the Commission was unreliable and outdated and that a large 
number of charities ignored the requirement to submit their annual accounts and that 
the Commission made no effort to enforce that this submission occurred. It also found 
that the Commission was under-resourced and understaffed.  
 
In 1987, the Government commissioned an efficiency scrutiny of the supervision of 
charities culminating in the Sir Philip Woodfield et al’s Report (Woodfield, 1987). The 
Report found the Charity Commission failing to supervise charities and recommended 
that the Commission be given more powers to monitor and investigate charities through 
a new legislation. Three months after the publication of the House of Commons’ Public 
Accounts Commission (PAC) Report, the Accounting Standards Committee issued the 
Statement of Recommended Practice No 2- Accounting by Charities (SORP (1988) 
hereafter). 
The PAC hearing of October 1987 endorsed the NAO findings and the Woodfield 
report. The Charities Act 1992 was passed in March 1992 incorporating the major 
recommendations of the NAO and the PAC. Part I of the Act deals with charity 
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accounts. It increases the power of the Commission to intervene to protect charity 
assets. It also increased the regulatory functions of the Charity Commission and 
increased the obligation of charities to be accountable to the public.  
 
The Act also deals with the control of fundraising in part II and public charitable 
collections in part III. The Charities Act 1993 was passed consolidating the Charities 
Act 1992 with the relevant provisions in the Charities Act 1960 and the Charitable 
Trustees Incorporation Act 1872 (Hind 1995: 399). Further amendments have been 
made to the act with the Charities Act 2006 introducing major changes particularly in 
the definition of what constitutes a charitable purpose. Of all the changes in the 
regulation of charities since 1988, the area where the most profound changes have 
occurred is in financial accounting and statutory reporting. 
 
Prior to 1988, financial accountability in charities was based on the use of simple 
Income and Expenditure accounts. There was no specific standard governing its 
preparation. This resulted in inconsistency in accounting treatment amongst charities. 
The lack of consistency in financial statements makes it difficult for users to 
understand the information provided (Connolly and Hyndman, 2000: 79). Bird and 
Morgan-Jones (1981) highlighted this in their research. In a survey of 135 fundraising 
charities they reveal immense diversity in charity accounting in the areas of formats of 
accounts, fund accounting, legacies and accounting for fixed assets for example. They 
conclude that such variations in treatment were used to affect the revenue result in such 
a way as to make charities appear attractive to potential donors. This research was 
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instrumental to the development of the first reporting standard for charities, SORP 
(1988)
1
.  The preamble to SORP (1988) states that it: 
‘sets out recommendations on the way in which a charity should report annually 
on the resources entrusted to it and the activities it undertakes. Although the 
recommendations are not mandatory, charities are encouraged to follow them’.  
 
The recommendations include preparing annual income and expenditure accounts 
showing a net surplus or deficit at the year end. But charities felt that the commercial 
income and expenditure accounts with emphasis on capital maintenance did not fully 
reflect their financial activities that centre on raising funds and using the resources for 
charitable purposes. Charities, except those that are effectively trading, do not need to 
match income and expenditure for particular periods. They are not working towards a 
particular year-end date and to place undue emphasis on the surplus or deficit at a 
particular point in time can be misleading. For example, grant received in a year may 
be for projects to be carried out in the following year or indeed over a number of years 
(National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2007). As a result, many charities did 
not comply with the SORP. Ashford (1989) reviewed the accounts of 56 charities and 
concluded that while 14 complied with the SORP (1988) others did not. Gambling et 
al., (1990) carried out a survey of 6 charities to determine their level of compliance and 
found that the SORP was generally ignored by charities. Among the reasons, they 
wrote: 
..charities felt that the SORP reflected the opinion of the accounting profession 
about charity accounting rather than those of charities (Gambling et al., 1990: 9) 
 
                                                 
1
 But see above for the role of the NAO’s Report in 1987 and Sir Philip Woodfield’s scrutiny as 
contributing factors. 
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To address the problem of compliance, the Charity Commission in 1992 sponsored the 
setting up of a review committee by the Accounting Standards Board comprising of the 
accounting profession, academics and leading charity finance directors to review SORP 
(1988). Following the review, a revised SORP was published in October 1995. The 
major changes introduced in the new SORP (1995) include eliminating many of the 
alternative accounting treatments permitted in SORP (1988) in order to improve 
consistency. It also introduced the Statement of Financial Affairs (SOFA) to replace or 
supplement the income and expenditure accounts (Connolly and Hyndman 2000: 83).  
SORP (1995) also requires that charity accounts be prepared using the fund accounting 
principle. It defines a fund as: 
‘A pool of resources, held and maintained separately from other pools, because 
of the circumstances in which the resources were originally received or the way 
in which they have subsequently been treated’ 
 
A fund will be either a restricted fund that is subject to specific conditions imposed by 
the donor or an unrestricted (general) fund that is not subject to externally imposed 
restrictions provided that they are used in pursuance of the charity’s objectives. Part of 
the unrestricted funds may be set aside for a specific purpose and put in a designated 
fund. The use of designated funds remains at the discretion of the trustees and are 
classified as part of the unrestricted funds. 
 
Because the environment in which charities operate is continually changing, the 
Charity Commission undertake periodic review of the charities SORP. In October 
2000, SORP (2000) was published and five years later, SORP (2005) was published. 
Though, the underlying principles of fund accounting is unchanged, there have been 
 53 
changes in the scope and content of charities’ financial reports.  For example, SORP 
(2005) introduced more specific guidance on the contents of Trustees’ annual reports 
emphasising on the reporting on activities and achievement against organizational 
objectives (Charity Commission, 2005). The introduction of the narrative reporting on 
activities and achievements is a significant step towards addressing a major gap in 
NGO (or charities) accountability.  Hyndman and McMahon (2011: 172) consider the 
increased reporting on performance and governance to be the ‘government’s most 
significant contribution to the content of the SORP’. Further less substantial 
amendments to SORP (2005) were made in 2009 but it retains its current form and 
name. 
 
In Uganda, the regulation of NGOs is vested in the NGO Board. The Board issued the 
Uganda NGO Regulation 2009 that gives guidance on various areas of NGO’s 
operations. In the area of statutory reporting, the requirements set out in section 16 of 
the regulations are not very demanding: 
‘An Organisation shall- 
a. Submit to the Board an annual return in Form E as specified in the Schedule 
to these Regulations; 
b. Submit to the Board a report approved by the Organisation’s annual general 
meeting or Board of Directors; 
c. Furnish to the District Development Committee of each area in which it 
operates, estimates of its income and expenditure for information; 
d. Submit to the board such other information that the board may consider to 
be in the public interest. 
(UGX/NGO Reg/09:162) 
 
Only a simple Income and Expenditure accounts and Balance sheet are required and no 
specific reporting standard or guidelines have been issued by the Board for their 
preparation. The statutory accounts are not based on the fund accounting principle and 
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no attempt is made to separate expenditure by individual funds. There are no statutory 
requirements to produce detailed narrative reports. The NGO Board has not given any 
guidelines on the minimum information content of the narrative element of the 
statutory report. 
 
In Nigeria, there is yet no attempt at statutory regulation of NGOs. Nigeria is a sub-
Saharan African country with a population of about 150m. It is a former British colony 
that gained independence in 1960. A range of NGOs operate in Nigeria in form of 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Religious Organizations, and Charities etc. 
The legal basis for these organizations is derived mainly from the Constitution and the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 1990). Section 40 of the 1999 constitution 
grants every person ‘the right to peaceful assembly and association’. The constitution 
however places certain limitations on this right but these relate mostly to political 
parties and trade unions. These organizations are subject to further regulation under the 
laws such as the Trade Union Act. But NGOs face no further regulations. NGOs can be 
registered in one of two ways:  
1. As a company limited by guarantee. The Companies and Allied Matters Act 
1990, Section 26(1)  provides that: 
‘Where a company is to be formed for promoting commerce, art, science, 
religion, sports, culture, education, research, charity or other similar objects, 
and the income and property of the company are to be applied solely towards 
the promotion of its object...the company..may be registered as a company 
limited by guarantee’ 
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2. As Incorporation of trustees by which the trustees of the association, rather than 
the association, obtain the status of a body corporate. This is provided for in 
CAMA, 1990 Part C, section 673: 
‘ Where one or more trustees are appointed by ...any body or association of 
persons established for any religious, educational, literary, scientific, social, 
development, cultural, sporting or charitable purpose, he or they may...apply to 
the commission...for registration..as a corporate body’ 
 
In addition to incorporation, some government departments require NGOs to register 
with them. But this is only for the purpose of collaborative work and not with a view 
towards regulation. There is no separate body that registers or regulates the activities of 
NGOs. The Corporate Affairs Commission is the only body charged with the 
responsibility of regulating all incorporated bodies in Nigeria. It maintains a register of 
all incorporated trustees and companies it has registered but there is no specific NGO 
register. The Commission attempts to regulate NGOs in the same way as other 
companies in line with the provision of the Act (CAMA, 1990). This regulation is light-
touch. Those that are companies limited by guarantee are required to submit annual 
returns just like other companies. This requirement is flexible. Section 373 of CAMA 
requires that the returns ‘shall be in the form prescribed in the Tenth Schedule...or as 
near to it as circumstances permit’. Likewise for NGOs registered as incorporated 
trustees, Section 690 provides that the trustees must ‘submit to the Commission a return 
showing, among other things, the name of the corporation, the name, addresses and 
occupations of the trustees’ 
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This light-touch regulation is not effective as the Commission does not monitor 
compliance and NGOs are free to operate unhindered by regulatory compliance. This 
freedom to operate has its origin in the colonial era when NGOs such as missionaries 
had the freedom to operate as long as they did not threaten public order. They ran 
health, educational and social welfare institutions. The incursion of the military into 
governance diminished the importance of this sector as many of the establishments they 
ran were transferred to state control. The attendant human rights violation under these 
regimes also saw the emergence of various Human Rights NGOs. But these 
organizations were denied legal recognition. Therefore, there was no apparent need to 
develop any system of regulation for them. 
 
Even the accounting profession pays no attention to the NGO sector. Nigeria has a 
standards setting body (The Nigerian Accounting Standards Board). It has issued 21 
Statements of Accounting Standards (SAS) which are in large part reflective of the UK 
standards. It has now adopted a convergence programme aimed at full adoption of 
IFRS from January 2012. Among the SAS it has issued so far, there is none that gives 
guidance to NGOs on how accounts should be prepared. In an informal interview, an 
official of the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board was asked if the board is working 
on developing a reporting standard for NGOs in Nigeria for now or for January 2012. 
His response was: ‘we will think about it when we get there (2012)’  
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2.3.3 Why a Fundamental Rethink on NGO Accountability is Needed 
From the literature, NGOs are organizations whose role and boundary are constantly 
being redefined by law and society. As the role of NGOs has evolved so has the debate 
on NGOs’ accountability. Ebrahim (2009) reflects on ‘the heavily normative nature’ of 
the current accountability debates. It identifies three ‘normative logics’ of ‘how 
accountability problems facing NGOs are frequently described and framed’. The first is 
the problem of governance which is addressed through a ‘coercive regulatory regime’. 
The second is the problem of measuring performance which is addressed through a 
‘professional or technocratic regime’ using accountability tools such as log-frame, 
evaluation and normative codes of performance. The third is the problem of 
demonstrating progress in achieving their mission addressed through a ‘strategic and 
adaptive' accountability regime. It raises a question as to whether there is a ‘difference 
between how accountability is imagined and how it actually operates’ (Ebrahim 2009: 
886) and calls for more empirical investigation or ‘thick’ description of the operation 
and the effects of the three regimes. 
 
A proper analysis that can produce a more enduring framework needs to be adequately 
grounded in theory. This requires a re-examination of the concept of accountability in 





2.4 Accountability: A Theoretical View 
Accountability has been described broadly as a relationship involving the ‘giving and 
demanding of reasons for conduct’ (Robert and Scapens, 1985: 447). It involves two 
parties- the one who gives an account and the one who holds someone to account. 
Stewart (1984: 15-16) highlights the necessity of having these two ‘strands’ in any 
accountability relationship: the giving of account in a form that is understood and the  
‘holding to account, an exercise of power involving making judgement and taking 
action on the basis of the judgement’. He asserts that, though the giving of account can 
stand on its own right as a form of accountability, it is not a full expression of 
accountability if it does not involve the exercise of the power to demand account. He 
described the accountability relationship between the one who accounts and the one 
who holds to account as a bond, asserting that the bond will remain strong where the 
one who holds to account has necessary authority and power. He described the 
relationship as a ‘link of account ‘where accounts are given without the power to hold 
to account. 
 
The nature of the form of giving of account and the form of holding to account could 
be viewed as major elements in the existing theories of accountability. Two of these 
theories, the Principal-Agent theory and the Stakeholder theory, are particularly 





2.4.1 The Principal - Agent Theory of Accountability 
In private sector accountability the major conceptual framework used is the economic 
model of Principal- Agent theory the central concern of which assumes that a 
‘Principal’ transfers resources to an agent and the transfer gives the principal rights to 
demand accountability. The expectations of the ‘Principal’ concerning the activities 
and conduct of the ‘Agent’ could be stated in an explicit contract which could be of a 
formal or informal nature (Laughlin, 1990: 96). The ‘Agent’ carries on activities aimed 
at fulfilling these expectations and demonstrates this by rendering accountability to the 
‘Principal’. Stewart’s (1984) two main strands necessary in accountability relationship 
could be seen in operation- the form of holding to account is strong as the ‘Principal’ 
has the power, under contract, to demand accounts. Also, the form of giving account is 
clear- the need of the principal is wealth maximisation so accounts are prepared to 
reflect performance against this objective using the appropriate language of traditional 
accounting
2
. Though this model is widely used and may be considered as successful in 
the study of private sector accountability, it has some limitations.  
 
In some organizations, there may be other objectives and values, different from 
maximising wealth, that are considered important, sacred or core. The obligation to be 
accountable to these sacred objectives or values may be very strong notwithstanding 
that the power to hold to account is not present or exercised. Examples are religious 
organizations where such sacred objectives are held as important and may be 
                                                 
2
 Traditional accounting is used throughout this thesis to refer to the network of practices defined by the 
Accounting Principles Board in its Statement No. 4 as concerned with provision of quantitative 
information, primarily financial in nature about economic entities that is intended to be useful in making 
economic decisions. More detailed explanation of this term is given in Section 4.3 
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considered a sort of ‘higher principal’ (Laughlin, 1996: 225). Other examples are 
educational institutions and hospitals described by Bourn and Ezzamel (1987: 34) as 
professional organizations founded on an ‘overriding value system’ loosely identified 
as ‘academic freedom’ or ‘clinical freedom’. These organizations hold themselves 
accountable to some values, or what one may consider as stakeholders, who do not 
have or exercise the power to demand accountability. NGOs are in a similar position as 
they subscribe to a common set of shared values which can be summed up as the 
‘principle of humanity’. This may have some role to play in NGO accountability as 
noted by Gray et al. (2006: 334): 
 ‘NGOs are actively accountable through shared values, understanding and 
 knowledge to the staff who work for them, to the other NGOs with whom they 
 interact and to the communities in which they are embedded...’ 
 
As noted in Gray et al. (2006:334) this shared values are often linked to some other 
stakeholders such as the community, staff, worshipers, a ‘higher principal’ or the 
public. The stakeholder theory, examined next, may, therefore, be a more embracing 
theoretical construct in these contexts. 
 
2.4.2 The Stakeholder Theory of Accountability 
An alternative theory of accountability is the stakeholder theory that suggests that an 
organization is accountable to its stakeholders. Freeman (1984: 46) defined 
stakeholders to include ‘individuals and groups who can affect, or are affected by, the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives’.  This could be interpreted in a narrow 
sense to mean that organizations are accountable only to those stakeholders who can 
affect the organization. But in the broader sense, it could mean that organizations have 
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a duty of accountability not only to those who have influence on the organization but to 
all individuals and groups whose life experiences may be affected by the organisation’s 
activities. Both interpretations of the theory have been used in accountability research 
in different contexts. 
 
The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) encourages a narrow 
interpretation of the stakeholder theory to mean that organizations are accountable only 
to those stakeholders who can affect the organization: 
 ‘Organizations will (and should) respond more to the demands of those 
 organizations and groups in the environment that control critical resources 
 (Pfeffer, 1982: 193) 
 
The private sector Principal-Agent model of accountability is consistent with this 
narrow interpretation of the stakeholder theory whereby the shareholders are treated as 
the only important stakeholders on account of providing the resources needed by the 
organization. The government is only considered a significant stakeholder because it 
has the power, through legislation, to affect private sector organizations. But the 
Principal- Agent model is not consistent with a broader interpretation of stakeholder 
theory. These are in different forms including the various normative and instrumental 
stakeholder theories in the corporate social responsibility literature (Jawahar and 
Mclauglin, 2001:399) that attempt to address the needs of other stakeholders.  But a 
descriptive stakeholder theory could be more useful in exploring the nature of 
accountability across a broader range of organizations. Brenner and Cochran’s (1991: 
462) descriptive stakeholder theory identifies four variables that affect organizational 
behaviour: 
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‘the nature of an organization’s stakeholders, their values, their relative 
influence on decisions and the nature of the situation are all relevant 
information for predicting organizational behaviour’.  
 
The following sections will examine the nature of the form of the giving of account and 
the form of holding to account, in different organizational contexts as variables in a 
theoretical exploration of accountability across organizations. 
 
2.4.3 The Giving of an Account 
Major streams of research have studied accountability from the perspective of the 
forms and ‘language’ used in presenting the accounts. This form or language varies 
widely with the context in which accountability is rendered. Stewart (1984: 15) 
highlights this in the following way: 
‘..accounts can be given in different languages depending on what has to be 
expressed and to whom. The language of the financial account is not the 
language of the policy account. Many languages are needed for a full account’  
 
He describes the form and language used in accountability as the ‘bases of 
accountability’.  Within the context of public sector accountability, he identified five 
accountability bases which he set out as a ‘ladder of accountability’ progressing from 
‘accountability by standard’ at the base (with focus on process) to ‘accountability by 
judgement’ at the top (with focus on outcome or performance). The first of these is 
accountability for probity concerned with ensuring that funds are used properly and in 
the authorised manner. The second is accountability for legality concerned with 
ensuring that the powers given under the law are not exceeded. The third, 
accountability for efficiency, is about ensuring that there is no waste in the use of 
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resources (Stewart, 1984: 17). These three forms of accountability fall within the area 
described by other researchers broadly as ‘managerial accountability’. Robinson (1971) 
describes ‘managerial accountability’ as encompassing fiscal accountability which 
measures whether money has been spent according to budget; process accountability 
which measures whether particular processes have been followed; and programme 
accountability which measures whether outcomes or defined results have been 
achieved. Though the terminologies differ slightly, what Robinson (1971) describes as 
managerial accountability essentially covers the first three accountability bases 
identified by Stewart (1984).  
 
Other researchers have devised similar classification of accountability according to the 
form of giving accounts. Sinclair’s (1995) study of accountability in 15 Australian 
public sector organizations finds that on one hand, accountability is viewed as a 
rational, objective and controllable activity.  In this category is ‘managerial 
accountability that requires those with delegated authority to be answerable for 
producing outputs or the use of resources to achieve objectives’ and involves the 
specification of outcomes and a system of formalised controls (Sinclair, 1995: 222-
232).   This form of accountability is consistent with those identified by Stewart (1984) 
as accountability for Probity, legality and efficiency and by Robinson (1971) as 
managerial accountability. These accountability bases could be aligned as shown in 
Figure 2.1.  
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The last two accountability bases, performance accountability and policy 
accountability, identified by Stewart (1984), fall outside the domain of managerial 
accountability. Stewart (1984:17) describes performance accountability as concerned 
with whether performance achieved meet required standard, an idea similar to what 
Robinson (1971) describes as programme accountability concerned with whether the 
work carried on has met the goals set for it. In these areas, depending on whether 
standards can be set with any reasonable level of precision, accountability may involve 
measurement of performance against pre-set standards or more subjective qualitative 
assessment of performance against objective. Because Stewart’s analysis was within 
the context of the public sector where performance may not be objectively measured 
against pre-set standards, it may be appropriate to leave this outside the domain of 
managerial accountability. Stewart (1984:18) describes this as ‘accountability by 
judgement’. But within the context of the private sector where performance may be 
more accurately specified and objectively measured, it may be possible to categorise 
Programme accountability as managerial accountability as Robinson (1971) suggests. 
 
Stewart (1984: 17) describes policy accountability, as the accountability of the 
government to the electorate for ‘both the policies it has pursued and those it has failed 
to pursue’. This falls more clearly in the domain where measurement is through 
qualitative judgement on performance as Stewart (1984: 18-19) argues ‘there can be no 




Figure 2.1 Accountability Bases 
































































The other two types of accountability identified in Sinclair’s structural discourse are 
closely related to Stewart’s (1984:17) policy and performance accountabilities. First, 
political accountability involves public servants exercising authority on behalf of 
elected representatives who are held directly accountable to the people. As public 
servants are responsible for implementing government policies, political accountability 
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could be viewed as equivalent to Stewart’s policy accountability. Second, public 
accountability is understood as a more informal but direct accountability to the public, 
interested community groups and individuals. This is equivalent to Stewart’s policy 
accountability and here as well accountability could only be by judgement on 
performance. 
 
As a personal discourse, Sinclair identified professional and personal accountabilities, 
two closely related concepts dealing with situations where there is no formal authority 
to enforce accountability. Here the form of giving account may not involve the 
rendering of formal accounts but demonstration of the achievement of some broad 
objectives or adherence to some principles or values. Though there may be no 
established approaches to evaluating the fulfilment of those objectives or adherence to 
those values, in some organizational contexts such as religious organizations, 
educational institutions and hospitals, the obligation to be accountable to these values 
may constitute the bulk of the organizational accountability.  
 
The various types of accountability discussed above can be grouped into two broad 
categories based on the form of rendering accounts. This is shown in Figure 2.1 and 
could be summarised as: 
1. Process based accountability that measures compliance with pre-set standards 
and  formally defined outcomes 
2. Performance based accountability involving qualitative assessment of 
performance against broad, less precisely defined objectives.  
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2.4.4 The Holding to Account 
The nature of accountability has also been studied from the perspective of the form of 
holding to account. This involves studying the roles and relationships between the party 
that accounts and the party that holds to account. Roberts (1991: 358) sees the practice 
of accountability as having ‘open possibilities in terms of the sense of self and our 
relation to others that it reflects and enacts’ and suggests that ‘different forms of 
accountability produce very different senses of self and our relation to others’. He 
identified two distinct forms of relationship involving two different forms of practices. 
First is the individualising form which focuses on the self, the desire for recognition 
and acceptance. He suggests that this relationship occurs in organizational life where it 
is sustained by disciplinary power. It is essentially focused on work, production, or 
output and leads to the ‘hierarchical form’ of accountability (Roberts, 1991: 361). He 
suggests that in this hierarchical form of accountability, accounting information 
typically plays a central role because ‘it’s apparent objectivity’ makes it ‘a tool by 
which others can view, judge and compare individual and group performance’ 
(Roberts,1991: 365).  
 
Roberts (1991: 360) uses Habermas’ distinction between ‘work’ and ‘interaction’ to 
argue that ‘alongside the instrumental individualism that hierarchical accountability 
produces, there are a variety of other possible experiences of accountability alive and 
flourishing’.  He identified a different type of relationship built on ‘mutual 
understanding and ties of friendship, loyalty and reciprocal obligations’ that leads to a 
‘socialising form of accountability’ (Roberts, 1991: 363). He identified conditions that 
may lead to this as ‘a relative absence of asymmetries of power and a context for the 
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face-to-face negotiation of the significance of organizational events’ (Roberts, 1991: 
362) 
   
Drawing from the above, it is possible to argue that the type and strength of the 
relationships between the stakeholders involved in organizations is another variable 
that influences the form of accountability practices. Elements of this can be seen in the 
existing theories of accountability. The relationship may be strong and individualising 
where a distinct stakeholder group holds and exercise the power to demand 
accountability. The Principal-Agent theory is based on the assumption of a strong, 
contractual relationship between the Agent that renders account and the Principal that 
has the power to hold the agent to account. Laughlin (1990: 226-229) critiques the 
‘unquestioning significance given to the principal and their expectation for the conduct 
of the agent’ and draws attention to the importance of the ‘implicit context which 
surrounds the relationship’. This context may be construed to include the involvement 
of other important stakeholders in addition to the principal. These other stakeholders 
may be affected by the actions of the party that gives account but may have no power 
to hold that party to account. The relationships and accountability that results from this 
situation is essentially different from that in the Principal-Agent model. Laughlin 
(1996) describes it as ‘communal’ and contrasts it with the type of relationship and 
accountability in the Principal-Agent model which he describes as ‘contractual’: 
‘The ‘Communal’ context encompasses a less formal set of accountability 
relationships where expectation over conduct, and information demands and 
supply  are less structured and defined.... The ‘contractual’ context, on the other 
hand, encompasses a much more formal set of accountability relationships 
where action expectation and information demand and supply are tightly 
defined and clearly specified’ (Laughlin 1996: 229). 
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The contractual context is basically the same as Roberts’ (1991) individualising context 
that leads to the hierarchical form, while the communal context is the same as the 
socialising context that leads to a socialising or communal form of accountability.  The 
communal form of accountability is particularly relevant in organizations where there 
is the involvement of many stakeholders some of whom may not have the power to 
hold the organization to account. The organization may nonetheless attempt to render 
accountability to them usually in less formal ways at the discretion of the organization. 
 
The bulk of the literature on accountability is based on the perspective of the 
contractual or hierarchical form while there are fewer researches into the communal 
forms of accountability. These two approaches are currently being treated as separate 
or alternative approaches. Roberts (1991:367) notes that current forms of 
organizational accountability separate these dimensions and privileges the hierarchical 
form. But the two approaches need not be mutually exclusive as both can be combined 
within the same organization as Roberts (1991:356) argues: 
 ‘the search for the possibilities of accountability should be concerned with the 
 reconciliation of this destructive and untenable divide’.  
 
These two essential elements, the form of rendering accounts (involving the language 
or bases of accountability) and the form of holding to account (involving the 
relationships) will be further explored in order to develop an analytical model of 
possible approaches to accountability. The model will attempt to reconcile the divide 
between the contractual and the communal forms of accountability. 
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2.5 An Analytical Model of Approaches to Accountability 
Drawing from the literature, there are two main dimensions on which accountability 
can be categorised. The first is on the basis or language used in rendering the account. 
This may be process based focusing on proper use of resources or performance based 
focusing on achievement of objectives. The second dimension is on the relationship 
between the party that renders accounts and the party that holds to account. This 
determines the form of holding to account which could be ‘contractual’ where the party 
holding to account has the power to demand account or ‘communal’ where any 
potential power is not exercised but accountability is discretionary or negotiated based 
on mutual trust.  These distinctions are built into a two-dimensional framework that can 
be used to categorise the diverse literature on accountability (See Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2- A contextual framework for categorising accountability approaches 
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But the literature on accountability is more focused on the ‘contractual’ form of 
holding to account while there is a paucity of research on the ‘communal’ form. This 
could be as a result of the lack of consensus on what constitutes accountability. Tricker 
(1983: 33) maintains that if the accountability relationship is not contractually bound 
then it is ‘not an act of accountability’. Stewart (1984: 16) sees accountability as a 
relationship of power that ‘can be analysed as a bond linking the one who accounts..to 
the one who holds to account’. He acknowledges that ‘there will be relationships which 
fall short of the bond of accountability in that accounts are given but there is no power 
to hold to account’. He describes such relationships as ‘links of account’ and argues 
that ‘they do not in themselves constitute a bond of accountability’. Laughlin (1990:97) 
consider both as constituting accountability.   
 
In the contractual form of accountability, the form of rendering accounts may be the 
process based approach, where the focus is on the use of resources according to 
prescribed standards (represented as type A) or performance based where the focus is 
on the achievement of set objectives or predetermined outcomes (represented as type 
B). In both types A and B, because the form of relationship is contractual, expectations 
are more explicitly expressed by way of prescribed processes and standards or expected 
output or performance. Within the contractual category, the literature on process based 
approach (type A) is more extensive than those on the performance based approach. 
This may be because the domain it covers involves accountability for quantifiable 
inputs, outputs and outcomes, areas that could be monitored by systems of formal 
controls. In this area, traditional forms of accounting play a key role in form of 
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financial reporting and the use of accounting for managerial control and performance 
measurement. The bulk of the literature on corporate sector accountability falls in this 
area and the Principal-Agent theory is relevant for analysis. Here the accountability of 
managers of businesses is predominantly to shareholders who appoint them and have 
the powers to hold them to account. But the involvement of the regulatory authorities in 
corporate accountability means that another stakeholder has the power to hold the 
managers to account. Because the accountability needs of the regulatory authorities are 
mainly financial and not significantly different from those of the shareholders, the 
traditional financial statements (type A) adequately meets the needs of these two 
stakeholders. But if the existence of other stakeholders such as the community is 
recognised, type A form of accountability may not be adequate as the needs of these 
stakeholders may be different from those of the shareholders and the regulators. 
Corporate accountability may therefore need to involve other approaches such as those 
in the remaining three segments B, C and D. The efforts towards corporate social 
responsibility may be in recognition of this need. 
 
In the type B form of practice, because the achievement of objectives may not be 
quantitatively measurable, the use of accounting methodologies may be limited. In the 
private sector where the objectives of the most dominant stakeholders are mainly 
financial returns and closely aligned to the use of resources, type B practices may be in 
the form of narrative reporting as an extension of the financial statements. But in other 
organizations where the objectives are not mainly financial returns, other forms of 
practices as determined by the party that holds to account may be used. This may be in 
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the forms of narrative reporting or performance measurement against pre-determined 
Key Performance Indicators or any other form. This form of accountability is 
predominant in organizational contexts where the focus is on the achievement of 
objectives and outcomes that are different from maximising financial returns. An 
example is the public sector. There may be difficulties when ‘type A’ form of practices 
is imposed in areas where type B is more appropriate. For example in the UK Public 
Sector some elements of the ‘new public management’ attempt to increase formal 
accountability by introducing measurable standards of performance and output but this 
initiative is problematic (Broadbent and Laughlin 1998:403-404).  
Communal forms of accountability results where the parties to whom the account is 
rendered either does not have or does not exercise the power to hold to account. The 
form of accountability is based on relationship of mutual trust and respect. It is 
negotiated, taking the needs of the parties involved into consideration. The form of 
rendering accounts could be performance based where the focus is on the impact of the 
organization on the stakeholders (represented as type C). It could also be process based 
where the focus is on the use of resources not necessarily according to some prescribed 
standards but in line with the needs of the stakeholders (represented as type D). 
 
Communal forms of accountability are less widespread in the accountability literature 
but could be found in certain organizational types. For example in religious 
organizations the nature of relationships involved has meant that the communal form is 
a prominent form of accountability practised. The basis involves performance based 
(type C) focusing mainly on meeting the spiritual needs of the stakeholders (the sacred 
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or the core mission). It also involves some element of the process based approach 
focusing on the resourcing and resource allocation. Because the resources are supplied 
by the devotees who, in order to allow the spiritual work to go unhindered, may not 
demand any formal accountability (Laughlin 1988: 30-39), practices here involves the 
use of accounting methods that are appropriate to the organization’s needs rather than 
any prescribed standard or format. The practices here are therefore type D. 
 
The communal form of accountability is more relevant in organizations with a core 
mission founded on the promotion of values or objectives that cannot be measured in 
quantitative or economic terms. The nature of the objectives and values may foster the 
development of relationships based on mutual trust, respect and friendship. Apart from 
religious organizations, Universities and Hospitals are other examples. In these types of 
organizations, the nature of accountability arguable should be mainly of type C. But 
because they require financial resources to carry out their activities, accountability may 
also involve some form of process based approach which could be type A if a 
contractual form is imposed, as it often is, or type D where the organization chooses 
practices that suit its needs. This may depend on how the organization is funded. For 
example, in the Church of England, initially, the funding was from the state but over 
the years, the state became divorced from the church and the responsibility for 
supplying the resources shifted to the devotees. The accounting system has therefore 
evolved to serve the changing needs of the organization (Laughlin, 1988: 33-37).  
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2.5.1 Contextualising NGO accountability using the analytical model of 
approaches to accountability 
This section applies the framework in figure 2.2 to examine NGO accountability and to 
categorise the existing research in the literature. The involvement of many stakeholders 
to whom NGOs are accountable has an impact on the form of holding to account. 
Among the stakeholders are the larger donors who have the power to hold NGOs to 
account. With the increasing prominence of their activities, NGOs have come under 
closer attention of the regulatory authorities who also exercise the power to hold NGOs 
to account. But there are other stakeholders such as the small individual donors, the 
beneficiaries and the community who do not have the power to hold NGOs to account.  
The nature of the relationships and accountabilities, therefore, could vary from the 
contractual (with the Institutional donors and the regulators) to the communal forms 
(with, the individual donors, the beneficiaries and the community). 
 
Concerning the basis or the language used in NGOs’ accountability, the complex nature 
of NGOs’ objectives and activities makes it difficult to specify in quantitative terms, 
the expected output against which performance could be measured particularly in the 
area of development and advocacy. The basis of accountability would therefore be 
expected to involve a substantial element of the performance based approach both of 
type B in relation to the demands of the stakeholders who have the power to demand 
account, and of type C in relation to the needs of the stakeholders who do not have such 
powers. Also, since the funding of NGOs are from both stakeholders who demand 
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account and those who do not, one would expect accountability to involve both 
elements of type A and D practices. 
 
The existing research on NGOs’ accountability has used diverse frameworks but these 
could be embodied within the analytical model in Figure 2.2. For example, Avina’s 
(1993) Functional-Strategic accountability framework views accountability from the 
perspective of the form of rendering accounts. Functional accountability focuses on 
accountability for the use of resources. It is consistent with the process based 
approaches which could be types A or D depending on the nature of the relationship 
between the NGO and the party to whom account is rendered. The relationship with the 
Institutional donors have been mostly contractual in form and the accountability has, 
therefore, been of type A. Strategic accountability focuses on measuring the impact of 
NGOs’ activities and is consistent with the performance based approaches which could 
also be types B or C depending on the relationship with the parties to whom account is 
rendered. Avina’s framework did not elaborate on the form of holding to account so 
one may assume that functional and strategic accountabilities could be rendered within 
both the contractual and the communal context.   
 
Najam’s (1996) framework focuses on the form of holding to account and identified 
three stakeholder groups to whom NGOs are accountable: the patrons (donors), the 
clients (beneficiaries and the community) and themselves (their goals and mission).  By 
examining the nature of the relationships between NGOs and these stakeholders, 
Najam’s framework could be analysed using the contractual-communal dimension in 
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Figure 2.2. Accountability to Clients and to their mission may be considered as 
communal as they are rendered voluntarily and involve no contractual obligation. But 
accountability to donors may be either contractual or communal depending on the 
donors involved and the relationships. To the Institutional donors who give grants for 
designated purposes, it is mostly contractual as the ‘donor asserts financial control by 
seeking accountability for the money, and policy control by seeking accountability for 
the designated purpose’ (Najam, 1996: 342). But accountability to the smaller donors, 
who give without making any formal accountability demands, could be grouped 
together with that to the beneficiaries and to their mission as communal in form. This is 
because the nature of the relationship is participatory and involves negotiation to strike 
a balance between ‘what people deem best for themselves and what the NGO and/or its 
donors deem best for the people’ (Najam, 1996: 347).  
 
Edward and Hulme’s (2002) framework of  ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ accountability is 
from the perspective of the power to hold to account, focusing mainly on the 
relationship between the party that accounts and the party that holds to account. It is 
consistent with the contractual-communal dimension in Figure 2.2. They used ‘upward’ 
accountability to describe NGOs’ accountability to donors and other stakeholders such 
as the regulators who have the power to hold them to account. The relationship 
involved here is the ‘contractual’ form. The power to hold to account derives from the 
right to demand account under the contractual grants given by the donors or under 
statutory authority. They used ‘downward’ accountability to describe NGOs’ 
accountability to the stakeholders such as the beneficiaries and the community who do 
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not have the power to hold them to account. The form of relationship here is 
‘communal’ as accountability is discretionary and negotiated. For both ‘upward’ and 
‘downward’ accountability, the form of rendering accounts could be either process or 
performance based. When analysed further using the framework in Figure 2.2 one can 
deduce that ‘upward accountability’ could be of types A and B while ‘downward’ 
accountability could be of types C and D depending on the language used in rendering 
the accounts. 
 
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2006b; 2007) use ‘social accountability’ to refer to NGOs’ 
accountability for the impact of their activities on their beneficiaries and the 
community, including others that their activities may inadvertently impact on. This 
form of accountability is rendered through participation and is mainly performance 
based. As the form of relationship involved is communal, it could be categorised as 
type C.  Other forms of accountability to beneficiaries involving participation have 
been identified (Khan, 2003, Dixon et al., 2006). These could also be categorised as 
type C as the relationships involved are communal in form and the accountability bases 
are mainly performance. These forms of accountability to beneficiaries do not involve 







2.6 NGO Accountability: Knowledge Gaps 
The literature on accountability is extensive and has been approached from different 
disciplinary perspectives. The two main contributors to the literature are the public 
sector and the private sector and more recently but to a limited extent, the NGO sector. 
The literature has dealt extensively on various descriptive and theoretical frameworks 
for analysing accountability in particular sectors. One of the dominant frameworks in 
the literature is the private sector ‘Principal - Agent’ model. Here the obligation to 
render account is contractual and the form or language of account is mainly process 
based, supplemented by some elements of the performance based in the form of 
narrative reporting. As a result, private sector accountability fall mostly in ‘segment A’ 
of the framework in Figure 2.2 with only a slight extension into segment B. Segment A 
has been well researched and the methodology, involving traditional accounting, 
sufficiently developed. But the growing demand for corporate social responsibility has 
called for the introduction of elements of ‘Communal’ forms of accountability, type C, 
into private sector accountability. The desirability of this or the modalities for doing it 
is a subject of contending academic debates and success in this direction has been very 
limited.  
 
Public sector accountability has enjoyed similar attention in the academic literature. 
The framework for analysis has been mostly contractual dealing with the obligation of 
elected public officials and their agents (public servants) to render accountability to the 
electorate. But the form in which account is rendered has been less coherent, consisting 
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of both process and performance based methods that one may consider as being spread 
between types A and B in the Figure 2.2. 
 
‘Communal’ forms of accountability have received relatively less attention of 
researchers. This may be partly due to the lack of a clear conceptual definition of what 
it involves. There are very few empirical studies available in this area. Because the 
context, the stakeholders and the relationships involved could vary, accountability is 
negotiated and adapted to the needs of the stakeholders and could take different forms. 
These forms are fragmented with few empirical details on how they are implemented in 
practice. Some of NGOs’ accountability may fall in this area. 
 
NGOs’ accountability involves many stakeholders and the nature of the relationships 
varies from contractual to communal. One would expect elements of both contractual 
and communal forms of accountability to be found in NGOs. Concerning the language 
of rendering accounts, the nature of NGOs’ core objectives and values, and the 
activities embarked on are such that a process based approach alone will be inadequate 
for accountability. One would, therefore, expect both the process and performance 
based approaches to be part of NGOs’ accountability. It appears that NGOs’ 
accountability may necessarily involve elements of all four approaches identified in 
Figure 2.2. But there are insufficient empirical details of actual practice in NGOs to 
confirm this. Though previous research has addressed some of these concerns and some 
progress made, there remain areas of gaps that call for more research.  
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Initially, the literature on NGO accountability was concentrated around the process 
based approaches mainly of the contractual form, type A. Even then, practices in this 
area were poor and undeveloped (Bird and Morgan-Jones, 1981). Further research and 
policy have improved practices in this area particularly as they relate to NGOs’ 
statutory financial reporting (Connolly and Hyndman, 2000). But apart from 
highlighting the significant influence of donors in NGO accountability, there has been 
less research in the area of how accounting is used in NGOs other than for statutory 
reporting. One of the few researches here is by Goddard and Assad (2006) who 
investigated the use of accounting in an African NGO and concluded that its use is 
mainly in ‘navigating legitimacy’ and this was considered more important than for 
decision-making. There remain gaps in the knowledge of how accounting is used (or 
could be used) in accountability to the beneficiaries and the community. 
 
Little research is available on performance based practices that could be categorised as 
type B. Earlier research only identified the needs here conceptually but give little 
insight into how it could be implemented. For example Avina’s (1993) Strategic 
Accountability framework argues for the need for NGOs’ to account for the social 
impact of their work but suggests no practical tool for implementing this. The major 
strides here again are those attributable to the statutory regulators. Hyndman (1990) 
drew attention to the ‘mismatch’ between the information needs of the users of 
charities accounts and the information contents of statutory financial accounts. The 
regulators have since improved statutory reporting to include narrative performance 
reports on NGOs’ objectives and activities (Hyndman and McMahon, 2011). Though 
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the donors also demand performance reports from NGOs, the methods by which this 
form of accounts is rendered are yet to be adequately researched. Therefore, there 
remain some gaps in the area of how type B form of accountability is implemented 
particularly with regard to donors’ needs. 
 
The practices of the communal forms of accountability in NGOs are yet to be 
adequately researched. Though the literature indicates that this form of accountability is 
relevant in NGOs, the mechanisms by which it is, or could be implemented, are yet 
unclear. Some research has looked at this in particular organisations (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007; Agyemand et al, 2011). While some insights have been gained into 
mechanisms by which some organisations attempt to implement these, there are yet 
some difficulties.  For example, O’Dwyer & Unerman (2007) investigated the 
implementation of a donor initiative termed multi-annual programme scheme (MAPS) 
aimed at making a development NGO accountable for the effectiveness and long-term 
impact of their work on the beneficiaries and the community. This initiative could be 
categorised as communal accountability considering that the focus is on beneficiaries, 
but because it is driven by the donors as a contractual grant condition, it could also be 
categorised as contractual accountability. This contradiction may be part of the reasons 
for the limited success of the initiative. The researchers call for more investigation of 
similar accountability relationships in other NGOs (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007: 467) 
 
A major area of gap remains on how NGOs render financial accountability to the non-
contractual stakeholders (type D). There is yet no major research in this area. In 
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addition, there remains a lack of a coherent theory to explain or link the diverse 
practices and frameworks found in the literature. 
   
This study aims to contribute to knowledge by adding to the insights from previous 
research and providing new insights into areas of gaps identified. The study aims to 
investigate whether NGOs practice the four types of accountability A, B, C, D in 
Figure 2.2 and determine how these practices are implemented. It also aims to develop 
a framework, grounded in theory, for describing and explaining NGO’s accountability. 
Specifically, the study aims to find answers to the following research questions:  
 
1. What theoretical model should inform the description and analysis of 
accountability practices in NGOs?  
2. What is the nature of accountability practices in actual NGOs? Do NGOs 
practice accountability types A, B, C and D in Figure 2.2? 
3. What theoretical, policy and practical implications can be derived from 
the analysis of NGO accountability practices?  
 
By seeking answers to these questions this study aims to provide a better theoretical 
understanding of NGOs’ accountability practices as well as empirical details 
concerning how it is implemented in selected NGOs. It is hoped that this will provide a 
basis for assessing the state of NGOs’ accountability and identifying the areas needing 




This chapter attempted to set the background for the study by analysing the historical 
development of NGOs through three main eras and how the change in their funding 
over these eras has impacted on their operation and accountability.  It attempted to set 
the scope of the study by defining NGOs and drawing from previous researches to 
propose a framework for classifying NGOs. This framework prepares a useful basis for 
sample selection for the case study.  The chapter further examines the nature of 
accountability in general drawing on existing research to conceptualize accountability 
in a way that it could be discussed consistently across different sectors. This 
conceptualization will be useful in developing a theoretical model for the investigation. 
The chapter examines the existing theories of accountability in general, the peculiar 
nature of accountability in NGOs and the various frameworks that have been used to 
analyse it. It draws on these to develop a broader framework of accountability and 
position the existing research within it.  It identifies the concentration of the research 











 Research Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two reviewed the state of accountability in NGOs by analysing their historical 
development and by examining the nature of accountability in general. It identified two 
broad conceptualization of accountability: one as a formally defined ‘contractual’ 
activity and the other as a socially negotiated ‘communal’ activity. It reviews the 
various frameworks used in the study of NGOs’ accountability and relates them to 
these two broad dimensions. It traces the complexity involved in NGOs’ accountability 
practices to the complex nature of their activities and the difficulty involved in relating 
them to the outcome or achievement. This complexity has implications for the research 
approach this study adopts to investigate NGOs’ accountability practices. 
 
Prior to 1980 the general approach to accounting research was mainly normative and 
prescriptive, yet these ideas and prescriptions were not taken up in practice (Laughlin, 
1995: 63). This has led to calls for a more grounded understanding of the functioning of 
accounting systems in practice to discover their fundamental nature and rationale. This 
call has been accompanied with no dominant consensus on the research approach to be 
used to access this understanding. This has led to the development of various schools of 
thought and resulted in ‘a proliferation of paradigms’ (Chua, 1986: 601) with each 
school claiming superiority for its chosen approach. 
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Before taking a position on the research approach to adopt, it is important to examine 
the various philosophical assumptions on which the competing research approaches are 
based. Several scholars have attempted to delineate these philosophical assumptions 
(Laughlin, 1995; Chua, 1986; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 
1979; Jensen, 1976). These delineations have been on various dimensions, and coming 
from various disciplinary perspectives.  
 
Five important dimensions have been identified. The first is on ontology relating to the 
nature of the world and the physical materiality of the phenomenon under investigation. 
The second dimension is on epistemology which relates to the perception on 
understanding or knowledge. Epistemological assumptions influence ‘what is to count 
as acceptable truth by specifying the criteria and process of truth claims’ (Chua, 1986: 
604) The third dimension relates to the role of the investigator or observer in the 
discovery process. This determines to what extent the researcher could be considered as 
objective and value-free. The fourth dimension is on ‘methodology’ or ways to 
investigate the world. The final dimension is in relation to the nature of society in terms 
of its stability or potential for change. 
 
Laughlin (1995) adopts a three schema classification that groups ontology and 
epistemology under the category ‘theory’. He categorized methodology and the role of 
the observer in the discovery process under the broad category of ‘methodology’. The 
third dimension is on the position of the observer concerning the desirability of change 
in the phenomenon under study linking this to the nature of society dimension 
 87 
(Laughlin 1995: 66).  This could range from a critical perspective that sees the need for 
change to the perspective that sees little problem in maintaining the status quo. 
 
This chapter examines the main themes of these various approaches to research and 
makes a choice of the most suitable research approach. It is divided into six main 
sections. Section 3.2 on research philosophy examines the two dominant positions on 
ontology and how they influence the research process. Section 3.3 on epistemology 
examines how the ontological position taken influences the approach to generating 
understanding. It reviews the two extreme epistemological positions: positivism and 
phenomenology. Section 3.4 examines the range of other epistemological approaches 
deriving from the two extreme positions and attempts to identify the key differences in 
them. Section 3.5 examines the relevance of these approaches to research on NGO 
accountability. Section 3.6 takes a position on the research approach adopted. It 
justifies the use of ‘middle range thinking’ as the most suitable research approach for 
this study. Section 3.7 examines the implication of this research approach for the 
choice of methodology and methods and sets out in detail how the study will be 
undertaken from a methods perspective. 
 
3.2 Research philosophy 
Several philosophical assumptions underlie the research process. They relate to the 
researcher’s view of the world and the process of building or discovering knowledge. 
Two of these are dominant. At one extreme are the rationalists that believe in the 
existence of an objective world that could be discovered through rational investigatory 
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processes free of observer bias (Laughlin, 1995:70). At the other end is the wholly 
subjective approach of the empiricist who claim that such knowledge come to us only 
via our senses (Brown, 1969: 60-1). The major schools of thought have their origin in 




This is the philosophical approach that assumes that physical and social reality exists in 
an objective plane independent of the researcher. Realism makes a distinction between 
the world ‘out there’ (the object) and the knower (the subject) and presumes that 
knowledge is achieved when the subject correctly discovers this objective reality 
(Chua, 1986: 606)  This approach is dominant in the sciences where the objects are 
clearly identifiable physical phenomena. The approach has also been applied in the 
social sciences where people have been viewed as identical to physical objects and 
studied in the same manner (Chua, 1986: 604). This approach has been adopted in 
accounting research by some scholars and appears to be the dominant school in 
accounting research 
 
‘Mainstream accounting has been dominated by a belief in physical 
realism….people are analysed as entities that may be passively described in 
objective ways’ (Chua, 1986: 606) 
 
Other researchers have criticised this approach claiming that people cannot be treated 
as scientific objects because they are self-interpretive beings who create the structures 
around them (Christenson, 1983; Lowe et al, 1983) 
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3.2.2 Idealism 
At the other extreme philosophical position is idealism traceable to the works of 
Immanuel Kant. Immanuel Kant’s idealism is a sociological perspective that 
acknowledges the existence of a material world but insists that all insights to it are 
subjective. To him, ‘neither experience nor reason alone can generate understanding as 
all discovery is mediated through human beings making the insights generated always 
conditional and inevitably subjective’ (Laughlin, 1995: 71). He maintains that all 
knowledge is characterised by the point of view through which it is known (Scruton, 
1982: 18). Several variations in interpretation of Kantian thinking have developed, 




The position taken on ontology is inextricably linked to and has direct implication for 
the epistemological and methodological choices that will follow. This subsection looks 
at the two dominant epistemological positions that follow directly from the two 
opposing ontological positions examined above. 
 
3.3.1 Positivism 
The positivist approach places more emphasis on the description of the empirical world 
distinct from any observer bias. It is traceable to the work of Auguste Comte who 
introduced the term. Positivism is generally believed to have certain fundamental rules. 
First is a conviction that all ‘knowledge’ is capable of being expressed in terms which 
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refer in an immediate way to some reality that can be apprehended through the senses. 
Accordingly, the distinction between essence and phenomenon should be eliminated on 
the ground that it is misleading (Kolakowski, 1972: 11) Second is the rule that refuses 
to call value judgements and normative statements knowledge (Kolakowski, 1972: 16) 
Finally is a belief in the ‘essential unity of the scientific method’ which expresses the 
belief that the methods for acquiring valid knowledge are essentially the same in all 
spheres of experience. This suggests that the methods of science can be applied to the 
study of social phenomenon. Giddens (1976) put this in the following way: 
‘Comte regarded the extension of science to the study of human conduct in  
society as a direct outcome of the progressive march of human understanding  
towards man himself’ (Giddens, 1976: 12) 
 
The positivist approach is a formal, structured approach to research as Laughlin 
(1995:73) makes clear: 
‘Comte’s positivism was a tightly defined rational, deductive process with 
similarly clear rules on how to observe the empirical world’  
 
The approach assumes the existence of an observable social reality that could be 
studied in ways that result in law-like generalisations (Remenyi et al, 1998: 32). This 
positivist approach searches for universal generalization and causal relationships. As 
such, data collection is focused on ‘discovery’ of rigorous generalizable relations and 
there is a neglect of ‘soft’ methods such as case studies (Hagg and Hedlund, 1979).  
This approach has been widely applied in accounting research resulting in a neglect of 
the importance of contextual variables on accounting practice. Kaplan (1984: 415) 
criticised this type of accounting research for their reluctance to ‘get involved in actual 
organizations and to muck around with messy data and relationships’  
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3.3.2 Phenomenology 
At the other extreme end of the continuum are the wholly subjective approaches such 
as phenomenology and linguistic philosophy. These approaches offer alternative 
perception on knowledge and understanding. Phenomenology critiques the natural 
science arguing that its claim to knowledge are secondary to and dependent upon the 
ontological premise of the ‘natural attitude’ while linguistic philosophy insists that 
there exists a logical disparity between the human world and the world of nature 
(Giddens, 1976: 131). Phenomenology dispenses with the rigidly defined methods of 
enquiry of the positivist approach and places more emphasis on understanding the 
phenomenon under study from the standpoint of the social actors. 
 
A major critique of this approach is that it cannot lead to the discovery of ‘new 
knowledge’ since it can do no more than describe or re-describe what we already know 
as participants in social life. Such a view has been rebutted. Even if it were true that the 
approach merely ‘describe’ what the actors already know about their actions, no one 
actor can possess detailed knowledge of anything more than the particular sector of 
society in which that actor participates. There still remains the task of making into an 
explicit and comprehensive body of knowledge that which is only known in a partial 
way by actors themselves (Giddens, 1976: 131)  
 
In between the two extreme positions on ontology and epistemology are several other 
schools of thought deriving from these two broad perspectives. 
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3.4 Other Variants of Positivist and Phenomenological Thinking  
3.4.1 Other Variants of Positivism 
Four contemporary schools have developed from Comtean thinking. These are 
positivism, instrumentalism, realism and conventionalism. Instrumentalism is a 
liberalised version of positivism. It agrees with positivism that only observational 
propositions describe reality. But while positivism awards scientific status only to 
statement of ‘what is’, instrumentalism admits that theories cannot be reduced to 
statement of ‘what is’. Instrumentalists think that the usefulness of theory is more as 
instruments of prediction than as description of reality (Christenson, 1983: 15). They 
maintain that theories are only ever instruments for prediction having no explanatory 
power (Laughlin, 1995: 74). 
 
Conventionalism is the more sociological end of Comtean thinking. It concedes the 
importance of the observer in the discovery process. Kuhn for instance maintains that it 
is a ‘paradigm’ which binds a community of scholars together and guides their ‘normal 
science’ behaviour. The significance of the concept of paradigm, in Kuhn’s sense, is 
that it refers to a series of very basic, taken-for-granted understandings that form a 
frame for the conduct of ‘normal science’ (Giddens, 1976: 136) But as noted by 
Laughlin (1995: 74), this paradigm is not fixed but subject to revolutionary change in 
order to fulfil its purpose. Kuhn conceded this but argues that outside these 
‘revolutionary phases’ of change, the development of science depends on a suspension 
of critical reason. This intolerance to critical reasoning is a marked characteristic of this 
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approach. Popper admits that ‘normal science’ is a subversion of the norms of critical 
exchange to which alone science owes its distinctive character (Giddens, 1976: 137) 
 
3.4.2 Other variants of Kant’s idealism 
Kant’s ‘idealism’ leaves some questions unanswered concerning the extent to which 
reality may be considered real or distinct from our mental image and to what extent one 
can critique the subjective interpretation of another observer (Laughlin 1995 :72) This 
has permitted varied interpretation of Kantian thought. The two marked variations are 
critical theory and Fichte’s transcendental idealism. 
 
3.4.2.1 Critical theory 
Georg Hegel interpreted Kantian thinking to give emphasis to a material world that 
could be understood or misunderstood. He also gave emphasis to an ideal to which we 
should be aiming thereby introducing the notion of critique and change into 
understanding and action (Laughlin, 1995: 72). Those following Hegelian thinking 
(divided between the left and right) view the need for change differently. The left 
Hegelians, led by Karl Max, maintained that the ideal society which would supply a 
complete understanding of what constituted ‘reality’ was yet to be discovered or 
created. They continued in the hope that this ideal state, interpreted by traditional 
Marxists as some classless society, would be created.  
 
Critical theory has its roots in the works of scholars at the Frankfurt Institute of Social 
Research which has an interdisciplinary orientation. Prominent among them are 
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Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. These scholars retained many of the themes of 
idealism such as the nature of reason and truth but recast the way it has been articulated 
by Kant and Hegel. They rejected the more structuralist interpretation of Marxism but 
nevertheless found in Marx’s thought a powerful tool for the analysis of historical 
events (Thompson and Held, 1982: 2) Habermas, a prominent scholar of this school, 
maintains that critical theory cannot be conceived on the model of natural science 
because critical theory is characterised by ‘self- reflection’, a concept which has no 
place in positivism (Thompson and Held, 1982: 6) 
 
Habermas provides a methodology for ‘self-reflection’ in language. He sees language 
as central in the formation of consciousness and capable of providing a foundation for 
critique. In his theory of social evolution, Habermas suggests that language provides an 
intrinsic and autonomous learning mechanism in the Institutional sphere that allows 
alternative solutions to be created as society goes through problems created by changes 
(Thompson and Held, 1982:10). This communication of meaning enabled by language 
is a major aspect of the evolution and change in the structural properties of societal 
systems discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
3.4.2.2 Fichte’s transcendental idealism 
On the other hand, Johann Fichte emphasized the subjective side of Kantian thought. 
Everything to Fichte is a projection of our minds thus making a material existence 
uncertain. This led inevitably to a lack of critique in terms of interpretation (Laughlin, 
1995: 72). Other schools of thought have developed from different interpretations of 
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Fitchean thought. At the most subjective end of this are the ethnomethodologists (e.g 
Husserl, Garfinkel) and the more subjective wing of symbolic interactionism (e.g 
Blumer and the Chicago school).  
 
Ethnomethodology draws a distinction between the ‘rationality of science’ and the 
rationality of commonsense or of the ‘natural attitude’ asserting that broad areas of 
human social activity appear to be non-rational when judged against a single standard 
of rationality specified by the ‘scientific attitude’ (Giddens, 1976: 35-36). Garfinkel 
maintains that actions are ‘indexical expressions’ having different meanings in different 
contexts. Ethnomethodology therefore, deals mainly with descriptive study of 
‘indexical expressions’ in all their empirical variety. The distinctive character of this 
approach is that the contextual details of the phenomenon are preserved as unique 
features thereby ruling out the necessity for critique or change.  
 
Other branches of Fitchean thinking have developed through the works of Wilhelm 
Dilthey and Max Weber who attempt to incorporate some elements of Comte’s 
objective approach into the Kantian/Fitchean thinking leading to a range of other 
schools such as symbolic interactionism and Giddens’ structuration theory. 
 
3.4.3 Giddens’ Structuration Theory 
Giddens defined structuration as ‘the structuring of social relations across time and 
space, in virtue of the duality of structure’ (Giddens, 1984: 376). A main theme of 
structuration theory is the interaction between human agency and structure. In a general 
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sense, structure refers to the rules and resources involved in the Institutional 
articulation of social systems while structural properties refer to the Institutionalized 
features of social systems stretching across time and space (Giddens, 1984: 185). 
Agency refers to peoples’ capability of doing things. It concerns events of which an 
individual is the perpetrator whether intentionally or unintentionally (Giddens, 1984: 9)  
 
The concept of ‘duality of structure’ refers to the idea that agency (individual actions 
and interactions in social settings) and structure (the rules and resources which 
reproduce social systems) presuppose one another. Structuration theory has an 
emphasis on underlying structures in all actions while maintaining the importance of 
the details in particular actions (Laughlin, 1995: 75)   
 
Structuration theory is not a theory in the empiricist tradition but an organized way of 
making sense of social life (Macintosh & Scapens, 1990: 469). Structuration theory 
concentrates primarily on ontological concerns. Its main purpose is to provide 
conceptions of the nature of human activity and of the human agent which can be 
placed at the service of empirical work (Giddens, 1984: 17-20). The main strength of 
structuration theory is that it recognises the importance of formal structures in social 
order while not discounting the significance of human agency within those structures. It 
is, therefore, positioned between and has the potential to overcome the weaknesses of 
the extreme positivist and phenomenological approaches. This will be relevant in the 
choice of research approach for this study. 
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3.5 Choice of Research Approach for Analyzing NGOs Accountability 
The different research approaches discussed in the preceding sections have direct 
implication for the entire research process. The ontological assumption made is 
invariably linked to particular epistemological positions and both may be viewed as a 
coherent whole. This has profound influence on the choice of methodology and of data 
collection and analysis methods:   
‘choose a research approach and you choose a coherent way of thinking that 
needs to be operationalised in accordance with its ontological, epistemological 
and methodological underpinnings, without mixing and matching unrelated 
elements that lead to inconsistent and ultimately incoherent ways of undertaking 
empirical research’ (Laughlin, 2007: 5) 
 
The position taken on ontology and epistemology is influenced by certain underlying 
assumptions or theories. Laughlin (1995: 66) clustered ontology and epistemology 
together under the label of ‘theory’ and categorized the possible approaches a 
researcher can adopt based on the level of ‘prior theorising and prior theories that can 
legitimately be brought to the empirical investigation’. In Figure 3.1 below (taken from 
Laughlin, 2004: 272) the implications of the two broad approaches to research for the 
whole research process is made clear. It further identifies a possible middle position in 
between the two extreme approaches. 
 
The following subsections examine each of the approach presented in figure 3.1 in 





3.5.1 The Comtean approach 
The comtean approach (the left column in Figure 3.1) sees the role of prior theories at 
the beginning of the research as all defining. This is consistent with the assumption of 
the existence of a material world distinct from the observer that could be researched in 
a value-free manner. The positivist approach that derives from this is characterised by a 
high levels of prior theorizing.  A theory or hypothesis is developed and tested through 
empirical investigation. This may result in a law-like generalization of the phenomenon 
under investigation. 
 
The second dimension is on the choice of methodology. This is depicted as flowing 
from the assumptions made on ontology and the role of theory. This encompasses 
defining the role of the observer in the research process. This may be either minimal 
‘where the general empirical pattern are assumed to be completely summarised within 
the theoretical term and concept’ (Laughlin, 2004: 272). Here the observer is viewed as 
objective. This view is consistent with the Comtean/Positivist approach and is naturally 
adopted in positivist studies. It involves the formulation and testing of hypothesis. The 
choice of data collection methods must, therefore, follow from this. ‘Clear, replicable 
empirical information must be fed into the prior theories with minimal subjective noise’ 
(Laughlin 2004: 272). This necessitates the use of quantitative data collection methods 














3.5.2 The Kantian/Fichtean approach 
At the other extreme position and depicted in the right column in Figure 3.1 is the 
Kantian/Fichtean approach. This assumes that the world is not material but a projection 
of our minds. Since such projections differ, it assumes that no empirically generalisable 
patterns exist.  This approach consequently places low reliance on prior theories to 
guide empirical understanding. As a result, the link between theory and methodology 
become more divorced and indicated by the wavy line in Figure 3.1. This approach 
allows for the total subjectivity of the researcher and does not rely on the structures and 
guides established in previous studies: 
 
‘…relying on previous theoretical studies and insights is both inappropriate and 
potentially corrupting of the diversity and detail of the present study. In this 
position, the empirical detail is not mere confirmable or refutable ‘data’ for 
some prior theory but becomes the theory for the particular phenomena’ 
(Laughlin, 1995: 67) 
 
This approach is an inductive approach where the research begins without a pre set 
theory but the theory is developed from the data.  Since the underlying assumption is 
that there are no general empirical patterns and therefore low reliance on prior theories 
in guiding the research, reliance is placed on the subjective analytical skills of the 
researcher. Consistent with this approach, therefore, is the methodology that permits 
the observer to be involved in the observation process ‘completely uncluttered by 
theoretical rules and regulations on what is to be seen and how the seeing should be 
undertaken’ (Laughlin, 1995: 67) Here the role of the observer may be assumed to be 
complete and the theory is induced from the data. This thinking informed the various 
interpretive approaches such as ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and 
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grounded theory. The data-collection and analysis method following on from this is 
qualitative using techniques such as observations, interviews and document analysis. 
 
3.5.3 The ‘Middle Range Thinking’ 
A ‘middle range thinking’ research approach lies between the two positions discussed 
in sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 and is depicted in the middle column of Figure 3.1. It takes 
the ontological stand that agrees with the Comtean view that some generalisation of an 
objective world that allows broad understanding of relationships is possible. It, 
however, differs from Comtean thinking in that it maintains that such generalizations 
cannot be complete as important details will vary according to the context. It believes 
that these general patterns can only be ‘skeletal’ needing to be ‘fleshed’ out with 
understanding gained from empirical studies.  
 
Following from this ontological assumption, the discovery process begins with some 
prior theorization but only in ‘skeletal’ form. The ‘fleshing out’ of the theory, however, 
relies on the innovation and creativity of the researcher. Here middle range thinking 
agrees more with the Kantian/Fichteans:  
‘To do this requires the innovation that human subjectivity can bring albeit in a 
way which is not totally left to the observer to specify in actual situations.’ 
(Laughlin, 2004: 273) 
 
However, it advocates that the subjectivity should not be ‘complete’ but rather some 
‘structure’ should be introduced into it. Structured subjectivity of the researcher implies 
that what is involved in the process of empirical investigation can be separately 
specified whilst leaving room for the observer’s skills, imagination and intuition: 
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‘Structured’….specifies in more precise and abstracted terms what is involved 
in this engagement process whilst at the same time not trying to squeeze out the 
intuitive, imaginative properties of individual observers’ (Laughlin 2004: 273) 
 
In this approach, the observer is part of the investigatory process and the method of 
observation is defined yet flexible enough to accommodate the subjective variety in 
perceptual powers of the observer.   
 
Certain methodological frameworks are consistent with the approach of structured 
subjectivity of the observer. Laughlin (2004: 274) suggests the methodological thinking 
drawn from German Critical Theory as one methodological framework consistent with 
this approach. Consistent with this is the use of qualitative data collection methods such 
as documents, interviews and observation.  This is, however, different from the 
qualitative data methods in the interpretive approaches because the data narratives are 
generated within a predetermined conceptual framework or theory, albeit of a ‘skeletal’ 
form. This is labelled as ‘qualitative 2’ in Figure 3.1 to distinguish it from the 
qualitative data used in the interpretive approaches. The main difference is that 
‘qualitative 2’ data narrative ‘provides a narrative where prior theoretical terms and 
concepts are more evident, having guided the empirical investigation in the first place’ 








 3.5.4 Justification for a ‘Middle Range’ Research Approach 
The research approach adopted in this study is based on ‘middle range thinking’. This 
has implication for the choices made in terms of the use of theory, the role of the 
observer, the methodological approach and the data collection methods. This section 
provides the justification for adopting this approach for the study. 
 
The more theoretically defined methods of the positivist approach and its derivatives 
has served the needs of the natural sciences but it has severe limitations in accounting 
theory and social theory in general. Accounting as a social practice is greatly 
influenced by the context in which it is conducted. If there are limitations in applying 
this approach to accounting research in general, there are even more severe limitations 
in adopting it in the study of accountability in NGOs.  
 
The term NGOs is socially constructed and the categorizations of NGOs is not rigid but 
flexible and context dependent. Likewise, accountability is a socially negotiated 
concept and its precise meaning and scope is influenced by the understanding of the 
social actors involved. While the attempt to search for generalizable commonalties 
prevalent in the positivist tradition is useful, divorcing this from context severely limits 
the accuracy and usefulness of the insights forthcoming 
 
On the other hand the subjective Kantian/Fitchean approach places a great deal of 
emphasis on learning from the uniqueness of each situation but its main weakness is its 
inability to learn from other situations (Laughlin 1995:83). While each NGO is unique 
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and faces accountability issues that are specific to it, there are nonetheless certain 
issues that recur across the sector. An example is the problem of holding NGOs 
accountable to their beneficiaries. While most actors in the sector agree that this is 
desirable, there are structural issues across most NGOs that make this impracticable.  
Full adoption of this approach will therefore limit the opportunity of obtaining such 
broad understanding. 
 
But while some features of NGOs’ accountability may be abstracted and studied across 
organizations, the richness of specific situation or subgroups and the complexity 
involved makes it impracticable to divorce this from the context. For instance a key 
component of NGO’s accountability is the ‘humanitarian imperative.’ What this means 
and how it affects practices varies across various parts of the NGO community. An 
emergency or welfare oriented NGO interprets this as the overriding importance of the 
need to save lives or relief suffering above economic rationality. But a development 
NGO interprets this as effectiveness and long-term sustainability of development 
assistance projects.  
 
The middle range approach allows the contextual details to be brought into the study 
while not foreclosing the possibility of broader categorization and uncovering of 
generalizable findings. This approach is suitable for this study and is adopted.  
 
A major area of difference in the approaches of the various research schools in 
accounting is the desirability for change. Neither of the two extreme philosophical 
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standpoints emphasises the need for change. However other research approaches have 
argued that research endeavour can and should be involved in processes of critique and 
of change (Laughlin & Lowe, 1985; Tinker et al, 1982). Laughlin (1987: 481) argues 
that though the benchmark for direction for these changes may be complex and yet 
unresolved, a case can be made for seeing the essence of research as understanding and 
transformation of the phenomena being investigated. This research will follow this 
lead. It will be mainly aimed at investigation of NGOs’ accountability practices and its 
theoretical basis but will also explore the possibility for change that may improve the 
practice.  
 
3.6 Data Collection and analysis 
This research adopts a case study approach. This is justified because the concept of 
accountability is influenced by the context in which it is practised. A case study 
approach has the advantage of offering a rich understanding of the subject within a 
specific context and may reveal understanding of the specific situational variables that 
affect it. Data collection is carried out using six NGOs as case studies.  Multiple levels 
of analysis is used in order to obtain understandings that are context specific as well as 
common to more than one organization or generalizable across NGOs. The next 
subsection discusses the approach to the selection of case studies while section 3.6.2 





3.6.1 Sample selection 
The selection of cases was carefully considered as it involves defining the population. 
This is crucial in defining the limits for generalizing the findings. For this study, the 
population is defined as the whole NGO sector as defined in Chapter 2.  
As the study is exploratory, the sample was carefully selected to include NGOs across 
the different categories identified based on their orientation and their level of operation. 
This is to ensure that the NGOs selected are representative of the whole categories of 
NGOs identified in Chapter 2. Concerning the sample size, the case study approach 
involving in-depth study in the selected NGOs necessitates limiting the sample size to a 
manageable six. 
 
One of the NGOs was chosen to be the lead case study based on a consideration of 
which NGO is most likely to be informative in answering the research questions and 
where there will be access for more extensive data collection to be undertaken.  The 
NGO selected as the lead case study was the one that provided the opportunity of wider 
access and also faced most of the challenging accountability issues under study.  
Extensive data collection and analysis was undertaken in order to explore the issues 
involved in NGOs accountability particularly in the areas where knowledge gaps have 
been identified. Based on the result of the preliminary analysis, the skeletal theory was 
modified and the data collection and analysis properly focused around the key issues 
emerging.  These were then developed into a structure that formed the basis of data 
collection and analysis in the five other NGOs selected for the study. 
 
 107 
Data collection in the remaining five NGOs was less extensive than in the lead case 
study but more focused on relevant themes. Due to the limited sample size, it is 
important to ensure maximum possible variation within the selected sample. The 
samples were selected to achieve a fair spread across the various categories of NGOs as 
defined in Chapter 2. This included emergency or welfare oriented, development 
oriented and advocacy oriented NGOs. This is presented in Table 3.1 below. The aim is 
to ensure that the unit of analysis is clearly defined.  
   
Table 3.1- Selected samples of NGOs for case study 
       




Case Study 3 
 
Lead Case Study 
 
Regional or National  
 
Case Study 4 
 
 









Case Study 5 
 
 
3.6.2 Data collection methods 
In this study, primary data was collected using the three main data collection methods 
associated with the Qualitative 2 method in middle range thinking. These are mainly 
document analysis, observation and interviews. Using multiple data collection methods 
offers the benefit of triangulation which provides stronger evidence by substantiation of 
findings. This is particularly important in this study because the data relevant to the 
research exist in diverse forms across the whole of the organization. As the nature of 
the research is exploratory, and consistent with the research approach, data analysis 
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commenced as an integral part of the data collection. This overlap is not uncommon 
with case study research. Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue for an iterative process of 
data collection, coding and analysis as a means of guiding the direction of research, the 
approach adopted here and consistent with middle range thinking is to allow some 
overlap only to enrich the process of fleshing out the skeletal theory. The benefit of the 
flexibility to make adjustments to the data collection process ‘allows the researcher to 
probe emergent themes or to take advantage of special opportunities which may be 
present in a given situation’ (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539) This was particularly useful in the 
lead case study where the main themes to be explored were not completely defined but 
were being developed through the data collection and analysis process. The following 
sections describe the main data collection methods used. 
 
3.6.2.1 Document analysis 
The most extensive form of data collection methods used in this research is document 
analysis.  
 ‘Organizations… have a variety of ways of representing themselves 
 collectively both to themselves and to others. It is, therefore, imperative that 
 our understanding of contemporary societies…incorporates an appreciation of 
 those processes and products of self-description’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 
 56-57) 
 
One of the products of self description is documents. They are routinely created in the 
normal course of organizational functioning and are the means through which 
organizational activities and decisions are implemented. Documents exist in different 
forms. MacDonald (2001:197-203) identified five major classes of documents available 
to researchers as: Public records, The media, Biographies, Visual documents (e.g films, 
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artwork etc) and Private papers (e.g minutes of meetings, internal memos etc). 
Documents are created and used for several purposes in organizations. This ‘includes a 
variety of materials concerned with their self-presentation. This might involve annual 
reports, prospectuses, financial accounts and the likes.’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004: 
57). One of the uses of documents in organizations is for accountability. This may 
include, but not limited to, financial reports, narrative reports to stakeholders, strategic 
planning documents, project evaluation reports and other forms of communications 
internally and to stakeholders.  
 
NGOs are highly regulated in the UK. There are extensive public records of issues of 
concern to this research and as such these documents were used extensively as a data 
source particularly for three of the six case studies that are UK NGOs. Some of these 
documents are annual reports and detailed information about the NGOs’ activities filed 
with the Charity Commission. There are also published surveys and reports on issues 
affecting the sector. The Charity Finance Directors Group and the National Council for 
Voluntary Organizations have carried out surveys on several issues concerning NGOs’ 
finance and accountability. The results of some of these surveys were used as data for 
analysis. There is an Office of the Third Sector in the UK Government that releases 
information on issues affecting the sector. Major Institutional donors such as the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) publish information concerning 
funding of NGOs on their website. These include calls for application detailing donors’ 
priority areas and criteria for assessment of NGOs’ proposals for funding. These 
documents are useful sources of data and were used extensively in this research. 
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Private papers were also used extensively particularly in the lead case study, where the 
researcher had more access, and to a reasonable extent in the other five case studies. 
These private papers consist mainly of strategy papers, minutes of management and 
trustees’ meetings, internal memos (including electronic mails) and papers on major 
decisions taken by the organizations. Also included in this category are management 
reports, both financial and narrative, fundraising applications and communications with 
Institutional donors. Feedback from donors on acceptance or rejection of project 
proposals submitted for funding were also used as data source on donors’ influence on 
NGO’s priorities and strategies. End of project evaluation reports were also used 
extensively as data sources. These provide the evaluators’ assessment of the success 
and difficulties encountered in the projects. In the lead case study, the NGO 
periodically compiles the evaluative reports of a number of completed projects and 
discusses this in joint meetings between management and project staff. This 
consolidated evaluative report was used as a data source in addition to participant 
observation of the group discussion on the reports. 
 








Table 3.2- List of documents analysed and their codes 
SN Description of document Code 





2 Strategic Plans */SP/** 
3 Programme of Work */PR/** 
4 Annual Audited Accounts */AA/** 
5 Grant or Programme Audited Accounts */GA/** 
6 Fundraising Proposals to donors */FP/** 
7 Programme Narrative Reports to donors */NR/** 
8 Programme Evaluation reports */PE/** 
9 Advocacy reports produced as part of advocacy 
programmes 
*/RE/** 
10 Donors’ Calls for Proposal  */CP/** 
11 Funding guidelines and other information from donors */FG/** 
12 Project Grant Contract */CT/** 
13 Feedback from donors on Programme Proposals */FB/** 
14 Published organizational literature */LT/** 
15 Minutes of Meetings of Trustees */MM/** 
16 Other Internal Memos and e-mails */IM/** 
17 Statement of Recommended Practices for Charities UK/SORP/** 
18 The Non-Governmental Organizations Registration Act, 
Cap. 113, Republic of Uganda, 1989 (Amended 2006). 
UGX/NGO 
Act/89 
19 The Non-Governmental Organizations Regulations, 2009. 
Statutory Instruments Supplement to The Uganda Non-
Governmental Organizations Registration Act, 1989 
UGX/NGO 
Reg/09 
20 The Companies and Allied Matters Act. Laws of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1990.  
NGN/CAMA/90 
 
                                                 
3
 * indicates the organization (NGO or Donor) that the document relates to. 
4
 ** indicates the year of publication or issue of the document 
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As the same types of documents are used across several NGOs, the coding system 
adopted identifies the organization, the document type, the year of publication or issue 
and where relevant, the page number. For example, CS1/AR/09:3 represents Case study 
1, Annual Report 2009, page 3 while DFID/FG/08 represents the Department for 
International Development’s Funding Guidelines issued in 2008. 
 
3.6.2.2 Participant observation  
Participant observation is a method that has its roots in sociology and anthropology. It 
involves a process where ‘the researcher attempts to participate fully in the lives and 
activities of the subjects and thus becomes a member of their group, organisation or 
community. This enables the researcher to share their experiences by not merely 
observing what is happening but also feeling it’ (Gill and Johnson, 1997: 113) 
One of the benefits of participant observation as a data collection method is that of 
‘immersion in the research setting’ (Delbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1994). This is of great 
value in an exploratory study of this nature where the issues being investigated are 
significantly dependent on the context. This method was, therefore, extensively used as 
the primary data collection method in the lead case study, where the researcher had 
extensive access. 
 
Participant observation exists in various forms. Gill and Johnson (1997) sets out four 
possible positions that a researcher can adopt in participant observation. These are: 
 Complete participant 
 Complete observer 
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 Observer as participant 
 Participant as observer 
 
In the first two of these positions, the ‘complete participant’ and the ‘complete 
observer’, the identity of the researcher is not revealed and the subjects are unaware 
that they are being observed for research purposes.  In the position of ‘complete 
participant’ the researcher takes part in the activities of the subject and attempts to 
become a member of the group being researched. This differs from the position of a 
complete observer, where the researcher does not participate in the activities of the 
group but observes from a detached position. 
 
In the last two positions, the ‘observer as participant’ and the ‘participant as observer’, 
the identity of the researcher is made known to the subject. In the ‘observer as 
participant’ role, the researcher participates in the activities of the group only to a 
limited extent while focusing more on issues relevant to the research.  But in the 
‘participant as observer’ position, the researcher takes part in the activities of the group 
in full. This position gives the maximum benefit of immersion in the research context 
and it is the position adopted in the lead case study. The researcher, being a staff 
member in the organization, had sought permission from the Executive Director who 
agreed to using the organization as a case study and to using the data collected in the 
course of the researcher’s work. A significant amount of the data required can be found 
in the strategies and decisions taken by the management team of the organization which 
the researcher is part of.  Saunders et al (2000: 224) describes this position as the 
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‘practitioner-researcher’ role and, while acknowledging the benefits of research access 
and quick understanding of the context, warn of certain pitfalls relating to approaching 
the research with some preconceptions and overlooking asking questions on basic 
concepts which the researcher may assume to already know. These issues were given 
careful consideration and addressed through careful recording and reflecting on the 
data collected and their analysis.    
 
Three key categories of data are generated in participant observation. They are primary 
observations of what actually happened, made by the researcher; secondary 
observations consisting of interpretations of other observers of the events; and 
experiential data consisting of the researcher’s perception of the events and recorded in 
his diary and field notes (Delbridge and Kirkpatrick, 1994). In the lead case study, 
extensive volumes of these three types of data were collected. Extensive data from 
primary observations were gathered and recorded in a diary or in annotation of 
important documents. Informal questions were asked of other participants to clarify 
issues encountered and to understand their interpretations of the events observed. These 
were recorded in the field notes. The data collected were coded according to the 







Table 3.3 Coding of data collected from Participant’s Observation 
Organization Data collection method Data type Code 
CS1 Participant’s Observation Primary Observation CS1/PO/PR 
CS1 Participant’s Observation Secondary Observation CS1/PO/SE 
CS1 Participant’s Observation Experiential data CS1/PO/EX 
 
 
3.6.2.3 Interviews  
Interviews are a widely used method of data collection particularly in qualitative 
research. Interviews are of several types and they are used in both Qualitative 1 and 
Qualitative 2 types of data narratives shown in Laughlin (2004) (see Figure 3.1 above). 
However, the nature and type of interview needs to be consistent with the research 
strategy and the research questions. Interviews have been categorised in different ways 
but the categorisation most relevant to this study is that based on the degree of structure 
introduced. This could be at three different levels: 
 
1. Structured interviews are highly formalised using standardised pre-prepared 
questions for each respondent. These were not appropriate for this study considering 
the research strategy adopted. While some structure is desirable to guide the direction 
of the research, the exploratory nature of the study and the need to reshape or ‘flesh 
out’ the theoretical framework based on the findings from the research implies that 
fully structured interviews will not be appropriate. It will be too inflexible and will tend 
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to exclude the opportunity to explore the unique features of each case. For this reasons, 
structured interviews were not used in this study. 
 
2. Unstructured interviews are informal and useful in exploratory studies in areas where 
the issues are not well defined. There are no prepared lists of questions but the 
interviewee is given the opportunity to talk freely on the issues and may have more 
control of the direction of the discussion. This method is more suitable for studies using 
the interpretive research approach. It is not the main approach adopted in this study. 
But informal interview was extensively used particularly in the lead case study. This 
involved the researcher asking questions to clarify issues arising from data analysis or 
gaps noticed in data collected using other methods. Some of the interviews lasted only 
a few minutes while others continued over lunch or dinner. Most of the interviewees 
are NGO staff. 11 informal interviews were held in CS1 with the Heads of conflict 
prevention programme; International Advocacy; Policy and Communications; 
Programmes and the Deputy Director. 7 informal interviews were held with staff of 
CS2, CS3, CS5 and CS6.  Others interviewed are 3 NGO trustees including the late 
Chair of the Council and the Treasurer at CS1.  Other informal interviews conducted 
outside NGOs are one with a staff member of the EC, an Institutional donor, and 
another with a senior official of the Nigerian Accounting Standards Board. The 
questions were aimed at eliciting more information or clarifying issues arising from the 
data analysis. The informality made the interviews easy to arrange and the respondent 
discussed more freely.   
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3. Semi-structured interviews lie between the two types described above. The questions 
are not standardized but the interviewer has a list of questions or themes to be covered. 
The questions and the sequence can be varied from one interview to another as the 
situation demands. This flexibility makes this method of data collection appropriate for 
a ‘middle range thinking’ approach and was therefore used in the study, though not as 
the main form of data collection. The main themes to be explored were developed 
using the initial skeletal theory while the questions were guided by the findings from 
the documentary analysis which was the first and primary form of data collection used 
in all the cases except in the lead case where it was combined with participant 
observation. Each of these interviews lasted about an hour. Based on the result of 
analysis of the data follow up interviews were required in some cases. These were 
conducted in three cases one lasting about an hour (in CS2) but the other two were 
much shorter, with one (in CS3) conducted by e-mail.  In total 14 formal interviews 
including the 3 follow up interviews were conducted between November 2007 and July 
2011. The formal interviews were coded as shown in Table 3.4 with the follow up 
interviews coded as part of the initial interviews to which they relate.  
 
3.6.2.4 Focus group discussion 
Focus group discussion or interviews involves a number of participants engaging in a 
fairly unstructured discussing facilitated by the researcher. The involvement of a 
number of participants has the benefit of allowing ideas to emerge and be promptly 
evaluated. This method of data collection was used in the lead case study. Here the 
organization already has a culture of informal group discussion of issues affecting the 
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sector. This ‘brown bag’ forum happens fairly frequently (about monthly) in an 
informal atmosphere over lunch (in brown bags). This existing culture made it easy to 
organize the first group discussion on the research in May 2008. This involved mainly 
the Programme Coordinators, the Head of Programme, the Head of International 
Advocacy, the Head of Law, the Deputy Director in charge of fundraising and 
programme evaluation and about 5 other staff members. The topic of the discussion 
was on NGOs’ accountability to the beneficiaries. The discussion was mainly 
exploratory but moderated by the researcher who noted the important themes coming 
from the discussions and the views of the programme managers. A second focus group 
discussion was undertaken in September 2009 to review the main points from 
programme evaluation reports completed in the proceeding one year and draw some 
learning points for future projects. This was initiated by the Deputy Director who was 
in charge of programme evaluation but the researcher joined in because the issue was 
very relevant to the research and presented an opportunity for collecting relevant data. 
 
3.6.3 Data Analysis 
Consistent with the ‘middle range thinking’ approach adopted, the main type of data 
generated is qualitative. The first level of data analysis was focused on the lead case 
study. The data collection and data analysis were carried out concurrently and guided 
by the initial skeletal theory developed. The extensive mass of data gathered in the lead 
case study was assessed with regard to their quality and relevance. The analysis was 
focused around the key themes that developed and was used to revise the skeletal 
theory. The second level of analysis synthesised the initial findings from across the six 
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case studies, beginning with the three UK NGOs. This enabled a coherent analysis 
covering all the case studies. 
 
Table 3.4 Coding of Interviews and Focus Group discussions 
Organization Person interviewed Date Code 
CS1 Head of International Advocacy Nov 2007 */IV1/** 
CS1 Independent Programme Evaluator  Mar 2008 */IV2/** 
CS1 Deputy Director June 2009 */IV3/** 
CS2 Head of Finance Jan 2010 & 
Jan 2011 
*/IV4/** 
CS3 Head of Programme Effectiveness unit Aug 2010 & 
July 2011 
*/IV5/** 
CS4 Human Resources Manager Aug 2010 */IV6/** 
CS5 Programme Officer Aug 2010 */IV7/** 
CS5 Programme Manager Aug 2010 & 
May 2011 
*/IV8/** 
NGO Board Officer Aug 2010 */IV9/** 
CS6 Director/Founder Oct 2010 */IV10/** 
CS6 Fundraiser/Administrative officer Oct 2010 */IV11/** 
CS1 Group discussion on beneficiaries’ 
participation 
 
May 2008 CS1/GD1/08 
CS1 Group discussion on learning from 
evaluations 
 







This chapter locates the research approach adopted in this study within a framework 
describing a range of possible approaches to research. It aimed to highlight how the 
chosen approach adopted differs from the other approaches and to justify the choice 
process. The chapter opened with a broad description of the philosophical assumptions 
underlying the various research approaches and how they have been categorised by 
various scholars. It identified the key assumptions underlying the research process as 
analysed according to the three categories of ‘theory’, ‘methodology’ and ‘change’ in 
Laughlin (1995; 2004).  It highlighted the limitations of the two dominant alternative 
approaches, the first starting with a prior-defined theory and structured investigative 
process and the other dispensing with a prior defined theory or structure but relying on 
the analytical skills of the researcher to induce the theory from the data. 
 
It identified a ‘middle range thinking’ approach lying between these two extreme 
alternatives. It chose this as a suitable research approach because of the exploratory 
nature of the study. Consistent with this approach, a case study approach will be used 
and the main form of data collection will be documentary analysis, semi-structured 
interviews and participant observation. Concerning the role of theory, ‘middle range 
thinking’ approach requires the study to commence with a skeletal theory that could be 
‘fleshed out’ with the findings from the investigation. The development of this skeletal 





The theoretical framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical approach to the study of accountability is diverse or varied. This is 
because accountability practices are context-dependent. As a result, different theories 
have been used to study accountability in various organizational situations.  
 
The role of theory in the research process follows from the choices made in the 
research approach. Chapter 3 sets out the possible approaches to research and justifies 
the choice of a ‘middle range thinking’ approach to the research on NGO 
accountability. This necessitates the use of a ‘skeletal theory’ in approaching the 
empirical investigation. This will then be ‘fleshed out’ with the findings from the 
investigation. This chapter develops the theoretical framework that is used to 
commence the study. It begins by examining some of the existing theories of 
accountability with a view to identifying their relevance and limitations. It then builds 
on the categorization of approaches to accountability developed in chapter 2 to 
construct the theoretical model. 
 
Section 4.2 Links the framework for categorising approaches to accountability to the 
existing theories. It examines agency theory and its dominance in private sector 
accountability and identifies why it is of limited use in studying NGOs’ accountability. 
Section 4.3 looks at the stakeholder approach to accountability and identifies the reason 
why NGOs prioritize accountability to some stakeholders over others as resulting from 
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NGOs strategies in dealing with unequal balance of stakeholders’ power and influence.  
Section 4.4 examines the suitability of accounting in a more traditional sense, as a tool 
of accountability and introduces a conceptual model to study the role and limitations of 
accounting in organizational accountability. Section 4.5 examines the relevance of 
Structuration theory to the study of the underlying stakeholder interactions that shape 
accountability practices in organizations while section 4.6 synthesises these different 
elements into a skeletal theoretical framework for approaching the study 
 
4.1.1 The Accountability Framework 
From the ideas presented in Chapter 2, accountability can be viewed as involving two 
strands: the giving of account in a form that is understood and the holding to account 
(Stewart, 1984: 15-16). These two strands are essential components of accountability 
relationships. The giving of account focuses on the ‘language’ used in presenting the 
accounts. This language may be quantitative or qualitative depending on the context 
but can be grouped into two broad categories: 
1. Process based accountability that measures compliance with pre-set standard 
and formally defined outcomes. This includes fiscal and managerial 
accountability that measures the efficiency of the organization’s processes and 
relies on the use of the quantitative language of accounting. 
2. Performance based accountability that measures performance against 
organizational objectives. This measure may be qualitative and the criteria 
against which performance is measured less precisely defined.  
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The second way of categorizing accountability practices is in terms of the form of the 
holding to account broadly divided between the ‘contractual’ and ‘communal’ forms. 
The ‘contractual’ form of accountability involves the rendering of formal accounts 
mainly to stakeholders who have the contractual right to demand it. The expectations 
and information demands are more clearly specified and the approach highly 
standardized.  But the ‘Communal’ form of accountability is mainly to stakeholders 
who may not have the contractual right to demand it. The approach is informal, less 
structured and often discretionary, as the obligation to account may be moral rather 
than contractual. 
 
These distinctions are built into the two-dimensional framework in Figure 4.1 which is 
based on the categorization in Figure 2.1 The four segments of the framework (A to D) 
describe the possible approaches to accountability practice.  The Process based 
approach involving measuring of outcome, using mainly the quantitative language of 
accounting, could be used either in the contractual or communal forms. In the 
contractual form as in segment A, accountability is rendered using traditional 
accounting with the practices standardized and regulated. When used in the communal 
form (as in segment D), it involves the use of accounting but this may not be in the 
traditional form. The stakeholders involved have the flexibility to determine the form 
of accounting that is relevant to their needs and adapt the practices accordingly.  
 
The performance based approach involves giving account of the attainment of 
organizational objectives. Under a contractual form, this may be structured and 
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regulated as in the extension of traditional financial statement to narrative reporting 
(type B) but in the communal form it may be unstructured and adapted to the varying 
needs in different organizational contexts (as in type C). The categorization of these 
different approaches first presented in Chapter 2 are reproduced here as the 
‘Accountability Space’ depicting the entire range of possible approaches to 
organizational accountability (Figure 4.1)  
  
Figure 4.1- The Accountability Space 
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4.2 Linking the Accountability Space to Theory 
Different theoretical approaches have been used to study the different forms of 
accountability but none of them is broad enough to address all the range of possibilities 
that exists. For example, segment A type that falls under the contractual form has been 
analysed using Agency Theory. But as discussed in section 4.2 below, this theory 
cannot explain the accountability practices of segments B, C and D types which may be 
analysed using the stakeholder theory. The following sub-sections examine the 
relevance and limitations of this theory in analysing the practices in the entire 
‘accountability space’ 
 
4.2.1 Agency Theory Approach   
The Agency Theory model dominates thinking on accountability particularly in the 
context of the private sector. In this model, the principal (in the private sector, the 
shareholders) owns the ‘asset’ (using this term broadly) that the agent manages on his 
or her behalf.  Accountability of the agent (the management of the organization) is 
predominantly towards the principal as the principal has the contractual rights to 
demand accountability. As a result, the wishes of the principal influence the action of 
the agent and by implication the objectives of the organization. In this context, the 
guiding principle in the agent’s conduct is the maximization of shareholder’s wealth 
which constitutes the main organizational objective. Accountability is measured in 
terms of performance against this objective. Because of certain characteristics of the 
organizational objectives and the nature of accounting (discussed in section 4.4) the 
accountability system uses predominantly traditional accounting. This model may not 
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be appropriate in other sectors. For example, Mayston (1993: 73-77) contends that the 
Agency Theory model of accountability is unsuitable for the public sector for certain 
reasons. First, it is difficult to identify who the principal is in such an agency 
relationship. The electorate, the consumers of public services or the central government 
do not fit into the role of the principal as clearly as the shareholder does in the private 
sector model. Though Mayston (1993) made no reference to a stakeholder view, he 
admits, by implication, that there is a multiplicity of interests groups (or stakeholders) 
in public sector organizations. Second is the fact that the aim of public sector 
organizations is to provide social services to the population and to implement 
government policies. The organizational objective is therefore a balance of several 
needs and influences as opposed to the single wealth maximization objective of private 
sector organizations. As a result, performance cannot be expressed in a single criteria 
or indicator such as profit or share value.  
 
Public sector accountability may be described as ‘contractual’ because the electorate 
have the power to enforce it by changing governments through elections. And though 
public servants have no formal contract with the public they are nonetheless indirectly 
held accountable through public office holders. But because the broad and qualitative 
nature of the objectives of public sector organizations, the basis of accountability is 
both process and performance, falling into both segments A and B.  Because there are 
other non-contractual stakeholders involved, accountability necessarily involves some 
elements of the communal form. 
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There are three major difficulties in applying agency theory to NGOs. The first is that 
NGOs’ resources are provided by donors mostly under contract. The victims of 
disaster, who are the beneficiaries of NGOs’ activities, are not the funders and have no 
contractual relationship with the organization. NGOs therefore contract with one party 
(the donor, who has the contractual right to demand accountability) for the benefit of 
another party (the beneficiary, who has no contractual right to demand accountability). 
The second is that the objectives of NGOs are broad and non-economic and 
performance cannot be expressed in a single criterion such as share value. The third is 
the involvement of multiple stakeholders with varying interests. Agency theory 
recognises only one dominant stakeholder (the Principal) and treats other stakeholders 
as largely non-existent. Laughlin (1996: 227) draws attention to the significance of 
other contextual variables in the accountability space (See Figure 1, Laughlin, 1996: 
227). If the actors that make up the context are viewed as stakeholders it could be 
argued that though they are not in a contractual relationship with the organization they 
are owed the duty of accountability. A more embracing approach that takes the interest 
of these varied stakeholders into consideration is argued, therefore, to be more 
appropriate. 
 
4.2.2 The stakeholder Theory Approach 
The composition of the stakeholders will vary across organizational types depending on 
the organization’s objectives. In the context of NGOs, these stakeholders will include 
the donors or funders, the beneficiaries of NGO’s activities, the government and the 
community or civil society. The donors may include individual supporters who give 
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small amounts or institutions and governments that give large grants to fund specific 
projects or the general activities of NGOs. The beneficiaries of NGOs’ activities may 
include the poor, the victims of natural or man-made disasters or the victims of human 
rights abuses. Some of these stakeholders may be in direct contractual relationship with 
the organizations while the others may not. As a result, their relative importance in the 
organization varies.   
  
Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) suggest that the strategies an organization adopts to 
deal with different stakeholders will be influenced by the extent to which the 
organization depends on those stakeholders for resources critical to the organization. 
This dependence has implications for the power relations between stakeholders and the 
organization. Emerson (1962) sees this dependence as linked to the provision of critical 
resources needed by the organization. The result is a tendency for organizations to 
prioritize the needs of the stakeholders who provide the most critical resources needed 
for the organizations’ survival over those of the other stakeholders. This could explain 
why, in private sector organizations, the needs of the shareholders are taken to be of 
overriding importance over those of other stakeholders. While this tendency may be 
seen in NGOs, it is not wholly applicable. While financial resources are critical to the 
survival of all organizations, private sector equity funds are provided or owned solely 
by shareholders. But NGOs have diverse funding sources from both contractual 
stakeholders such as Institutional donors and from non-contractual stakeholders such as 
from membership subscription, individual donations, foundations and legacies. This 
makes them less susceptible to the influence of a single stakeholder like private sector 
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organizations. Furthermore, NGOs’ reserves (equivalent to shareholders’ funds in 
private sector organizations) are not owned by any of the funders and cannot be 
withdrawn by any stakeholder. It must be used in furtherance of its charitable object 
(Charity Commission, 2006). These factors limit the influence of a single funder or 
stakeholder.  
 
In organizations having other stakeholders apart from those in direct contractual 
relationship with the organization, communal forms of accountability becomes 
important. For example in religious organizations the resourcing is supplied by the 
faithful devotees who have no direct contract with the organization and may not require 
or demand any formal accountability. They are more interested in the spiritual work 
(the sacred or the core mission) of the organization (Laughlin 1988: 30-39). 
Accountability therefore involves mainly demonstration of the fulfilment of the sacred 
core mission. 
 
 This idea of a sacred core is relevant in other organizational types. Universities and 
Hospitals are typical examples. Bourn and Ezzamel (1987: 34) described them as 
professional organizations founded on an ‘overriding value system’ loosely identified 
as ‘academic freedom’ or ‘clinical freedom’. Likewise,  NGOs are guided by the 
Principle of Humanity which implies that no service whatsoever for the benefit of a 
suffering human being is to be dismissed out of hand (ICRC, 2002:4). Adherence to 
this principle is taken to be of central importance and Slim (1998: 28-48) argues that 
these fundamental values should be at the centre of accountability in humanitarian 
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assistance. In these organizations accountability of the form in ‘segment C’ of Figure 
4.1 which involves qualitative reporting on the achievement of objectives or adherence 
to the core values will be very important. This is rendered in different forms but there is 
yet no standard approach towards it. But because these organizations also use financial 
resources, they may also render financial accountability to these non-contractual 
stakeholders. This may involve the use of elements of accounting but in a form 
different from that in segment A as the organization or the stakeholders may choose 
elements of accounting they consider as appropriate to the context. Practices in this 
area (segment D) are largely unregulated or non-standardized. 
 
4.3 The Theoretical Framework 
From the ‘Accountability space’ in Figure 4.1, accountability in organizations involves 
various approaches depending on the context. When using the process based approach 
to accountability in the contractual form, traditional accounting is the major tool 
employed. Here traditional accounting is used to describe the network of practices 
concerned with the provision of relevant information for decision-making, the 
achievement of rational allocation of resources and the maintenance of accountability 
and stewardship. These functional attributes are reflected in the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) definition of accounting in its Statement No. 4 as  
‘..to provide quantitative  information, primarily financial in nature about 
economic entities that is intended to be useful in making economic decisions..’ 
 
Traditional accounting may satisfy the accountability needs in certain organizational 
context. But viewing accountability in terms of it only may be inadequate in other 
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contexts. This is because certain endogenous and exogenous variables may render it 
inadequate or inappropriate. The endogenous variables relate to the nature of the 
objectives of the organisation, the activities required in achieving them and certain 
elements of the nature of traditional accounting while the exogenous variables relate to 
the information preferences of the stakeholders. The following sub-sections examine 
these variables and propose a conceptual model for understanding why accounting 
meets more or less the accountability needs in different organizational settings. It is not 
a scientific model derived from some tested hypothesis but a skeletal one based on 
general observation and the result of previous research. It is intended only as a guide 
for empirical investigation.  
  
4.3.1 Endogenous Variables 
Contingency theorists argue that there is no universally appropriate accounting system 
applicable to all organisations. They attempt to identify specific aspects of an 
accounting system and demonstrate an appropriate matching with particular 
organisational contexts (Otley et al, 2001). They identified three major contingent 
factors (the environment, organisational structure and technology) that impact on the 
accounting system. This section proposes that there is a relationship between the nature 
of the organisational objective and the adoption of accounting practices. This 
relationship has its origin in the nature and history of accounting. Some key aspects in 
the definition of accounting (given in Section 4.3) together with certain organizational 
characteristics constitute the endogenous variables that influence the appropriateness of 
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traditional accounting practices in organisational accountability. These endogenous 
variables are examined in the following subsections. 
 
4.3.1.1 Specificity of Organisational Objective and the Certainty of Cause/Effect  
The first two of the endogenous variables are closely related. They are the nature of the 
organizational objectives and the extent to which the activities required to achieve them 
are programmable. Thompson and Tuden (1959) examine this relationship in the 
context of organizational decision making process. They conclude that when the 
organisational objectives are clear and specific, and the consequences of action known 
(or in other words, if the activities required in achieving those objectives are 
programmable), there is a high potential for decision making by computation. 
 
Thompson and Tuden (1959) shows other possible combinations of uncertainty (or 
conversely certainty) of Objective and Cause/effect as presented in table 4.1 below 
with the implication for the decision making process.  
 
Table 4.1 Relationship between organizational objectives and decision 




Cause and effect 
 
Uncertainty of Objectives 
 Low High 
Low Decision by computation 
 
Decision by compromise 
High 
 
Decision by judgement 
 
Decision by inspiration 
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Traditional accounting, which by its nature, provides quantitative information, is more 
suitable for accountability in organizations where decision-making is by computation. 
From 4.1, one may conclude that traditional accounting will be more useful in 
organizations where the objectives are certain and the cause/effect relationship between 
the objectives and activities is high. One can deduce that the first two variables that 
affect the adoption of accounting practices in organisations are: Certainty of 
organizational objectives (now labelled O) and the extent to which the activities 
required to achieve the objectives are programmable (now labelled P) 
 
4.3.1.2 Economic Nature of Organisational Objectives or Activities 
The history and development of accounting dates back to the practices of Italian 
merchants from about the 13
th
 century but codified in 1494 by Luca Pacioli. Double-
entry book-keeping developed as a way of keeping records of business transactions. As 
businesses grew larger and more complex, cost and management accounting developed 
in response to the need for more information for controlling and decision making. 
Though historians of management accounting differ in their account and theories of its 
development (Garner, 1954; Kaplan, 1984; Hopper and Armstrong, 1991) there are 
areas of common understanding. Whether the aim was to control labour or promote 
economic efficiency, few disagree with Garner (1954: 348) that: 
‘Cost theories and procedures have evolved as a natural corollary of their 
industrial environment. The expansion of the factory system…and the keener 
competition brought about by widening markets all combined to cause the 
manufacturer to appreciate more fully the necessity for adequate information as 
to his cost of production’ 
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The development of accounting is therefore rooted in commercial practices. This is 
reflected in the definition which indicates that accounting information is more suitable 
to making economic decisions. As a result, the adoption of accounting practices in an 
organisation will depend on the extent to which the objectives (or the activities carried 
out to fulfil them) are economic in nature (now labelled E).   
 
4.3.1.3 A Model of Endogenous Variables that Influence the usefulness of Traditional 
Accounting in Organizational Accountability 
All of the variables identified above affect the usefulness of accounting within the 
organisation and impact on the extent to which traditional forms of accounting meets 
the accountability needs in the organization- an idea referred to in this thesis as a 
sociological divide. The sociological divide (ds) is inversely proportional to the product 
of the three variables discussed above and could be represented as:  
ds           1  .                               
            O*P*E 
 
High values of O and P implies that the organizational objectives are clearly defined 
and the activities needed to achieve them are highly programmable. High values of E 
imply that the dominant objectives of the organization are mainly economic. This is the 
case in private sector organisations where the objective (maximization of share value) 
is purely economic, clear and measurable and the activities required to achieve it 
(profitable trading) has a programmable link to the objectives. As a result, ds is very 
small and traditional accounting should be used for organisational accountability. In 
this situation, provision of accounting information arguably almost completely meets 
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the accountability needs of the organization. Accountability in this type of 
organizations will be predominantly of type A in Figure 4.1 
 
But where the variables take on low values the sociological divide will be large and 
traditional forms of accounting will be inadequate or unsuitable for organisational 
accountability.  In public sector organizations for example, the objectives may be 
considered clearly specified in terms of the provision of basic services at a cost that 
makes them accessible to the population. But these objectives are not entirely economic 
as they serve other social or political needs.  Furthermore, the activities required to 
achieve this are not entirely programmable. There exists a moderate level of 
sociological divide and accounting may not entirely serve the accountability needs of 
the organization. Attempts to extend the influence of accounting beyond the 
appropriate level will result in difficulties and resistance. This is consistent with the 
result of other research in this area (Mayston, 1993; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1998; 
Broadbent et al 2001). In this type of organizations, though type A form of 
accountability is still very important, it needs to be complemented by methods of 
reporting on the achievement of objectives in form of type B (where there are 
contractual stakeholders) and type C (where there are non-contractual stakeholders).  
 
But there exist other organizational forms with much wider objectives and stakeholders 
whom though have no contractual relationship with the organization are nonetheless 
influential or important in the organization. For example, in religious organisations 
where the main objective is the worship of a sacred being and the resourcing to allow 
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this to happen is provided by a wider group of stakeholders who see financial 
accountability for those resources as a ‘secular’ and less important concern relative to 
the ‘sacred’ purpose of the organization.  Accountability for these ‘sacred’ activities 
cannot be rendered using any standardised methods such as types A and B as they rest 
on some belief system. Relying on traditional accounting for accountability in these 
circumstances creates a sociological divide. This is consistent with the result of 
Laughlin’s (1988) study of the role of accounting in the Church of England. It found 
that accounting is viewed as a secular activity distinct from the sacred objectives of the 
Church and only partly adopted at different levels of the organisation based on specific 
and limited needs.  In this type of organization accountability consists mainly of the 
communal forms involving elements of types C and D practices (Figure 4.1). 
    
In NGOs the organizational objectives relate to delivery of welfare services, 
development and advocacy. Though these objectives may be stated to different degrees 
of clarity and specificity, the activities required to achieve them may not be clear or 
specific. In some situations they may be communally negotiated between NGOs and 
the beneficiaries. In some cases, this may be a compromise
5
 established through 
participatory processes such as needs assessment
6
. Furthermore, those activities are not 
programmable as it is difficult to link those activities directly to measurable 
improvements in welfare or development or the success of particular advocacy 
                                                 
5 In interview IV1, the Head of International Advocacy at CS1, cited instances where communities failed to 
mention crucial human rights as part of their needs during consultation. In other instances, they did not 
consider important issues like girls’ education as part of their needs. 
6
 Apart from needs assessment, other tools such as the Logical framework, Participatory Rural Appraisal 
(PRA) and Participatory budgeting are used to involve communities and ensure that their needs are 
reflected in project design 
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campaigns. This suggests that the endogenous variables in NGOs will take on low 
values. As a result there is a sociological divide suggesting that traditional accounting 
practices alone cannot fully satisfy NGOs’ accountability. This is consistent with the 
findings of Connolly (2002). 
 
While financial reporting is used to establish NGOs’ accountability for the use of 
resources in carrying out their activities, it does not establish any link between those 
activities and the achievement of their objectives. But the non-contractual stakeholders 
such as individual supporters, the beneficiaries and the wider community are more 
interested in the impact of NGOs’ work rather than purely financial accountability. 
Therefore, for full accountability, NGOs need to go beyond the provision of traditional 
accounting information and embrace elements of all of the practices in segments B, C 
and D in addition. 
 
4.3.2 Exogenous variables 
The composition of stakeholders and their information needs have a major impact on 
organizations’ accountability. The widespread approach is to use accounting 
information for organizational accountability as Thompson and Tuden (1959: xx) put 
it: 
‘Although accounting information in no way reflects the totality of activities 
that take place within the organisation and in its interaction with the wider 
environment, it does provide information on one dimension of such activity. 
Because the information is expressed in common monetary terms, it can be 




In a similar manner, Jones and Dugdale (2001: 45) wrote: 
‘The power of accounting rests to a considerable extent on its ability to re-
present other forms of data and calculation in terms of money as pure 
information. Accounting claims to provide the ultimate translation - the bottom 
line’. 
 
These perceptions would be appropriate for organizations where all the stakeholders 
are concerned primarily with financial returns. Accountability based on the use of 
traditional accounting information (type A) will be adequate in meeting stakeholders’ 
needs. But in other types of organisations where there are stakeholders whose interests 
are not financial returns, other forms of accountability will be important as well. How 
well accounting or any other chosen practices serve the accountability needs of an 
organization will, therefore, depend on the information needs of the stakeholders. To 
determine if accounting information (or the chosen practices) will satisfy the 
stakeholders’ information needs it is important to identify the stakeholders involved 
and assess their information preference. Using Freeman’s (1984: 46) definition of a 
stakeholder in an organization as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’ one can represent this bilateral 
relationship as the stakeholder map in Figure 4.2. The way the stakeholder can affect 
the organization’s objectives and activities is represented as the ‘Power’ while the way 














The model conceives the influence of a stakeholder on the organization as the product 
of the Impact and the Power of the stakeholder: 
Stakeholder’s Influence = Impact x Power7 
The stakeholders with the greatest influence are those that the organization’s activities 
have a high impact on and who also have the power to make changes in the 
organisation. Examples are the shareholders in private sector organizations. The 
stakeholders who have moderate influence on the organization are those who have 
limited power to make changes in the organization or who the organization’s activities 
have only limited impact on their lives.  There are also a few stakeholders on whose 
lives the organizations’ activities have high impact but have little or no power to make 
any changes in the organization. They may therefore have little or no influence in the 
organization. Examples are beneficiaries in NGOs. Conversely, there may be other 
stakeholders on whom the organization’s activities have little or no impact but who 
nonetheless have the power to make significant changes in the organization. Here the 
influence may also be little as the stakeholder may have no motivation to exercise its 
power to make changes in the organization. An example is the government as a 
                                                 
7





stakeholder in religious organizations. The government does not look to religious 
organizations for tax revenue but is yet able to make changes, through legislation, that 
affect the organizations. 
 
4.3.2.1 A Model of the Information divide  
Where some stakeholder groups have information preferences that are not satisfied by 
the organization’s chosen practices, an information divide (di) is created. This divide 
represents the divergence between the organization’s chosen accountability practices 
and the information preferences of that particular stakeholder: 
 
di = Organization’s accountability practices – Stakeholder’s preference 
 
An information divide will be created where an organization has many stakeholder 
groups but focuses its accountability practices exclusively on the needs of the most 
influential stakeholders. Where the organization’s activities have low impact on the less 
influential stakeholders, this may not be considered a problem. But where the 
organization’s activities have a high impact on the less influential stakeholders, this 
information divide will be a problem if not addressed. 
 
Table 4.2 below uses the model to illustrate possible scenarios of the information 
divides in three organisational types if accountability practices are limited to, for 
example, traditional accounting practices (type A). The illustration assumes that the 
information preferences of the stakeholders are the varying mix chosen from the four 
possibilities, types A, B, C and D, identified in the ‘accountability space’ in Figure 4.1.   
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Table 4.2- Stakeholders’ information preference in three organizational types 
Commercial Organizations 






 L L L C, D A Yes 
Users (Customers) L L L C,D A Yes 
Government/regulators H H H A A No 
Shareholders H H H A A No 
 
Religious Organizations 




Community M M M C A Yes 
Users (Worshipers) H M H C, D A Yes 
Government/regulators L H M A A No 
 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 






L/M? M M/L? C,D A Yes 
Users (Beneficiaries) H L M/L? C,D A Yes 
Government/regulators M H H A A No 
Institutional Donors M H H A, B A Yes/No? 
 
                                                 
8
 For commercial organizations involved in oil exploration, forestry, tourism etc, the influence of the 
community may be higher on account of the high impact of the organization on their lives. Through 
organising into advocacy groups, they may also increase their power to make changes in the 
organization. Their level of influence may then increase to medium (M) 
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The scenario in table 4.2 suggests that in private sector organisations there are 
information divides in relation to the needs of the community and the customers as 
stakeholder groups. The accountability focuses mainly on type A on account of the 
high influence of shareholders and the government (or regulators) both of whom are 
primarily interested in financial accountability. The information divide in relation to the 
needs of the customers (users) and the community may not be considered a problem if 
there is low impact of the organization’s activities on them. In this instance, the 
organization does not significantly affect their lives and in a competitive environment, 
they can chose not to deal with a particular organization. But this is not the case in 
organizations operating in sectors having significant externalities such as mining, 
petroleum exploration, forestry and tourism. In such cases, the effect of the 
organisation’s activities on their lives and environment may be very severe. This may 
raise the level of impact and an information divide in relation to the needs of these 
stakeholders will be problematic. Where the community is able to organise themselves 
into advocacy groups, they may increase their power and force the organization to 
render accountability. 
 
In religious organizations, there will be an information divide in relation to the needs of 
the worshipers and the community if accountability is viewed only in terms of 
traditional accounting (type A). This will be a problem because the impact of the 
organization’s activities on the worshipers’ lives is High and on the community 
Medium. The divide will be a major problem because in case of the worshipers, in 
addition to the high impact, they also have some power to make changes in the 
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organization and are therefore somewhat influential stakeholders in religious 
organizations. Compared with commercial organizations, the non-profit seeking 
worshipers (users) actually provide the funding for the running of the organization. But 
for the limited ability to make changes in the organization, their position could be more 
like that of the shareholders in commercial organizations. 
 
NGOs are somewhere in between the two extremes of commercial and religious 
organizations. The Institutional donors (and the individual donors in the community) 
replace the shareholders in providing the funding for the organization. But their motive 
is not profit and they have no residual claim on the assets of the NGO. The impact of 
NGOs’ activities on them is Medium, particularly for the Institutional donors, as NGOs 
help them achieve their humanitarian objectives. The Institutional donors through their 
funding decisions have power to make changes in the NGOs though the individual 
donors do not have such power. But both require more than traditional accounting 
information (types A). This means that if accountability is limited to type A, there will 
be an information divide in relation to the needs of the donors. Assessing NGOs’ 
accountability against the same practices as the private sector may, therefore, yield the 
misleading conclusion that NGOs are less accountable as noted by Gray et al. (2006) 
concerning a study that suggests NGOs are less accountable than corporations based on 
a definition of accountability in terms of control and reporting, attributes that are 
closely similar to type A form of accountability: 
‘At the heart of Kovach et al. (2003) study is an examination of the 
accountability  processes of three groups of organisations: transnational 
corporations (TNCs),  NGOs and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). The 
accountability was proxied by two variables: member control and access to 
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online information....Of course, one would need to extend considerable caution 
on relying on the results shown (that NGOs are less accountable than TNCs)’ 
(Gray et al., 2006: 332) 
  
Also, the role of the beneficiaries (users) is somewhat different from those of the 
worshipers (also users) in religious organizations. The main difference is that unlike the 
worshipers, they do not provide the funding for the organization and have no power to 
make changes in NGOs. 
 
In summary, the nature of accountability practices in organizations is affected by the 
composition of the stakeholders, their relative influences and information needs. Where 
the resulting practices do not meet the needs of some stakeholders (more likely the less 
influential stakeholders), an information divide is created. This will be considered more 
problematic where the Impact of the organization’s activities on those stakeholders is 
high than where the Impact is low.  
 
The composition of the stakeholders, their needs and influence are variables that affect 
organization’s accountability practices. The influence, which is linked to the power of 
stakeholders and the way it is exercised, is a particularly significant variable. The 
interactions between these variables occur within a social context that affects the 
practice of accountability in organizations. The theoretical model therefore uses 





4.4 A Structuration Theory Model of Accountability   
The concept of accountability is a socially constructed one therefore, its meaning and 
form cannot be divorced from the social context in which it is practiced. This section 
introduces Giddens’ (1979; 1984) structuration theory as a relevant approach to 
understanding how the social context affects the evolution and sustaining of 
accountability practices in different organizations and sectors. The introduction of this 
thinking is intended to complement and extend the theoretical analysis developed in 
section 4.3 by adding a more contextual appreciation to the dynamic interactions 
between the stakeholders’ influence and their information needs. 
 
 The core of structuration theory is the ‘duality of agency and structure’: that agency 
and social structure interact in the production and reproduction of social systems 
(Giddens, 1984: 162). This means that social systems (or structure) are dynamic and 
constantly recreated as a result of the activities of the social actors involved. Giddens 
rejected the view of social systems as a form of totality having properties analogous to 
those which control the form and development of an organism (Giddens 1984: 163). He 
contends that through the activities of social actors, social systems evolve or change in 
clear identifiable episodes. He describes these episodes as 
‘identifiable sequences of change affecting the main institutions within a 
societal totality, or involving transition between types of societal totality’ 
(Giddens, 1984: 244)  
 
To understand how social actors (or Human Agency) influence or recreate social 
systems, it is important to examine Giddens’ views on each of these two important 
elements of the theory. 
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4.4.1 Human Agency 
Giddens uses human agency to refer to the activities of social actors. He sees human 
agents as knowledgeable. By this he means that they know a great deal about the 
conditions and consequences of what they do. Giddens (1984: 3) suggests that the 
‘knowledgeability of the human agent is reflexive in form and different from the coded 
programmes that sustain natural systems’. This implies that the activities of social 
actors can result in a change is social systems but not in any programmable manner. 
The ability of social actors to effect conscious change in a particular direction is 
curtailed by the limited nature of the knowledge possessed by social actors, or as 
Giddens put this:  
‘This knowledgeability …involved in the recursive ordering of social 
practices…is bounded on one hand by the unconscious and on the other by 
unintended consequences of action’ (Giddens, 1984: 3-4) 
 
According to Giddens (1975:5) knowledge exists on three levels. The first is the level 
of unconsciousness which relates to the motives behind human action. The second 
level, practical consciousness, is the tacit stacks of knowledge which actors draw upon 
in the constitution of social activities while discursive consciousness, the third level, 
involves knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of discourse 
(Giddens, 1984: 44-45) Discursive consciousness is involved in the rationalization of 
action which entails giving verbal expression to the reasons for conduct. However, it is 
practical consciousness that is involved in the reflexive monitoring of action as actors 
often respond to social interaction using implicit stocks of knowledge which are not 
directly accessible to the consciousness of individual agents (Gidden 1984: 5-7). This is 
because it is impossible for agents to pause, reflect and make conscious choices about 
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their behaviour for every event flowing by the stream of social action and interaction 
(Macintosh and Scapens, 1990: 458). What this implies is that the various methods of 
accountability in use by organizations are influenced by the tacit stock of knowledge 
that the social actors draw upon in shaping their accountability practices. This is the 
level of practical consciousness. But the practices are also influenced by the 
‘unconscious’ level relating to the motivation behind those actions and the unintended 
consequences of the actions. This motivation may not be obvious to an observer or 
even the actors. It is the interaction with this ‘unconscious’ that makes the evolution 
and shaping of social systems (or structure) complex and non-programmable and 
somewhat out of the direct control of the social actors. 
 
4.4.2 Structure 
The concept of structure is fundamental to structuration theory. Giddens (1984: 185) 
used it in two senses. In the first sense, he uses structure to refer to ‘rules and resources 
involved in the Institutional articulation of social systems’ (Giddens, 1984: 21). He 
describes rules of social life as generalizable procedures enacted to order social 
practices, which actors are aware of in their practical consciousness. According to 
Giddens, it is these rules that structure social systems by ‘sustaining, termination and 
reforming of encounters’ (Giddens 1984: 22-23). The various rules, practices and 
methods of accountability currently used by organizations may therefore, be viewed as 
constituting part of the structure on which the accountability system is built.  
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In the second sense, Giddens (1984: 186) uses structure in a more general way to refer 
to ‘the Institutionalised features of social systems stretching across time and space’ In 
this sense, Giddens implies that once the social practices have been structured and 
those practices accepted as the norms of social life over a wide span of time, those 
practices then constitute the structure. The distinction between structure and system is 
not very explicit but Giddens (1979: 66) attempts to explicate it  
‘Structure (refers to the) rules and resources organised as properties of social 
systems….System (refers to) reproduced relationships between actors and 
collectivities organized as regular social practices’ 
 
Robert and Scapens (1985: 446) further explain that ‘systems are not structures, but 
rather systems have structures which are produced and reproduced only through being 
drawn upon by people in interaction with one another.’  
 
For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to view organizational accountability as a 
social system supported by a structure consisting of certain Institutionalised rules and 
practices.  This system or structure though stable may change or evolve over time. How 
the system is created, sustained or recreated over time could be understood by 
examining certain properties of social structures. Giddens identified three such 
structural properties as signification, domination and legitimation.  
 
Signification refers to the organised sets of codes or rules on which the system is 
founded. These are drawn upon by social actors who apply their stock of knowledge 
(practical consciousness) reflexively to communicate meanings. In essence, 
signification refers to the collective understanding of the rules of the system entrenched 
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in the practical consciousness of the actors. This is not easily changeable as 
demonstrated by the failure of the first SORP introduced for charity accounting in the 
UK (see 2.5.4. for details).  Gambling et al (1990) concluded that the standard was 
generally ignored because a major group of social actors involved (the charity 
accounting practitioners) did not identify with the views expressed in it. The emphasis 
on net surplus and capital maintenance suggested by the standard, which has gained 
acceptance or signification in the private sector was challenged by practitioners in 
charities as not suitable in reflecting their activities. These views were taken into 
account in subsequent revision of the SORP.  For any such views to permanently 
influence or change the accountability structure, they must be widely accepted by all 
the major actors and Institutionalised in form of rules or codes. The process by which 
this occurs could be described by the other two structural properties identified by 
Giddens (1984) as ‘domination’ and ‘legitimation’.  
 
Domination describes the potential for some social actors (or stakeholders) to influence 
the course of evolution of social systems by reason of their control of allocative 
resources (referring to capabilities generating command over objects, goods or 
materials) and authoritative resources (referring to capabilities generating command 
over persons or actors) Giddens (1984: 31- 33) describes it as ‘the persuasive influence 
of power in social life’. The most powerful stakeholders (usually those having 
allocative or authoritative capabilities) have more influence in determining which set of 
practices are sustained.  
 
 150 
Legitimation relates to the sanctioning of conduct. The sanction could be positive 
connected with reward, or negative in form of punishment (Giddens 1976: 109-110): 
‘Legitimation structures are those shared sets of values and ideals about what is 
to count as important and what is to be trivialised; and what ought to happen 
and what ought not to happen. It involves a normative aspect consisting of rules 
and a moral aspect consisting of the obligation to follow them’. (Macintosh and 
Scapens, 1991: 142) 
 
Structures of signification are closely connected to those of domination and 
legitimation and are separable only analytically (Giddens, 1984: 31-33) For example  
the idea of ‘accountability’.. gives cogent expression to the intersection of 
interpretive schemes and norms. To be ‘accountable’ for one’s activities is both 
to explicate the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby 
they may be ‘justified’. (Giddens, 1984:30) 
 
Through the use of the power of sanction, powerful stakeholders have influence in 
determining which of the evolving organizational practices gain legitimacy thereby 
completing the process of Institutionalization. It can be concluded that while the 
evolution of accountability practices is influenced by the collective understanding and 
practices of all the social actors involved, those practices that gain ‘domination’ and 
‘legitimation’ are determined by the more powerful stakeholders involved. These actors 
may therefore have significant influence on the course of evolution or change in the 
structure of accountability practices. According to Giddens (1984: 27-28): 
‘in the context of social life, there occur processes of selective information 
filtering whereby strategically placed actors seek reflexively to regulate the 
overall conditions of system reproduction either to keep things as they are or 
change them.’  
 
Roberts and Scapens (1985: 448) analyse accountability systems as ‘drawing upon and 
thereby reproducing structures of Signification, Legitimation and Domination’. They 
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show the signification properties of accounting as a language of accountability, 
providing organization members with a set of categories that serve as a structure of 
meanings drawn upon to order their experiences and action. This may or may not be 
appropriate for all the stakeholders depending on their objectives and values as Roberts 
and Scapens (1985: 448) admit that ‘the precise significance of events are open to 
different interpretations, to elaborations, to negotiation and to dispute’. The 
legitimation and domination structures can be viewed in terms of the exercise of the 
power and influence of the stakeholders. These also have significant influence on 
organizations’ accountability practices. 
 
This study incorporates elements of structuration theory in the skeletal theoretical 
framework for analysis to explain how the composition of the stakeholders, their 
objectives, values and information needs and the interaction between them have 
determined the accountability system and practices in organizations. 
 
A major critique of structuration theory relates to its abstract form and the difficulty in 
linking it with any particular approach to empirical research.  Gregson (1989: 240) sees 
it as a ‘second-order theory’ that is concerned with constituents of society, different 
from a ‘first order theory’ which is relevant in explaining the events of a particular 
period. Giddens (1990:310) clarified that structuration theory is not meant to be a 
concrete research programme but rather an ‘overall ontology of social life, offering 
concepts that should be useful as sensitising devises for research purposes’. It is in this 
sense that the theory is used to enhance understanding of the dynamics of the 
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relationships between the variables in the theoretical framework developed for the 
study. 
 
Laughlin (1990: 94) sees structuration theory as enabling the design of skeletal models 
which can be applicable across different situations but ‘fleshed out’ using different 
empirical details. He argued that ‘appreciating the underlying context and structure of 
accountability practices provides a much needed dynamic complement to the 
theoretical insights into accountability already advanced’ (Laughlin, 1990: 98) 
 
The following subsection summarises the skeletal theory used for the empirical 
investigation.  
 
4.5 A model of Accountability in Organizations 
Figure 4.3 is a summary of the theoretical model used in the study. It shows that 
accountability practices in organizations could be rendered using one or more of the 
four possible approaches. What determine the actual practices are two main influences 
operating at two different levels. At the first level are two direct influences arising 
from: 
1. The endogenous variables that influence the form in which account is rendered 
(or the bases of account). These variables are: how specific and measurable the 
organization’s objectives are (O); how economic the activities required to 
achieve those objectives are (E); and how programmable is the link between 
those activities and the achievement of the objectives (P). Where the size of 
 153 
these variables are low, accountability bases will tend towards the performance 
based as there  will be a sociological divide (ds) that limits the ability of 
traditional accounting (the main tool in the process based approach) to satisfy 
the full accountability needs in the organization.  The size of this divide is 
measured as: 
ds           1  .                               
            O*P*E 
 
2. The exogenous variables relating to the composition of the stakeholders, their 
objectives and information needs and their relative influence in the 
organization. This influence is proportional to the product of their power to 
make changes in the organization (P) and the impact of the organization’s 
activities on them (I). 
 Stakeholder’s Influence = Impact x Power 
The influence may be exerted in shaping the organization’s objectives and 
activities or in determining the forms of accountability practices.  
Where the information needs of a particular stakeholder are not met, an 
information divide (di) results, the magnitude of which is expressed as: 
di = Organization’s accountability practices – Stakeholder’s preference 
 
At the second level are the indirect influences resulting from the dynamic 
interactions between the stakeholders occurring within the social context marked by 
the structure of signification, legitimation and domination. 
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Figure 4.3 - A skeletal model of the influences on the choice of 
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The empirical work will investigate the nature of the endogenous and exogenous  
variables in the 6 case studies. It will investigate the existence and the extent of any 
sociological and information divides and examine the interplay of the social context 
and the nature of the interactions between the stakeholders. Fleshing out the skeletal 
theory with these empirical details will offer a descriptive analysis of NGOs’ 




This chapter attempted to outline the basic theoretical framework used to approach the 
study. The chapter revisited the categorisation of the approaches to accountability 
based on the form of giving account and the form of holding to account developed in 
Chapter 2. It labelled the resulting four possible approaches as the ‘accountability 
space’ defining the range of possibilities from which organizational practices could be 
chosen.  
 
The chapter introduced the model of endogenous variables to explain the role and 
limitation of traditional forms of accounting in organizations’ accountability. It 
suggests that where the organization’s objectives are specific and measurable and the 
activities required in achieving them are economic in nature and bear a programmable 
link to the achievement of the objectives, there will be a very small sociological divide 
that means accounting information will to a large extent fulfil the organization’s 
accountability.  But where the converse is the case, there will be a significant 
 156 
sociological divide that means traditional accounting information alone cannot fulfil the 
organization’s accountability and should be supplemented with other forms of 
performance based approaches.  
 
It also introduced a model of the exogenous variables relating to the stakeholders’ 
information needs and suggested that organisation’s accountability practices depend on 
the information preference of the stakeholders. It suggests that the influence of 
stakeholders is related to their power to make changes in the organization and the 
impact of the organization’s activities on the stakeholder. It suggests that where the 
organization’s accountability practices are focused exclusively on the needs of the 
influential stakeholders there will be an information divide with regard to the needs of 
the non-influential stakeholders. It described the information divide as the divergence 
between the organization’s practices and the information preference of stakeholders. 
This divide will not be considered a problem if the impact of the organization’s 
activities on the non-influential stakeholders is low, but it will be considered a problem 
if the impact is high. The chapter introduced structuration theory to explain how the 
interactions between the stakeholders, against the backdrop of their relative influence 
and their values (or views on the significance of events), determine the form of 
organizational accountability. 
The following propositions follow from the theoretical model developed: 
1. Where an organization’s objectives are specific and measurable and the 
activities required to achieve them are economic in nature and bear a 
programmable link to the achievement of the objectives, there will be a very 
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small sociological divide and traditional accounting information will to a large 
extent fulfil the organization’s accountability.  
2. Where an organization’s objectives are not specific or measurable and the 
activities required to achieve them are not economic in nature and bear no 
programmable link to the achievement of the objectives, there will be a large 
sociological divide and traditional accounting information alone cannot fulfil 
the organization’s accountability. 
3. Where an organization’s accountability practices are focused exclusively on the 
needs of some stakeholders there will be an information divide with regard to 
the needs of other stakeholders. 
4. An information divide with regard to a particular stakeholder will cease to exist 
if this stakeholder has the power to make changes in the organization to ensure 
that accountability information required by this stakeholder is supplied. 
5. An information divide with regard to a particular stakeholder will continue to 
exist if this stakeholder does not have the power to make changes in the 
organization to ensure that the accountability information required by this 
stakeholder is supplied. This will be a significant problem if the impact of the 
organization’s activities on the stakeholder is high. 
6. The signification, legitimation and domination structures that underlie the 
accountability practices in organizations provide important insights into why 
these practices occur.  
As befits ‘middle range thinking’ these propositions will be used to shape and be 
shaped through the empirical data and analysis of actual NGO accountability practices. 
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Chapter 5 
Lead Case Study: Data and Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding two chapters set out the research approach and the theoretical model 
used in the study. This informed the approach to data collection and analysis.  The 
main categories used for the data collection and analysis are taken from the theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 4. At the first level are the organizational objectives, the 
organization’s activities, the stakeholders’ needs and the accountability practices. At 
the second level are the underlying social interactions that shape them and how these 
have influenced the practices observed. This chapter sets out the data collected, the 
analysis and the main findings from the lead case study (labelled as Case Study 1 or 
CS1). The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 5.2 gives the general 
background to CS1, its objectives, activities and sources of funding. Section 5.3 
describes CS1’s current accountability practices while section 5.4 follows through a 
typical programme implemented by CS1 to exemplify how these practices are 
operationalised. Section 5.5 uses the theoretical model developed in chapter 4 to 
analyze CS1’s accountability practices. The influence of the social context on these 
practices is examined in section 5.6 using Structuration theory. Section 5.7 draws some 
conclusions from the data analysis. 
 
5.2 Background to CS1 
CS1 was established in 1969 by a journalist, worried about the post second world war 
rise in inter-ethnic conflict and pogroms against minorities around the world. He 
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‘brought together a small group of journalist, academic and anti- apartheid 
campaigners’ and proposed using the strategy of ‘the higher blackmail’ involving 
publishing information about human rights violation and discrimination in order to 
shame governments into improving their records (CS1/LT/09: 3).With the first grant 
secured from the Ford foundation, the organization was launched at a press conference 
in November 1969. It started researching and gathering information on human rights 
violation experienced by minorities around the world. Six initial reports were produced. 
By the end of the decade, it had produced fifty reports and had gained consultative 
status with the United Nations. By 1988 it had produced 150 reports and half a million 
copies sold by 1990. These achieved the organization’s objectives but to a limited 
extent in that ‘while many governments acknowledged the importance of human 
rights…the need to ensure protection for minority communities still regularly proved 
controversial’ (CS1/LT/09: 6). The organization found out that to protect minorities, it 
needed to do more than exposing injustices and human rights violations. It began to use 
‘international pressures and the authority of international law to challenge instances of 
minority rights violations around the world. Our consultative status at the UN is a 
major boost to our advocacy efforts’ (CS1/IV1/08).  CS1 records as part of its 
achievement the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the UN Declaration on the Right 
of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 
1992. It considers this as a major step forward in securing international agreement on 
minority rights. It also counts as major parts of its achievement its help in securing the 
following major advances in minority and indigenous peoples’ rights: 
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1. The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, 1995 
2. Establishment of the office of the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide (2004) and the UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues (2005) 
3. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007.  
4. The UN Forum on Minority Issues 2008 
(CS1/LT/09:7) 
 
By the turn of the century, most of its published resources had migrated to the internet. 
These included the online World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People 
containing entries on minority issues in every country in the world. It also publishes the 
annual State of the World’s Minorities which contains the Peoples Under Threat table 
that identifies those communities most at risk. 
 
CS1 realized that ‘international agreements on human rights were worthless unless they 
were implemented on the ground’ (CS1/LT/09: 10) and began seeking new ways of 
holding governments to account on how minorities were treated. This resulted in the 
development of its National Advocacy programmes, involving partner organizations, 
aimed at equipping minority communities with the skills to dialogue with their 
governments. ‘But when governments refuse to listen, it sometimes becomes necessary 
to take legal action’ (CS1/IV1/ 08). In 2002 CS1 decided to add to its work, 
international litigation for the protection of minority rights. This has developed into a 
full programme involving a number of legal cases. 
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‘We select cases where new precedents could be set or where the judgments can 
impact positively on a large number of people such as an entire community’ 
(CS1/IV1/ 08) 
 
The prominent ones among these legal cases are where CS1 have: 
1. Challenged the denial of minorities’ access to high office in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina before the European Court of Human Rights. 
2. Promoted a major claim for indigenous land rights in Kenya before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
3. Together with other organizations, helped win a European Court ruling banning 
the segregation of Roma Children in Czech Republic. 
4. Helped secure representation for minorities in the Botswana House of Chiefs 
after a 40-year struggle. 
 
 In 1981 CS1 was registered in the UK as a charity and a company limited by 
guarantee. It has annual turnover of about £3m and employs 35 people, 27 of whom are 
based in the UK and the rest mainly in two offices located in Africa and Europe. Its 
stated aim is: 
‘to secure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and 
indigenous peoples and to promote cooperation and understanding between 
communities’ (CS1/PR/09: 4). 
 
 It draws a link between minority rights and safe/equitable society and thinks that abuse 
of minority rights causes conflict. It maintains that respect for minority rights also 
benefits the larger community by avoiding conflict and promoting peaceful co-
existence. Its strategy for achieving its objectives has evolved over the years since its 
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first approach at inception which then involved conducting research into areas of 
minority rights abuse and publishing reports on findings. It finds out that this was not 
having as much impact as desired as policy makers often ignore the reports. This 
prompted the change in strategy towards influencing policy changes through advocacy 
in the 1980s. It has recently expanded its work to include taking up legal cases 
involving minority rights abuse before National and International courts. It also works 
with major international institutions to strengthen international mechanism for the 
protection of minorities.  
 
CS1 is governed by an international council of about 12 - 15 members including 
representatives of minority communities around the world. It aims to maintain a North-
South balance of representation at this level by ensuring that 50% of its members are 
drawn from countries based in the southern hemisphere. The council meets twice a year 
to approve the accounts, the strategy and the planned upcoming programmes of the 
NGO. The board has two committees: A Finance and General Purposes Committee that 
meets a further twice a year to look after the finance and administration issues and a 
Legal Advisory Committee to support the legal cases programmes of the organization. 
 
The management of CS1 is carried out by a team of five, consisting of the Executive 
Director, the Deputy Director in charge of the fundraising and the human resources 
functions, and three other directors: The Directors of Programmes; Policy and 
Communications; and Finance and Administration. The organization has its main office 
in London and two regional offices to support its programmes in the regions. The 
 163 
Uganda Office coordinates its Africa Programmes while the Hungary Office 
coordinates its Europe Programmes.  These offices are established as NGOs under the 
countries’ laws and prepare accounts which are audited locally. These are consolidated 
into the Head Office accounts. In addition CS1 works through partners, mainly local 
NGOs and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) spread globally, by giving them 
small grants to carry out specific activities under its various programmes. The 
involvement of the community is based on the belief that ‘the best long-term advocates 
for minority rights are members of minority communities themselves’ (CS1/IV1/ 08). 
 
5.2.1 Organizational Objectives and Strategy 
The main objectives of CS1 are derived from the original vision of its founder to 
protect the human rights of minorities in the face of increasing conflicts around the 
world. This is stated in its mission statement as two fold. The first is protecting the 
rights of minorities and indigenous peoples while the second is promoting cooperation 
and understanding between communities. It aims to achieve these objectives by 
developing and implementing relevant programmes. These programmes potentially 
cover a broad area of activities. CS1 has attempted to define its mandate/ focus of its 
activities in more specific terms. This has been challenging because of two main issues 
around the nature of its objectives. The first is that there is no legal or internationally 
accepted definition of minorities. One of the reasons for this relate to ‘the diversity of 
this groups and the situations in which they live’. In some cases, they may be 
geographically separated from the majority population (for example the Himong 
minority in Vietnam who live in the mountainous province of Yen Bai). In other cases, 
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they are scattered throughout the country (e.g the Serbs in Kosovo) or throughout a 
region (e.g the Roma people in Europe). Another reason is because of the fear that such 
a definition could be used by governments to exclude certain minorities from their 
rights because of the limiting criteria of a definition (CS1/LT/08:8). Up to 2006, CS1 
accepted this position and admits that: 
‘There is no internationally agreed definition of minorities ..In its 60-year 
history and despite repeated attempts, the UN has failed to agree a definition of 
what constitutes a minority’ (CS1/PR/ 05: 2) 
 
This has not been a major limitation to CS1’s work, as certain recurring characteristics 
are used to identify minorities and to guide its work. Some of these characteristics are: 
specific ethnic, linguistic or religious identity; position of numerical minority; or 
distinct ethnic religious or linguistic groups which are subject to discrimination even 
when they are not a numerical minority. Though taken together, these characteristics 
identify the groups of people the organization aims to support, ‘none of these 
characteristics are entirely satisfactory taken by themselves’ (CS1/LT/08:8) For 
example a group may be a minority within a state but a majority in the region. Or a 
numerical minority in a state may have a disproportionate amount of economic and 
political power. But from 2007 CS1 began to review this position. It reasons that: 
‘for an organization whose main objective is the protection of minorities’ 
rights, accepting that there is no definition of minorities makes the organization 
appear weak and less focused’ (CS1/IV1/ 08) 
  
It therefore decided to adopt its own definition and in September 2008 assigned a team 
headed by a council member (trustee) knowledgeable in the subject to consult with all 
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staff and stakeholders to produce a ‘working’ definition.  After a series of consultations 
and debates, a proposed definition was accepted in April 2009. It reads: 
‘Minorities of concern to CS1 are disadvantaged ethnic or national, religious, 
linguistic or cultural groups who are smaller in number than the rest of the 
population and who usually wish to maintain and develop their identity’ 
(CS1/MM/09:4- 45) 
 
But the organization accepts that this is neither a legal definition nor an all-inclusive 
one as some groups that qualify to be described as minorities may not be included in 
the definition (CS1/MM/09:4) 
 
In order to aid the measurement of its achievement against its broad objectives, CS1 
has attempted to break down its main objectives into smaller more specific objectives 
around which its activities are organized. This is done through the strategic planning 
process carried out in a 4-year cycle by the management team with involvement of all 
staff. It is done in a consultative process involving a wide range of its stakeholders, 
including partners, donors, Council members and staff’ (CS1/PR/04: 5) The plan 
breaks down the two broad objectives into specific and measurable ones around which 
individual programme activities are designed. The plan is approved by the board of 
trustees (the Council) and guides the work of the NGO over the planning period. It also 
serves as a tool for accountability against which performance is measured and reported 
yearly and at the end of each strategic planning period. The ways the two broad 
objectives have been broken down has changed over the years and continue to evolve. 
In the 2001 -04 strategic plan, the two broad objectives were developed into fourteen 
detailed strategic objectives (see Appendix 1) 
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The plan incorporates a list of activities to be carried out towards achieving these 
objectives but the plan did not clearly indicate how the achievement of these detailed 
objectives would be measured. Under the heading ‘Development and progress aimed 
for in 2002-2004’ it merely lists the activities it aims to carry out as the achievements 
expected over the plan period. It, therefore, makes no clear distinction between the 
activities to be carried out and the objectives that would be achieved.  A strategic 
review was undertaken in 2004.  CS1 realized the shortcomings in how it has 
interpreted its objectives and the weak link between its activities and the expected 
outcomes. The NGO sought to improve this in its next strategic plan: 
‘we are, however, looking for new and better ways of presenting our strategic 
statements. Although our work will remain broad in scope, we aim to reduce the 
strategic objectives to no more than six. We aim to find ways of sharing our 
theories of how our work causes positive changes in the real world for 
minorities’ (CS1/PR/04: 5) 
 
The strategic plan for 2005-2008 made a major attempt to translate its broad objectives 
into a more concise list of six objectives which were now labelled as planned 
‘outcomes’ to emphasize the focus on measuring their achievement: 
‘This presents a strategic shift towards a greater focus on ensuring our work 
eventually translates into on-the-ground change for minorities and indigenous 
peoples’ (CS1/PR/ 05: 4)   
 
The six objectives or outcomes are: 
1. Increased public participation by minority and indigenous peoples 
2. Positive changes in national legislation, policy and practice   
3. Strengthening international mechanisms and standards 
4. Improved international development cooperation for minorities and indigenous 
peoples 
5. Increased awareness and understanding of inter-ethnic and inter-religious issues 
6. Prevention of violent conflicts in situations involving minorities. 
(CS1/PR/05: 6-8)   
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The activities required to achieve these objectives were listed as:  
‘Capacity building and training of minorities and indigenous peoples’ 
organizations; In-country research and advocacy programmes with partners; 
Legal casework; Advocacy at UN, EU and other inter-governmental bodies; 
Reports, briefings, media coverage; publicity and early warning’(CS1/PR/05: 
6). 
  
The detailed 2005-08 strategies together with the activities needed to achieve them are 
listed in Appendix 2 and summarized in Figure 5.1  
 
Achievements against the strategic objectives are measured yearly but more 
comprehensively at the end of the four year period during the strategic review exercise.  
 
CS1 is aware that some of the objectives may not be achieved over a four-year period 
but may take longer to achieve. It therefore devised a second time-frame of ten years 
over which the achievement of some of the objectives will be measured. It expects that 
its work ‘cumulatively would result in these four broad outcomes:  
1. National laws, policies, processes and practices are inclusive of minorities and 
respond to their needs and concerns appropriately. 
2. Minorities and indigenous peoples’ standards of life, political participation and 
civil rights are closer to national averages 
3. Discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples is reduced. 
4. A reduction in inter-communal tension leading to fewer new inter-ethnic 
conflicts breaking out’ (CS1/PR/05: 9) 
 
The strategy has been implemented and a report on the outcome compiled. The report 
incorporates feedback from stakeholders who in the main were donors and 
beneficiaries. The feedback shows that the core area of CS1’s work around research 
and publications; workshops and training of minority rights CBOs and activists were 
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rated as more successful and valued by stakeholders than the newer areas such as legal 
cases and media work. The feedback was incorporated in the new 2009-12 strategic 
plan which also incorporates emerging needs identified: 
 
‘We considered the changing patterns of violations against the rights of 
minorities and indigenous peoples, the emerging opportunities for advocacy 
with governments and inter-governmental organizations and the expressed 
needs of minority communities, in order to decide how and where our work 
could have most impact over the next four years’ (CS1/PR/09: 3) 
 
This, however, did not lead to a major change but the six objectives were slightly 
modified and restated as: 
1. Strengthening the voices of minorities and indigenous people 
2. Reducing poverty and ending discrimination 
3. Changing discriminatory attitudes. 
4. Promoting minority and indigenous participation 
5. Preventing conflict and mass atrocities 
6. Strengthen international systems for minority protection’ 
(CS1/PR/09: 3) 
The modification was to give more emphasis to particular areas of its work and 
deemphasize others. For example, Objective 1 (Strengthening the voices of minorities 
and indigenous peoples) was reinforced while Objectives 2 and 3 in the 2005-08 
strategic plan were reconceived as mere strategies for achieving the six new objectives: 
‘Our key strategies for achieving this will include bringing about positive 
changes in national laws, policies and practices, and increasing the participation 
of and protection for women from minority and indigenous communities’ 
(CS1/PR/10: 3) 
 
To achieve these objectives a range of activities are planned. These are packaged as 
separate programmes and described in the next subsection. 
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5.2.2 Organizational activities 
CS1’s programmes are varied and diverse. They are grouped together either as regional 
programmes addressing one or more of the detailed objectives in a particular region or 
thematic programmes focusing on particular objectives across several regions: 
‘Programmes are divided between two types: those which are based on a 
thematic area or methodology and can involve minority partners from all over 
the world and those which are geographically based and concentrate on 
minorities or indigenous peoples in a particular region, sub-region or country’ 
(CS1/PR/10: 14) 
   
In terms of regional grouping, the organization works mainly in Africa, Europe and 
Asia. New projects are being developed for the Middle East and Latin America but 
these are yet to attract funding and so have not been implemented.  
‘While our current geographical focus remains in the Horn, Eastern and Central 
Africa, South East Europe and South and South East Asia, we are pleased to 
report that active work in Latin America has started in 2009…we have also 
designed a new programme of work for the Middle East, a region where our 
presence has remained limited until now’ (CS1/PR/10: 22) 
 
In terms of grouping along thematic lines, programmes are developed to address 
particular issues across several countries or regions.  Thematic areas of its work are:  
  
1. Prevention of genocide and conflict involving minorities: This involves 
research aimed at understanding the minority rights issue in most of the world’s 
conflict and ‘disseminating early warning and other public information about 
minority rights abuses, thus contributing to preventing conflict and mass 
atrocities. This contributes to the achievement of Objective 5.  
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2. Legal cases challenging minority rights violation: this includes challenging the 
displacement of indigenous communities from their ancestral lands (e.g the 
Endorois in Kenya); fighting for non-discriminatory access for minority tribes 
to the house of chiefs in Botswana; challenging discriminatory treatment of 
religious minorities in Bosnia and Kosovo; fighting for the rights of Turkey’s 
minorities to register their children’s names according to their culture and 
heritage; challenging the forced removal of the indigenous Chagos islanders 
from their land in a British overseas territory. These legal cases contribute to 
achievement of Objective 6:   
‘Many of these cases are hinged on governments respect for 
International  treaties and form an integral part of our advocacy work’ 
(CS1/IV1/08) 
 
3. Minority Voices in the Media: aims to address the negative attitudes resulting 
from ignorance and lack of contact between majority and minorities and 
indigenous peoples by highlighting to the global public the necessities of 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals for them. It aims to launch a 
‘Minority Voices web-hub’ to upload stories, photos and video footages for use 
by EU-based journalists. This contributes to achievement of Objectives 1, 2 and 
3. 
(CS1/PR/ 09: 14-18) 
 
These programmes usually span a period of one to three years. Figure 5.1 exemplifies 
the interconnections between the objectives and programme activities using three of the 
23 projects implemented in 2008.   
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In order to achieve its objectives, CS1 carries out various activities. While some of 
them are specific to particular programmes, a number of them are generic and 
frequently reoccur in many of its programmes. For example, training of minority 
rights activists, publication of reports on minority rights abuse and national 
advocacy campaigns are activities that frequently occur across many programmes. 
In total, 23 programmes were implemented in the year 2008 (Appendix 2). An 
example is the programme: South East Europe: Diversity and Democracy-Phase 3 
(or SEE project) which focused on establishing links and dialogue between 
minority communities in South East Europe (with focus on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) and 
individuals within the European Commission and parliament. The programme was 
designed to contribute to the achievement of objectives 1, 2, 3 and 6 in the 2009-12 
strategic plans.  
‘Throughout this project…we are supporting minority organizations to ensure 
that they acquire the skills and knowledge they need to effectively engage with 
their government and the European Union as part of the EU accession process 
(outcome 1). The focus of the advocacy campaigns implemented as part of this 
initiative is to tackle the poverty and discrimination faced by minority 
communities across the region (outcome 2)’. (CS1/PR/10: 32) 
 
The activities involve organizing seminars to train minority representatives on 
carrying out advocacy on behalf of their communities and supporting them to use 




CS1’s programmes are designed based on needs assessment carried out. This may be in 
one of two ways. The first involves a field visit by CS1 staff to meet with the intended 
beneficiaries of a proposed programme (CS1/PO/PR). The needs are jointly identified 
and the range of activities required to meet them are agreed with the beneficiaries 
(CS1/PO/SE). In the second case particular needs are identified by beneficiaries who 
then approach CS1 for support. If the needs fall within areas of CS1’s objectives, a 
programme may be designed to address it (CS1/PO/EX). The activities needed to 
achieve the programme objectives are laid out and the time frame or programme 
duration set (usually one, two or three years). The tool used in this is the ‘Logical 
Framework’ (called Log-frame from now on). It is a table setting out the programme 
objectives, the outcome expected and the activities to be performed together with 
verifiable indicators of their achievement and the means of verification. The use of the 
Log-frame is encouraged by CS1’s major donors (particularly the European 
Commission and the UK Department of International Department, DFID) who require 
CS1 to use it in the design, monitoring and reporting on programmes proposals 
submitted to them for funding: 
‘The Logical Framework is useful in the design and planning, implementation, 
and monitoring of a programme…We wish to ensure that reporting and 
monitoring for strategic funding relationships does not focus on excessive detail 
but rather remain at the strategic level by focusing on outcomes and impact’ 






The DFID provides a sample Log-frame with guidance on how to use it and justifies 
why it recommends its use in this way: 
‘DFID recommends the use of the Log Frame because: 
- It clarifies how the programme or project is expected to work and what it is 
going to achieve and helps to ensure that inputs, activities, outputs and 
purpose are not confused with each other; 
- It clarifies how programme or project success (qualitative and quantitative) 




CS1 uses the log-frame for programme design and reporting. Extract from the log-
frame for the SEE project is shown in Appendix 5. 
 
A budget is also prepared and a decision to commence implementation is made when 
adequate funding is secured. This may be 100% of the budget or less where a 
programme is jointly funded by two or more donors (CS1/PO/EX). For example the 
Development Education programme and the Turkey project (see Section 5.4 below and 
Appendix 2) both commenced when only part of the funding were secured while 
fundraising activities continued. But the scope of the project may be limited if towards 
the end of the project’s life less than the total funding required has been raised. The 
project is deemed as completed when either all activities set out in the grant contract 
have been carried out or when the grant expires (CS1/PO/EX). Accountability for the 
programme is then carried out in accordance with contractual requirements. This 
process is described further in Section 5.3 
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CS1’s services are generally not paid for by the beneficiaries. For example, as part of 
its advocacy activities, CS1’s beneficiaries are given grants to attend international 
events in order to speak on issues affecting them. The amounts spent on advocacy 
events vary depending on the targets of such advocacy (e.g the UN, ACHPR, ECHR), 
the number of participants involved and their location.  CS1’s programme officers 
work with the local NGOs and CBOs involved to agree on the activities needed and 
establish a budget. CS1 does not appraise the economic efficiency of the activities 
either at the design or budgeting stages. Also, shadow reports and other publications 
are given free to advocacy targets. Where the publications are sold the fees are nominal 
and do not cover the cost of production and dissemination. For example, the sale of 
publications through the main distribution channel (Central Books) shows that for the 
period to January to October 2009 the distribution cost of the publications exceeded the 
sales revenue.  
 
CS1’s activities are, therefore financed mainly from grants and donations from 
individuals, Institutions and Governments. The next subsection describes the sources of 
CS1’s Income and how they are expended on its various activities.  
 
5.2.3 Funding of CS1’s programmes 
Figure 5.2 below is a summary of the composition of CS1’s Income and Expenditure. 
Funding for CS1’s activities come from two main sources: Unrestricted (or voluntary) 
income and restricted income.  
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Unrestricted incomes are funds generated by the organization with no restrictive 
conditions attached to its use. They are used for the general activities of the 
organization and to fund any of its programmes not already funded by the restricted 
fund. These constitute about 30% of its total funds.  
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CS1’s unrestricted income comes from 3 main sources: 
1. Internally generated from the sales of its reports, publication and copyrights; from 
subscription by individual and institutions; from consultancy services rendered; and 
income from investments (I in Figure 5.2). This accounts for only about 5.5 % of the 
unrestricted income. 
 2. The second source of unrestricted income is from individual supporters, in form of 
donations and legacies (d in Figure 5.2). This accounts for only about 0.5% of the 
unrestricted income. 
3. The third and most important type of unrestricted income are unrestricted (or core) 
grants from Institutional donors, foundations and some governments of northern 
countries for the general activities of the organization with no restriction made as to its 
use (D1).  In 2008, this accounted for about 94% of the unrestricted income. 
 
All the unrestricted income constitutes about 30% of CS1’s total income. About 80% of 
this is used up in meeting its overheads while only 20% is used in implementing 
programmes that could not be funded from restricted sources. This 20% usually serve 
as ‘match-funding’ for programmes that are only partly funded by restricted grants. 
Appendix 3 shows a breakdown of the restricted income by sources.  
 
The second major income type is Restricted Incomes provided under contract to the 
NGO for specific projects. 70% of CS1’s income is of this type. Total restricted income 
in 2008 was £1.9m out of a total income of £2.7m received (see Appendix 4). Almost 
all of the restricted income is provided by Institutional donors, governments and 
foundations. They are of two types. The first type is grants for specific approved 
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programme (D2). The second type is block grant for a number of named programmes 
which CS1 allocates according to the funding needs of the named programmes (D3)  
The programmes are small usually costing between £50,000 and £300,000 per annum 
and highly focused around a limited number of specific objectives. While some donors 
may fund 100% of a particular programme, others may provide only a part (e.g 80%) of 
the total cost and require CS1 to provide the match-funding from its unrestricted 
income or find another donor to provide it. Appendix 2 contains details of the restricted 
programmes implemented in 2008 showing the contributing donors and the amounts 
involved. 
 
Programme funding is secured in one of two ways. The first is by submitting 
programme proposals following the donors’ ‘call for proposals’. These happen when a 
donor has earmarked funds for certain broad purposes and invite NGOs to submit grant 
applications. The call specifies the donor’s areas of priority and the objectives they 
want the projects to achieve. It also contains guidance on the types of activities they 
envisage would be carried out and the size of the grant. NGOs are invited to submit 
‘Concept Notes’ which are a short description of the project. The projects may be 
designed specifically in response to the ‘Call for proposal’ in which case the project 
objectives are designed to fit into those set out in the ‘Call’. Or more commonly, a pre-
designed programme may be submitted in response to the call. Appendix 6 is an extract 
from a ‘Call for proposal’ for which CS1 submitted a Concept Note. It highlights the 
nature of information given by the donors when making such calls. 
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 The donors assess the various proposals received based on its pre-set criteria and 
decide on the programmes to fund. The successful programmes are those which the 
donor considers as meeting its priorities.  Most of CS1’s programmes are pre-designed 
and submitted to donors for funding either following a ‘call for proposal’ or 
independent of such call. This is because it takes CS1 about six to nine months to 
design a programme but many donors’ call are open for a period of about only six 
months making it difficult to meet the deadline if the design starts after the donor’s call 
has been made. Examples of CS1’s pre-designed programmes are the Development 
Education programme for which funding was successfully raised and the 
Afrodescendants in Latin America programme for which no funding was secured and 
the project could, therefore, not commence. Where a funding application is rejected, the 
feedbacks given by donors are carefully considered as learning points in the design of 
subsequent programmes. At other times, the application is not rejected entirely but the 
programme is pre-qualified subject to certain modifications. CS1 considers these 
suggested modifications and where possible incorporates them in the programme. 
 
What determines whether a programme is funded are the criteria which donors use in 
their appraisal. These vary from donor to donor but a few elements are common to all. 
Example of criteria used by one of CS1’s donors, the DFID in the preliminary 
assessment of programme proposals are: 
 Track record of working in the field of the theme applied for 
 Coherence and relevance of the set of activities and objectives proposed 
 Expected impact of the set of activities and objectives in making a 
difference in the area of the chosen theme 
 Adequate set of indicators and means of verification to evaluate progress 
(DFID/FG/08) 
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These criteria do not include the assessment of economic viability or efficiency of the 
programme. The donor confirms this in its ‘guide to funding scheme’: 
‘Proposals submitted are passed through a full technical appraisal. At this stage 
no-one undertakes a rigorous appraisal of your budget’ (DFID/FG/08: 3) 
 
Another of CS1’s major donor is the European Commission, EIDHR (see Glossary) 
uses an evaluation grid to assess proposals. The criteria are: 
 Financial and operational capacity of the NGO 
 Relevance of the objectives and priorities. This includes how well the 
programme objective supports the donor’s objectives as listed in the call and 
whether the target country falls within EC’s priority. Also included here is 
how the proposal meets the needs of the beneficiaries. The needs must be 
identified and justified and the number of beneficiaries involved 
(EC/FG/09) 
 
The relevance of objectives is considered more important, and is scored out of twenty-
five with a minimum score of twenty required for an application to be successful. The 
financial and operational capacity is considered less important than the programme 
objectives and scored out of twenty. A programme needs a minimum score of 12 to be 
successful. The guide requires that budget estimates accompanying a preliminary 
proposal only need be a general one which can be increased or decreased by up to 20% 
if it is prequalified to submit a detailed proposal.  
 
5.2.4 CS1’s Stakeholders 
CS1 has a number of stakeholders. These are: 
 Individual donors and supporters (d) who give small amounts towards its work. 
This group consists of numerous and dispersed individuals who do not come 
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together as one body. They contribute about 1% of CS1’s income and this goes 
into the unrestricted income pool 
 Institutional donors consisting of governments of the UK and some 
Scandinavian countries and major foundations and trusts. They give larger 
amounts of funds either as unrestricted or core grants (D1) or as restricted 
grants for specific projects (D2). Some may give restricted ‘block’ grants for a 
number of projects leaving CS1 with the discretion to allocate the amounts 
between the projects. 
 The regulatory authorities mainly through the Charity Commission. They do not 
provide funding for CS1 but are vested with the power to register and regulate 
charities’ activities. The commission provides the framework for its statutory 
reporting 
 The beneficiaries consisting of minority and indigenous communities and the 
small local NGOs and CBOs that represent them. They are the focus of CS1’s 
activities as its programmes are designed to meet their needs. 
 
The stakeholders could be categorized as contractual and non-contractual. Two of the 
stakeholders fall into the contractual group. The first are the Institutional donors who 
provide the bulk of CS1’s funding as contractual grants. The needs of the Institutional 
donors for accountability are clearly spelt out in the contract with CS1. The regulatory 
authorities can be seen as the second contractual stakeholder. CS1 owes a legal duty of 
accountability to them. The other stakeholders constitute the non-contractual 
stakeholder group. Individual donors though providing small funding to CS1 do so 
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without any contract specifying how the money should be used. They could be 
described as non-contractual stakeholders along with the beneficiaries who, although 
they are directly affected by CS1’s activities, do not provide the funding for those 
activities and have no contractual power to influence programme design and 
implementation or to demand accountability. The stakeholders may be subject to 
various influences and values. The regulatory authorities appear to be more interested 
in maintaining accountability for use of resources and for protecting the public interest. 
The donors’ criteria for funding requires CS1 to demonstrate that its programmes are 
having impact on the beneficiaries but do not appraise the economic efficiency of the 
programmes. This value appears to be based on humanitarian principles. CS1’s values 
also appear to be founded upon this principle which it interprets to mean a world where 
discrimination (that leads to poverty and conflict) is eliminated and people and 
communities live together in peace. This principle influences its objectives and 
programmes and to a varying extent, the thinking of the other stakeholders and appears 
to play a significant role in the contextual variables that shape the stakeholders’ 
interactions and influence CS1’s accountability practices. The absence of profit seeking 
stakeholders is also significant in that profit maximization as a value appear to play no 
significant influence in the stakeholders interaction and in effect the accountability 
practices.  How these interactions shape the accountability practices is analyzed in 





5.3 CS1’s Accountability Practices 
This section describes the current approach that CS1 uses in rendering accountability. 
A number of different approaches are being used for different purposes. The first is 
statutory reporting. As a charity and company limited by guarantee, CS1 files annual 
returns with the Companies house and the Charity Commission. This consists of 
financial reporting that complies with the Charity Commission’s Statement of 
Recommended Practices (SORP) as well as narrative reporting on its charitable 
activities and fund balances. The second approach is the Donor Reporting system 
whereby CS1 reports to donors on the grants and donations received. For the donors 
providing unrestricted income, the statutory reports are accepted as sufficient 
accountability. But the donors that provide restricted grants require specific programme 
financial report on the use of resources as well as narrative report on delivery of 
programme activities and the achievement of objectives. They may also commission a 
project financial audit to confirm the validity of the financial reports and a programme 
evaluation to confirm that the project was delivered and the objectives achieved.  In 
addition CS1 uses other means such as consultation with stakeholders to demonstrate 
accountability to its beneficiaries who require information on how CS1 is responding to 
their needs. These various approaches are discussed in the following subsections.  
 
5.3.1 Accounting Information 
Traditional accounting (described in section 4.4 as the network of practices concerned 
with the provision of relevant information for decision-making, the achievement of 
rational allocation of resources and the maintenance of accountability and stewardship) 
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is a major component of CS1’s accountability. This consists of the statutory reporting 
under the Charities SORP, financial accounting to Institutional donors in forms dictated 
by the donors and the management accounting system that support the first two 
systems. The whole system is based on the fund accounting principle that aim to 
separate and account for the income and expenditure on the unrestricted funds and the 
various restricted funds. 
 
On statutory reporting, the annual accounts are prepared in line with the Charities 
SORP and audited. The Charities SORP applies to larger charities (defined in terms of 
income or total assets) that are required by law to have an audit: 
‘..you will not usually need an audit until your income in a year is more than 
£500,000 or your total assets are £2.8m or more…Charities that are required by 
the law to be audited by a qualified accountant must follow the SORP in full for 
both the annual report and accounts’ (SORP 2005: v)9 
 
The SORP is compatible with the requirement of the law and the relevant accounting 
standards as they apply to NGOs: 
 ‘it provides the charity sector with an interpretation of accounting standards and 
 principles and clarifies the accounting treatment for sector specific transactions’ 
 (SORP, 2005: 3) 
 
Since its inception in 1990, the SORP has undergone revisions to reflect the nature of 
charities. It recognizes that charities do not have shareholders and do not match income 
and expenditure over year end and concepts such as distributable profit or 
surplus/deficit at particular points are irrelevant. SORP (2005) therefore, recommends 
an accounts structure comprising: 
                                                 
9
 Using the main SORP, not the SORP update of May 2008 
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a) a Statement of Financial Activities (SOFA) for the year that shows all 
incoming resources and all resources expended and reconciles all 
changes in its funds 
b) a balance sheet that shows the recognized assets, the liabilities and the 
different categories of funds of the charity 
c) notes explaining the accounting policies adopted and other notes which 
explain or expand upon the information contained in the accounting 
statements 
 (UK/SORP/2005: 5) 
The SORP requires the use of fund accounting separating the resources of the charity 
into the main funds shown below in Figure 5.3: 
 
Figure 5.3- The types of funds of charities (taken from Figure 1 SORP, 2005: 11) 
 
Funds of a Charity 
Unrestricted Income Fund Restricted Funds/Special 
Trusts 
General Designated Income Endowment (Capital) 
Expendable Permanent 
 186 
CS1 has no endowment funds but has all of the other categories of funds. The SORP 
requires that the SOFA shows the incoming resources for each fund category, the cost 
of generating the funds, the charitable expenditure also by fund categories, and the net 
position. It also requires the funds to be grouped together in the Balance Sheet 
according to their types and to give further analysis of each fund in the note to the 
account. Table 5.1 below is an extract from the SOFA in CS1’s 2009 accounts. It 
shows total restricted income was £2,082,144. This represents the total restricted grants 
on the 24 projects implemented in the year. The total restricted expenditure on these 
projects amounted to £2,148,319.  For the same period the unrestricted income was 
£731,097 and expenditure was £497,948 out of which £280,956 was spent on 
‘Advocacy and Projects’ and the rest on overheads and support. The total expenditure 
on Advocacy and Projects of £2,429,275 therefore, consists of unrestricted expenditure 












Table 5.1- CS1: Statement of Financial Activities January to December 2009 
 
 Restricted   General   Total  
 
 £   £   £  
Incoming resources    
Incoming resources from generated funds    
Voluntary income        646,469          646,469  
Investment income           4,649              4,649  
    
Incoming resources from charitable 
activities    
Advocacy & Projects                -          2,082,144  
Publications           6,509              6,509  
Consultancy         25,091            25,091  
Other income         48,379            48,379  
    
Total incoming resources       2,082,144        731,097        2,813,241  
    
Resources expended    
Costs of generating funds: 
 
  
Costs of generating voluntary income         98,068            98,068  
    
Charitable activities    
Advocacy & Projects    2,148,319       280,956        2,429,275  
Advocacy Support         10,581            10,581  
Project support         31,926            31,926  
Publications         35,887            35,887  
Consultancy         11,859            11,859  
Governance costs         28,671            28,671  
    






The SORP further requires that the detailed breakdown of the total project expenditure 
(restricted and unrestricted) be given in the notes to the accounts. This is provided as 
Note 3 in CS1’s 2009 accounts extract from which is shown in Table 5.3 below. 
 
Table 5.2 CS1- Extract from the notes to the financial statements 31 December 
2009 
Notes to the financial statements : 31 December 2009  




  £  
Staff Costs (note 5)               827,974  
Consultancy & Volunteers               159,323  
Recruitment                  7,367  
Staff Training & Development                  4,944  
Staff Travel               147,656  
Regional Offices                 16,818  
Partners' Activities               632,918  
Partner attendance at events               150,893  
Training Events                 32,094  
Publications Production                 65,376  
Media, PR & Marketing                  5,938  
Communications                 36,056  
Office Running costs                 11,723  
Premises costs               143,452  
Office Relocation                  1,557  
IT & Equipment                 34,397  
Depreciation                  9,495  
Bank charges and forex                  3,299  
Professional Fees                 26,210  
Charity Management & Statutory                  6,402  
Support costs               105,383  




This detailed breakdown is available only for the total project expenditure but not for 
the 24 individual projects (or funds) that make up the total. The only details provided 
for these funds is that in Note 13 in the accounts showing the total income and 
expenditure for each restricted programme (or fund) and the summary by region and 
thematic areas. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 below are extracts from Note 13 in CS1’s 2009 
accounts. 
 
Table 5.3- Extract from Note 13 showing the Summary of CS1’s restricted funds 
by region and by thematic areas for the year end 31 December 2009 
13. 
Movement in funds (summary 
note)     
  








 Restricted funds: £ £ £ £ 
      
 
AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST 
REGION    171,295      751,455  -    781,434    141,316  
                -    
 ASIA PACIFIC REGION    110,247      184,663  -    201,342      93,568  
                -    
 EUROPE / CIS REGION          266      266,538  -    264,751        2,053  
      
 
MINORITIES & CONFLICT 
PREVENTION    110,265      269,956  -    331,391      48,830  
      
 
STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATIONS    171,100        89,299  -    214,102      46,297  
      
 
INTERNATIONAL 
ADVOCACY    273,685      713,335  -    388,751    598,269  
      





For each region (or thematic area) the detailed Income and Expenditure on the 
individual funds or programme implemented in that region is provided. For example, in 
Europe/CIS region, the £264,751 spent was on three projects implemented in the year. 
Two of them are significant: the South East Europe programme (on which £144,657 
was spent) and the Development Education programme implemented through the 
Hungary Office (on which £ 116, 683 was spent). These two projects were jointly 
funded by a number of donors. The Development Education project did not attract 
enough donors’ funding and CS1 had to spend £33,452 from its unrestricted income in 
order to fulfil the match funding requirements for the project. These details are shown 
in Table 5.4 below. 
 
Table 5.4 Extract from Note 13 showing the Income and Expenditure on 
Europe/CIS region programmes 










South East Europe Programme            -          144,657  
-     
144,657             -    
UK Department for International Development            -          117,657  
-     
117,657             -    
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland            -           27,000  -      27,000             -    
Hungarian office Dev Ed Project            -          118,941  
-     
116,683        2,258  
European Commission            -           77,489  -      75,231        2,258  
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs           8,000  -        8,000   
CS1 Match funding         33,452  -      33,452   
INFOCON/UN Advocacy Project         266           2,940  -        3,411             -    
European Commission           2,940  -        2,940             -    
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs         266                -    -           471  -       205  
Sub Total Europe / CIS Region         266        266,538  
-     




 This level of details meets the requirements of the statutory authorities as no queries 
have been raised concerning CS1’s returns for the years 2004 to 2009. But this is 
insufficient for accountability to the various donors for the individual grants that form 
the restricted income pool. Some of these grants are funded by a single donor and 
others jointly by two or more donors (see Appendix 3 for the contributing donors to the 
23 programmes implemented in 2008). In most of these cases, the donors require 
separate financial reports in particular formats specified in the grant contract. These 
formats are in forms that compare expenditure against approved budgets drawn up 
according to the sequence of activities to be carried out. For example, in the General 
Conditions applicable to EC- financed grant contracts for the EC funded Turkey 
project, Article 2.1 states: 
‘the Beneficiary must draw up interim reports and a final report. These reports 
shall consist of a technical section and a financial section....The report shall be 
laid out in such a way as to allow comparison between on the one hand.….the 
budget details for the Action and on the other hand….the costs 
incurred’(EC/CT/05: 13) 
 
The summarised expenditure report sufficient for statutory reporting is, therefore, 
insufficient for financial reporting to donors. CS1 finds this donor reporting 
requirement challenging. But SORP, 2005 advises charities: 
‘to account for the proper administration of  the individual funds in accordance 
with their respective terms of trust and accounting records must be kept in a 
way which will adequately separate transactions between different funds’ 
(SORP, 2005: 10)  
 
This level of detail required has meant that CS1 expends considerable resources on 
reanalyzing data from its main accounting system to support the preparation of 
individual grant financial reports. 
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Some of CS1’s grant contract requires that the financial reports to the donors be subject 
to independent audit. For example, in the General Conditions applicable to EC- 
financed grant contracts for the Turkey project, Article 15.6 requires that: 
‘A report on the verification of the Action’s expenditure, produced by an 
approved auditor who is a member of an internationally recognized supervisory 
body for statutory auditing, shall be attached…conforming to the model in 
Annex VII’ (EC/CT/05: 13) 
 
In addition to statutory reporting, CS1’s accounting system serves two further 
purposes. The first is that it supports the donor financial accounting system by 
providing monthly information on individual programme expenditure. This is shared 
internally with the fundraising team and the programme managers. The information is 
used in controlling programme activities and in preparing financial reports to the donor. 
The second is in supporting the Senior Management team in decision making at the 
organization level. This involves controlling the various programmes to ensure that the 
activities are delivered according to plans and the organization is financially stable. 
Generally, an expenditure level consistent with budget is taken to mean that the 
programme is progressing according to plan. Any surplus (excess of income over 
expenditure) on individual programmes (restricted funds) at the year end is taken as 
owed to the donor and carried forward into the following year for spending on the 
programme. It does not contribute to the surplus on general funds.  
The accounting system also supports the design of new programmes by providing data 
on previous programme costs and for allocating overheads to programmes. But the use 
of the accounting system does not include appraising efficiency or economic viability 
of the organization’s activities.  
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In addition to the financial reports the donors also require accountability for the 
programme activities carried out and objectives achieved. This is fulfilled using   
narrative reports.  
 
5.3.2 Narrative reporting 
CS1 uses narrative reporting in three ways. The first is as an extension of the statutory 
financial reports. SORP 2005 recommends a Trustees’ Annual Report. The Charity 
Commission recognizes that the financial information alone does not meet the needs of 
all the stakeholders: 
‘Charity accounts alone do not meet all the information needs of users who will 
usually have to supplement the information they obtain from the accounts with 
information from other sources….The accounts of a charity cannot alone easily 
portray what the charity has done (its outputs) or achieved (its outcomes) or 
what difference it has made (its impact)’ (SORP, 2005: 5)  
 
The annual accounts, therefore, incorporates the trustees’ reports (called Report of the 
Council in CS1) consisting of narrative notes on the overall organization objectives, 
strategy and programmes. 
 
The Report of the Council contains sections on the governance structure, a review of 
the year’s financial performance, the organization’s policies on grant making, 
investment and reserves and the plans for the future. It also contains a section that lists 
the six strategic objectives and how they have been achieved. However these comments 
are very brief and give only basic information. The following extract from the 
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‘Objectives, activities and achievement’ section of the Report of the Council in the 
2008 accounts shows the level of details supplied: 
‘2008 was the final year of a four- year strategic planning period spanning 
2005-2008. For this period CS1 has the following 6 planned outcomes: 
1. Increased public participation by minorities and indigenous peoples. This was 
achieved through a variety of training programmes designed to give minority 
activists the skills and confidence to carry out advocacy and promote the human 
rights of their communities. Training events took place in the Great Lakes 
region of Africa, Hungary, Turkey, Uganda, South Africa and South East 
Europe. After training events, CS1 also supports partner organizations to 
prepare and run advocacy projects and this work was going on in 2008 across 
Africa, in 7 states in South East Europe, 4 states in South Asia as well as 
Turkey, Iraq, Indonesia, Syria and Sri Lanka’. 
(CS1/AA/08: 3)  
 
Further narrative details on the programme activities are given in the ‘Purpose of 
restricted funds’ section of Note 13 to the accounts. The section describes the 
programmes (grouped by regions or thematic areas) implemented in the year. However 
these are also very brief and give only basic information about the programmes. For 
example, in 2008 six programmes were implemented under the theme ‘International 
Advocacy’ and described in one paragraph as: 
‘INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY 
To build the capacity of selected minority and indigenous communities 
worldwide to participate effectively in international fora and international legal 
processes to represent the needs of their communities and pressure states to 
make policy changes that result in improvements in the day-to-day life for 
minorities’ (CS1/AA/08: 22)  
 
The second way in which CS1 uses narrative reporting is in its ‘Annual Report on 
Activities and Outcomes’. This is a system of organization-wide reporting to its 
stakeholders on its activities and the implementation of its strategic plans. This is done 
voluntarily as it is not part of the statutory reporting requirement. This report, which is 
in more details than the Trustees’ Report,  addresses how the major objectives listed in 
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the strategic plans have been achieved in the year and how the programme activities 
carried out have contributed to the achievement of the strategic objectives: 
‘This report is structured around the six planned outcomes established in this 
strategy document…Under each outcome it sets out the activities we planned at 
the beginning of the year to achieve these outcomes..It sets out the targets we 
aspired to reach as indicators of progress and shows to what extent progress has 
been made on achieving these.’ 
(CS1/AR/05: 10) 
 
For example with regards to specific objective 1 (increased public participation by 
minorities and indigenous peoples) the 2005-08 strategic plan lists under ‘Target for 
one year (2005)’ that it expects: 
‘125 community representatives (to)…report that they have gained skills, 
knowledge or confidence to carry out advocacy on behalf of their communities 
and 90 of (them to) go on to use these skills.’ (CS1/AR/05: 6) 
 
To demonstrate how CS1 has performed against this target, the report states that: 
 ‘We ran a training workshop for 38 participants in Geneva on international 
 standards, advocacy and other influencing strategies and skills…. Following the 
 training, participants went on to attend the UN Working Group on Minorities 
 and 20 participants  made an intervention on behalf of their community ’ 
 (CS1/AR/05: 13) 
 
Though these reports account for the whole organization’s objectives and outcomes, 
they are prepared for and disseminated to mainly donors who have supplied funding, 
both restricted and unrestricted, to CS1 in the year.  
 
The third way CS1 uses narrative reporting is at an individual programme level. This 
may be an interim report carried out mid-way into the programme or a final one 
prepared on completion of the programme. These reports are required by the donors 
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and included as condition of contract for the restricted grants. CS1’s donors require 
these reports to be in prescribed formats usually based on the structure of the ‘logical 
framework’ which presents in tabular form the programme objectives, the activities to 
be carried out to achieve those objectives, the output expected and the indicators to be 
used in measuring their achievement. The project narrative reports sets out the 
activities carried out and the achievements made against those indicators agreed in the 
‘Logical-framework’.  
 
5.3.3 Programme Evaluation 
CS1 carries out programme evaluation usually at the end of the programme, though 
sometimes interim evaluations are carried out for programmes running for two or three 
years. Programme Evaluation aims to measure the extent of achievement of 
programmes objectives and the impact on their intended beneficiaries. As such it is 
taken as a means of accountability not only to the donors but also to the beneficiaries 
and other stakeholders. The evaluation is carried out by an independent consultant 
appointed by CS1 but paid from the programme fund. It is supported and encouraged 
by CS1’s major donors. For example, DFID’s guidance on Project budget management 
includes: 
‘We recognize the value of evaluation and, as such, expect to see a budget line 
for evaluation in all CSCF budgets. We do allow up to 5% of project costs for 
evaluation’ (DFID/FG/06) 
 
The evaluation process involves the evaluator travelling to the programme site to verify 
the activities carried out and where possible, speaking with the beneficiaries to assess 
how far the programme has met their needs and achieved the objectives stated in the 
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logical framework. But because of certain constraints, it may not be possible to reach 
many of the beneficiaries: 
‘The most effective way of getting feedback from beneficiaries is through 
interviews. But this requires a lot of resources which may be limited in supply. 
Furthermore, the evaluator’s terms of reference may not leave enough room for 
adequate consultation with beneficiaries. There may also be situations such as 
war that make it impracticable to reach some beneficiaries’ (CS1/IV2/08) 
 
 Evaluative reports prepared are qualitative assessment based on the knowledge and 
experience of the evaluator. These may vary greatly and there are no agreed standard 
that the evaluation process must conform to. One of CS1’s evaluators interviewed said: 
‘Many NGOs use evaluation as a way of institutional learning. There are no 
widely accepted standards. Some NGOs have some form of standards at 
individual organization level but this varies across organizations. And do they 
comply to the standards? Who checks this? Is there any Police Force to ensure 
compliance?. Generally, it is Institutional donors that drive this process but 
what about those NGOs that seek mainly unrestricted funds?’ (CS1/IV2/08)  
 
The evaluative report is sent to CS1 who disseminates them to donors, beneficiaries 
and other stakeholders. But the reports are not always disseminated in their original 
form. CS1 sometimes produces two versions of evaluative reports: a private version 
used internally for learning and a public version widely disseminated to beneficiaries 
and other stakeholders. A selection of some of the public version of evaluative reports 
is displayed on CS1’s website.  Evaluative reports that are critical of the internal 
processes are kept private and the weaknesses identified are taken as learning points to 
be used in improving the organization’s processes. The management of CS1 explained 
to the Trustees the reason for this: 
‘All major programmes have at least a final independent external 
evaluation…In 2007 and 2008, evaluators assessed 6 programmes. The main 
findings, conclusions and recommendations of these 6 evaluations are attached. 
 198 
All evaluations are publicly available on our website…occasionally where 
evaluations are clearly critical of either an individual or a partner organization 
as a whole, we modify the text slightly to avoid any suggestion of us ‘naming 
and shaming’ or publicly humiliating anyone. In three cases, the evaluations 
included above are the ‘internal’ and more frank ones... In each case there is a 
public version of the text on the website’ 
(CS1/MM/10:09- 48) 
 
5.3.4 Stakeholders’ participation 
CS1 attempts to secure the participation of its stakeholders, particularly those whose 
needs may not be met through any of the other methods of accountability. Primarily in 
this group are beneficiaries of CS1’s work. These are minority and indigenous peoples 
and the local organizations that represent them. CS1 attempts to incorporate them in the 
planning and implementation of its programmes. At the planning stages, meetings are 
held with this group to design the programme activities to ensure that it meets their 
needs. But not all programmes so designed are funded. Where a programme is not 
funded eventually, any money spent on such consultation is not recovered. This limits 
the extent to which CS1 is able to engage beneficiaries in this way. 
 
To exemplify how the various means of accountability discussed in this section operate 
in relation to a particular programme, the following section examines in detail, a typical 
CS1’s programme that was completed in 2009. 
 
5.4 Accountability trail for a typical CS1 programme: Combating discrimination 
and promoting minority rights in Turkey  
This section aims to use one of the completed projects implemented by CS1 to 
exemplify how the NGO practices accountability. It traces the life-cycle of the project 
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from conception to completion, breaking it down into stages and highlighting the 
relevant issues relating to accountability. 
 
The initiation of the programme can be traced to 2005, the beginning of CS1’s new 
strategic plan 2005-08, when six new strategic objectives were developed.  The first 
two of these objectives involves achieving:  
 
1. Increased public participation by minority and indigenous peoples 
2. Positive changes in national legislation, policy and practice. 
 
 
During this period, the European Union was considering opening accession talks with 
Turkey. Turkey has particularly poor records on respect for minority rights. Since the 
Turkish republic was established in 1923, minorities have been perceived as a threat to 
the ‘indivisible integrity of the state’ enshrined in the Turkish constitution 
(CS1/REP/09: 4). This idea impacts on the fundamental rights of minorities in Turkey. 
For example, in spite of Turkey’s ratification of major international treaties designed to 
protect the rights of minorities, Turkey’s minorities (apart from Armenians, Jews and 
Rums) are denied the right to open their own schools and the teaching or use of their 
languages is banned in all public and private schools in Turkey: 
 
‘Although Turkey has ratified International treaties including the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)..it has put 
reservations on provisions that are relevant to minority rights (CS1/REP/09: 4). 
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CS1 decided to use the opportunity of the accession process and Turkey’s desire to join 
the European Union to address this by producing a report designed to inform the 
European Union’s decision as to whether to open accession talks with Turkey. It also 
aimed to use the opportunity to put pressure on the government of Turkey to redress the 
denial of rights to a broad section of Turkey’s minorities. The Turkey project was 
designed in 2005 to achieve these aims and contribute to achievement of the two 
strategic objectives listed above by ensuring that: 
1. International standards on minority rights are fully understood in Turkey by 
minorities, the authorities and the EU 
2. Practical steps to their full implementation are devised and taken with focus in 
particular on three key areas: anti-discrimination, education rights and the rights 
of displaced minorities  
(CS1/PR/07: 27)   
    
The programme, was implemented from 2006 through 2009. Table 5.5 portrays in 
chronological order the main events and the stakeholders involved through majors 
stages in the life of the project categorized as the planning, implementation and 
reporting phases. The following subsections amplify those events and their significance 
in the accountability process in CS1. 
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 Table 5.5 Turkey Project Timeline           
 Planning phase Implementation phase (EC component) Reporting phase Impact phase 
        Implementation (FCO)    




Jun 2006 Jul- Dec 2007 Jan- Jun 2007 Jul- Dec 2008 Jan- Jun 2008 Jul- Dec 2009 Jan- Jun 
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5.4.1 The planning Phase 
CS1 undertook a strategic review at the end of 2004 aimed at reviewing the success of 
its 2001-2004 strategy and providing useful input for its next strategy for 2005-2008. 
The process involves consultation with stakeholders and environmental analysis that 
‘takes into account the opportunities and threats for minority communities that are 
emerging’ Some of the opportunities identified include the accession and constitution-
building processes of the EU and the establishment of institutions of international 
justice (CS1/PR/05: 3) These opportunities were taken into account in formulating the 
strategic objectives for 2005-2008 and reflected in the first two strategic objectives 
which aimed to improve the public participation of minorities and ensure that national 
laws and policies are conducive to this. The Turkey programme was developed in 
response to the opportunity provided by Turkey’s intention to join the EU accession 
process. It was designed to make the government of Turkey address the denial of 
rights to a broad section of Turkey’s minorities through campaigning for: 
 Education reform that ensures public and private education respects all 
communities including languages, religions, ethnicities and cultures. 
 Changes in legislation and practice to incorporate mechanisms for the peaceful 
resolution of conflict over discrimination and the development and adoption of 
an anti-discrimination law 
 Creating favourable conditions for the return of refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and compensation for loss of property. 
Those directly involved in this initiation stage are mainly the management of CS1, the 
Programme Manager, the Programme Coordinator and the Fundraiser. The result of 
the consultation with stakeholders, mainly the donors and the partner organizations, 
were compiled and used as input in the process. At this stage, the EC had made a ‘call 
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for proposal’ entitled ‘Combating racism, xenophobia and promoting the rights of 
Minorities’ (EC/CP/05). The EC was therefore identified as a likely funder. The 
Fundraising team and Programme Managers then developed a Concept Note which, 
after approval by the Board of Trustees, was presented to the EC. This was approved 
by the EC and a full proposal was developed jointly by the Fundraising team and the 
Programme Managers. The full proposal and grant application were sent to the EC in 
April 2005. The aim of the programme was stated as: 
‘the implementation of minority rights protection in Turkey to European 
standards (the Copenhagen criteria), benefiting the target group of minorities 
in Turkey, several million people- including Kurds, Syriacs, Armenians, 
Greeks, Laz and Alevis’ (EC/FP/05: 2) 
 
The main activities to be carried out were summarized in the application as  
‘ The main activities are production of a report on how to achieve EU 
standards of minority rights protection in Turkey; workshop leading to specific 
guidelines on how to create an education system  respecting minority rights; 
drafting of a comprehensive anti-discrimination law  to meet EU standards and 
litigation to begin implementation of anti-discrimination laws; and workshops 
and research on property rights and return, leading to specific guidelines for 
policy makers and a guide for internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees 
and litigation to support property claims’  (EC/FP/05: 2) 
 
The application then lists both the minorities and the partner organizations that 
represent them as direct and indirect beneficiaries but admits that the majority of them 
will be indirect beneficiaries and that due to the particular nature of advocacy 
projects, the changes sought may not occur during the life of the project: 
 
‘Given this is an advocacy project, guaranteeing direct beneficiaries depend on 
the implementation of policies and laws which may not occur during the 
project. (But) the project will make much more likely the passing of an anti-
discrimination law…which will directly benefit minorities-more than 14% of 
the population or 14 million people…The four partner organizations will 
benefit from experience of research…training on and working with the EU 
and media…Indirect beneficiaries will include EU and its staff…as well as the 
Turkish authorities’ (EC/FP/05: 5) 
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The document, in response to the EC’s requirement, explains how the beneficiaries or 
their representatives (called partners) were involved in the design of the programme 
through series of planning and consultation meetings: 
‘The design of this project has been based on a relationship over 18 months 
with three out of the four partners. Either the partners or some of their 
members have been involved in past work with CS1and have fed into the 
design their analysis of minorities’ needs as well as the political constraints. 
This has involved at least four meetings in Turkey over this period with each 
partner and two joint planning meeting with all partners’ (EC/FP/05: 4) 
 
These meetings between CS1’s staff and the partner organizations were mainly to 
agree the project design, the activities, the work plan and allocation between CS1 and 
the partners, and the budgets. Initially the partners selected were the Diyarbakir Bar 
Association (DBA), Foundation for Society and Legal Studies (TOHAV), Cultural 
and Solidarity Association of Mesopotamia (MEZODER) and Human Rights 
Association, Istanbul (HRA). The work plans agreed at the planning meetings were 
mainly in outline form but the detailed proposal was finalized by CS1’s programme 
managers and fundraisers with inputs into the budgets by the finance department.  On 
11 September 2005, the full proposal and grant application were submitted to the EC 
for funding. The total budget for the project was €613,062 and CS1 sought 80% of the 
funding from the EC delegation in Turkey amounting to €490,450.   
 
The grant application also included a logical framework and activity plan covering the 
three years of implementation. The EC approved the grant subject to certain 
clarifications or amendments requested by a letter dated 21 Nov 2005. This includes 
the request to include other disadvantaged groups apart from minorities in the target 
beneficiaries and the need to commission an external evaluation at the end of the 
programme: 
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‘Drafting of anti-discrimination law: The inclusion of disadvantaged groups 
other than minorities, like the disabled, women, homosexual etc  is vital for 
the achievement of a consensus law reflecting the concerns of all parties which 
would pave the way for more successful advocacy. CS1 should ensure their 
participation in drafting or endorsement of the draft law’ (EC/FB/05) 
 
CS1 agreed to this as shown in its response to this point contained in the reply letter 
of 25 November 2005: 
‘We fully agree that the more disadvantaged groups represented the more 
effective the work can be…..Presently, we have the interest of the groups 
KAOS GL and Turkiye Sakatlar Dernegi’ (CS1/FB/05) 
 
Following modification in line with the EC’s request, the EC approved the proposal 
and agreed to finance 80% of the cost. CS1 was to supply the balance of 20% of the 
funding either from its unrestricted funds or raise match-funding from another donor.  
A grant contract was signed on 30 December 2005 for implementation over three 
years ending 30 December 2008. Included in the contract were the agreed budget and 
the EC general condition of contract stipulating the reporting requirements, narrative 
and financial, and the templates that must be used to prepare them. It provided 
detailed description of eligible costs as direct cost of the programme activities (staff 
cost, travel etc) plus a lump sum of 7% of the direct cost to cover CS1’s 
administrative overheads: 
‘A fixed percentage not exceeding 7% of the total amount of eligible cost of 
the Action may be claimed as indirect costs to cover the administrative 
overheads incurred by the beneficiary for the Action’ (EC/CT/05) 
 
Currency exchange losses were to be borne by CS1 while exchange gains and any 
unspent funds were to be returned to the EC.  
 
The standard condition of contract also provides for the submission of annual interim 
reports, narrative and financial, and end of programme reports. These interim reports 
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are exactly the same in format and content as the end of programme reports but they 
allow for progress monitoring and for important issues to be brought to the attention 
of the donor earlier. The narrative reports format specified is closely aligned with the 
format of the log-frame while the financial report format compares expenditure to 
budget. The contract stipulates that the end of programme financial report should be 
audited and named SV, a firm of certified accountant and the external auditors to CS1, 
as auditors for the programme audit. The EC audit guideline that specified how the 
audit must be performed (technically an ‘agreed upon procedure’) was made available 
to SV.  
 
5.4.2 The implementation Phase 
The programme was implemented over 42 months from January 2006 to June 2009 
extending six months beyond the original 36 months planned due to delays in 
implementation particularly on the part of some of CS1’s partners.  CS1 had 
difficulties in raising the remaining 20% match funding required for the programme. 
In the first year of the programme (2006) £20,200 was provided by Cordaid
10
 in the 
form of allocation from a larger block grant for a number of CS1’s projects.  The rest 
of the match funding came in only in the final year of the programme through a grant 
from the British Embassy, Ankara for a specific activity under the programme and 
another grant from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office for another set of 
activities under the programme. The latter grant ran for 5 months till July 2009 taking 
the implementation period beyond the EC contract end date of April 2009.    
 
                                                 
10
 Catholic Organization for Relief and Development- a Dutch development agency 
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The EC’s approved funding was released in 3 yearly instalments, the second based on 
receipt of satisfactory reports of the first year activities and the last based on 
completion of the programme and submission of an acceptable audit report.  
 
The following is a chronology of events in the implementation phase. It is not a 
comprehensive account of all the events and activities but a highlight of the most 
significant ones. 
 
5.4.2.1 January to June 2006  
CS1’s Programme Coordinator and Programme Manager met with the staff at EC 
delegation in Ankara and some Members of European Parliament to discuss minority 
rights issues in Turkey for inclusion in the EC country report. Also, CS1 and its 
partners visited Sarejevo to give partners a chance to learn about the experience of 
displacement in another country through roundtable discussions with experts. 
Information obtained during this visit was later used in the “Action Plan.” 
 
5.4.2.2 July to December 2006  
The Programme Coordinator travelled to Istanbul and Diyarbakır to meet with project 
partners. During this visit she held meetings with Roma NGOs, TESEV, and the 
Mayors of Diyarbakir, Yenişehir, and Suriçi Municipalities. She also attended a 
roundtable meeting in Brussels to give a brief to EC staff on minority rights in 
Turkey. CS1 and TOHAV prepared the “Action Plan.” TOHAV published both 
English and Turkish versions and distributed them widely.  
CS1 and DBA published the “Guide” in Turkish and Kurdish. Both were distributed 
widely across the country and were also sent to Kurdish and Assyrian NGOs in 
Europe. A press conference was organized in Istanbul for the launch of the Action 
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Plan and the Guide. Some other NGOs working on displacement attended the press 
conference. In December 2006 CS1, DBA and TOHAV had a roundtable meeting in 
Ankara with staff and representatives from UNDP, EC Delegation and Human Rights 
agencies to discuss and exchange ideas about the Action Plan and the Guide.  
 
5.4.2.3 January to June 2007  
The first workshop on anti-discrimination and litigation was held in Istanbul. In this 
workshop Turkish legislation on anti-discrimination, relevant EU and international 
standards and the anti discrimination practices in different countries were examined. 
Twelve individuals from Universities and different NGOs working on discrimination 
related issues attended this two day workshop. CS1 staff travelled to Brussels to give 
a briefing to the staff at the enlargement unit of EC on the situation of minorities in 
Turkey. 
 
5.4.2.4 July to December 2007  
The second workshop on anti discrimination and litigation was held in Istanbul. Anti-
discrimination law, remedies, and relevant EU and international standards and 
practices from different countries were examined. The outline of the draft law on 
discrimination was also examined. Sixteen individuals from Universities and different 
NGOs working on discrimination related issues attended this two day workshop. The 
country report on Minority rights in Turkey was printed in London in English and 
Turkish. CS1 launched the report on its website and sent the report to the press. In 
December 2007 some legal cases were selected for intervention including supporting 
the Yumak and Sadak case among others through submission of an amicus brief to the 
ECHR’s Grand Chamber. 
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5.4.2.5 January to June 2008 
CS1 held a workshop in Istanbul titled “Education Rights in Multicultural 
Communities: Turkeys’ experience.” Twenty eight participants from NGOs, minority 
communities and international organizations attended and discussed, among other 
things, access to education. During this period CS1 staff and partners travelled to 
Brussels where they made a presentation on the situation of minorities in Turkey to 
the Members of European Parliament. They also travelled to Sweden to meet with the 
members of Assyrian, Kurdish and Yezidi communities in Stockholm to discuss with 
their representatives the country report and possible strategies for return. The 
delegation also visited Swedish Parliament. 
  
 
5.4.2.6 July to December 2008  
CS1 and IHOP held a workshop in Ankara titled, “Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
and Equality Bodies.” Fifty two participants from NGOs and governmental bodies 
attended this workshop. Also in this period, the Project Coordinator made an oral 
presentation at the European Commission on Turkeys’ progress with minority issues 
and attended the UN Forum on minority issues held in Geneva where she made a 
statement on the education of minorities in Turkey.  
 
5.4.2.7 January to June 2009  
CS1 published a report on the situation of minorities in the education system in 
Turkey. The report, titled “Forgotten or Assimilated? Minority Rights in Education 
System of Turkey” was published in Turkish and English and introduced to the public 
by a media launch in Istanbul. CS1 also submitted a shadow report on Turkeys’ 
compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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Racial Discrimination to UN CERD and attended the CERD session on Turkey with a 
minority community representative. They organized a lunch-time briefing for the 
members of the CERD and carried out individual advocacy before and after the 
session 
 
CS1’s Project coordinator made a presentation to EU countries representatives and 
diplomats in Turkey on minority rights in Turkey, at an event hosted by the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Ankara and in cooperation with Education 
Reform Initiative and the History Foundation.  The draft anti-discrimination law was 
prepared. 
 
5.4.3 The Final Reporting Phase 
The project implementation for the EC grant ended in April 2009 and the final 
reporting started. But implementation continued through April to June 2009 for the 
other activities funded by the other donors. There was, therefore, an overlap of the 
implementation and reporting phases from April to June 2009.  Though the final 
reporting phase has been separately identified as more reporting and accountability 
happened at this stage, there was indeed some form of reporting and accountability 
going on concurrently through all the other phases. This consists mainly of the 
statutory reporting and the reporting to the donors including the end of programme 
evaluation. The involvement of beneficiaries (mainly the local partners) was counted 
by CS1 as a form of accountability but this is not structured. The main aspects of 




5.4.3.1 Statutory Reports 
In terms of the statutory reporting, the programme activities were reported along with 
other CS1’s activities in the annual audited accounts and the reports to the Charity 
Commission for the years 2006 to 2009. The statutory reports consisted of the 
Statement of Financial Activities and the Directors’ report. The Statement of 
Financial Activities (SOFA) gives a financial account of the income received by CS1, 
split between the two major funds (the unrestricted and the restricted funds) and how 
they were expended.  But at this stage no distinction is made between the several 
project funds that make up the total restricted funds. The extract below (Table 5.6) 
from the SOFA from 2006 to 2009 shows the total Income and expenditures on the 
restricted funds. 
 


















   
1,899,226 















Included in these are the 23-25 programmes implemented in each of the years, one of 
which was the Turkey programme. Detailed breakdown of the income and 
expenditure by individual programmes were given in the notes to the account.  An 
extract of this for the Turkey programme for 2006 to 2009 is shown in Table 5.7 
below. 
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Income (Turkey project) 
 - EC 
 - Cordaid 
- FCO/British embassy 
  112,150 
    91,950 
   20,200 
  100,935 
  100,935 
  129,738 
  114,738 










Expenditure (Turkey project) 
 - EC 
 - Cordaid 
- FCO/British Embassy 
  107,404 
   87,204 
   20,200 
    97,383 
    97,383 
    93,445 
    78,445 
     











 The narrative aspect of the statutory report consists mainly of the Directors’ reports 
which describe the overall activities of CS1 but gives no account of individual 
projects. In the reports for 2006 to 2009 no specific account of the Turkey project was 
given but the overall activities on ‘International Advocacy’ within which the 
programme was classified was briefly described. 
 
The statutory audit reports for 2006 to 2008 were unqualified and appropriate returns 
to the Charity Commission and the Companies’ House were filed with no queries 
arising from them. 
 
5.4.3.2 Reporting to Donors 
The reporting to donors consisted of two parts- a narrative report and a financial 
report. The interim forms of both reports were given to the donors yearly while the 
final forms were given at the end of the project. The narrative reports submitted to the 
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EC were in line with the prescribed format. These reports were designed mainly to 
meet the information needs of the donor. The format consists of 4 sections with 
specific questions asked by the donor to which CS1 was required to provide answers. 
The main sections are: 
 
Section A titled Contractual Compliance asks the question ‘has the project been 
carried out as foreseen in the terms of reference of the contract?  Here CS1 details all 
the changes to the planned project activities and changes to the involvement of 
partners and justifies them.  
 
Section B titled Project Activities required CS1 to list all the activities carried out 
under the project, publications and reports produced (attaching copies) and to disclose 
and justify why any planned activity had not taken place.  
 
Section C titled Impact and Evaluation asks the question: What is your assessment of 
the results of the project? It required CS1 to comment on the extent to which foreseen 
goals were met and whether the project had any unforeseen positive or negative 
results. Here CS1 cited among other things the wide coverage given to publication of 
the education report in the media and the awareness of minority issues raised. On the 
positive experience, CS1 cited the relocation of the project coordinator to Turkey and 
the opportunity this allowed for her to interview and obtain inputs of several minority 
representatives in the Education report. In terms of the negatives CS1 cited the’ lack 
of adequate contribution and support’ from the local partner resulting in the replacing 
of one of them causing ‘an extension and even non completion of the activities around 
the model equality law before the termination of the project’ (CS1/NR/09: 21)  
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Section D on Partners and other cooperation asks the question: How do you assess 
the relationship between the partners of this project?  It requires CS1 to give details of 
the division of responsibilities, transfer of expertise and overall coordination of the 
partnerships. It also requires each partner organization to write a one-page assessment 
on its role and cooperation in the partnership. CS1 acknowledges that certain 
difficulties leading to the change in partnership was a major obstacle to a good 
implementation of the project as some activities were carried out later than planned. It 
stated that ‘some project partners still did not provide CS1 with activity and financial 
reports on the dates agreed’ It however stated that ‘CS1 is generally content about the 
development of this partnership’ (CS1/NR/09: 24) 
 
The second aspect of the reports to donors is the financial reports. Interim forms of 
these were submitted to the EC yearly and a final form at the end of the project. The 
reports, prepared using EC templates, basically compare actual expenditure to budget 
for each budget line item and the total. The currency used in reporting is the Euro as 
specified in the contract though actual expenditures were incurred in Euro, Sterling, 
Swiss Francs and Turkish Lira. The non-Euro expenses were converted at exchange 
rates specified by the EC, though actual exchange rates obtained from the market 
were different. Where this resulted in a loss, the loss was borne by CS1 from its other 
income as the EC considered these as non-eligible for funding. 
 
The EC grant final financial report was audited by SV as stipulated in the contract. 
The audited report shows total expenditure up to April 2009 was € 470,477 out of 
which €380,620 was eligible for funding under the contract with EC. The balance of 
the expenditure incurred from May to June 2009 was charged to the match funding 
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grant from Cordaid, the British Embassy in Turkey and the FCO. The eligible cost 
charged to the EC grant (€380,620) was less than the total of the upfront payments 
received from the EC. The difference includes exchange gains resulting from the 
weakening of Sterling against the Euros over the project period. The programme 
grants were received in Euros but expenditures were incurred in sterling and other 
currencies and converted to Euro at the average exchange rates for the year. But the 
auditors raised exception as noted in the grant audit report at the end of the project: 
‘We hereby certify that the operations account (income and expenditure) are 
faithful, reliable and supported by the appropriate supporting documents and 
that eligible expenditure totalling EUR 380,620 has been incurred in 
accordance with the provisions of the contract except as noted below:  
1. Bank interest has been earned on part of this funding. No separate bank 
account was set up by CS1 for this funding 
2. Expenditure has been translated using the annual average exchange 
rates instead of the InforEuro monthly rate specified in the funding 
agreement 
3. CS1 was unable to split expenditure funded by the EC and that funded 
by other contributors 
 (SV/GA/09) 
 
Based on this, the EC requested that the report be restated using the exchange rates 
supplied by the EC for all the expenditures. The exchange difference together with the 
unspent balance of the grant amounting to €44,144 was returned by CS1 to the EC.  
 
5.4.3.3 Programme Evaluation 
Following the completion of the programme in July 2009, a programme evaluation 
was commissioned by CS1 in line with the contract condition and an evaluator was 
appointed. The brief given by CS1 to the evaluator was to verify that the activities 
were effectively carried out and the desired outcomes achieved. How far this meets 
the beneficiaries’ needs was not expressly included in the brief. 
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‘This evaluation has been made upon the request of CS1 with the purpose of 
providing an assessment of: 
-whether CS1 completed all activities as planned in the project, 
-whether the activities contributed to the planned results, 
-whether the project and its implementation was relevant and effective;  
-whether there were any unplanned outcomes or impacts  
- the extent to which gender was successfully mainstreamed 
throughout the project;  
-the lessons that CS1 and other organizations can learn for future 
similar initiatives’ (CS1/PE/09: 5) 
 
The evaluative report highlighted some of the difficulties CS1 had in implementing 
the project particularly that involving its engagement with its partners: 
‘It is obvious that CS1 has had some serious difficulties working with its 
partners in Turkey. At the early stages of the implementation of the project, 
CS1 lost one partner. One important partner was included into the project 
scheme at the very end of the project’ (CS1/PE/09: 11) 
 
The evaluator traced the causes of the problems with the partners to their limited 
involvement in decision-making concerning the project: 
 
‘There were serious problems in getting specific work done by the 
partners.....the partners only had knowledge and initiative on the parts of 
project that they were responsible for. No partner seemed to have full 
knowledge and responsibility over the implementation of the whole project 
except CS1.  Some partners have the feeling that their participation in decision 
making process was not satisfactory’ (CS1/PE/09: 11-12) 
 
The evaluator also noted that the complexity of the technical and contractual 
requirements dictated by the donor was too challenging for the partners involved: 
 
‘it seems that the technical details of implementing an EU funded project have 
taken precedence over the enthusiasm of creating a serious impact. The 
evaluator believes that partners of CS1 were not motivated enough to 
undertake such energetic work’ (CS1/PE/09: 12) 
 
The report was sent to the EC. A summarized version was placed on CS1’s website 
with a link to the full report. 
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5.4.4 The Impact Phase 
The impact phase is the most prolonged of all the phases. CS1 constantly monitors 
developments in the area of the project objectives, drawing attention to any 
achievements and making follow up non-programmatic interventions such as granting 
interviews, speaking on the issue at conferences etc. Implementation of the Turkey 
project was completed in June 2009 but the desired impact and change sought were 
not immediately realized but continued gradually into 2010. For example by June 
2009 when the programme ended, the anti-discrimination law that the programme 
campaigned for had not been passed neither had the return of property to the IDPs 
happened. But in November 2009, the government of Turkey decided to initiate the 
process for enacting an anti-discrimination law, a key component of what the Turkey 
project has campaigned for.  The draft law was sent to some NGOs for comments in 
March 2010. Substantial sections of the draft were taken from the draft law prepared 
as part of the Turkey project. CS1’s project coordinator was delighted by this and 
announced this as one of the achievements of the project in an e-mail to all CS1’s 
staff: 
‘I am glad to say that more than half of the Ministry’s draft law is directly 
copied from our draft law…’ (CS1/IM/10) 
 
CS1 continues to participate in meetings to comment on the draft law, organize other 
NGOs to input their views and sustain its advocacy through the media and 
international organizations. But feedback from the beneficiaries was limited as there 
was no common platform or mechanism to obtain the views of partners involved in 




5.5 Analysis of CS1’s Accountability Practices 
From the data presented in the preceding sections, it could be deduced that 
accountability in CS1 involves the use of a combination of several methods or 
approaches. These approaches, focusing on different aspects of the organization’s 
accountability and serving the needs of different stakeholders, fit into those identified 
in the theoretical model.  They consist of: 
1. A system of statutory financial reporting and audit focusing on accounting for 
the overall income and expenditure by fund (restricted and unrestricted) in line 
with the reporting standard (SORP). These are in summarized form as detailed 
financial accounts for the individual restricted fund activities are not rendered 
at this level.  
2. Statutory Narrative reporting focusing on the overall organization objectives 
and activities including brief summaries of the restricted programme activities. 
This is in the form of Directors (trustees) report in the audited accounts and 
annual returns to the Charity Commission. These reports do not include 
detailed account of the individual programme activities. 
3. Donor financial reporting comparing detailed programme income and 
expenditure with budget using formats specified by the donors in the grant 
contract. The report may be subject to a project financial audit where specified 
in the contract.  
4. Programme narrative reporting focusing on the implementation of individual 
programme activities, the achievement of objectives and the desired outcome 
and impact. This uses the format specified by the donor which is closely 
aligned with the structure of the logical framework.  
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5. Annual reports in narrative form focusing on the implementation of CS1’s 
strategic plans. This covers the whole organizational activities and measures 
performance against the strategic objectives. It takes into account the 
combined achievements of all the programmes rather than those of individual 
programmes. This report is disseminated to all stakeholders and no 
standardized format is used.  
6. Programme Evaluation involving an independent evaluator visiting the 
programme site and the beneficiaries to verify that the activities were carried 
out and the objectives achieved.   
7. A system of involving the beneficiaries and stakeholders to ensure that the 
programmes implemented address their needs. This is carried out through 
consultation during programme design and participation of beneficiaries’ 
representatives in the implementation. But evidence from the data indicates 
that this system is not operating effectively.  
 
The accountability practices observed are analysed using the skeletal model (Figure 
4.3). The first level of analysis identifies whether the obligations to render account are 
contractual or communal and whether the accountability bases are process or 
performance. A categorization of the practices according to the types A, B, C and D 
then follows from this. The next levels of analysis will examine how the natures of the 
exogenous and endogenous variables and the signification, legitimation and 
domination structures have shaped the emergence of these practices.  
 
 
On the first level of analysis, the process based approaches focus on the use of 
resources in conformity to standard and the performance based approaches focus on 
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measuring the achievement of objectives and the meeting of stakeholders’ needs. 
Evidence of the use of these two approaches could be seen in the data. While the 
statutory financial reporting system is process based, the statutory narrative reporting 
system is performance based. Likewise, the system of financial reporting to donors is 
process based while the narrative reporting to donors is performance based.  The 
annual reports/ strategic planning, programme evaluation and beneficiaries’ 
participation are all performance based system as they aim to assess the achievements 
of objectives. 
 
The categorization into the contractual and the communal systems of accountability 
relate to the nature of the obligation to render accounts. Both forms of practices were 
observed. The contractual system, driven by the needs of the donors and the 
regulators, is evidenced in the statutory reporting and donor reporting systems (both 
financial and narrative) in use.  But evidence of the use of the communal system is 
sparse. The system of involving beneficiaries could be categorized as communal but 
this is not sufficiently developed in CS1. Programme evaluation cannot be categorized 
as communal as it is driven by the donors even though it considers the views of the 
beneficiaries. 
 
5.5.1 The Process based approach- Types A and D 
The process based approach could be used in two forms –under the contractual 
method (type A) with practices in line with prescribed standards and under the 
communal method (type D) with practices determined by the information needs of the 
wider stakeholders. Two forms of the process based approach are in use at CS1. But 
both appear to be of type A as they are influenced mainly by the needs of the 
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contractual stakeholders. The first is the statutory financial reports. This is filed with 
the Charity Commission as a statutory requirement. It is also used for financial 
accountability to some Institutional donors that give CS1 unrestricted funding without 
requiring separate financial accounts for the grants. These donors are satisfied with 
the statutory reports and require no further detailed financial reports. But the statutory 
financial report only partly meets the needs of those Institutional donors who provide 
CS1’s restricted funds. In addition to it, these donors require specific financial 
information on their particular programmes and the system of financial reporting to 
donors is used for this purpose. Both of these forms of accountability may be 
described as type A, as CS1 has no flexibility in determining how it is practiced. CS1 
prepares this donor financial reports using the same basic financial data used for the 
statutory reports and faces the challenge of reconciling both reports (this was noted in 
the audit management letter, 2008) as the two systems are not integrated.  The 
organization expends considerable effort in processing the same financial data in two 
different systems and struggling to reconcile both. 
None of the practices observed could be categorised as type D as none of them is 
aimed at accounting to the non-contractual stakeholders for the use of resources 
 
5.5.2. The Performance based approach- Types B and C 
The performance based approach to accountability focuses on measuring the 
achievement against objectives. It could be used under the contractual system where it 
is prepared in fulfilment of a contract condition or a statutory requirement (type B). 
The focus may be on the overall organizational objectives or particular programme 
objectives. This accountability practices are rendered by CS1 using two main forms of 
practices.  The first is statutory narrative reporting prepared as the narrative part of the 
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financial statements and the annual returns to the Charity Commission. The second is 
the programme narrative reports that focuses on the achievement of individual 
programme objectives and are prepared for donors as part of the conditions of 
contract.  
 
The performance based practices are also used in the communal system where it is 
rendered voluntarily with the aim of meeting the needs of the stakeholders (mostly the 
non-contractual stakeholders since the contractual stakeholders have the power to 
ensure their needs are met). This accountability practices that could be categorised as 
type C is rendered by CS1 using three forms of practices.  The first is the Annual 
Report and strategic planning system. These reports cover the whole organizational 
activities and measure the performance of the organization against the strategic 
objectives. Considering that the organization’s objectives are directly linked to the 
programme objectives which in turn are highly influenced by the objectives of the 
donors this report may be viewed as type B. But because feedback from beneficiaries 
and other stakeholders are incorporated in the reports and strategic plans they may 
also be considered as type C.  The second is Programme Evaluation. Though 
evaluation is contractually required and funded by the donors and the evaluator is 
appointed by CS1, the brief involves obtaining the views of beneficiaries and wider 
stakeholders. Programme evaluation may, therefore be viewed as both type B and 
type C accountability. 
 
The third form of type C accountability used by CS1( and the only one that is 
exclusively type C) is beneficiaries’ participation. This is in form of consultation with 
beneficiaries in the design and implementation of programmes. But this is not always 
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done due to cost constraint and the difficulty of securing funding for such activities. 
The second form of consultation with stakeholders is during the process of review of 
implementation of the strategic plan. But there is no mechanism to ensure that the 
feedback from the beneficiaries is taken up in future plans.  
  
The performance based approaches as used in CS1 have some limitations. With 
regard to programme narrative reporting, the limitations result from two main issues. 
First, ‘measurable indicators’, against which achievement of programme objectives 
are reported, are not always measurable. For example, from the logical framework of 
the SEE project (Appendix 5), the purpose of the project include ‘to mainstream 
effective minority and minority women’s participation in political and developmental 
process in South East Europe’. The ‘measurable indicators’ of its achievement given 
in the logical framework include ‘The position of minorities and minority women in 
SEE countries is strengthened’. This indicator is qualitative and difficult to measure.  
Second, baseline data on the pre-intervention state of the issue the programme seeks 
to address are not always available. For example the SEE programme proposal 
presents no data on the state of representation of minorities in SEE other than that 
they are underrepresented. It is then difficult to measure how much the programme 
contributed to the change achieved. Third, as the narrative report is prepared by the 
NGO implementing the programme there is a tendency to present a fairer picture than 
was achieved in reality. 
 
Accountability for the achievement of wider objectives and fulfilment of non-
contractual stakeholders’ needs (type C) is performed only to a very limited extent as 
the methods used for it were not particularly developed for the purpose.  The most 
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prominent here is Programme Evaluation. It was developed to give assurance to 
donors that programme objectives were being met and could be considered as more of 
type B accountability. However, CS1 disseminates the reports to beneficiaries and 
other non-contractual stakeholders and claims this as a form of accountability to them. 
But Programme Evaluation as a form of accountability has its own limitations. The 
first limitation is that the evaluators may not be totally independent as they are 
appointed by the organization they evaluate. In an interview with MD, an evaluator of 
a number of CS1’s programmes, he thinks this influence is mitigated where evaluators 
appointed are people who have established their reputation and have reasonable 
financial independence. 
11
 But this is not always the case as some evaluators 
appointed by CS1 do not fall in this category. A threat to the independence of 
evaluators is the fact that some have carried out other consulting work for CS1. For 
example in the introductory paragraph of the evaluation report of one of CS1’s 
programmes, the evaluator wrote: 
‘I was commissioned by CS1 to undertake a final evaluation for the LC 
Programme, a process required by the main donors, the FCO. I was delighted 
to undertake this task, owing to my previous involvement in preparing the 
feasibility study as well as the interim evaluation. It has been an enormous 
pleasure to witness the programme grow and develop from its inception and to 
view at close hand the difference that this programme has made to a number of 
minority and indigenous communities’(CS1/PE/07) 
 
The lack of independence of evaluators may impact on the objectivity of the reports 
and their usefulness as a means of accountability. This situation is not helped by the 
fact that the practice is not regulated. Evaluators do not operate under a professional 
body and there are no agreed standards or approach used by all evaluators.  
 
                                                 
11
 MD has retired after a successful career in Development and has been commissioned to perform 
evaluation on a number of CS1’s programmes. He appears to be professional, objective and financially 
secure. He has not performed any other consultancy work for CS1 apart from the evaluations. 
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The second limitation of evaluation is that the desire of NGOs to obtain good 
evaluative reports may lead to sub-optimal decisions in programme implementation 
where more effort is directed towards ‘countable’ achievements. The quote below 
taken from CS1’s report on learning from evaluation reports illustrates this: 
We must ensure that completing one activity does not absorb so much energy 
that it detracts from the important advocacy/follow up etc on potentially all the 
other activities.  Although the activity feels more “countable” and glaringly 
obvious if it is not completed, in fact, the less visible advocacy and follow up 
to the other activities may well be more valuable, and most if not all donors 
would understand this (although, of course they should be asked first) 
(CS1/MM/4-09) 
 
Finally, evaluation does not fully meet the accountability needs of beneficiaries. It 
happens only at the end of the programme and the feedback only used to the benefit of 
the NGO. Beneficiaries do not have the power to commission the evaluation, appoint 
the evaluator or demand the report. As a result they do not feel that the process was 
important to them. This is illustrated by the following extract from the evaluation 
report of CS1’s TB programme: 
‘I encountered what I felt were surprisingly substantial difficulties in 
persuading some individuals who had taken part in the project to talk to me or 
give me all the information I requested...it was probably due to a feeling that 
this evaluation was not very important’ (CS1/PE/08). 
 
The programme evaluation reports are sometimes disseminated in summarized 
versions. These summarized versions highlight issues CS1 consider as important. This 
process of information filtering means that accountability to this group is selective 
and does not guarantee that any adverse feedback from beneficiaries would be 
disseminated or acted upon. Furthermore, because evaluation as a tool of 
accountability is designed for the donors and paid for by them, there is beneficiaries’ 
apathy towards it as noted in the comment of the evaluator of the TB project.  
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The observed practices fitted within the ‘accountability space’ produced the result 
shown in Figure 5.4 
 
Figure 5.4 Accountability Practices in CS1 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           




5.5.3 The Influence of Endogenous Variables on CS1’s Accountability 
From the model of the endogenous variables presented in Chapter 4, the importance 
of traditional accounting in CS1’s accountability practices will depend on the nature 
of CS1’s objectives (how clear and measurable), the nature of its activities (how 
programmable) and how economic in nature the objectives and the activities  are. 
Where these three variables take on low values, there will be a sociological divide that 
limits the extent to which traditional accounting could be used in CS1’s 
accountability. The following sub-subsections present in detail the analysis of the data 
collected with regard to each of these variables and highlights the existence of a 











Process A- Traditional 
Accounting  
Statutory financial reports (1) 
Donors’ financial reports (3) 
C- Stakeholders’      
participation 
B- Narrative Reporting  
 
Statutory narrative reports (2) 
Program narrative reports (4) 
D- Accounting for 
stakeholders use 
*Annual report/Strategic plan review (5) 
*Programme evaluation (6) 
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5.5.3.1 The Specificity of CS1’s Objectives 
CS1’s objectives are very broad. Protecting the rights of minorities and indigenous 
peoples is a wide objective because minorities and indigenous people can be found in 
every continent and in almost every country of the world. Also, the objectives are not 
clear or specific as there is no agreed definition of who constitutes minorities. 
Different people have taken the term ‘minorities’ to mean different things. Such an 
imprecise term being at the heart of the organization’s objective makes a clear 
definition difficult to achieve.  But this was not considered to be a problem until the 
end of the 1990s. It could be inferred that this is because then there were no obvious 
pressure for NGOs to be accountable. The pressure to be accountable increased from 
the 1990s when increased funding of NGOs brought accountability to focus. From 
about the end of the 1990s, CS1 began to consider this as a problem and to advocate 
for a clear definition of the term ‘minorities’ From about the same time, it began the 
first attempt to clarify and restate its broad objective in detailed terms through its 
strategic planning process. These two events could be interpreted to be in response to 
the pressure to demonstrate accountability for the achievement of objectives.  
 
The strategic planning process can be viewed as an attempt to make accountability for 
the achievement of objectives more achievable. The process has focused on 
redefinition of the broad objectives through breaking them down into clearer, more 
specific and measurable detailed objectives against which performance could be 
measured and reported. But the way that CS1’s objectives have been redefined (or 
broken down) has changed with each 4-year planning period. The broad objectives 
were broken down in the three strategic plans covering 2001 to 2012 initially into 14 
detailed objectives which were later summarized into 6 objectives and subsequently 
 228 
rephrased to reflect a slightly different focus. This suggests that the broad objectives 
are fluid enough to be interpreted to mean different things.  Over the same period CS1 
has expended substantial effort in an attempt to focus its work by defining what 
constitute ‘minorities’. After the enormous work and debates, it came up with a 
‘working definition’ but conceding that it is not all-inclusive.  Defining the second 
part of CS1’s broad objective (protecting minority rights) is no less challenging. The 
issue of ‘rights’ is subjective and dependent on cultural interpretations. For example, 
CS1’s view of girls’ education as a right is not exactly in consonance with the 
understanding in some communities it works with. This suggests that the aim of 
clarifying the objectives has not been fully achieved. Measuring how well it has 
performed in achieving those objectives therefore remains subjective.  This indicates a 
low value of O in the model of endogenous variables.  
 
5.5.3.2 The Nature of the Link between CS1’s Objectives and Activities 
CS1’s activities are generally packaged as programmes with specific objectives linked 
to the overall organizational objectives set out in its strategic plans. Within each 
programme, several activities are carried out ranging from organising training, 
workshops, advocacy events and campaigning, to taking up legal cases involving 
minority rights violation before national and international courts. But the relationship 
between the successful implementation of the programmes activities and the 
achievement of the objective is tenuous. Successful implementation of the activities 
does not guarantee the achievement of the objectives or the desired change. The 
organization recognizes and accepts this. For example CS1’s analysis of three of the 
evaluation reports on recently completed programmes admits: 
Our reports are generally of high quality, (“All of the reports and briefing 
papers received high praise from those people who had in fact read and/or 
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used them, whether (country) specialists or generalists” Conflict page 12) 
however many of their intended targets had not read them or denied ever 
having received them.  Often there is not a lot of evidence that they have had 
any impact.  (CS1/MM/4-09) 
 
The reasons for this are twofold. First is the general nature of advocacy work that 
makes impact difficult to attribute as many actors are involved in any particular 
advocacy work. Second, and more important, is the fact that the changes sought in 
advocacy campaigns take a very long time to realise. For example, the change in 
Turkey’s national law to recognize minorities, and grant the right to education in 
minorities’ mother tongue at primary school level has not happened though CS1’s 3-
year Anti discrimination programme, Turkey had this as one of its main objectives. 
The project has ended but its achievement remains unclear. But this change may well 
occur in future. For example, in March 2010 the Turkey government prepared a draft 
anti-discrimination law that incorporates substantial elements of the draft prepared by 
CS1 as part of the Turkey programme that ended nine months earlier. As a result, 
there is no measurable cause-effect relationship between the achievement of CS1’s 
objectives and the programme activities.  CS1 accepts this and admits that there are 
no ‘logical connections or causalities that link the activities to the targets and 
outcomes’ (CS1/PR/05: 9). This suggests that CS1’s activities are not programmable 
which is indicative of a low value of P in the endogenous variable model.  
 
5.5.3.3 The Economic Nature of CS1’s Objectives and Activities 
CS1’s main objectives are predicated on the principle of humanity. This is consistent 
with the values of the major stakeholders that shape its detailed objectives (the 
management and the Institutional donors). This reflects in the fact that the 
organizations’ services are provided free to beneficiaries. It also reflects in the low 
emphasis given by donors to economic efficiency as criteria for approval of its 
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programmes for funding. This thinking affects the accountability practices across the 
organization. There is no system of appraising the economic viability or efficiency of 
CS1’s programmes either at the planning, implementation or reporting stage. The 
accounting in CS1 focuses on supporting programme delivery by monitoring 
expenditure against budget but does not cover appraisal of the economic efficiency of 
the programme activities or cost control. This is acceptable to the other stakeholders 
as they are influenced by the same values. A review of narrative reports and the 
evaluative reports of CS1’s programmes reveals that none included any reference to 
the cost or economic efficiency of the programme delivery.  This suggests a low value 
of the endogenous variable E in the model presented in Chapter 4.  
 
Because all the endogenous variables in CS1 take on low values, the model suggests 
that there will be a sociological divide in CS1. This implies that traditional accounting 
alone will be inadequate for organization-wide accountability. Evidence from the data 
suggests that CS1 and the major stakeholders realize this and the use of multiple 
systems of accountability appears to be in response to this. For example, CS1’s 
donors demand detailed financial accountability in addition to those in the statutory 
financial reports. But they also require programme narrative reports and evaluation to 
supplement the use of accounting reports. This seems to be in response to the 
realization of the limitation of traditional accounting resulting from the sociological 
divide. 
 
5.5.4 The Influence of Exogenous Variables on CS1’s Accountability 
CS1 has several stakeholders. These were categorized in Section 5.2. as contractual 
and non contractual stakeholders. The information needs and the level of influence of 
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these stakeholders vary. This has some impact on CS1’s objectives and accountability 
practices. Evidence from the data suggests that CS1 uses both the contractual and the 
communal systems of accountability but to different extents. The contractual system, 
driven by the needs of the contractual stakeholders, is more prominently used while 
the communal system is sparsely used.  
 
The following subsection examines in more detail the exogenous variables in CS1 and 
how these impact on the organization’s objectives and accountability practices. 
 
5.5.4.1 The Influence of Stakeholders on CS1’s Objectives 
The influence of stakeholders derives from their power to affect decision-making in 
CS1 and the importance or impact of CS1’s activities on them.   
Prominent among the stakeholders are the Institutional donors. The broad and 
imprecise nature of the objectives and their detailed interpretation makes them 
susceptible to the influence of the Institutional donors who supply the bulk of its 
funding determine and therefore determine which programmes are funded and thereby 
implemented. This influence is most visible in cases where CS1 designs programmes 
specifically in response to donor’s ‘call for proposal’. In such instances, the donor’s 
objectives (usually stated in the call) are translated into the programme objective and 
by extension into CS1’s objectives. Because of the competition for funding among 
NGOs, donors assess funding application based on their strict criteria. In one feedback 
on a funding application submitted to the EC in response to a call, ‘relevance to the 
priorities and objectives of the call’ was allocated 20 out of 50 marks and though CS1 
scored 18 out of 20 on this criterion, the application was rejected because ‘it received 
a lower score than the ones selected to go through’ (EC/CP/11).  
 232 
 
Even where pre-designed programmes are put forward for funding applications, 
sometimes, the donors give feedback requesting CS1 to make certain amendments to 
the programme design. CS1 often modify the programme to suit the donors’ needs 
wherever this is possible or achievable.  For example, the DFID’s reply to CS1’s 
Concept Note in support of a funding application contains this paragraph: 
‘We have highlighted below issues arising from your concept note which must 
 be addressed in your full proposal: 
   
1. The project contains elements that meet the objectives of the DFID in that 
 you will aim to improve capacity of local Dalit communities to engage in 
 decision-making at the local and national level as well as at the international 
 level. Your full proposal will need to further develop the international 
 advocacy dimension of the project’ (DFID/FB/09). 
 
CS1 has the option to choose between this project and an alternative one on ‘The 
impact of climate change on minorities’. CS1’s response is summarized in the e-mail 
of 30/06/09: 
‘We then needed to decide between Dalit Gender and Climate change. We 
have decided to go with Dalit Gender. There are two reasons for this. The 
main one is that we already have (part) funding in place…The second reason 
is that I feel that the feedback on Dalit Gender is less challenging to address’ 
(CS1/IM/09:2) 
 
From the above analysis, the power of the Institutional donors to affect decision-
making in CS1 is high. Because these donors need NGOs to implement their 
programme, the impact of NGOs’ activities on them (their success) is also high. The 
Institutional donors therefore exert significant influence in CS1 which is evident in its 
accountability practices.   
 
Another stakeholder group are the beneficiaries. They have little power to affect 
decision making in CS1’s. They are not adequately consulted during programme 
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design because of cost constraints or more fundamentally because they have no 
contractual powers to demand it.  Notwithstanding that the impact of CS1’s activities 
on this stakeholder group is high, their influence is low. The humanitarian values that 
tends to guide the thinking of CS1 and the influential stakeholders has meant that the 
beneficiaries interests do get incorporated in the organization’s and programme 
objectives but only indirectly through the understanding of these stakeholders and 
other influences that they may be subject to. The effect is that the beneficiaries’ needs 
may not be accurately reflected in the programme objectives and activities.  
 
Figure 5.5 below shows how the various stakeholders influence CS1’s organizational 
and programme objectives. 
 













Strong Influence (P x I) 
(Power to approve 
programmes for funding) 
Weak Influence (P x I) 
(High Impact but no 
Power to affect decisions) 
 
Direct Influence through 
strategic planning and 
programme design (strong) 
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5.5.4.2 Influence of stakeholders’ needs on CS1’s accountability practices 
The varying influence of stakeholders on CS1’s objectives has implications for the 
accountability practices. Those stakeholders who have high influence over the 
organization’s objectives or the programme objectives, principally the Institutional 
donors, have their needs adequately reflected in those objectives. Accountability for 
the achievement of these objectives cannot be addressed merely by the provision of 
financial information which focuses only on the use of resources in implementing the 
activities designed to achieve those objectives. The accountability practices therefore 
focus on the achievement of the programme objectives, in addition, to ensure that the 
information needs of these stakeholders are met. The other influential stakeholders are 
the regulatory authorities who have the power to demand accountability in forms 
appropriate to their needs.  But practices designed to meet the needs of these 
influential stakeholders may not meet the needs of the other non-contractual 
stakeholders whose interests are not adequately reflected in the organizational or 
programme objectives. If these needs are not addressed through some other system of 
accountability, an information divide is created. The recognition of this divide may be 
the reason for the attempt to introduce some communal forms of accountability in 
CS1.   
 
But any potential information divide in relation to the needs of the contractual 
stakeholders may have been addressed through the use of the multiple systems of 
accountability which are in response to the different information needs of the 
stakeholders. For example, the regulatory authorities are more interested in 
standardized overall financial information that demonstrates legitimate use of 
resources as well as qualitative information to confirm that CS1 is operating within its 
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charitable objectives. These two needs are achieved within the structure of the 
statutory financial and narrative reporting. But the Institutional donors require more 
than that. They want specific financial information on their grants in forms suited to 
their varied needs. This may be different from what the statutory financial reports can 
provide. In addition they want individual narrative reports on the achievement of 
programme objectives in more details than that in the statutory reports. This need 
necessitates the additional individual programme reporting and the programme 
evaluation that supports it. 
 
Generally in CS1, accountability practices that address the information needs of the 
contractual stakeholders are more prominently used though some effort is made to 
incorporate practices aimed at the information needs of other non-contractual 
stakeholders. One may conclude that there is little information divide in relation to the 
needs of the contractual stakeholders but a significant information divide in relation to 
the needs of the non-contractual stakeholders. 
 
In summary, accountability practices in CS1 involve a multiplicity of systems and 
practices aimed at achieving different purposes. This situation results from two main 
conditions present in CS1: 
 
1. The existence and recognition of a sociological divide that means traditional 
accounting (type A) is not exclusively relied upon for accountability.  
2. The involvement of many stakeholders with different information needs and 
the need to minimise any potential information divide that may result if 
information the needs of stakeholders are not satisfied. 
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The reason why the accountability practices in CS1 addresses the information needs 
of some stakeholders better than those of others can be explained using a structuration 
theory analysis of the social context in which CS1 operates. 
 
 
5.6 The Influence of the Social Context on CS1’s Accountability  
The nature of accountability as a social practice and the significant influence of the 
stakeholders involved in shaping the practices makes structuration theory a suitable 
complement to the theoretical framework for analysis. Here the activities of the 
different stakeholders constitute the ‘human agency’ involved in the creation of the 
accountability system. The main structural properties of signification, legitimation 
and domination play a crucial part in the emergence of the observed practices. 
 
5.6.1 The Signification Structures in CS1 
The signification structures reflect what counts as important. This is influenced by the 
objectives of the organization and the collective views of the most influential 
stakeholders involved. A common background influence on the objectives and the 
views of the major stakeholders is the humanitarian principle which suggests that no 
service whatsoever for the benefit of a suffering human being is to be dismissed out of 
hand (ICRC, 2002:4). As a result, responding to the needs of beneficiaries is 
considered to be of greater importance than the economic efficiency of such response. 
This value permeates the collective structure of meaning which gets translated into 
actions and practices in CS1. For example, in appraising funding applications 




The other CS1’s donors have a similar approach. They are interested in achieving 
their objectives but within an allocated aid budget. The budget is disbursed on 
projects they judge to contribute most to their objectives. No financial return is 
expected from such disbursement but it is important to them that the programme is 
implemented and the objectives achieved. They consider the financial management of 
programmes as important but only in ensuring that plans are implemented within the 
budget. The low importance attached to economic efficiency in the signification 
structures reflects in the whole accountability process from programme design 
through funding approval and final accountability.  
 
The second major element of the signification structures in CS1 is the need to ensure 
that money meant for a particular purpose is utilized only for that purpose. The 
Institutional donors hold this important for accountability and this may be the driving 
force behind fund accounting that require separate identification of income and 
expenditure for their grants. This highly detailed fund accounting is integral to CS1’s 
operations. But this value was not important to the regulators who were more 
interested in accountability for the overall pool of Charities’ income and as such it 
was not recognized in the first SORP. But the enormous influence of the Institutional 
donors in the sector has meant that this practice is sustained (or gained domination) 
and had to be recognized in the subsequent revision to the SORP. But this is still not 
in enough detail. As a result, the system of detailed fund accounting for donors is 
practiced alongside the statutory reporting system. 
 
The needs of CS1’s beneficiaries influence the signification structure though they are 
a less influential stakeholder group and do not play any active role in determining 
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those structures. CS1 considers them as important just as the Institutional donors who 
require that beneficiaries are consulted and their needs taken into consideration in any 
programme proposal for funding. This is one of the criteria the EC and DFID, two of 
CS1’s major donors, use in assessing programme proposals. But the donors do not 
provide the funding for this consultation. Where the programme does not succeed in 
attracting funding, the cost of such consultation is not recovered from the donors but 
borne by CS1. CS1 therefore attempts to minimize this cost by using the ending 
period of funded programmes to consult beneficiaries on subsequent phases or follow 
on programmes. But where a programme is entirely new, this opportunity for a funded 
beneficiary consultation is not available and the consultation process often skipped  
‘We know that some form of beneficiaries’ representation in programme 
design and implementation is required. In some cases, we meet community 
leaders who represent the views of the beneficiaries….In some cases we work 
with beneficiaries who have organized themselves into groups. Good 
examples are the Endorois Welfare Council for the Trouble in paradise 
campaign and the Pastoralist Women’s Forum for the Pastoralist 
project...Where it is practicable we consult with beneficiaries at the project 
design stage. The difficulty is that most of our donors would not fund the 
planning phase with the exception of the Big Lottery Fund that provides some 
grant at the Concept Note stage for detailed project planning…As we have 
very limited core funding to finance extensive consultation with 
beneficiaries…(where) this opportunity is not available…we may skip this 
phase’ (CS1/FG/ 07) 
  
From the above analysis, it is clear that the signification structure in CS1 gives more 
emphasis to the achievement of programme objectives over economic efficiency. The 
system of accountability therefore goes beyond the provision of financial information 
relating to the programme activities to include several other approaches. The major 
ones are narrative reporting on the implementation of the activities and achievement 
of objectives and independent programme evaluation which focus on the same issues. 
Other approaches such as participatory budgeting, outcome mapping and stakeholder 
consultation aimed at engaging with beneficiaries in programme design and 
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implementation are considered important and talked about but not implemented in 
practice. To understand why some practices have gained more prominence, it is 
important to examine the domination and legitimation structures in CS1. 
 
5.6.2 The Legitimation and Domination structures in CS1 
The legitimation and domination structures are closely connected and are better 
viewed together. These structures determine which of the values, objectives and 
practices become widely adopted and form part of the system. It reflects the unequal 
influence of stakeholders. The most influential stakeholders in CS1 are the 
Institutional donors and the regulatory authorities through the Charity Commission. 
This influence derives from the control of the source of CS1’s financial resources by 
the donors and the use of authoritative power by the regulatory authorities. But their 
influence is exerted in different ways. The Institutional donors influence the 
objectives and the activities of CS1 in ways already discussed in section 5.5.4.1 but 
they also influence the accountability practices in a number of ways. This influence 
could be seen in the detailed fund accounting system in use in CS1 that is in direct 
response to the needs of the Institutional donors. The level of detail required as grant 
contractual conditions are over and above those required to meet the statutory 
reporting needs. This is exemplified in CS1’s Turkey programme where the 
programme was accounted for within the statutory accounts from 2006 to 2009 which 
received unqualified audit reports. But a specific project audit requested by the donor 
and performed by the same auditor revealed inaccuracies in the project financial 
reports requiring some adjustments.  
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Narrative reporting using the logical-framework format is another prominent 
accountability practice in CS1. This is encouraged by the Institutional donors who 
require that programme proposals submitted for funding must include the logical 
framework and where approved the contract conditions require that narrative reports 
be prepared using this format. This method of reporting, used primarily only for 
accountability to the Institutional donors, is well established in CS1.  
 
Another influence of Institutional donors in CS1 could be seen in the focus of its 
accounting system mainly on monitoring expenditure against budget. This is driven 
by the needs of the donors. For example, one of CS1’s donors includes the following 
in its guidelines on grant management: 
‘DFID is governed by Government Accounting Rules. These rules are such 
that if, for any reason, the Fund does not spend the £14m it has been allocated 
the unspent balance is not carried over in to the next financial year. In effect, 
any under spend on the £14m allocation has to be surrendered to the Treasury. 
It is important that all organizations submitting proposals to or receiving 
funding from the fund understand this and are aware of the implications.’ 
(DFID/FG/06) 
 
The donor is as much displeased with expenditure below budget as with expenditure 
above budget. This influences the accounting systems in CS1 to give emphasis to the 
monitoring of spending to ensure that it keeps pace with budgets.   
 
Beneficiaries do not play a part in the domination and legitimation structures. While 
all stakeholders view the needs of beneficiaries as important, consultation with 
beneficiaries are subject to availability of funds. Furthermore, CS1 takes the feedback 
from the consultation process as desirable action points, not as binding 
recommendations. For example, some of the feedback from CS1’s consultation with 
 241 
beneficiaries following the implementation of the 2005-08 strategy was taken up in 
the new strategic plan 2009-2012 while some others were not.  
 
The regulatory authorities play a major part in the domination and legitimation 
structure through the use of ‘authoritative resource’ in the regulation of charities. This 
is manifested for example in their role in developing the reporting standard for the 
sector (SORP) and making it mandatory for charities. Evidence from the data suggests 
that, statutory financial reporting does not meet the challenging demands of 
accountability to the Institutional donors but it has remained a part of the 




CS1 renders accountability by using a multiple system falling mostly into segments A 
and B of the skeletal theoretical model of accountability. The organization attempts to 
use some form of communal accountability (type C) for accountability to 
beneficiaries but the methods are not properly developed or appropriate for that 
purpose so no significant impact has been made in this area. The various systems in 
use are not integrated and there are no clear cut divisions between them. As a result, 
there are areas of overlaps and gaps. The overlap results in duplication of efforts with 
two systems of accountability addressing the same area of concern. An example of 
this is the financial accountability which is being addressed by two forms of type A, 
one focused primarily on the needs of the Institutional donor and the other on the 
needs of the regulators. Also, narrative reports on all programmes are prepared in the 
form of the Annual reports and Trustees’ reports. These are in addition to specific 
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programme narrative reports. All of these are type B but addressing the needs of 
different stakeholder groups. The use of multiple systems and the lack of integration 
between them mean more resources than necessary are going into accountability. 
Another problem with the system is that there are gaps in areas where none of the 
accountability systems in use cover. An area of gap is in types C and D forms of 
accountability.  Even though some limited attention is given to type C, anything like 
type D form of accountability is not practiced at all. The non-contractual stakeholders 
have no involvement in decisions relating to how the resources of the NGO is utilised. 
These overlaps and gaps are not immediately obvious because no stakeholder takes a 





























Data from the Secondary Case Studies 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 sets out the data from the lead case study along with the analysis and 
findings. These guided the data collection in the following five case studies which are 
spread evenly across the NGO classification scheme developed in Chapter 2 and used 
for the initial sample selection in Chapter 3.  
 
Two of these additional five case studies (CS2 and CS3) are UK based NGOs while 
the other three (CS4, CS5 and CS6) are NGOs based in Africa, two in Uganda and 
one in Nigeria. Of the two NGOs based in Uganda, one is an affiliate of one of the 
UK based NGOs studied. This chapter presents the data from these five case studies 
labelled Case Study 2 (CS2) to Case Study 6 (CS6) while the analysis of the data is 
presented in Chapter 7.  
 
Section 6.2 presents the data on CS2 a national charity based in London providing 
services to people who have experienced mental health issues. Section 6.3 presents 
the data on CS3, an international development NGO based in the UK but operating in 
15 countries to provide access to safe water and sanitation to poorer people. Section 
6.4 presents the data on CS4, a Uganda based NGO that is an affiliate of CS3. Section 
6.5 presents the data on CS5 also a Uganda based NGO that works in the area of 
conflict prevention and resolution. While CS5 is not an affiliate of CS1, it has 
received funding from it to carry out specific activities in the area of their common 
objectives. Finally Section 6.6 presents the data on CS6 an Orphanage based in 
Nigeria’s capital city, Abuja.  
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The descriptions of these cases are presented within the framework of the 
understanding gained from the lead case study (CS1). The analysis of CS1 indicates 
that the accountability practices consist of a combination of different approaches that 
serve the needs of different stakeholders.  They consist mainly of: 
1. Statutory financial reporting and audit focusing on accounting for the 
overall income and expenditure by fund (restricted and unrestricted) in line 
with the reporting standard.  
2. Narrative reporting extension of the statutory reports in the form of 
Directors (trustees) reports, focusing on the overall organization objectives 
and activities including brief summaries of the restricted programme activities.  
3. Donor financial reports comparing detailed programme income and 
expenditure with budget using formats determined by the donors and specified 
in the contract.  
4. Programme narrative reports focusing on the implementation of individual 
programme activities, the achievement of objectives and the desired outcome 
and impact.  
5. Annual reports and Strategic plan review consisting of narrative accounts 
of the implementation of CS1’s strategic plans, taking into account the 
achievements of all the programmes.  
6. Programme Evaluation involving an independent evaluator visiting the 
programme site and the beneficiaries to verify that the activities were carried 
out and the objectives achieved.   
7. Participation of the beneficiaries and other non-contractual stakeholders 
to ensure that the programme effectively addresses their needs. 
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Elements of these seven approaches to accountability are also apparent in the five 
case studies. 
 
6.2 CS2- Background   
CS2 is a charity established in 1981 to address a lack of services for London and 
Hackney residents experiencing mental health issues. It aims to promote good mental 
health in the society and to protect people who have experience of mental health 
difficulties. It started as an advocacy organization but has grown into the provision of 
welfare services for its beneficiaries. The welfare component of its work has grown 
substantially and it is now classified as a Welfare NGO though it still retains the 
advocacy elements of its work. It has annual income of £2.7m (2009) and employs 75 
staff and 40 volunteers working in four main premises in the UK. It is governed by a 
Board of Trustees consisting of 17 members selected by a panel that includes a 
representative of users. CS2 carries out various activities aimed at achieving its 
mission and objectives.  These activities are organized into distinctive areas of 
services described in detail in sub section 6.2.2 
 
6.2.1 CS2’s Objectives and Strategy 
CS2 articulates its vision and objectives in its strategic plans which it undertakes in a 
four year planning cycle. Its 2006-2009 strategic plan states: 
‘Our vision is of a society that promotes and protects good mental health for 
all, and that treats people with experience of mental distress fairly, positively, 
and with respect’ (CS2/SP/06: 3) 
 
The plan then summarizes in its mission statement how it aims to achieve this vision 
through advocacy on behalf of people with mental health problems and the provision 
of services that meet their needs: 
 246 
‘Our mission is to advance the views, needs and ambitions of people with 
mental health problems and to challenge discrimination and promote 
inclusion. We will influence policy and promote equal rights through 
campaigning and education and develop innovative quality services which 
reflects expressed need and diversity’ (CS2/SP/06:3) 
 
The plan also lists as part of its objectives certain qualitative values it believes in and 
which it commits to promoting in all its work. These values are: 
 Egalitarian ethos: contribution of all roles equally valued 
 Strengthening user participation: putting users at the heart of the 
organization 
 Strengthen relationship with stakeholders 
 Strengthen the financial position of CS2 
(CS2/SP/06:4) 
 
The plans are developed with input from all staff, managers, and trustees during a 
‘Strategic planning day’ event. The users of its services are given the opportunity to 
input into the plan through separate meetings. For example, during the development 
of the 2006- 2009 strategic plan two consultation meetings were held with users at 
CS2’s sheltered accommodation at Homerton Friends Lodge and at Tudor Road. 
These meetings were to ‘discuss the positive aspects of the services offered by CS2 
and the areas they would like to see change, improvement or entirely new services 
developed’ (CS2/SP/06: 4) 
 
Each strategic plan focuses on particular aspects of the organization and can vary 
significantly from year to year. For example for the 2006-09 period the plan lists as its 
focus four key goals that are markedly different from the previous plan:  
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‘Last year’s strategic plan focused on internal issues such as organizational 
development and staff capacity building. This year we will focus on services 
especially around the following themes: 
1. To improve/enhance all our services in line with best practice. 
2. To promote effective joint working between departments and projects in order 
to provide a holistic service to our clients that address all their needs in a 
coordinated way. 
3. To integrate user participation in all our work. 
4. To develop new services in line with assessed and changing needs’ 
(CS2/SP/06: 4) 
The programmes and services are designed with the aim of achieving these four 
strategic goals: 
‘Plans to achieve these four strategic goals will be incorporated into the annual 
plans of all the departments/projects’ (CS2/SP/06: 4)  
 
The detailed Implementation plan lists the activities to be undertaken in order to 
achieve each strategic goal and the outcomes and targets expected together with the 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to be used in measuring them. The KPIs used for 
measuring the achievement of the strategic objectives are developed by CS2 
internally. But for its funded programmes and services the KPIs used are influenced 
by the funders in the process of negotiating grant contract.   
‘Where we receive grants for particular programmes, the contract usually 
stipulates the expected outcomes and the KPIs to be used in measuring them. 
For example the KPI used for the employment project includes the number of 
people enrolled and the number of people that graduated. Reporting against 
the KPIs involves extensive collection of non-financial data’ (CS2/IV4/10)  
 
The KPIs set by the donors for CS2’s grant-funded programmes are more demanding 
than the KPIs that CS2 has set for itself to measure its overall performance against its 
strategic objectives. These are flexible and less challenging to achieve. For example 
the following extract from the 2006-09 ‘Strategic Objectives Action Plan’ show for 
each strategic objective some of the actions or activities to be carried out and the KPIs 
developed by CS2 to measure their achievement. 
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Table 6.1- Extract from CS2’s Strategic Objective Action Plan 2006-09 




1. Improving all our 
services in line with 
best practice 
Undertake review of Education 
and Employment service (and  
other services) 
Review completed and 
recommendations 
implemented 
 Undertake review of IT services 
to ensure effective use of ICT 
IT systems in line with 
latest technologies;  
 Develop and implement 
‘Absence at Work’ policy 
Reduce sickness level by 
40% 
 Develop and implement plan to 
improve standard of office 
environment & infrastructure 
30% of Tudor projects 
redecorated. Old equip and 
furniture replaced. 
 Improve evaluation systems to 
include clear outcome-oriented 
approaches 
Support care plans and 
outcome monitoring 
reports 
2. Promote effective 
joint-working in 
order to provide a 
holistic service that 
meet clients’ needs 
Develop an assessment process 
to include all our services and 
not just one department 
Referral and assessment 
system for all projects 
reviewed to be in line with 
objective two 
 Become a more information 
centred and information driven 
organization with  greater 
emphasis on gathering, 




Two research reports 
or/and good practice 
guides published per year; 
CS2’s services leaflets 
updated yearly;   
 Increased focus on recovery/ 
improving quality of life, case 
work and group work for all 
services 
Clear outcomes focused 
on recovery and improved 
quality of life for users 
3. Integrating user 
participation in all our work 
Develop a training programme 
for users to enable them 
participate 
Training programme 
delivered to at least 10 
users 
 Encourage users to take part in 
decision-making where possible 
Performance Review 
Panels in place for all 
projects  
 Undertake annual user 
satisfaction survey  
User satisfaction survey 
reports 
4.Develop new services in 
line with assessed and 
changing needs 
Pilot a floating support service 
to provide support in one’s own 
home rather than in specialized 
supported housing  
Floating support provided 
to at least 10 tenants in 
non CS2’s  supported 
housing 
 Increase/enhance services to 
support carers in line with 
government policy 
Increase staffing and the 
number of befriending 




Many of these KPIs are qualitative and only subjectively measureable. The more 
exacting KPIs used at individual programme level are dictated by the funders though 
not all funders’ suggestions on KPIs are accepted. They are discussed and are only 
agreed or adopted where they are workable within CS2’s system. KPIs have been 
developed and agreed for some areas. For example, the Employment & Education 
services have the number of enrolment on courses and the number of beneficiaries 
placed on jobs as KPIs. But KPIs have not been developed for some other important 
areas (e.g the advocacy service) as a result of the difficulty in developing objective 
criteria for measurement: 
‘ We have been unable to develop meaningful KPIs in areas like Advocacy 
service….This is because the nature of advocacy services makes it difficult for 
any reasonable or measurable KPIs to be developed’ (CS2/IV4/10).  
 
CS2 realizes that accountability in form of a reliable system of measurement of the 
outcomes of its programmes is important to its funders:  
‘The monitoring arrangements associated with many of our recent contracts 
points to the need for us to improve on our ability to identify and measure key 
performance indicators. The challenge ahead lies in developing meaningful 
measures and in collecting information in a way that enhances rather than 
hinders the service provision, or the experience of the service users’ 
(CS2/SP/06: 7).  
 
Responding to the demands of its funders is crucial to CS2’s long-term stability and 
survival as noted in its Strategic Plan:  
‘The voluntary and community sector has long struggled with short-term 
funding arrangements which have made future planning unpredictable..We 
will seek to lengthen as many of our funding streams as possible to ensure 






6.2.2 CS2’s Activities  
CS2’s activities are developed around its main objectives. They are organized into the 
following four departments.  
 
The first is the Counselling, Befriending and Prescribed Drugs Department. CS2 sees 
social isolation as one of the challenges faced by people with mental health problems. 
It therefore provides supportive, reliable relationships through trained volunteer 
befrienders to individuals with mental health difficulties who struggle with social 
isolation. 
‘Befriending is a relationship between a volunteer and a recipient which is 
initiated, supported and monitored by a voluntary or statutory agency’ (CS2/ 
AR/09:16).  
 
CS2 recruit, train and support volunteer befrienders and match them with individuals 
who have been identified as needing such support. It aims that through providing 
these individuals access to a range of activities and social skills, they can build 
increased self-esteem and self confidence. CS2 uses as a measure of the success of 
this service the fact that ‘The Befriending Service was awarded APS (Approved 
Provider Standard) by the Mentoring and Befriending Foundation…Meeting the 
criteria for the award of APS signifies competence and safe practice in mentoring and 
befriending’ (CS2/AR/09: 4)   
 
Second is the Education and Employment department. CS2 supports its beneficiaries 
to increase their level of academic and vocational achievement and help them to gain 
employment or voluntary work thereby improving their self confidence and 
motivation to succeed. It also provides mediation service and mental health awareness 
training to employers and local businesses in order to ensure that employees with 
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mental health needs are able to successfully retain their jobs. CS2 reports on its 
performance in terms of the KPIs it has set for this area. For example, the 2008-09 
Annual Report sets out the achievements of the Education and Employment service: 
‘This year we provided assistance to over 200 people: 25 gained paid 
employment, 70 accessed education and training opportunities, and a further 
51 participated in voluntary work placement… during the year 30 people were 
seen by the Work Retention Advisor, of these 20 retained their original 
employment, five sought alternative work and five are currently still on sick 
leave’ (CS2/AR/09: 10) 
 
Third is the Advocacy and Advice Department. CS2’s advocacy project supports 
people to express their views and wishes about their mental health care and 
treatment.  It employs ‘Advocates’ who help people to make informed decisions by 
providing information and exploring options with them. From 1 April 2009 most 
patients detained under the mental health act have a legal right to an Independent 
Mental Health Advocacy (IMHA) service. CS2 provides IMHA services helping users 
to understand and access their legal rights under the Mental Health Act, to find out 
information about aspects of their care, access their medical records and to have their 
voice heard by putting forward their views and complaints. 
 
Fourth through the Housing and Community Department, CS2 maintains a registered 
care home for people leaving long-stay mental health hospitals offering them 
accommodation in a good setting and providing support on mental health issues. It 
also provides supported housing services tailored to tenants’ needs with specialization 
on mental health. It provides a day service that supports people by providing for them 
services such as housing advice, leisure and sporting activities, skills acquisition etc. 
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CS2’s activities are complementary and all contribute to achieving its stated objective 
of promoting good mental health and protecting those who have experienced mental 
health issues. The activities are all based in the community of London and Hackney 
and are designed by CS2 either based on its assessment of the needs of beneficiaries 
or in response to identified funding opportunities. 
‘We actively design new programmes some in response to funding 
opportunities and others in response to needs we identify. For example when 
we became aware of the build-up of a refugee community and the high 
incidence of mental health issues we designed a programme in response to it 
and then started approaching prospective funders’ (CS2/IV4/10) 
 
CS2’s activities have been running for many years and are developed only 
incrementally. Initiatives with funding prospects or those specifically suggested by 
funders are only added on within the context of existing programmes and services. As 
a result of this the influence of the funders in determining the activities are low: 
‘we are usually more successful with funding application… we experience low 
rejection rate because we know what the needs are and the areas to cover and 
our services have been well developed through consultation with GPs, 
Psychiatrists and the users…feedback from donors requesting us to redesign 
our programmes are rare’ (CS2/IV4/10) 
 
The success of the activities or programs is measured in terms of the achievement of 
KPIs. But the KPIs are not directly related to the cost of the services as the 
relationship between cost and service output is not programmeable: 
‘Some of our funders have requested for unit costing of our services but it has 
not been straightforward.. it has only been possible in areas like counselling 
but most other areas of our services don’t lend themselves to unit costing..for 
example, Employment service or welfare rights could take one week or one 
month to deliver. You cannot precisely determine the cost ahead of the actual 





6.2.3 CS2’s Stakeholders 
CS2 has three major stakeholders with varying influence in the organization. First 
there are the major funders who are in the main government agencies and the National 
Health Service Primary Care Trust (NHS PCT). These funders consider that CS2’s 
activities can contribute to the achievement of their own objectives. They, therefore, 
provide CS2 with grants to implement specific activities. Together this group 
provided 75% of CS2’s restricted funds in 2009.  Though they have some input in 
determining CS1’s programme and services they have limited scope in influencing its 
core objectives or to take CS2 in an entirely new area outside its core services. 
 
Second, there are the regulatory authorities mainly the Charity Commission. As a 
registered Charity, CS2 has a statutory duty of reporting and compliance with the 
Commission’s regulations. The role of the Commission as a stakeholder in CS2 is 
similar to that in CS1 already presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Third there are the beneficiaries who are mainly people who have experienced mental 
health issues as well as the entire community. CS2 exists primarily to serve this 
stakeholder group. It therefore seeks to involve them in the development of its 
programmes. It holds a fortnightly consultation meeting where CS2 collects feedback 
on its activities and the needs of the stakeholders. This has developed into a full users’ 
forum facilitated by users themselves. CS2 also attempts to involve the users in 
governance and in reporting. However, the fact that they do not pay for the services 
limits their influence in determining which service or initiative is given priority or in 
ensuring that the feedback given is actually acted on. Respondent 1 described one 
such instance: 
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‘We got to know of the high importance of the IRIE mind project (a day centre 
for people just released from long term hospitalization) to our beneficiaries 
through feedback from the users’ forum. Their feedback informed our decision 
to keep the centres open 7 days a week and all through the Christmas period as 
that is the period when users feel lonely the most and experience suicidal 
tendencies. But when funding became difficult we had to reduce the opening 
time to five days per week. The users are angry about this change but we can’t 
go back to opening 7 days because funders’ support is just not available 
anymore’ (CS2/IV4/10)  
 
These stakeholders could be categorized as contractual and non-contractual. The 
external funders who provide the grant under contract and the regulatory authorities to 
whom CS2 owes a duty of accountability could be categorized as contractual 
stakeholders. The beneficiaries and the community are non-contractual stakeholders 
though CS2 also attempt to demonstrate accountability to them.  To highlight the 
influence of the contractual stakeholders in CS2, the next sub-section presents more 
information on CS2’s funding structure. The role of the regulatory authorities as a 
contractual stakeholder in CS1 has been dealt with in Chapter 5. This is broadly the 
same for CS2 and other UK Charities and will not be repeated here.  
 
6.2.4 Funding of CS2’s Programmes 
CS2 funds its activities from both restricted and unrestricted sources. In 2009, the 
total incoming resource was £2, 696, 411 out of which £405,028 (15%) was from 
unrestricted sources. The unrestricted income is mainly from 3 sources but the most 
important of them, constituting 88% of the unrestricted income, was received as rent 
from the Housing and Community services. Restricted income for that year was 
£2,291,383 or 85% of total income. This was provided by a total of 16 funders but 
four of them (see table 6.2 below) are particularly important. These four funders 
jointly provided 75% of the restricted funds. 
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Table 6.2- CS2: Restricted Income from major funders in 2008/09 
 Funder Amount £ % 
1 City & Hackney Teaching Primary Care Trust £670, 637 
 
29.3 
2 East London & City NHS Foundation Trust £ 304, 797 13.3 
3 London Borough of Hackney    £603, 939 
 
26.4 
4 London Development Agency £133,441 5.8 
 Total from main funders 1,712,814 75 
 Other restricted Income sources 578,569 25 
 TOTAL RESTRICTED INCOME 2,291,383 100 
 
 
Two of the four main funders are government agencies while the other two are a NHS 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) and a Hospital Foundations Trust. The PCT funding is 
given in form of ‘mainline grants’ which are renewed yearly for the same amount 
until cancelled. Respondent 1 commenting on the predictability of the grant said: 
‘It could be lost usually only on breach of contract…It makes budgeting easy 
as you know exactly how much to expect yearly’ (CS2/IV4/10) 
 
 But the other three are not as secure as they are not automatically renewed. 
Most of CS2’s funding from donors is to continue the programmes and services 
already designed and being carried out by the organization. But occasionally, the 




6.2.5. CS2’s Accountability practices 
This sub-section describes the approaches that CS2 adopts in rendering 
accountability. This involves a combination of different methods. The first is statutory 
reporting. As a charity and company limited by guarantee CS2, like other UK 
charities, files annual returns with the Companies House and the Charity Commission. 
This consists of financial reporting in line with the Charities Statement of 
Recommended Practices (SORP) as well as narrative reporting on its charitable 
activities and fund balances. The second approach is the Donor Reporting system 
whereby CS2 reports to its funders on the grants received. This consists of the 
financial reports and performance reports. CS2 also uses consultation with 
stakeholders to involve the users of its services in decision making concerning the 
design of its programmes and services and in governance. This it views as a form of 
accountability. The various approaches are consistent with those in use in CS1 and 
can be grouped under similar headings. These approaches are discussed in the 
following sub-section. 
 
6.2.5.1. Statutory Financial Reporting 
Traditional accounting in line with SORP is used mainly for statutory financial 
reporting. The account is based on fund accounting principles and separately 
identifies the income and expenditure on each of the service it provides (as separate 
funds). Table 6.3 below is an extract from CS2’s 2009 Financial Statements showing 





Table 6.3 CS2: Statement of Financial Activities for the year ended 
31 March 2009 






Incoming Resources from generated funds     
Voluntary Income  10,089 9,750 19,839 
Bank Interest  1,893 0 1893 
  11,982 9,750 21,732 
Incoming resources from charitable activities     
User Involvement   18,889 18,889 
Advice, advocacy and appropriate adult  15,650 583,475 599,125 
Counseling, befriending and prescribed drugs  20,761 305, 262 326,023 
Education and Employment   598, 116 598,116 
Housing and Community Services  356,835 775,891 1,132,526 
  393,046 2,281,633 2,674,679 
Total Incoming resources  405,028 2,291,383 2,696,411 
Resources Expended     
Charitable activities     
User Involvement  0 18,578 18,578 
Advice, advocacy and appropriate adult  17,154 566,080 583,234 
Counseling, befriending and prescribed drugs  1,500 275,520 277,020 
Education and Employment  1,628 581,078 582,706 
Housing and Community Services  409,683 759,520 1,169,203 
Provision for maintenance of property  6,000  6,000 
Total charitable expenditure  435,965 2,200,776 2,636,741 
Governance cost  13,109  13,109 
Total resources expended 6 449,074 2,200,776 2,649,850 
Net (outgoing)/incoming resources  (44,046) 90,607 46,561 
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Generally, expenditure is maintained at about the same level as income and any 
surplus or deficit on restricted income/expenditure is carried forward as a restricted 
fund balance due to the funders. But any surplus/deficit on unrestricted activities is 
taken to general reserves. The general reserve is important in CS2 as it is the net free 
funds available to it. In its reserve policy CS2 sets a target level of reserves it desires 
to maintain. For example, the net deficit incurred in 2008/09 took the general reserve 
further down from its low level increasing the gap between the desired and actual 
level of reserve maintained. Under the heading ‘Reserves Policy’ the Trustees’ report 
in 2008/09 states: 
‘Reserves are particularly important for CS2 as we have no endowment 
funding and are entirely dependent for income upon short term contracts and 
funding which are inevitably subject to fluctuation. We aim to establish a sum 
equivalent to 3 months’ operating costs as unrestricted reserves, estimated at 
£500,000. At the end of the year, these reserves stood at £78,988 which is 
15.8% of the required sum for the year under review’ (CS2/AA/ 09) 
 
6.2.5.2 Statutory Narrative Reporting 
Narrative reporting forms an important part of CS2’s accountability practice. It is 
used in three forms. The first is as an extension of the statutory financial reports. The 
Board of Trustees’ Report in the financial statements for 2009 contains sections on: 
1. Organization structure, Governance and Management 
2. Objects and Policies 
3. Review of activities and performance 
4. Financial Review 
5. New developments in 2008-2009 
The most extensive of these sections is that on ‘Review of activities and performance’ 
where CS2 attempts to demonstrate how its activities have contributed to the 
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achievement of its strategic objectives. The focus of the report was however on listing 
the areas of achievements only. 
 
6.2.5.3 Financial reporting to donors 
Another component of accountability in CS2 is the system for financial reporting to 
donors. This consists two main parts. The first is the system of measuring 
performance against Key Performance Indicators. Respondent 1 says ‘it involves 
extensive data gathering and is sometimes unworkable for some services’ 
(CS2/IV4/10). The second part is unit costing whereby CS2 attempts to establish unit 
cost for the services it provides. There are difficulties with this aspect but CS2’s 
funders are more interested in unit costing as a way of establishing contract value and 
monitoring performance. But this is possible only for some of its services. For 
example, Respondent 1 says ‘we do unit costing for services like counselling but in 
areas like employment for example, welfare rights could take 1 week or 1 month so it 
is difficult to work out any unit cost. Some funders want to insist on unit costing but 
this is not always practicable’ (CS2/IV4/10) 
 
The accounting in CS2 is also used for planning, budgeting and monitoring of 
programme expenditure. This is linked to the system of reporting to donors as it aims 
to ensure that all the organization’s costs are packaged as programmes for funding by 
donors:  
‘We collect extensive data on our costs particularly the central administration 
costs or overheads. This helps us in our budgeting as we aim to absorb all 
overheads into our programmes and services. This is very crucial as any 
unabsorbed overheads reduces our free reserves’ (CS2/IV4/10) 
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CS2’s donors require financial reports but in different forms. While some are satisfied 
with the statutory financial reports, others want particular financial reports given in 
formats determined by them. The varying emphasis on financial reports is linked to 
the particular interests of the donors: 
‘The Big Lottery Fund one of our donors places a lot of emphasis on detailed 
financial reporting, monitoring and control of programme transactions. This 
may be due to their commercial background. But  another, the HSF is more 
concerned about outcomes, for example checking our classrooms to ensure 
they are properly equipped for our education project…for them the statutory 
financial statements is sufficient’ (CS2/IV4/10) 
 
6.2.5.4 Programme Narrative Reports 
CS2 prepares narrative reports on its programme for donors. The formats and contents 
of the reports are given in the contract by the donors. The focus of the reports is on 
demonstrating or measuring outcomes. How the outcome is measured varies with 
donors: 
‘for example the Learning Trust is more interested in outcome measurement 
e.g exam success rate for the Education project but the Henry Smith Trust is 
more interested in verifying that the facilities exist for users (e.g having well 




The outcomes and the means for measuring them are agreed at the start of the project 
and included in the grant contract.  
 
6.2.5.5 Annual Reports and Strategic Planning 
Another way in which CS2 uses narrative reporting is by producing annual reports 
describing its activities in relation to its strategic objectives and highlighting major 
achievements. For example, the Chair’s report in the 2008- 2009 annual report states: 
‘Our innovative Peer Advocacy Project has become successful in creating a 
pool of user advocates, six of whom have obtained paid work as mental health 
advocates across London. We have enhanced our Befriending Service which 
has now achieved the Approved Provider Standard- a national standard for 
mentoring and befriending’ (CS2/AR/ 09: 1)  
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The annual report is linked to the strategic planning process and generally contains 
more information than is available in the Trustees’ reports. It substantiates 
achievements with examples and case studies. It also contains summarized 
information from the financial accounts. But the financial information reveals no 
more than is already available in the annual audited accounts.  
 
The annual report is used as a form of reporting on its achievements against its goals 
stated in the strategic plans and though it is prepared annually, it takes a more long 
range account of the overall activities of the organization. It is widely disseminated to 
stakeholders both contractual and non-contractual. Some of CS2’s major funders 
demand it but CS2 also gives it to prospective funders who would want to learn more 
about its activities. 
 
6.2.5.6 Programme evaluation 
CS2 does not carry out any formal evaluation of its programmes but often, the donor 
sends in evaluators to monitor progress on the programmes. The focus of these 
monitors is usually on the use of resources and ensuring the programme activities 
were carried out. These differ in focus from the type of evaluation observed in CS1 
that focuses on the effectiveness of the programmes in achieving their objectives.  
 
6.2.5.7 Participation of the beneficiaries and wider stakeholders 
In relation to participation of non-contractual stakeholders, CS2 attempts to obtain 
inputs from its stakeholders concerning its programmes and services. It holds 
fortnightly meetings with users to obtain feedback on its work. This has developed 
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into a full users’ forum that conducts and facilitates its own meeting and gives its 
feedback directly to the Executive Director who reports this to the Board of Trustees. 
The coordinator of the users’ forum is on the Board. CS2 also involves a users’ 
representative in the selection of Trustees. The feedbacks from the users’ forum are 
acted on and influence the work of CS2: 
‘We are a user-led organization…users’ needs drive what we provide. For 
example, the Trauma and Refugee counselling project was initiated through 
feedback from the users’ group. This project was later funded by the Big 
Lottery Fund’ (CS2/IV4/10)  
 
CS2 produces a bi-monthly newsletter by which it informs users about its activities 
and how it affects them. Though CS2 counts these various forms of users’ 
participation as a form of accountability to stakeholders, they may however be 
symbolic as there is no evidence to show that the inputs from the users actually 
influence decision making in the organization. 
 












Table 6.4- Summary of main data from CS2 
 CS2 Comments 
Type of NGO Welfare Started with Advocacy but now 
delivers welfare services 
Area of operation National Operates only in the UK  
Annual Income £2.7m  
% of Income provided by contractual Stakeholders 
(restricted income) 
85% Mainly NHS PCT 
% of Income generated internally or from non-
contractual Stakeholders (unrestricted) 
15% Mainly through charges from its 
maintained shelter 
Influence of  contractual stakeholders High Request for funds, supplying 
information, reports 
Participation of non-contractual stakeholders Medium Consultation to obtain feedback on its 
services and in programme design  
Accountability methods in use:   
1. Statutory financial reporting √ Reporting under SORP 
2. Narrative reporting extension of statutory 
reports 
√ Basic Trustees’ report as required 
by SORP 
3. Annual reports and strategic planning √  Comprehensive reports on Strategic 
Plans 
4. Donor financial reports √ Determined by donors’ needs 
5. Programme narrative reports √ Determined by donors’ needs 
6. Programme evaluation √ Monitoring performed by donors 
7. Participation of beneficiaries and wider 
stakeholders 






6.3 CS3- Background 
CS3 is an international NGO that aids ‘the world’s poorest people to gain access to 
safe water, sanitation and improved hygiene’ (CS3/AR/09:4). It believes that water 
and sanitation are basic human rights that ‘underpin health, education and livelihoods 
and form the first, essential step in overcoming poverty’ (CS3/AR/09:4). But it 
estimates that ‘globally 884 million people live without safe drinking water and 2.5 
billion do not have adequate sanitation’ (CS3/SP/09: 5). It claims that the lack of 
these basic services adversely affects peoples’ health, education, dignity and 
livelihoods. Its vision is of ‘a world where everyone has access to safe water and 
sanitation’ (CS3/SP/09: 6). It was established by a trust deed in 1981, incorporated as 
a company limited by guarantee in 1984 and registered as a charity in the same year. 
In 2009, it employed 621 staff, 442 of whom are based in the 15 overseas countries in 
which the organization works and the remaining 179 in the UK. CS3 also has a 
wholly owned trading subsidiary through which it sells Christmas cards and other 
goods. It has its Head Office in London from where it is managed by a team of 6 
Directors including the Chief Executive and 5 other Directors in charge of 
respectively, International Programmes, Campaign and Policy, Finance and IT, 
Fundraising and Communications, and Human Resources. It maintains country offices 
in the 15 countries in which it has programmes with each headed by a country 
representative. These offices support the local partners in delivering water, improving 
hygiene and sanitation and in influencing policy around the provision of these 
services. It also works in partnership with other organizations to reach beneficiaries in 
countries where it maintains no offices. It is governed by a Board of Trustees with 13 
members (2008/09 figures) who are Directors of the company and Trustees of the 
Charity. The board provides overall policy direction but delegates management to the 
 265 
Chief Executive. The board has three committees: The Audit Committee, the 
Nominations Committee and the Remuneration Committee.  CS3 has a risk 
management process that ensures appropriate steps are taken to mitigate risks. 
 
6.3.1 CS3’s Objectives and Strategy 
CS3 sets out four aims it intends to achieve in order to meet its objectives. It expects 
that by achieving these aims 25 million people will have access to safe water, 
improved hygiene and sanitation as a direct result of its work and that by influencing 
the policies and practices of governments and service providers it would have reached 
a further 100 million people. The four aims are to: 
1. Promote and secure poor people’s rights and access  to safe water, improved 
hygiene and sanitation 
2. Support governments and service providers in developing their capacity to 
deliver safe water, improved hygiene and sanitation 
3. Advocate for the essential role of safe water, improved hygiene and sanitation 
in human development. 
4. Further develop as an effective global organization recognized as a leader in 
our field and for living our values. 
Targets of achievements are set by extrapolating from past historical performance 
taking into consideration the amount of resources available: 
‘These (targets) are set by looking at what we have achieved in the past and 
the amount of  resources used and projecting for what could be achieved based 
on the amount of resources we expect to have…. For the number of people 
reached through influencing, we used a ratio of 4:1. We probably reached 
more people but since this is difficult to verify we use a more conservative 
estimate. It is a hypothesis, really, a bit of a guess and it could have been 




CS3 lists the following as indicators of the achievement of its objectives/aims: 
1. 25 million more people will have access to safe water as a direct result of 
our work (Aim 1) 
2. Improved hygiene behaviour practices will be sustained (Aim 1). 
3. By 2015 our influencing work will contribute to 100 million more people 
having safe water, improved hygiene and sanitation (Aim 2) 
4. By 2015, water, hygiene and sanitation will be given greater priority in 
national development plans – in particular those for health, education and 
economic development (Aim 3) 
(CS3/SP/09: 8) 
But CS3 admits that these indicators could be flexible or difficult to measure. For 
example access to safe water is measured relative to the context: 
‘There are protocols for different countries. We have the JMP (Joint 
Monitoring Programme) guidelines that suggest 25 litres per person 
per day. But we use 10 litres per person per day as a minimum 
standard depending on the context’ (CS3/IV5/10) 
 
6.3.2 CS3’s Activities 
CS3 works mainly in 15 poorer and developing countries to provide services for 
communities lacking access to safe water and good sanitation and to carry out 
advocacy campaigns related to achieving these goals. It work covers emergency 
response, providing safe water and sanitation in cases of disasters, as well as 
development. It also carries out some advocacy work to enhance the effectiveness of 
its work. Its activities centre on the direct provision of two main services.  
 
The first service is in relation to the provision of water and water resource 
management services. CS3 supports the local organizations it works with to install 
new water supplies and rehabilitate broken facilities. It is also involved in mapping 
water points in order to aid rural water supply in these countries: 
‘CS3 now sits on a steering committee that develops water point mapping 
platforms to be used by multiple governments across West and East Africa. As 
an example, the Water Sector Working Group of the Tanzanian government is 
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to adopt water point mapping into a National Rural Water Supply Monitoring 
System’ (CS3/AR/09: 7). 
 
 CS3 also helps communities to provide sustainable solutions to water resource 
management: 
‘In Ethiopia, our partners have constructed sand dams in seasonal river beds to 
increase water supply during dry season, and in Nepal, we have been working 
with communities and local authorities to implement Water User Management 
Plans which provide a framework for effective management of water 
supplies’. 
 
The second of CS3’s services is the promotion of improvement in hygiene and 
sanitation. CS3 believes that: 
‘a lack of somewhere safe and hygienic to go to toilet lead to disease and a 
lack of privacy and dignity’ (CS3/AR/ 09: 7) 
 
CS3 therefore helps communities to provide basic facilities to address this problem. 
‘(we) help communities to build somewhere safe and clean to go to the toilet 
and to improve individual’s health and dignity’ (CS3/AR/09: 7).  
 
CS3 also work to raise the level of hygiene awareness of communities. For example it 
worked with 12 partners in Pakistan to develop hygiene promotion materials for use 
in communities. It also carries out hygiene work in response to natural disasters such 
as flooding which increases the risk that communities face: 
‘In our Southern Africa region, we responded to the largest outbreak of 
cholera for ten years by sharing good hygiene practices to help keep the 
epidemic under control’ (CS3/AR/09: 7) 
 
Most of CS3’s activities are carried out in rural communities as it considers 
community involvement as central to its work. But it also works in urban areas where: 
‘more people than ever are living in unplanned urban settlements, increasing 




6.3.3 CS3’s Stakeholders 
CS3 has a number of stakeholders. The first major groups are its individual supporters 
and donors who give unrestricted funding for its work. This group is important to CS3 
as they provide 64% of its total funding. The second group consists of Institutional 
donors and governments that provide its restricted income and some of its unrestricted 
income. This group that accounts for the remaining 36% of its income is also 
important. The group consists of about 17 donors but two of them, the DFID and the 
EC, are the most important. Together they provide about 19% of CS3’s income. The 
third are the regulatory authorities mainly the Charity Commission. This group, as 
with all UK charities, has contractual rights to demand accountability. Finally, there 
are the beneficiaries who are mainly poor people lacking access to safe water, hygiene 
and sanitation. This group is diverse and consists of people based mainly overseas in 
developing countries. Then there is the general community who supports its work and 
makes small individual donations to it. 
 
All the stakeholders could be categorized either as contractual or non-contractual 
stakeholders. The Institutional donors and the regulators could be considered as 
contractual stakeholders because they have the power to demand accountability. But 
the individual donors could be categorised along with the beneficiaries and the 
community as non-contractual stakeholders because they do not have such powers. A 
significant difference between CS3 on one hand and CS1 and CS2 on the other is that 
the bulk of CS3’s funding comes from non-contractual stakeholders. This funding 




6.3.4 Funding of CS3’s Programmes 
CS3’s activities are funded from both restricted income and unrestricted income 
sources. The unrestricted incomes are mainly from four sources: 
1. Regular giving from individuals, donations and legacies 
2. Income from fundraising events 
3. Investment income.  
4. Unrestricted grants from Institutional donors. 
Together the unrestricted income amounted to £27,990,000 constituting 64% of the 
total income of £43, 787,000 in 2008/09. The largest of the four sources of 
unrestricted income amounting to £24,076,000 is from donations and legacies. The 
second largest, amounting to £1,823,000 was given as unrestricted grants by two 
Institutional donors: The UK Department of International Development (DFID) under 
a Programme Partnership Agreement and the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Table 6.5 below is an extract from CS3’s annual audited accounts 2008/09 











Table 6.5 CS3- Consolidated statements of financial activities for the year ended 
31 March 2009. 






Incoming resources     
Donations  2 24,076 3,309 27,385 
Grants 2 1,823  1,823 
Gift in kind 2 185  185 
Investment income  505 30 535 
Grant funding for specific activities 4  12,458 12,458 
Other incoming sources 5 121  121 
Total incoming resources  27,990 15,797 43,787 
Resources expended     
Cost of generating funds  9,692  9,692 
Charitable activities     
Supporting partners to deliver water, 
sanitation and hygiene 
6 14,346 16,109 30,455 
Influencing policy in water, sanitation and 
hygiene 
6 5,825 605 6,430 
Governance cost  342  342 
Total resources expended  30,205 16,714 46,919 
Net (outgoing)/incoming resources  (2,215) (917) (3,132) 
 
 
The total restricted income of £15, 797,000 (36% of total income) in the year 
consisted mainly of restricted donations of £3,309,000 and restricted grants totalling 
£12, 458, 000. Table 6.6 below shows the various sources of the restricted grants.  
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Supporting partners to deliver water, sanitation and hygiene  
Department for International Development 5,163 
European Commission 2,254 
Other CS3 affiliates 1,327 
Unicef 492 
UN Habitat 380 
Dutch Lottery 363 
Swiss Development Corporation 446 
Band Aid 276 
Water For Survival 130 
Big Lottery Fund 187 
Overseas Development Institute 57 
Small Islands 183 
Terre Nouvelle 59 
Ensemble Foundation 101 
Irish Aid 96 
Other grants 635 
Influencing policy in water, sanitation and hygiene  
Department for International Development 227 
European Commission 82 
Total 12,458 
 
The restricted grant of £12, 458, 000 was provided by a total of 17 donors but 2 of 
them (the DFID and the European Commission) combined with other CS3 affiliates 
together accounted for £9, 053, 000 or about 73% of the total restricted grants as 
shown in table 6.7 below. 
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Supporting partners to deliver water, sanitation and hygiene   
Department for International Development 5,163  
European Commission 2,254  
Other CS3 affiliates 1,327  
Influencing policy in water, sanitation and hygiene   
Department for International Development 227  
European Commission 82  
Total restricted grants from major funders 9,053 72.67% 
Total restricted grants for the year 12,458 100% 
 
 
The influence of the Institutional donors on CS3’s programmes is limited by the fact 
that they do not provide the bulk of its income. Only the two major donors the DFID 
and the EC have significant influence in CS3 and together they provide about 19% of 
its total income. The effect is that CS3 is able to determine its own programmes and 
activities with little influence from donors: 
‘Most of our programmes are designed independent of any call from donors. 
The fact that we have a significant proportion of our income as unrestricted 
income helps here. Most of the programmes have the input of the community 
in their design,,,this helps community ownership and sustainability. When we 
do get restricted grants to fund such projects it presents some challenges. Any 
change suggested by the donor may not be possible as it may not be in line 
with the vision of the community’ (CS3/IV5/10)  
 
The reduced influence of donors in CS3 has implications not only for programme 
design but also for the accountability practices. 
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6.3.5 CS3’s Accountability Practices 
CS3 views accountability in terms of its effectiveness in achieving its vision and 
objectives. It aims to demonstrate this in the design, implementation and monitoring 
of its programmes: 
‘Accountability is broadly about effectiveness in achieving our vision and 
mission…Effectiveness comes before efficiency because you have to ensure 
you are doing the right things first. We ensure we are doing the right things all 
through planning to implementation and monitoring. Accountability is 
embedded in the whole planning, monitoring and evaluation system’ 
(CS3/IV5/10) 
 
CS3 adopts a combination of methods in performing accountability through all of 
these stages. The main forms of accountability observed in CS3 are discussed in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
6.3.5.1 Statutory financial reporting 
CS3 files annual returns with the Charity Commission consisting of a consolidated 
financial statement and Trustees’ report. The financial statement shows the total 
income received split between funds and analyzed by source. This is matched with the 
total expenditure and a net incoming/outgoing resource position shown. 
The net surplus or deficit on restricted activities is added to restricted fund balance 
which essentially is owed to the project for which they are meant or returnable to the 
donors. But the net on surplus/deficit on unrestricted activities is added to the general 
fund balance or reserve which could be used for any of CS3’s charitable activities. 
CS3 does not aim to accumulate reserves but rather to maintain a level of reserve 
necessary for its work. 
‘The Board of Trustees has set a target operational reserve within the general 
funds to enable CS3 to meet the potential costs related to any corporate risks 
materializing. The rationale for this reserve is discussed in the Trustees’ report 
 274 
and the range required for 2009/10 is £11m to £13m against an actual balance 
of £14.2m’ (CS3/AR/09: 43). 
  
CS3’s reserve was £18m in 2007/08, 16m in 2008/09 and 14.2m in 2009/10. The 
organization has consistently incurred a net deficit on its unrestricted charitable 
activities over the last three years. This appears to be deliberate as it spends more on 
its charitable activities than the income raised in order to bring the reserves down to 
the target level required as the reserves has been more than the target level in the last 
three years to 2008/09. 
 
6.3.5.2 Statutory narrative reporting 
 Narrative report in form of the Trustees’ report is produced as part of the statutory 
reports. CS3 provides more than the minimum information statutorily required for this 
reports by incorporating its detailed annual reports as the Trustees’ reports. This 
avoids the duplication of reports observed in the other case studies as the information 
provided in the Trustees’ reports are contained in the annual reports in more detail. 
 
6.3.5.3 Financial reporting to donors 
CS3 prepares financial reports for the donors where grants have been received for 
restricted projects. The major Institutional donors to which CS3 reports are the same 
as for CS1 and the practices here are broadly the same as they are in line with the 
donors’ requirements. It consists mainly of detailed expenditure reports against the 





6.3.5.4 Programme narrative reporting to donors 
CS3 also prepares narrative reports for the grant funded projects. The reports follow 
the donors’ prescribed formats which is based on the structure of the ‘logical 
framework’ developed at the project design stage and approved with the grant. Since 
the major Institutional donors to which CS3 reports are the same as for CS1 the 
practices here are also broadly similar. 
 
6.3.5.5 Annual Reports on Review of Strategic Plan 
The strategic planning system in CS3 is viewed as part of the system of 
accountability. The planning is done in a 6 year cycle covering the global operations 
of the NGO. It involves developing specific objectives around which its programmes 
are designed: 
‘Accountability at the planning stage is done through our global strategic 
planning which happens in a 6 year cycle. Within this, our various country 
offices prepare their country strategy in 3 year cycles. Our programmes are 
designed to achieve specific objectives which feed into the regional objectives 
which in turn feed into the global strategy’ (CS3/IV5/10) 
 
The achievements of the strategic objectives are measured in terms of the 
achievement of the programme objectives designed to achieve those strategic 
objectives. Reports on these achievements are prepared and disseminated in the form 
of annual reports and various reports to donors: 
‘The main means of reporting on the achievement of the strategic objectives is 
the Annual reports… In terms of the measurement, we compile the outcomes 
from the different programmes and determine the overall achievements’ 
(CS3/IV5/10) 
 
CS3 produces annual reports in form of a narrative account of its activities and 
achievement for the year against the targets it sets for itself. 
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‘Here you can find an overview of how we performed against the aims we set 
ourselves for 2008/09 with more specific highlights following in the regional 
sections’ (CS3/AR/09: 6) 
 
The targets are set internally by CS3.  For the year 2008/09 the target set was: 
‘to support our partner organizations in 15 country programmes to provide 
safe water to over one million people and sanitation to more than 3 million 
people’ (CS3/AR/09: 6) 
 
The target was later reviewed downward when on completion of one of CS3’s largest 
programmes located in Bangladesh it became apparent that the initially projected 
number of beneficiaries could not be reached. 
‘Following re-evaluation….the number of people we aimed to reach with 
sanitation was reduced from three million to 1.8 million’ (CS3/AR/09: 6) 
 
In reporting against this target, CS3 summarized its achievement this way: 
‘In 2008/09 we worked with over 1,100 partners in 15 countries in Africa and 
Asia to reach 1.14 million people with water and 2.01 million people with 
sanitation’ (CS3/AR/09: 6) 
 
The report then breaks down this achievement by region mentioning the number of 
beneficiaries reached in each country in the region. The report contains a financial 
section that shows the amount spent in providing these services but does not relate 
this to the cost. But a summarized financial figure titled ‘How your £1 was spent in 
2008/09’ shows a breakdown of expenditure between Fundraising and Governance 
and Charitable objectives. Table 6.8 below brings together an extract from the 






Table 6.8 Achievement and cost of CS3’s activities in 2008/09 






West Africa    
Ghana 1,741 50 29 
Nigeria 1,694 30 41 
Mali 1,264 39 55 
Burkina Faso 1,795 55 51 
East Africa    
Ethiopia 2,638 71 65 
Uganda 1,284 35 18 
Tanzania 1,985 63 4 
Southern Africa    
Zambia 1,266 45 39 
Malawi 1,030 26 37 
Madagascar 1,532 35 34 
Mozambique 2,104 61 42 
Asia    
India 2,831 82 58 
Bangladesh 5,037 512 1,503 
Pakistan 433 0 0 
Nepal 1,268 38 33 
Freshwater Action & other UK charitable expenditure 5,851   
Allocated UK support cost to charitable activities 3,132   





£36.8m of the total £43.92m spent (i.e 79p in £1) was on direct charitable activities. 
Out of this, amount spent on delivery of water, sanitation and hygiene was £30.46m 
(or £26.69 per water user reached or £5.63 per sanitation user reached) and on 
influencing policy on water, sanitation and hygiene was £6.43m (or £5.63 per water 
user reached or £2.91 per sanitation user reached). 
 
The link between the programme objectives and the strategic objectives are not so 
measurable. CS3 may be aware of this as it seeks to devise a better means of 
measuring the achievement of the objectives: 
‘We are now developing a new system involving 15 strategic indicators but 
this is to be approved in November (2010). This will help us to measure how 
we are performing against the strategy’ (CS3/IV5/10)  
 
6.3.5.6 Programme Evaluation 
CS3 carries out evaluation of its programmes. These evaluations are not focused on 
individual programmes as in CS1 and CS2 but on the entire programmes implemented 
in a particular country over a period of time. The evaluations are carried out in 
particular countries every 3 to 5 years. Though CS3 has a Programme Effectiveness 
unit that carries out these evaluations, the unit engages independent consultants with 
wide experience in Water and Sanitation (CS3/LT/10). The evaluators review the 
programme plans and the reports on their implementation and then meet with the 
communities (the beneficiaries) for data collection and analysis. CS3 views evaluation 
as a way of rendering accountability to the community and other stakeholders:  
 ‘Evaluations allow CS3 to be accountable and transparent with communities, 
 partners, donors and supporters’ (CS3/LT/10). 
 
The evaluations focus more on learning lessons from past mistakes and driving 
improvements in the programmes. They are not critical of the programmes but 
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designed to support them. For example, a review of the report of CS3’s July 2010 
evaluation of its Uganda programme (implemented by CS4) confirms that the 
evaluation was ‘carried out at the same time as CS4’s country strategy development, 
and was designed to support that process’ (CS3/PE/10). The report’s 
recommendations were mainly related to improving CS4’s strategy. Examples of the 
first two of the 15 recommendations are: 
 ‘Recommendation 1: In recognition of the common goals of Government and 
 CS3, influence and support national processes. Don’t ‘go it alone’. 
  
 Recommendation 2: Work in a few carefully selected Districts...and 
 collaborate with all other players in that District’  
 (CS3/PE/10) 
  
6.3.5.7 Participation of beneficiaries and non-contractual stakeholders 
CS3 attempts to render accountability to its non-contractual stakeholders in different 
ways, three of which are prominent. The first of this is by involving the beneficiaries 
of its programme in the design of its programmes. This is by way of consultation with 
the community to establish their needs, and by involving them in the selection of site 
for the water facilities. The second way is by involving the beneficiaries in the 
maintenance of the facilities it provides. CS3 encourages the formation of village 
committees and community groups who it trains to manage the water facilities 
provided. The third way is by providing information to the wider stakeholders 
concerning the unit cost of its services and the utilisation of its resources. This 
information is not statutorily required. But CS3 provides this information to help the 
individual donors and the beneficiaries understand how its resources are used and to 
relate this to actual services provided. This type of information, though useful for the 
individual donors and the beneficiaries, cannot be obtained from the current form of 
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statutory reports in the UK. CS3’s practices in this area are ahead of those in CS1 and 
CS2 who do not provide this type of information. 
 
Tables 6.9 below summarizes the key data from CS3 
 
Table 6.9- Summary of data from CS3 
 CS3 Comments 
Type of NGO Development Mainly Development but includes 
some Advocacy work 
Area of operation International  
Annual Income £43m  
% of Income provided by contractual 
Stakeholders (restricted income) 
36%  
% of Income generated internally or from non-
contractual Stakeholders (unrestricted) 
64%  
Participation of  contractual stakeholders High  
Participation of non-contractual stakeholders High  
Accountability methods in use:   
1. Statutory financial reporting √ Reporting under SORP 
2. Narrative reporting extension of statutory 
reports 
√  
3. Annual reports and strategic planning √   
4. Donor financial reports √  
5. Programme narrative reports √  
6. Programme evaluation √  
7. Participation of beneficiaries and 
wider stakeholders 
√ Involves  users in location of water 
points & their maintenance 
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6.4 CS4- Background   
CS4 is an affiliate of CS3 registered in Uganda as a company limited by guarantee 
and also registered as a NGO with the Ugandan NGO board. CS3 has worked in 
Uganda since 1983 and decided to open a Country office in Kampala in 1992. It 
therefore established CS4 to work within the statutory and regulatory framework in 
Uganda. The establishment of the office is part of CS3’s strategy to ‘widen our 
experience in a range of contexts, giving us greater credibility to influence change’ 
(CS3/SP/09:25) 
CS4’s organization structure is made up of a Country Representative and three core 
units that work closely together to share information and ensure the effective and 
efficient operation of the programmme. The management maintains a strong link to 
the parent NGO. 
 
6.4.1 CS4’s Objectives and Strategy 
The strategic planning system in CS4 is closely linked to that of CS3, its parent NGO. 
Its current strategy is for the period 2006-2011. The strategy was developed with 
input from CS3 and it reflects and seeks to contribute to CS3’s strategy. Its ‘vision is 
of a Uganda where all people have access to safe water and sanitation’ (CS4/AR/08: 
3) It’s mission is ‘to contribute towards the provision of sustainable and equitable safe 
water and adequate sanitation to the poor through advocacy and strategic 
partnerships’ (CS4/AR/08: 3) Essentially, the office was established with the same 
aims and objectives as CS3 but within the context of Uganda. It is intended to bring 
the work of CS3 closer to the beneficiaries at the field level. It identifies ‘working 
with partners’ (mostly beneficiaries) as the first of the three ways it intends to deliver 
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its strategy.  CS4 aims to contribute to the capacity building and organizational 
development of the partner organizations (CS4/SP/06: 4). CS4 informs its partners 
and the NGO board about its strategy. It gives copies of its strategic plans to its 
partner to help them prepare their work plan.  
 
6.4.2 CS4’s Activities 
CS4’s activities are principally in three main areas. The first is provision of access to 
water and the management of water resources: 
‘Uganda’s natural wetlands and groundwater supplies are under threat from 
changing weather patterns and over-abstraction. Therefore, all of our projects 
look at managing water resources sustainably….(our partners) use a range of 
different technologies such as boreholes, hand-dug shallow wells or spring 
protection’ (CS4/LT/08: 2). 
 
The second part of CS4’s activities involves improving sanitation and hygiene. The 
NGO works both in urban and rural areas building latrines and drainages and 
promoting good sanitation and hygiene.  
‘One way we successfully promote sanitation is through sanitation markets 
where various types of latrines are built, allowing visitors to choose which 
option suits them and their budgets best…Our work in urban areas have found 
that …it is vital that drainage, street cleaning and solid waste (rubbish) 
management are addressed to give the communities..a healthier quality of life’ 
(CS4/LT/08: 2)  
 
Though CS4’s work is mainly in the areas of emergency and development, some 
aspect of its work involves advocacy at national level. This is the third part of CS4’s 
activities. Through this, it aims to influence the government to provide water and 
sanitation services and the community to hold them to account: 
 ‘we also influence others to prioritize and invest in these essential services 
 (water and sanitation)…communities are informed about their entitlement to 
 water and sanitation services and are helped to hold those responsible for 
 providing services to account’ 
 (CS4/LT/08: 3) 
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6.4.3 CS4’s Stakeholders 
CS4 has a number of important stakeholders. The first major groups are its donors 
who give the funding for its work. Because of CS4’s affiliation with its parent NGO, 
CS3, 80% of its funding comes from CS3. Furthermore, it’s governing body and 
management is directly constituted by CS3 making it one of the most important 
stakeholders. The other stakeholders are the Institutional donors who provide its 
restricted income. This accounts for 20% of its total income. In this group the main 
stakeholders are the DFID, Band Aid and the Simavi-Dutch lottery. The third 
stakeholder group is the regulatory authorities and the government of Uganda.  This 
group has the rights to permit or refuse registration of the NGO to operate in Uganda 
and to demand accountability. The fourth group is the beneficiaries who are mainly 
poor people lacking access to safe water, hygiene and sanitation. Finally, there are the 
‘partners’ mainly local organizations, NGOs and CBOs that work to provide services 
to the beneficiaries.  This group is diverse and consists not only of smaller NGOs and 
CBOs but also government agencies and departments. The inclusion of the 
government departments and agencies in this group puts the government in a dual 
role. This dual role, as a regulator and as a beneficiary, is complex and further 
examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
The government is a stakeholder in CS4 as a ‘partner’ on one hand and as a regulator 
on the other. NGOs in Uganda are registered as companies limited by guarantee under 
the country’s laws. Charitable status is conferred on NGOs through a process of 
registration with the Uganda’s National Board of Non-Governmental Organisation 
(the NGO board)  The board is established under the Non- Governmental 
Organisations Registration Act 1989 (Amended 2006). It is charged with the 
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responsibility of regulating NGOs.  Section 7 of the Act lists the functions of the 
Board: 
‘The functions of the board shall be to- 
a. Consider applications for registration by organizations; 
b. Keep a register of registered organizations 
c. Guide and monitor organizations in carrying out their services 
(UGX/NGO Act/89) 
 
 Section 13 of the Act empowers the Minister for Internal Affairs, in consultation with 
the NGO Board, to make regulations necessary for the implementation of the 
provisions of the Act. The NGO Board, in exercise of this power, established the 
Non-Governmental Organizations Registration regulations, 2009.  The aim of 
registration and regulation however, is not towards enforcing NGOs’ accountability 
but mainly to coordinate their activities with a view to ensuring that they add on to or 
complement the work of the Uganda government: 
‘An Organisation shall, in carrying out its operations….co-operate with the 
local councils in the area and the relevant district committees’ 
(UGX/NGO Reg/09: 160) 
 
The government’s approach towards NGOs seems to fit well with CS4’s strategy that 
aims to work closely with and through organizations it calls ‘Partners’. It has some set 
parameters it uses to identify appropriate partners to work with and government 
agencies seem to qualify under these parameters: 
‘CS4 works through local partners who are…agencies or institutions with 
whom CS4 is relating to achieve its mission. They have essential knowledge 
of the local context, well-established relationships with local leaders and 
strong links with the community’ (CS4/AR/09: 3).  
 
CS4 has therefore identified government ministries and local governments as 
appropriate partners to work with: 
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‘In Nebbi, Hoima and Masindi we worked with the Ministry of Health to help roll 
out the Kampala Declaration on Sanitation (KDS) through advocacy work on total 
sanitation. In Mpigi we worked with the District Local Government to provide 
 Refresher training for hand pump mechanics 
 Development and rolling out of a sanitation strategy 
 Design of tools for hygiene promotion’  
(CS4/AR/09: 4).   
 
CS4’s partnerships with these government agencies are long standing and ongoing. 
For example CS4 has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ugandan 
Water and Sanitation ministry. CS4 considers that this partnership is of mutual benefit 
to both sides: 
‘All of our activities contribute to the work of the ministry and its plans. For 
example, the ministry may have particular projects and want us to take it up. 
We may also require information in possession of the ministry’ 
(CS4/IV6/10) 
 
While this cooperation is useful in enhancing the work of the NGO, it is 
acknowledged that it is a constraint on the independence of NGOs in Uganda: 
‘You (NGOs) could be a positive critique of government activities… but the 
government is getting tough about this’ (CS4/IV6/10) 
 
The potential constraint on NGOs’ independence results from the influence the 
government wields through the NGO Board which holds the power to deny 
registration to any NGO in the country or to revoke such registration or dissolve the 
NGO entirely: 
‘An Organisation may dissolve by order of the Board if- 
a) The board has reason to believe that a registered organization has not 
commenced its activities within twelve months from the time of 
registration or without justifiable cause has ceased to exist after that; 
b) It is proved to be defrauding the public or its members or both; 
c) It has violated the terms and conditions attached to its permit 
d) It has operated in contravention of the provision of the Act 
e) For any other reason the Board considers necessary in the public interest’ 
(UGX/NGO Reg/09: 163) 
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6.4.4 Funding of CS4’s programmes 
The total income of CS4 for the 2007/08 year was UGX 3.1m (£921,525). This 
increased to just over £1m in 2008/09. 20% of this was given by Institutional donors 
as restricted grants for projects while the rest was provided by CS3, the parent NGO 
of CS4. 84% of the restricted grants were provided by three donors- The DFID, Band 
Aid and the Simavi-Dutch lottery. 
 
6.4.5 CS4’s Accountability practices 
CS4’s accountability practices are in line with practices in its parent NGO, CS3 and 
the statutory requirements in Uganda. There are stronger evidences of some practices 
than others. The practices observed are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
  
6.4.5.1 Statutory financial reporting   
CS4 prepares annual accounts. But these are in line with the country reporting 
structures for all of CS3’s affiliates located in different developing countries. These 
reports are not prepared in line with any statutory guidelines in Uganda. Rather, they 
are prepared in line with specific guidelines and formats determined by CS3 for all its 
overseas country offices. It is a simple Income and expenditure accounts that lists the 
income by donors distinguishing between funding from CS4 and those from other 
donors. It lists the expenditure breaking them down into Water and sanitation; 
Advocacy; research; Capacity building; and overheads. No further details are 
provided at this level. But the transactions are consolidated into CS4’s books who 
report on its global activities under UK GAAP.  These global reports are sent to the 
NGO Board who does not require further country level reports. They are also sent to 
the Water and Sanitation ministry and the Ministry of Finance and are accepted as 
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satisfactory. The NGOs’ statutory reporting requirement in Uganda is weak and this 
form of reports is not a part of CS4’s accountability practices. The nature of NGOs’ 
statutory reporting practices in Uganda will be discussed in more details in CS5 where 
this form of reporting is better exemplified.  
 
6.4.5.2 Statutory Narrative Reporting 
Because CS4 does not produce statutory reports, this form of reporting is not 
practiced. In its place, CS4 uses its Annual reports which contain more details of what 
could have been included in this form of reports. 
  
6.4.5.3 Financial Reporting to Donors 
Restricted funding constitutes only about 20% of CS4’s funding. The donors that 
provide this are the same as those for CS3 and CS1. CS4’s practices in rendering 
accounts to these donors are guided by the donors’ requirements. As a result, practices 
observed here are broadly similar to those found in CS1 and CS3. The financial 
reports give an analysis of the expenditure against the budget agreed as part of the 
grant contract.  
 
6.4.5.4 Programme Narrative Reports 
Programme narrative reports are prepared for the restricted grants from donors. They 
give a detailed qualitative account of the programme implementation and their 
achievements in the format prescribed by the donors. The practices here also are the 




6.4.5.5 Annual reports and Review of Strategic Plans 
Like its parent NGO, CS4 views accountability in terms of its effectiveness in 
achieving its vision and objectives and seek to demonstrate this in the design of its 
programmes and the reporting on their achievements through the strategic planning 
and review system. The strategic planning system in CS4 is aligned to the global 
strategic planning system of its parent NGO. It involves developing specific 
objectives around which its programmes are designed. As a result, the main input into 
the plans and the capacity for its development and reporting is supplied by its parent 
NGO. The achievements of the strategic objectives are measured in terms of the 
achievement of the programme objectives that relate to those strategic objectives. 
Reports on these achievements are prepared and disseminated in the form of Annual 
Reports. This is a narrative account of its activities and achievement for the year 
against the targets it sets for itself. For example, the annual report for 2007/08 counts 
as part of its achievements: 
 Access to clean water was improved for about 56,000 Ugandans 
 Sanitation services were enhanced for 47,600 people 
 Hygiene practice was improved for 13,450 people in focus district 




The Annual report gives the total expenditure for the year 2007/08 as £928,373 and 
provides the breakdown of how this has been spent. This breakdown is broad, only 
stating for example that 32% of the expenses were on Rural Water Sanitation and 





6.4.5.6 Programme Evaluation 
CS4 does not carry out a separate evaluation of its programmes. Its programmes are 
evaluated by CS3 every 3 to 5 years. But the reports of the evaluations are shared with 
CS4 and the learning points or recommendations are implemented with support from 
CS3.  They are not critical of the programmes but designed to support them.   
  
6.4.5.7 Participation of beneficiaries and wider stakeholders 
CS4’s practice of accountability to non-contractual stakeholders is integral to CS3’s 
practices. Because CS4 is closer to the beneficiaries of its programme, it is more 
involved in consultations with the beneficiaries and the community, obtaining their 
views and feeding these back into programme design by CS4 and into decision 
making relating to the maintenance and management of the water facilities provided.  
CS4 participates in the formation of village committees and community groups and 
the training to manage the water facilities provided.  
 











Table 6.10- Summary of data from CS4 
 CS4 Comments 
Type of NGO Development Including some Advocacy work 
Area of operation Water and 
Sanitation 
 
Annual Income £1m  
% of Income provided by contractual 
Stakeholders (restricted income) 
20% Contribution from CS3 is 80% . 
This is treated as restricted  
% of Income generated from non-contractual 
Stakeholders (unrestricted) 
0%  
Involvement of contractual stakeholders High CS3 is taken as a contractual 
stakeholder 
Involvement of non-contractual stakeholders Medium  
Accountability methods in use:   
1. Statutory financial reporting × Not used 
2. Narrative reporting extension of statutory 
reports 
× Not used 
3.Annual reports and strategic planning √  
4.Donor financial reports √  
5.Programme narrative reports √  
6.Programme evaluation √  











CS5 is a NGO in Uganda established in 1995. It works in the area of promoting 
conflict resolution and peace-building. Its vision is of a ‘Society where peace, 
tolerance and human dignity prevail’ (CS5/LT/10). CS5’s main objective falls within 
the domain of one of the main strands of CS1’s work (that deals with promoting 
peaceful co-existence between communities). While it is not an affiliate of CS1, it has 
received funding from it to carry out specific activities in areas relating to conflict 
resolution which falls within the area of activities of both NGOs. CS1 lists CS5 as one 
of the 150 ‘partners’ it works with worldwide (CS1/PR/11: 40). It pursues its 
objectives by carrying out advocacy at local and national levels aimed at influencing 
policies and practices. But because a large part of its activities are community based, 
it may be classified as a local based advocacy NGO. CS5 has 14 staff including 
interns. It is governed by a board of trustees consisting of nine members.  
 
6.5.1 CS5- Objectives and Strategy 
CS5’s aims and objectives centre on seeking alternative ways of preventing and 
resolving conflict by working: 
‘..with people, especially-but not only- in areas where conflict is present or 
threatened, to develop their awareness to empower them with the knowledge 
and skills relevant to their situation and to facilitate conflict resolution 
transformation and prevention’ (CS5/LT/10) 
 
It aims to achieve its objectives by empowering ‘individuals, organizations, 
institutions and the community to resolve conflict by applying alternative and creative 
means in order to promote a culture of tolerance and peace.’ (CS5/LT/10) 
The way it aims to achieve this is: ‘to research and develop the theory and to 
implement the practice of conflict resolution applying alternative and creative means’ 
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(CS5/LT/10). It also aims to disseminate such knowledge and information through 
networking and share knowledge and information on early warning and preventive 
mechanisms on conflict. 
  
The strategy CS5 uses to achieve its objectives is one of advocacy through education 
and training of the affected communities and stakeholders, building and promoting 
constructive partnerships amongst organization and communities and equipping them 
with information and knowledge on conflict resolution, and engaging the media in 
peace-building efforts (CS5/IV8/10).  CS5 does strategic planning every four years.  
But its objectives and strategy has remained unchanged.  It has a strategic plan 
document but there is no evidence of any structured process of involvement of 
stakeholders, staff and trustees in the process of its formulation. It has not attempted 
to break down the objectives into measurable units against which it can measure its 
achievements. To achieve its objectives, CS5 carries out a number of activities mainly 
involving training, advocacy, mediation and research.  
 
6.5.2 CS5’s Activities 
CS5 organizes training for communities to increase their awareness of causes of 
conflict and how to resolve them. It also conducts research and disseminates 
information on early-warning and preventive mechanisms on conflict. It promotes 
peace education in the non-formal sectors of the society and lobbies decision makers 
to introduce it in schools’ curriculum. It also develops innovative approaches to 
conflict resolution. These activities are organized within various programmes. For 
example, its ‘Hands Across the Border’ project it carried out in the Greater Teso and 
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Karamoja Districts of Uganda, aimed to resolve the decades-long violent conflict 
between the two communities over access to land: 
 ‘These two communities for years have been locked up in a violent conflict 
 closely connected with Karimojong cattle-rustling in neighbouring districts 
 and the drought in Karamoja district. The conflict has led to loss of lives, 
 livestock and property and destabilised the two communities that used to enjoy 
 friendships, sharing and good neighbourliness’ (CS5/LT/10).  
 
The Karimojong, cattle rearing people have been largely blamed for plundering the 
farms of their neighbours in the search for pastures for their livestock. The project 
aimed to support the government’s peace initiatives in order to help bring about 
understanding and eventual reconciliation between the two districts. The project 
brought representatives of the two communities and the government to a series of 
workshops to discuss their problems and possible solutions. An innovative solution 
that came out of this as a final activity was the gathering of key leaders of the 
Karimojong cattle-rearing community (the suspected organizers of the violent raids 
against other communities) and some representatives of their neighbouring Teso 
community for a tour. They were taken around the country to see how other cattle-
rearing pastoral communities coexist with non-pastoralist communities. They were 
also taken across the border ‘to neighbouring countries (DR Congo and Rwanda) to 
witness how communities across international borders interact peacefully in their day 
to day life’ (CS5/LT/10). The result of the project was better understanding between 
the two communities. But by how much this has reduced the conflict may not be 
visibly measurable in the short-term.  
 
6.5.3 CS5’s Stakeholders 
There are a number of major stakeholders in CS5. First there are the donors that 
provide the funding for the organizations. The most significant of these donors are 
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International NGOs who provide contractual grants for specific programmes or 
activities. They require some form of accountability practices that are clearly 
specified in the contract. The second stakeholder group is the government/regulators. 
CS5’s peace building efforts and initiatives complement the role of government in 
ensuring peace and security. The government therefore supports its work and has 
participated in some of its workshops and events. This support, however, does not 
include any financial backing or grants to CS5. The government, also as a regulator 
for the sector in which CS5 operates, is a stakeholder in this regard. The last group of 
stakeholders are the beneficiaries which are mainly communities with potential or 
actual experience of conflict. Before designing its programmes CS5 claims to consult 
beneficiaries to establish their needs: 
’We carry out situation analysis whereby the beneficiaries tell us what is 




However, when further questions were raised concerning this assertion, no evidence 
was supplied to substantiate it. It appears the respondent was describing what he 
thought they should be doing rather than what they actually do. It appears that more of 
its programmes are led by its own initiatives, information gathered and the outcome of 
its research efforts. 
 
6.5.4 Funding of CS5’s Programmes 
CS5 generates very little funding of its own. Only about 5% of its income is 
unrestricted income derived from consultancy services and interest on bank balances. 
The bulk of CS5’s incomes are given as restricted grants. Just as with CS4, most of its 
programmes are dependent on restricted funding from Institutional donors and 
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International NGOs. This has impact on the design of its programmes and activities 
and the stability of its funding: 
‘Sometimes we design programmes and then seek funding but we sometimes 
fail and this could be discouraging’ (CS5/IV8/10)  
 
The impact of this is two-fold. The first is that part of its programmes are designed to 
meet the objectives and needs of the donors in order to have a better chance of success 
with funding applications. The second impact is that CS5’s income fluctuates. The 
total income was £280,000 in 2008 but fell to £96,000 in 2009. The bulk of the 
income in 2008 (64%) was from a grant of about £180,000 from Safer World. Table 
6.11 below shows the breakdown of the main income sources for the two years 2008 
and 2009.  
 








Safer World   555,688,464 64.2 
GOPA 42,685,251 14.4 134,368,418 15.6 
Diakonia 116,189,564 39.2 71,945,028 8.3 
Consultancy & interest income 15,682,637 5.3 41,028,401 4.7 
Grant from CS1 98,548,420 33.2   
Other Income sources 23,519,790 7.9 62,264,832 7.2 
Total income (Ugandan Shillings) 296,625,662 100 865,295,142 100 
Exchange rate 2984.4  2771.5  
Total income (GBP equivalent) 99,392  312,212  
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6.5.5 CS5’s Accountability Practices 
CS5’s accountability practices are of various forms. These are generally consistent 
with the different forms already described in CS1 to CS4. But unlike CS4 that 
operates under the same regulatory regime, statutory reporting is prominently used in 
CS5. The various practices observed are mainly:  
 
6.5.5.1 Statutory Financial Reporting 
CS5 operates a system of statutory reporting in line with the country’s regulatory 
regime. The practice here is determined solely by the statutory requirement in Uganda 
since CS5 has no affiliation to any International NGO (INGO). The NGO regulations 
2009 require that NGOs submit annual returns. The requirement for this, set out in 
section 16 of the regulations require only a simple Income and Expenditure accounts 
and Balance sheet with no specific reporting standard or guidelines issued for their 
preparation. The accounts are submitted to the NGO board in hard copy form only. 
The Board has no capacity or facilities for processing or scrutiny of the accounts so 
no queries are raised. When asked what the board does with the accounts, an official 
of the NGO Board who receives the accounts, replied (pointing to a huge shelve with 
dusty paper files): 
‘We file them for future reference. If there happens to be a complaint or 
problem with a NGO, we refer to the returns they have submitted for 
information on their activities’ 
(NGO Board/IV9/10) 
 
6.5.5.2 Statutory Narrative Reporting. 
The NGO Board has not given any guidelines on the minimum information content of 
the narrative element of the statutory report. CS5’s statutory reports therefore give 
very limited insight into the work and achievement of the NGO. The one page 
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Directors’ Report in its 2009 Financial Statements simply summarises the NGO’s 
activities as ‘The principal activity of the organisation is to implement the practice of 
conflict resolution and peace building’ (CS5/AA/ 09:4). 
 
 This level of statutory reporting appears adequate as the audit opinion on the 
financial statements concluded: 
  ‘ In our opinion, proper books of accounts have been kept and the 
 accompanying financial statements which are in agreement with the books of 
 accounts give a true and fair view.....in accordance with Ugandan Companies 
 Act’ (CS5/AA/09: 6) 
 
6.5.5.3 Financial Reporting to Donors 
CS5 prepares financial reports to donors for its restricted grant. The forms of these 
reports are determined by the donors’ contractual requirements. The method of doing 
this is broadly the same as for the other NGOs that receive restricted grants from 
Institutional donors. Some of the restricted grants that CS5 receives are not directly 
from the Institutional donors but indirectly through INGOs such as CS1. But the 
method of reporting is exactly the same as when received directly from the 
Institutional donors. It consists of a simple expenditure report against budget in the 
prescribed format and the justification of variances. The budget here is a small part of 
a larger overall budget held by the INGO involved. Because restricted grants 
constitute about 90% of CS5’s income, this form of accountability is the predominant 
form observed in the organization. But because the restricted grants are not accounted 
for as separate funds in the statutory accounts, there is no means of verifying the 
consistency between the donor reports and the statutory reports or the reliability of the 
system of aggregating all the transactions into the overall statutory reports. 
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6.5.5.4 Programme narrative reports 
CS5 prepares programme narrative reports for its restricted grants in line with donors’ 
requirements. CS5 is very close to the community it works with and its programme 
narrative reports are detailed and informative. Where CS1, acting as an INGO, 
provides funding to CS5 for particular programme activities, CS1relies on the 
programme narrative reports from CS5 as important inputs into its own programme 
narrative reports to the Institutional donors 
 
6.5.5.5 Annual Reports and Strategic Planning 
The Strategic Planning, Review and Reporting system in CS5 is weak. Though a 
strategic plan is available there was no evidence of any structured involvement of 
stakeholders and staff in its preparation. The document is not of adequate quality and 
depth when compared with those from CS1, CS2, CS3 and CS4. There is no attempt 
to break the objectives down into measurable sub-objectives and no performance 
indicators for measuring their achievements were suggested. Annual reports that are 
normally based on reporting against these measurable sub-objectives and performance 
indicators are not prepared.  
 
6.5.5.6 Programme Evaluation 
Formal programme evaluations are used by CS5 only where a donor specifically 
requests one. This has been requested for some of the restricted projects that CS5 
implemented. CS5’s involvement in these evaluations has been limited to the area of 
work they have implemented. But more informally, CS5 carries out a ‘lesson sharing 
and evaluation meeting’ with the beneficiaries usually community leaders and 
representatives. These meetings serve as forum for exchanging information and views 
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about the programme implemented. The issues that come up from the meetings are 
used to ‘inform future interventions and avoid pitfalls’. These are summed up in an 
evaluation report produced at the end of the meeting. This could be described as self-
evaluation though the process adopted is similar to that involving an external 
evaluator. 
 
6.5.5.7 Participation of beneficiaries and wider stakeholders 
This form of practice may appear weak in CS5 when viewed from a structured or 
process perspective. CS5 works closely with the beneficiaries but the process of 
participation is not in a structured way and not frequently documented. CS5 is close to 
the community and has detailed knowledge of the main concerns and priorities of the 
community. It embarks on studies to gather the views of the community concerning 
the issues that affect them and uses this as a basis to plan its work. But CS5 does not 
involve the beneficiaries or the community in resource allocation or utilisation issues.  












Table 6.12- Summary of data from CS5 
 CS5 Comments 
Type of NGO Advocacy  
Area of operation National  
Annual Income £0.1-03.m  
% of Income provided by contractual 
Stakeholders (restricted income) 
87-90%  
% of Income generated internally or from non-
contractual Stakeholders (unrestricted) 
5-10%  
 Involvement of contractual stakeholders V. High This includes INGOs and 
Institutional donors 
Involvement of non-contractual stakeholders Low Beneficiaries’ views are sought but 
there are no non contractual donors  
Accountability methods in use:   
1. Statutory financial reporting √  
2. Narrative reporting extension of statutory 
reports 
×  
3. Annual reports and strategic planning ×  
4. Donor financial reports √  
5. Programme narrative reports √  
6. Programme evaluation √  










6.6 CS6- Background 
CS6 is an orphanage in Abuja, Nigeria established in July 2004 as a NGO.  The 
founder, a barrister educated at Leeds and Buckingham Universities, had concern for 
the plight of abandoned and orphaned children in and around the city. The orphanage 
was established in response to this and the founder is still actively involved in its 
running. The orphanage employs 28 staff and runs two homes both in the capital city. 
In 2007 another orphanage established and ran by the government was closed and 7 of 
the children were transferred to CS6. The home now accommodates about 76 children 
in the two locations it runs. 
 
6.6.1 CS6’s Objectives and Strategy 
The vision of the founder of CS6 has remained central to the objective of the 
organization which is stated as: 
‘To alleviate the problems facing many innocent children who were 
abandoned or orphaned and..ensure that every child has the opportunity for 
success’ (CS6/LT/09:2).  
 
This core objective has been translated into a guiding philosophy that informs its 
strategy: 
‘our philosophy is to love your neighbour’s child like you would your own’ 
(CS6/LT/09:5).  
Though CS6 does not go through any structured strategic planning process, it pursues 
a clear strategy which is directly linked to its objectives and has remained consistent 
over the years. For example, based on its philosophy ‘to love your neighbour’s child 
like you would your own’ the organization aims to provide for the children in the 
orphanage the same level of care and education that is given to the biological children 
of the founder or any member of staff. This reflects in the decisions made in terms of 
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the services procured as CS6 aims to provide for the children the best quality of 
services available. The children are enrolled in premium fee paying schools and cared 
for in good fee paying hospitals.  
 
CS6’s strategy is informally communicated. There are no elaborate strategic plan 
documents available. But the strategy is clearly understood by the staff of the 
organization and is integral to its operations. The strategic focus on giving the 
children the best quality of life possible reflects in the interaction between the 
children and the staff. The children relate to CS6’s staff members as parents or 
members of the same family and freely communicate their needs and concerns.
12
 The 
strategy is understood by the children as well as they are kept informed about 
decisions on important issues such as the choice of school, medical care and resource 
allocation. The strategy is also communicated to supporters or donors who visit the 
home and interact with the children and staff and identify with the vision and the 
work of the NGO.  But this strategy has been expensive as good quality medical care 
and education are very expensive in the city. Because of the low level of resources 
available to it, the bulk of CS6’s resources are used up in procuring these services and 
the organization is in a poor financial state. 
 
6.6.2- CS6’s Activities 
CS6 admits children who have been abandoned in various circumstances. Some were 
abandoned in the hospital at birth while others were picked up from the streets. These 
children, some of whom were brought into the home from as little as one day old, are 
in need of a home, love, medical care and education. CS6’s activities centre on the 
                                                 
12
While the interview was going on, one of the children came to ask the interviewee about an issue 
concerning her school. The cordial rapport and warm embrace of reassurance all convey the impression 
that the children are truly cared for and valued 
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provision of these basic needs for the children and supporting them to grow into 
responsible adults. When they have attained adulthood, the organization seeks to 
maintain the ‘family ties’ and continue to support the children well into their adult 
life. One of the former inmates now an adult works with the organization.  
The orphanage’s main building serves as home to the children and a part of it as the 
office. It provides a stable and secure environment for the children to live while the 
staffs provide the love and care that makes it a comfortable home for the children. 
Medical care is a major area of activity in the orphanage. Some of the children on 
admission test positive to HIV (CS6/IV10/10). The home separates those children that 
have tested positive to HIV from the rest and have trained them not to share things 
like spoons, soaps etc.  
 
Education is another major area of activity. While some of the children are enrolled in 
public schools, others are sent to fee paying private schools.  The decision on the 
choice of school is based on the children’s abilities and needs and not on economy in 
the use of resources. About 19 of the children are enrolled in Solid Foundation 
Primary School paying about N50, 000 (about £200) per term excluding books. One is 
in a boarding school, Royal College Masak paying N210, 000 (£920) per term.  
As a result of the strategy to provide high quality education to the children, the largest 
part of CS6’s expenditure is on education: 
‘We pay about N3.5m (£15,000) per term as school fees for the children’ 
(CS6/IV10/10).  
 
This has been a strain on the finances of the organization and CS6 now plans to set up 
its own school:  
‘We plan to build ‘Light on the Hilltop Academy’, a school that will start with 
a twelve (12) grade boarding facility which will not only cater to the 
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educational needs of the children in the orphanage but also care for young 
girls who fall victim of the unfortunate situation of teenage pregnancy. The 
school will have a special curriculum for these girls i.e. special skills in 
nursing, forensic sciences, foreign languages, computer programming etc. The 
orphans however will receive proper formal education’ (CS6/IV11/10) 
 
The project has been suspended due to lack of funds. Other needs in the organization 
remain unmet. For example, the home needs a school bus which it yet can’t afford.  It 
conveys the children to school in multiple trips using minibuses. 
 
6.6.3 CS6’s Stakeholders 
There are a number of stakeholders in CS6. First there is the government. CS6’s work 
complements the effort of the government through the Ministry of Youth and Social 
Welfare in providing social services to this group. The government has not been very 
effective in this regard and has looked to CS6 and similar organizations to 
complement its effort. For example, the government between 2005 and 2009 closed 
down similar homes it ran and transferred the children to CS6 and other homes, 
supporting them with only very little funding. The position of the government as a 
stakeholder here is therefore as a form of beneficiary of CS6’s work. On the other 
hand, the government also stands in the position of a regulator through another of its 
departments, the Corporate Affairs Commission. But it performs little or no activities 
in this role as no form of regulation of NGOs is attempted. 
 
A second stakeholder group in CS6 is the community it serves and from which its 
donors come. CS6 maintains very good relationship with the community. Various 
groups and individuals come in to visit and are given access to the children and staff. 
They speak with them and share their stories and concerns. Some supporters have 
adopted children from the home while others support them with donations and gifts. 
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There is a remarkable absence of Institutional donors or INGOs as stakeholders in 
CS6. The NGO receives no funding from these sources.  
 
The third group of stakeholders is the beneficiaries, the children that the home was 
set-up to care for. Their care and well-being is entirely dependent on the well-being of 
the organization. While they are in a vulnerable state and do not provide the resources 
for running the organization, they are nonetheless actively involved in the 
organization. They have direct access to the management and staff of CS6 and freely 
discuss their needs and concerns. They also have access to the supporters and donors 
and often speak directly to them about their needs and welfare. They are informed 
about decisions that affect them. The channel of communications between the 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders appear free, informal and unhindered. The needs 
and concerns of the children therefore, gets translated into the programmes of the 
NGO. 
 
6.6.4- Funding of CS6’s programmes 
The sources of CS6’s funding are varied and no single source appears to be dominant. 
The organization relies on donation from individuals and corporate bodies to run its 
activities. In addition it receives a small annual subvention of N600, 000 (£2,600) 
from the Nigerian government. The most regular source of donation is from 
individuals and associations who visit the orphanage as part of their charitable work. 
The donors are generally members of the community who are sympathetic towards 
the cause and objective of the orphanage. These supporters make repeated visits to the 
home and are allowed to meet the children, interact with them and listen to their 
stories. This enables them to gain more insight into the work of the orphanage and its 
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needs. This understanding reflects in the form of donations given. The donations 
received are not only in form of cash but also needed furniture and equipment, food 
and domestic supplies. CS6 prepares its budget in the form of a needs list which is 
made available to the supporters and donors. Its overall budget is therefore not 
quantified monetarily. For example for the year 2010, CS6’s budget incorporate a 
needs list including items such as a school bus, computers, a generator, and furniture 
and kitchen equipment. Apart from the budget on capital expenditure on its school 
project, its annual expenditure budget is valued to be in the range of £200, 000 to 
£300,000.  
 
CS6 has not been particularly successful at fundraising from corporate and 
Institutional donors. Though it has no dedicated fundraising department its 
administrative officer combines the role of fundraiser. At the moment, the 
organization has no grant from any Institutional or corporate donor. While no major 
effort has been made towards accessing funds from Institutional donors, there has 
been some effort towards raising funds from corporate organizations. Funding 
proposals have been submitted to prospective corporate donors. For example, a 
proposal to fund the staging of an arts exhibition tagged ‘Painting my beautiful life’ 
aimed at raising N120m (£0.5m) towards the building of its proposed school, was 
submitted to three corporate organizations. None of these applications was successful 
and the event could not hold. CS3’s Fundraising Officer thinks the scale of their needs 
is huge and that may be what ‘scares away’ potential donors (CS6/IV11/10). But CS6 
has received some unrestricted donations from some corporate organizations. Some of 
this, surprisingly, also comes in form of food and supplies. Dangote Group, a major 
trading conglomerate in Nigeria donated a large quantity of food and supplies to CS6 
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in 2010. This happens frequently, about once or twice annually. A significant 
proportion of CS6’s donations, therefore, come in form of food and basic supplies. 
The supplies meet the needs of the organization in this areas but not enough cash is 
donated to allow the organization provide the top quality education and medical care 
it envision in its strategy. It could therefore place only some of the children in top fee-
paying schools. It also falls into arrears of school fees and sometimes sells part of its 
excess of donated food and supplies to pay school fees or medical bills. CS6 has not 
accessed any funding from International NGOs apart from the Nigerian Red Cross 
that gave it small unrestricted donation in 2010.   
 
6.6.5 CS6’s Accountability Practices 
The pattern of accountability observed in CS6 is different from those observed in the 
other NGOs studied. Some elements of the main forms of accountability practices 
observed in the other five case studies were observed in CS6 but with a notable 
absence of some of the other forms.   
 
6.6.5.1 Statutory financial reporting 
CS6 is registered as a NGO in Nigeria but does not prepare statutory financial reports. 
The complete absence of this form of accountability practice is due to the lack of 
requirement to produce such reports in the regulatory environment in which CS6 and 
other NGOs in Nigeria operate. There is no separate body established to regulate 
NGOs beside the Corporate Affairs Commission that regulates all incorporated 
bodies. The Commission only requires NGOs to prepare simple income and 
expenditure accounts in line with the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters 
Act (1990) but does not monitor compliance. Because of these contextual issues, 
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statutory financial reporting is not practiced in CS6. Consequently, the narrative 
reporting extension of the statutory reports is also not practiced. 
  
6.6.5.2 Financial and Narrative Reporting to Donors 
Because CS6 has no donor-funded restricted programmes, no financial or narrative 
reports are prepared for donors. Internal record-keeping and accounting are designed 
to address only the needs of the organization. CS6 keeps records of its financial 
transactions and makes internal reports based only on its needs. The main use of these 
is in resource allocation and cash flow management. Cash flow is a major issue for 
CS6 and the period of greatest needs are at the beginning of the school terms when the 
children’s school fees have to be paid. CS6 sometimes sells part of its supplies to raise 
cash to meet more urgent needs: 
‘Until now we still owe school fees on some of our children. We had to sell 
some of the foodstuffs donated in order to raise cash to pay school fess’ 
(CS6/IV10/10). 
 
CS6 has identified that its two most significant expenditure items are school fees and 
medical care. It is building its own school which it hopes will save it money and give 
it better opportunity to offer the top quality education it desires to give all the 
children. The management of its resources therefore involves a delicate balance 
between allocation to revenue and capital expenditure. While the expenditure on 
school fees can be more accurately budgeted for, expenditure on medical cost cannot. 
There is, therefore, a contingency provision for medical care in the management of its 
resources. A large part of this is done informally and the formal reports generated do 
not fully reflect the dynamic and iterative nature of how these financial information 
feed into management decision. In all these, there is good communication flow 
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between those that generate the information, the decision makers and the beneficiaries 
even though there is little paper trail to reflect this dynamics.  
 
6.6.5.3 Annual Reports and Strategic Planning 
CS6 prepares a report that communicates its strategy and relates it to its work and 
achievements for dissemination to its stakeholders. It also uses it to set out its plans 
for the future as well as its needs. The reports however place less emphasis on relating 
the success of its work to measurable achievement of its strategic objectives. The 
reports are similar to the annual reports in the other five NGOs but are not labelled as 
such and are not necessarily produced annually. A review of the most recent report 
produced in 2009 shows that the reports are not particularly focused on the needs of 
Institutional donors or INGOs. It does not employ the language of quantifying 
objectives and relating its actual activities to their achievements as in 4 of the other 5 
NGOs.  
 
6.6.5.4 Programme Evaluation 
As CS6’s activities are funded entirely from unrestricted donations, no formal 
programme evaluation in the form observed in the other cases was in use. But its 
programmes and activities are entirely open to the donors and other stakeholders who 







6.6.5.5 Participation of beneficiaries and wider stakeholders 
Out of the three main stakeholder groups in CS6, two are non-contractual 
stakeholders. The first of the two non-contractual stakeholders are the beneficiaries. 
These are the children in the orphanage. While they have no power to hold the 
organization to account, CS6 puts them at the centre of its objectives and seek to 
demonstrate accountability to them. This is done in informal ways rather than through 
any comprehensive sets of reports. There is a sense of communality in objective and 
decision making in the organization. The staff and management all understand the 
objective that the children are the focus of the organizations’ strategy and every child 
deserves the best quality of life and education. The children are encouraged to share 
their concerns with the staff who they see as parents. Though the process is informal, 
the needs and concerns raised get translated into effective decisions quickly. The 
children are involved in or informed about decision making and there appears to be a 
sense of collective ownership of the decisions. For example, when one of the children 
who was HIV positive took ill and was taken to the hospital, resources were diverted 
from other basic needs to paying medical bills. The other children were informed 
about this and there was a visible sense of collective loss among the children and staff 
when the child died. The children are generally made aware of donations given and 
are kept informed about how they are utilized and how resources are allocated.  The 
children are allowed to meet visiting donors and discuss issues of concern to them. 
 
The second group of non-contractual stakeholders are the donors or the community 
that supports its work. They give unrestricted donations to CS6. One may include in 
this group the few corporate donors such as the Dangote group since the donations 
they give are not based on any funding application or tied to any project. They are 
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wholly unrestricted with no accountability or reporting requirements tied to it. But 
CS6 renders accountability to them in other informal ways. Apart from the annual 
reports, the donors are informed about the work of the orphanage through maintaining 
open access and free communication. They can visit the orphanage at short notice and 
are allowed access to the children and staff and free to discuss issues. The community 
or donors value this relationship and repeated visits from individuals and groups are 
common. They take keen interest in the NGO and in the progress of the children as 
individuals. 
  

















Table 6.13- Summary of data from CS6 
 CS6 Comments 
Type of NGO Welfare  
Area of operation Local  
Annual Income £0.1- 0.5m Donation in kind are not valued for 
accounting purpose 
% of Income provided by contractual 
Stakeholders (restricted income) 
0% No contractual grant in use 
% of Income from non-contractual 
Stakeholders (unrestricted) 
100% Relies wholly on unrestricted 
donations  
Involvement of contractual stakeholders  None  
Involvement of non-contractual stakeholders  High Frequent visits, access to staff and 
beneficiaries, good communication 
and information flow 
Accountability methods in use:    
1. Statutory financial reporting × The regulatory environment does 
not encourage its use 
2. Narrative reporting extension of statutory 
reports 
×  
3. Annual reports and strategic planning √ The contents understates the 
achievement of the NGO 
4. Donor financial reports × No restricted grants used 
5. Programme narrative reports ×  
6. Programme evaluation ×  
7. Participation of beneficiaries and other 
non-contractual stakeholders 
√ Frequent visits by donors, 
involvement  in decision-making; 
direct communication between 




This chapter presented the data collected from the five cases, CS2 to CS6. The 
structure of the data collected was guided by the theoretical model and the findings 
from the lead case study, CS1. This structure which was also used in the presentation 
of the data was broadly adequate. However, some practices observed in the lead case 
study were missing in some of the subsequent five cases while a few new practices 
not found in CS1 were observed in some of these other cases. Table 6.14 attempts to 
bring together the main elements of the data collected in the five case studies along 













































Area of operation International National Internation
al 
National National Community 
Annual Income 2-3m 2.7m 43m 1m 0.1-
0.3m 
0.1-0.5m 
% of Income from contractual 
Stakeholders (restricted income) 
70% 85% 36% 100% 90% 0% 
% of Income from non-
contractual Stakeholders 
(unrestricted) 
30% 15% 64% 0% 10% 100% 
Statutory  Regulation of NGOs Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak Absent 
 Accountability Practices 
 
     
1 Statutory financial reports           
2 Statutory narrative reports          
3 Donors financial reports            
4 Programme narrative reports            
5 Annual report on strategy            
6 Programme evaluation           
7 Stakeholder participation in 
programming decisions 
         
8 Stakeholder participation in  
resource utilisation decisions 





Analysis of Data from Secondary Case Studies 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 sets out the data collected from the five case studies consisting of two 
further NGOs in the UK in addition to the lead case study and three NGOs in Africa. 
There were areas of broad similarities in accountability practices amongst the UK 
NGOs particularly in the area of statutory reporting and strategic planning review. But 
there are marked variations when compared with practices in the three NGOs based in 
the developing world. This chapter presents the data analysis and findings from all the 
five case studies highlighting the areas of similarities and differences. The analysis 
proceeds from the skeletal theory that identifies two main sets of variables that 
influence organizations’ accountability practices. The first are endogenous variables 
relating to the nature of the organization’s objectives and activities and how 
meaningful accounting information will be in organizational accountability.  The 
second are exogenous variables relating to the information needs of the stakeholders. 
The next section presents the analysis of CS2 and CS3 which are UK NGOs and 
compares the findings with those from the lead case study (CS1). Section 7.3 presents 
the analysis of CS3, CS4 and CS5 all of which are African NGOs and brings out the 
similarities and differences between them and the UK NGOs. Section 7.4 presents a 
structuration theory analysis of the accountability practices in NGOs and explains 
why some practices are used in preference to the others. Section 7.5 concludes the 
chapter with a summary of the key findings from all the six case studies and the 




7.1.1 Linking the analysis to the theoretical model and the findings from CS1 
From the theoretical model presented in Chapter 4, accountability practices in 
organizations are determined by two variables. The first are the endogenous variables 
that determine whether traditional accounting will be the appropriate method of 
rendering accountability. This depends on the nature of the organization’s objectives 
and activities. The second are the exogenous variables relating to the information 
needs of the stakeholders. This may suggest that one or more of the four possibilities 
named A, B, C and D in the accountability space will be the appropriate method of 
rendering accountability.  The actual choice of organizational practices depends on 
the composition of the stakeholders, their relative influences and the social 
interactions between them.  This choice may be optimal (leading to full 
accountability) or sub-optimal.  
 
From the analysis of CS1, the nature of the endogenous variables is such that there is 
a wide sociological divide that means traditional accounting alone cannot fulfil the 
organization’s accountability needs. Other methods are therefore used in addition. The 
six accountability practices observed in CS1 are therefore spread across both the 
process and performance based methods in the ‘accountability space’ but more of the 
practices (four) are performance based while two are process based. This result is 







Figure 7.1 Accountability Practices in CS1 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
            
           
     
In CS1, the contractual stakeholders are very influential on account of providing most 
of the funding for the running of the organization. This is reflected in the 
accountability practices as almost all of the practices are of the contractual form. 
Though two of the six practices observed attempt to address the information needs of 
the non-contractual stakeholders, but because these two methods are driven by the 
needs of the contractual stakeholders, they at best could only be described as 
straddling the contractual- communal accountability space. There is a notable absence 
of any practice that could be described as D type supplying quantitative financial 
information to non-contractual stakeholders. The following sections give detailed 














Process A- Traditional 
Accounting  
Statutory financial reports (1) 
Donors’ financial reports (3) 
C- Stakeholders’      
participation 
B- Narrative Reporting  
 
Statutory narrative reports (2) 
Program narrative reports (4) 
D- Accounting for 
stakeholders use 
*Annual report/Strategic plan review (5) 
*Programme evaluation (6) 
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7.2 UK NGOs: Overview 
CS2 and CS3 are NGOs based in the UK just like CS1. They therefore operate within 
the same general context. This reflects in certain elements of the practices observed 
across these organizations. This introduction examines the general context in which 
UK NGOs operate while the following subsections examine the specifics of the 
findings from the data. 
 
The UK is a wealthy country and a member of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). GDP per capita in the UK was £21,110 in 
2010 (ONS). Charitable donations are tax deductible expenses under UK corporation 
tax laws while there is tax allowance for individual giving under personal income tax 
law. As a result, the level of individual donations to charity is high, totalling £10.6 
billion in 2009/10 (NCVO, 2010: 10). These individual donations are given not as 
contractual grants but as unrestricted donations. There is, therefore, a large pool of 
unrestricted funding to UK charities allowing them to pursue activities they deem 
appropriate to advancing their causes. The second but larger pool of funding available 
to Charities is from Institutional donors. These are Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) given as contractual grants by the governments of developed countries and 
multilateral agencies such as the United Nations and the European Commission. 
These grants are made in response to proposals written in line with the donors’ 
specific guidelines. Making a successful proposal requires a combination of 
programming, fundraising and budgeting skills. UK NGOs have access to this type of 
funding source because of the availability of a pool of skilled workforce (particularly 
in Programming and Fundraising) and because of access to information and 
infrastructural support needed to access these donors. While these present 
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opportunities for UK NGOs, they also present the challenge of meeting the varied 
accountability demands of these donors.  In addition to meeting these accountability 
demands, UK NGOs operate within a framework of statutory regulation carried out by 
the Charity Commission. These contextual influences affect the practice of 
accountability in UK NGOs and are integral to the analysis of the case studies 
presented in the following sub-sections. The analysis proceeds from an examination 
of the nature of the endogenous variables in UK NGOs, the existence of the 
‘sociological divide’ in the use of traditional accounting for NGOs’ accountability and 
how these affect the practices in the UK NGOs. 
 
7.2.1 Analysis of the Sociological Divide in UK NGOs  
The existence of the sociological divide depends on the nature of the endogenous 
variables in organizations. These endogenous variables could be summarized as: 
1. How clear, specific and measurable the organizational objectives are (O) 
2. The extent to which the activities required to achieve the objectives are 
programmeable (P)  
3. The level of economic rationality involved in decision-making in the 
organization (E) 
The relationship between these variables and the sociological divide (ds) is 






Where this divide is large (O, P, E have low values meaning O is not clearly 
measurable, P is non-programmable and E is non-economic), traditional accounting 
alone will be inadequate for accountability and it will be important for the 
organization to adopt additional forms of accountability to complement it. The 
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following paragraphs present an analysis of the endogenous variables and the 
sociological divides in CS2 and CS3 and compare them with those of CS1.  
 
7.2.1.1 How clear, specific and measurable are UK NGOs’ objectives? (O) 
CS2’s objectives revolve around protecting people with mental health issues. This 
involves delivering certain services to them and protecting their rights.  Determining 
the needs of these beneficiaries (e,g for social inclusion, education and right to 
employment) around which CS2’s services are designed is fairly subjective. CS2 
works with GPs and Psychiatrists in an attempt to establish these needs. The 
subjectivity involved in this process is reflected in the modification to the 
programmes as they evolve. But the subjectivity involved is not as much as was found 
in CS1 where the detailed sub objectives and activities have tended to vary with each 
strategic plan. CS1’s objectives have been restated is different ways with each 
successive strategic plan.  In both CS1 and CS2 meeting the beneficiaries’ needs are 
at the centre of the NGOs’ objectives. But the beneficiaries have limited involvement 
in determining their needs or in designing the NGOs’ programmes aimed at meeting 
those needs. While CS2 consults with experts who know best what the beneficiaries 
need, CS1 adopts a ‘needs assessment’ process whereby it consults the beneficiaries 
to find out what their needs are. In both cases the process is out of the control of the 
beneficiaries. Compared with CS1, CS2’s objectives are more specific. The higher 
degree of specificity of CS2’s objectives reflects in its activities. Most of CS2’s 
services have been running for many years with only incremental changes, 
modifications and additions. This is unlike CS1 where there has been a wider 
variability in the programmes implemented. Situating this in the skeletal theory, the 
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variable O (specificity of objective) in the endogenous variable model could be 
viewed as having a medium value in CS2 as opposed to the very low value in CS1.  
 
In relation to CS3, the main objective is to ensure that the poorest people in the world 
gain access to safe water, sanitation and improved hygiene. This objective has 
remained stable and less susceptible to varied interpretations.  
 
In terms of the measurability of objectives, CS1’s objective of protecting minorities’ 
rights has been less measurable than CS2’s objectives which deal with delivering 
services to and protecting the rights of people with mental health issues. The reason is 
attributable to the nature of advocacy work the impact of which is inherently difficult 
to measure. CS1’s work is mainly in the area of advocacy. Though CS2 started as an 
advocacy NGO, its work now involves more of welfare service delivery. This 
explains why the achievement of CS2’s objectives is now slightly more measurable 
than CS1’s.  As for CS3, access to safe water, which is at the centre of its objectives, 
could be more objectively determined. The international standard (the Joint 
Monitoring Programme) suggests that everyone should have access to 25 litres of 
water per day. Though this standard is not absolute, as CS3 has redefined it for its 
own purpose as access to 10 litres of water per person per day as a minimum standard, 
it is still sufficiently measurable. But improved sanitation and hygiene may not be as 
easily measurable and there is no similar standard for measuring good sanitation and 
hygiene. Because of this component of its work and its involvement in advocacy for 
improved access to water, sanitation and hygiene, CS3’s objectives can only be 
described as partly measurable. It appears that the higher the advocacy element of the 
NGO’s work, the less measurable its objectives are. The strategic planning process in 
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CS3 aims to tackle this by breaking the objectives into more specific and measurable 
units. This is with a view to aiding accountability and reporting to stakeholders on 
performance against these objectives. For example, the 2009 strategic plan lists as 
success indicator that by 2015: 
  ‘25 million more people will have access to safe water, be practicing good 
 hygiene and have improved sanitation as a result of our investment in partner 
 organisations’ (CS3/SP/09:14). 
  
While there is an objective criterion for determining how many more people have 
gained access to safe water, there are no objective criteria for establishing how many 
more people practice good hygiene and sanitation. This suggests a medium value of O 
for CS3 as in CS2. 
 
7.2.1.2 To what extent do the activities of UK NGOs have a programmable link 
to the achievement of their objectives? (P) 
In terms of the nature of the activities, the link between CS2’s activities and the 
achievement of the objectives may be considered non programmable in some areas 
but fairly programmable in others. The link between Employment services and mental 
health patients keeping their job is fairly programmable. In 2009 spending on 
Education and Employment service increased 86% to £582,706 from its 2008 level of 
£313,455 mainly through the new ‘moving on’ project.  71% (£415,635) of this 
spending was mainly to engage and support four employment advisers ‘to provide 
advice and guidance specifically to people who are on long-term incapacity benefits’ 
(CS2/AR/09:6). The result of the increase in activities in this area was reported as: 
‘Through this projects this year alone we provided assistance to over 200 
people: 25 of who gained paid employment, 70 accessed education and 
training opportunities and a further 51 participated in voluntary work 
placement’ (CS2/AR/09: 6) 
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But many of CS2’s other activities don’t have the same direct link to the achievement 
of its objectives. For example in areas of Advocacy a similar increase in spending of 
50% to £583, 234 from the 2008 level of £389,416 occurred. 63% of the spending 
(£369,592) was to engage and support ‘14 full- and part-time advocates’ up from 5 
advocates in the previous year (CS2/AR/09: 3). But the result of this increased 
activity was expressed this way with no indication of any measurable achievement: 
‘It is the purpose of the Advocacy Project to strengthen the voices of our 
service users. Our advocates have achieved this on a daily basis, whether 
speaking on people’s behalf or supporting them to speak for themselves…The 
substantially increased uptake of our services clearly shows the scale and need 
for advocacy provision: demand for our services appears to be limited 
primarily by our capacity to provide them’ (CS2/AR/09: 5)   
 
The only data available to justify the achievement was the number of users seen and 
the number of contact meetings involved. This shows that in 2008 there were 490 
advocacy contact meetings where 104 users were seen. In 2009 this increased to 1,250 
contact meetings where 118 users were seen (CS2/AR/09: 5). No further information 
was available on how far the users’ voices have been strengthened or their rights 
respected.  The variable P (the extent to which the activities have programmable link 
to the achievement of objectives) can therefore be taken to have a low value in CS2. 
 
To achieve its objective, CS3 carries out activities involving two main strands. The 
first is direct provision of water to communities and promoting improved hygiene and 
sanitation. The second involves advocacy and campaign to influence others (mainly 
governments) to achieve this. Towards the first strand, CS3’s activities involve 
providing water points, building water supply infrastructure and helping communities 
to manage their water resources. There is a fairly programmable link between these 
activities and the objectives of access to safe water. Towards the other objective of 
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improved sanitation and hygiene, CS3 carries out hygiene promotion activities 
involving campaign and education.  The link between this promotion and campaign 
activities and improved sanitation and hygiene is less programmable. This is mainly 
for two reasons. The first, already discussed, is that no objective scale for measuring 
improvement in sanitation and hygiene has been developed. The second is that 
education and campaign inherently have no direct or immediate link to the change 
they seek to bring about. One may, therefore, take the value of P in the model to be 
medium in CS3. These two results contrast with that in CS1 where the activities bear 
little programmable link to the objectives they seek to achieve. 
 
7.2.1.3 How much of economic rationality is involved in decision-making in UK 
NGOs? (E) 
In terms of the economic nature of the activities, the third endogenous variable in the 
model, the NGOs’ services are not paid for by beneficiaries. The NGOs do not aim to 
make profit or accumulate surplus. All of the three UK NGOs studied deploy all of 
their income towards their charitable objectives and aim to maintain only just enough 
reserves to mitigate business risks. Attaining an improved economic position is 
therefore not part of the NGOs’ objectives and has not been seen to influence 
decision-making. The decisions on programme design and implementations are made 
without any form of economic appraisal such as cost-benefit analysis. None of the 
accountability practices observed address the issue of economic efficiency of any of 
the programmes or services. One may conclude that the variable E in the model takes 
on low values in all the UK NGOs 
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All these taken together suggest that the sociological divide exist to varying extents in 
all the three UK NGOs. It is medium in CS3 but wide in CS2 and very wide in CS1. 
The result of this is that traditional accounting information alone does not meet the 
full accountability needs in the UK NGOs. The extent of the sociological divide 
indicates how inadequate traditional accounting information will be in meeting the 
organization’s accountability needs. Improving NGO’s system of statutory financial 
reporting which itself is based on the traditional accounting model appear to be a way 
of addressing this sociological divide. The efforts to develop the SORP to meet the 
specific needs of NGOs’ reporting, the adoption of fund accounting principle that is 
very important to the donors and the introduction of the trustees’ report that ensures 
that account is given of the achievement of the NGOs’ objectives are examples of 
initiatives that have been introduced on recognition of the existence of the 
sociological divide in using traditional accounting for NGOs’ accountability.  
 












Table 7.1- The Sociological Divide in UK NGOs 
 CS1 CS2 CS3 
Type of NGO Advocacy Advocacy & Welfare Development & 
Advocacy 
Objectives Protecting Minority 
rights and promoting 
peaceful co-existence 
Protecting the right of 
people with mental 
health issues. 
Providing safe water and 
promoting hygiene & 
sanitation 
Indicators of the 
achievement of  the 
objectives  
Changes in legislation 
achieved; changes in 
attitude of communities 
Number of users trained; 
number of users that 
gained or retained jobs 
Number of  users given 
access to safe water or 
hygiene training 
How specific and 
measurable are the 
Objectives (O)? 
V. Low Low Medium 
Activities Seminar, training, legal 
cases, advocacy 
campaign 
Advocacy, education & 
training,  employment 
support 
Building water points & 
latrines and hygiene 
promotion 
How programmable are 
the activities? (P) 
V. Low Low Medium 
Economic rationality 
used in decisions? (E) 
V. Low Low Low 
Is there a sociological 
divide? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Size of sociological 
divide 







7.2.3 A Theoretical Analysis of UK NGOs’ accountability practices 
A main factor that has shaped accountability practices in UK NGOs is the existence of 
the sociological divide that means traditional financial accounting alone is inadequate 
to demonstrate NGOs’ accountability. As a result, the two UK NGOs, CS2 and CS3 
have developed various means of accountability which they use in combination. 
These methods could be categorized in line with the theoretical model in the same 
way as the practices in CS1 have been categorized and presented in figure 7.1. The 
practices observed in CS2 and CS3 are broadly similar to those identified in CS1 but 
differ in form and details. While there is a balanced spread of the practices between 
the process based methods and the performance based methods, the practices 
observed appears to be more concentrated around the contractual methods (types A 
and B). There are a few practices that do not fit neatly into one of these categories but 
straddle the contractual-communal accountability space. These are mainly the 
Strategic Planning and Review process and the Annual Reports. These forms of 
accountability, particularly as practised in CS3, attempt to integrate the needs of the 
non-contractual stakeholders more than in CS1. They could, therefore, be viewed as 
venturing slightly more into the communal part of the accountability space than in 
CS1. There seems to be no process based method of accountability of the communal 
form (type D) in use in CS2 and CS1 as no method has yet been developed to render 
financial accountability to the individual donors who give unrestricted funding to the 
NGOs, or to the beneficiaries. But CS3 to some extent involves beneficiaries in the 
management of the water facilities it provides. This involvement includes the direct 
participation in the management of the resources generated and used towards the 
maintenance of the facilities. Furthermore, CS3 provides to the non-contractual 
stakeholders information on the unit cost of its services and relates the resources used 
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to the services delivered to its beneficiaries. These practices could be categorised as 
type D in the accountability space.  
 
The six types of practices initially observed in CS1 and shown to repeat to a varying 
extent in CS2 and CS3 are described below together with the two additional practices 
observed in CS3. Areas of commonality and differences are highlighted. 
1. A system of statutory financial reporting under UK GAAP in line with the 
charity SORP. This separately accounts for the restricted and unrestricted 
funds but does not include the detailed accountability for the individual 
programmes and services that are treated as separate funds. This method of 
accountability is well standardized and its practice is similar across all of the 
three NGOs studied. The statutory financial reports of CS2 and CS3 are 
comparable in form and information content to those of CS1 as they are 
prepared under the same reporting standard, the Charity SORP.  
2. Statutory narrative reporting. This is an extension of the statutory reports in 
the form of trustees’ reports that explains the activities of the NGOs and the 
achievement of its objectives. Though it is carried out within the same 
regulatory framework determined by the charity commission, the content is 
not very standardized. The practice here is identical in form across the three 
UK NGOs studied but they differ in depth. While the form and information 
content of the trustees’ report is similar in CS1 and CS2, CS3 goes into more 
depth, and incorporates its annual report as the narrative part of the statutory 
report.  
3. Financial reporting to donors on contractual grants.  
 329 
The forms of these reports are determined by the funders and specified in the 
contractual requirements for the individual grants. While the format varies 
with the different funders, it involves mainly demonstrating that the grant 
funds have been utilized in accordance with contract. The formats involve 
setting out the grant Income and Expenditure against the approved budget and 
explaining the variances. This method dominates accountability practices in 
CS1 and CS2 because of the high dependence on contractual grants. But while 
it is prominently used in CS3 it is not as dominant because contractual grants 
constitute only about 36% of its funding. Since the practices are determined by 
the donors, the practices are similar where the NGOs have the same source of 
funding. 60% of CS3’s contractual grants are from the EC and DFID, the two 
main donors to CS1. The method of financial reporting to donors is, therefore, 
similar in CS1 and CS3. But the practices in CS2 are slightly different as most 
of its contractual grants are from statutory bodies with slightly different 
reporting styles. 
4. Narrative reports or Performance reports to donors on contractual grants. 
These reports highlight the achievements of programmes objectives or 
outcomes against Key Performance Indicators (KPI) or measurable indicators 
agreed in the grant contract.  These reports are predominantly used in all of the 
UK NGOs studied but again more in CS1 and CS2 than in CS3. The reports 
give narrative accounts of how the NGO has performed against the indicators 
agreed in the grant contract. Their usefulness is dependent on how accurately 
the indicators reflect the achievement of the programme objectives and how 
practicable it is to gather data on the performance against those indicators. 
These reports differ in form and style across the three NGOs as they are 
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determined by the needs of the donors. Again, practices in CS3 are similar to 
those in CS1 while practices in CS2 are slightly different.   
5. Annual reports and the strategic planning & review system. 
This method of accountability involves giving narrative accounts that detail 
the NGO’s overall strategic objectives and how its activities have contributed 
to their achievement. The annual reports are more detailed than the statutory 
narrative reports and take an overall view of the NGO’s objectives and 
activities rather than those of individual programmes. It is not prepared as a 
contractual grant requirement and does not form part of the statutory reporting 
requirements. As a result, the form of these reports varies among the three UK 
NGOs.  In CS1 and CS2 these reports are prepared separately and aligned with 
the strategic review process. But in CS3, the annual reports are incorporated as 
the narrative element of the statutory reports. These reports emphasize mostly 
the positive achievements of the NGOs and in addition to informing the 
general public about their work, they are also used as a fundraising tool. The 
three NGOs view the annual reporting and strategic review process as a form 
of accountability to the non-contractual stakeholders because the process 
involves consultation with them. But these consultations are only one-way, 
particularly in CS1 and CS2, as these stakeholders do not influence strategic 
decisions beyond giving the NGOs the information and support they need to 
make the decisions. But the involvement of the non-contractual stakeholders is 
greater in CS3 where the beneficiaries play a greater role in helping the NGO 
determine their needs, the appropriate location of water points and the 
maintenance of the facilities. This involvement can be described as a form of 
communal accountability (type C) and is categorised as such. In addition, only 
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CS3 attempts to incorporate in its annual reports, financial accountability for 
the use of its resources aimed at the needs of the individual donors, the 
beneficiaries and the community. This practice may be considered as type D 
and is categorised as such.  
6. Programme evaluation and impact studies.  
This involves an evaluator reviewing the programmes of the NGO and making 
judgments as to their effectiveness in meeting the objectives. The practices 
here vary between the UK NGOs. In CS1 evaluation is carried out by 
independent consultants engaged by the NGO to evaluate the programmes 
implemented, the objectives achieved and the impact on beneficiaries. The 
services are usually requested and paid for by the donor under particular grants 
but the evaluators are appointed by CS1. The lack of independence of the 
evaluator compromises the objectivity of the reports as such reports tend to 
emphasize mostly the positive accomplishments. 
 
In CS2 evaluation is performed by the donors’ staff as most of CS2’s donors 
have their own internal evaluators. This evaluation is more rigorous and tends 
to be more critical than those observed in CS1. But as in CS1, the evaluations 
focus on individual grants rather than the whole of the NGOs’ programmes. 
 
CS3 has its own Programme Effectiveness unit that evaluates its programmes 
worldwide. The evaluation focuses not only on individual programmes but on 
the whole work of a particular unit (e.g a country office). However, the 
emphasis is more on learning points and the evaluation tends to be less critical 
of the programmes.  
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While the NGOs view programme evaluation as a form of accountability to 
the non-contractual stakeholders in the sense that evaluators seek their views 
on how the programme has benefited them, it could not be described as a 
communal form of accountability as it is, particularly in CS1 and CS2, driven 
by the needs of the contractual stakeholders. 
 
7. Beneficiaries’ participation: This is used as a form of accountability to very 
limited extents in CS1 and CS2 but more extensively in CS3. This is in the 
form of consultation with the beneficiaries in programmes that affect them and 
their participation in decisions relating to them. CS3 encourages the 
beneficiaries to form village committees through which they participate in 
decision-making concerning the location and maintenance of the facilities 
provided for them.  
8. Financial accountability to non-contractual stakeholders: In terms of providing 
financial accountability to non-contractual stakeholders (type D) evidence 
from the data suggests that only CS3 attempts to explain to all stakeholders 
how each £1 of donation is utilized in its work by breaking down the unit cost 
of the services it provides and relating them to its output. Though this 
information is also used for fundraising, it provides transparency and 
accountability to the individual donors, the community and the beneficiaries.  
 
Some of these main methods of accountability are used to different extents in the UK 
NGOs. There is some consistency in practices across the three NGOs in the area of 
statutory reporting (type 1 and 2) This is due to progress made in the effort to 
 333 
standardize financial reporting in UK NGOs.  But there is no attempt to standardize 
the methods used to report to donors as the donors have different reporting needs and 
styles.  Also, the system of strategic planning and review is not standardized. The 
three NGOs have focused mainly on their achievements and successes and have 
tended to restate their objectives or redefined success criteria where they seemed 
unattainable. Concerning accountability to the non-contractual stakeholders (type C 
and D) there is little effort by CS1 and CS2 but CS3 goes a bit further here.  
 
The practices observed in CS2 are similar to those in CS1 presented earlier in Figure 
7.1 and will not be represented here. But while some of the practices in CS3 are 
similar to those in CS1 and CS2, two additional forms of accountability not used in 
CS1 and CS2 were observed in CS3. Figure 7.2 below presents the eight forms of 
accountability practices in CS3 within the accountability space.  
 
Figure 7.2 - Accountability practices in CS3 
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- Donor financial reports (3) 
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-Programme Evaluation (6) 
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CS3 has some practices in common with CS1 and CS2 but also has some practices 
that are unique to it. The system of statutory reporting in CS3 is broadly the same as 
in CS1 and CS2 but there are differences in the other areas of practice. Unlike in CS1 
and CS2 where the annual reports are produced as separate documents aligned with 
the system of strategic review, CS3 incorporates its detailed annual reports as the 
narrative component of its statutory reports in place of the trustees’ report.   
 
The conclusion from the analysis of the UK NGOs is that while practices in CS1 and 
CS2 are almost wholly determined by the needs of the contractual stakeholders, 
practices in CS3 venture slightly into some communal forms of accountability. 
 
An important issue to consider is whether the accountability practices observed in the 
UK NGOs are adequate.  An examination of the stakeholders’ information needs will 
shed some light into the adequacy of these practices. 
 
7.2.4 Analysis of Stakeholders’ Information needs in UK NGOs 
There are several stakeholders involved in UK NGOs. They can be categorized as 
contractual and non-contractual stakeholders. These stakeholders have varying levels 
of influence and different information needs. Because the information needs of the 
non-contractual stakeholders are not necessarily the same as those of the contractual 
stakeholders, limiting accountability to what is contractually required potentially 
creates an information divide. In order to avoid this, the needs of the non-contractual 
stakeholders have to be addressed within the accountability system in the NGOs as 
well as those of the contractual stakeholders. 
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Included in the contractual stakeholder group are the regulatory authorities and the 
Institutional donors. The regulators have the power to hold NGOs to account and 
demand accountability in any form they deem appropriate. This form has evolved 
over the years. The emphasis was originally on accounting for the use of resources 
through the traditional financial statements but this has now been extended to 
narrative reporting particularly on the achievement of the NGOs’ objectives. The UK 
NGOs studied have all complied with the statutory requirements and it appears that 
the statutory authorities’ information needs are met because of this.  
 
The influence of the second group of contractual stakeholders, the Institutional 
donors, derives from providing significant amount of funding to the three NGOs. The 
information needs of these contractual stakeholders include financial information to 
demonstrate proper use of the resources as well as performance reports on the 
achievement of the programme objectives. This need was observed to shape the 
accountability practices in the UK NGOs as they responded to the information 
demands of these donors. The contractual methods of accountability have therefore 
dominated accountability practices in all the three NGOs but more particularly in CS1 
and CS2 that relies to a greater extent on funding from contractual donors. 
 
The non-contractual stakeholders in the UK NGOs consist mainly of the beneficiaries 
or users of their services, the individual donors and the community from which they 
are drawn. The needs of the non-contractual stakeholders are varied. The individual 
donors give small amounts of donations to the NGOs. They are less interested in 
elaborate financial reporting but more interested in the effectiveness of the NGOs’ 
activities in meeting the needs of the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries do not provide 
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the resources used by the NGOs but they are more interested in how well the NGOs’ 
programmes that are intended to meet their needs do in fact meet those needs. 
 
As accountability practice in NGOs is aimed at providing appropriate information to 
the stakeholders, a gap in accountability or ‘information divide’ occurs when a 
significant section of the stakeholders are not getting the information they need. This 
may occur where the practices focus exclusively on the information needs of only a 
section of the stakeholders. In the UK NGOs, as the practices focus on the needs of 
the contractual stakeholders, there appears to be a significant information divide in 
relation to the needs of the non-contractual stakeholders. This is more pronounced in 
CS1 where little effort is made to establish and respond to the information needs of 
the non-contractual stakeholders. CS1’s accountability practices have not addressed 
these needs and there remains an information divide resulting from this. CS2 has 
established an organized way of obtaining regular feedback from the users of its 
services and therefore has better knowledge of their information needs. But its 
accountability practices do not adequately address these needs so the information 
divide is observed here as well. But CS3 has gone further than CS1 and CS2 in terms 
of involvement of the beneficiaries in the decision making relating to the location and 
maintenance of the facilities it provides for them. This involvement is however, 







7.3 Overview of African NGOs 
The remaining three case studies (CS4, CS5 and CS6) are NGOs based in Africa, two 
in Uganda and one in Nigeria. The general contexts in which these NGOs operate are 
similar but markedly different from those of UK NGOs. Three main contextual 
differences mark them apart from the UK NGOs. The first is the level of poverty in 
both countries. Uganda for example is a poor country with GDP per capita of $1,200 
in 2009. Also in Nigeria, in spite of the revenue from crude oil, GDP per capita was 
only $2,300 in 2009 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). The implications of this are 
twofold. First is that the levels of individual and corporate donations are low so NGOs 
in these countries have a very low level of unrestricted income derived from this 
source. The second is that the high level of poverty means that most of the 
beneficiaries of UK NGOs that work in the area of poverty relief, such as CS3, are in 
these countries. Perhaps the most important contextual issue, the third, is the role of 
the government and the statutory regulators in these countries. Unlike in the UK 
where NGOs are largely independent of government but subject to a structured 
regulatory reporting regime, NGOs in Uganda and Nigeria are less independent of 
government but not subjected to any elaborate regulatory reporting regime. This 
section presents the analysis of the data from these case studies. 
 
7.3.1 Analysis of the Sociological Divide in African NGOs 
This section present an analysis of the endogenous variables and the sociological 





7.3.1.1 How clear, specific and measurable are African NGOs’ objectives? (O) 
The main objectives of CS4, like those of CS3, its UK-based parent NGO, is to ensure 
that the poorest people in Uganda gain access to safe water, sanitation and improved 
hygiene. This is an adaptation of the objective of CS3 to the local context in Uganda. 
This is consistent with the fact that CS4 was established purposely to achieve the 
objective of CS3 in Uganda. As noted in section 7.2 for CS3, access to safe water, can 
be more objectively measured but improved sanitation and hygiene and the advocacy 
elements of its objectives may not be as easily measurable. CS4’s objectives, like 
CS3’s, can only be described as partly measurable. 
 
In CS5, the objectives involve the prevention and resolution of conflict. These 
objectives are broad and not easily measurable. CS5 prepares strategic plans every 
three years but the process is not structured or rigorous and does not attempt to re-
present the NGOs objectives in any clearer or measurable way. No measurable 
indicators have been developed to aid the measurement of their achievement. The 
endogenous variable O relating to the specificity and measurability of CS5’s 
objectives could, therefore, be considered as low. 
 
In the case of CS6, the objective is encapsulated in the vision of the organization 
which is to alleviate the problem faced by abandoned or orphaned children and to give 
them the chance to succeed in life. The immediate problems faced by these children 
are the basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care. These 
objectives are fairly specific. No effort is expended in breaking them further into 
measurable terms and no measurable targets of achievement have been set for their 
achievement. For example, CS6’s target to provide the children with good quality 
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medical care and education is qualitative and its attainment difficult to measure. 
Though CS6 does not carry out any formal strategic planning process, evidence from 
the data suggests there is a clear strategy being followed and all the stakeholders are 
clear about the strategic objectives. One may conclude that the endogenous variable, 
O, related to the certainty of the objectives, takes on a medium value in CS6.  
 
7.3.1.2 To what extent do the activities of African NGOs have a programmable 
link to the achievement of their objectives? (P) 
To achieve its stated objectives, CS4 carries out activities involving direct provision 
of water to communities, sanitation and hygiene promotion, and advocacy on these 
issues. While there is a fairly programmable link between the activities and the 
achievement of the objectives of giving access to safe water, the link to the other areas 
of the objectives is less programmable. The endogenous variable P is therefore 
medium as in CS3 already discussed in Section 7.2.  
Though CS5 claims that it carries out activities directly related to the achievement of 
its objectives, there are no measurable indicators developed to establish this link. 
None of the organization’s reports attempt to attribute identifiable achievements in the 
areas of its objectives to the success of  particular programmes it has implemented.  
This may be due in part to the inherent nature of advocacy work that forms a major 
part of its activities. Outcome of advocacy work take a long time to occur making it 
difficult to attribute them to particular activities. But it may also be due to the 
inadequate efforts made in breaking down the objectives into measurable units and in 
developing measurable indicators relating them to particular activities aimed at 
achieving those objectives. This is one of the main reasons for strategic planning in 
the UK NGOs studied but this is missing in CS5. The cause and effect relationship 
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between CS5’s activities and the achievement of its objective is therefore weak. 
Because of this, the endogenous variable P in CS5 may be considered to have low 
values.   
 
CS6’s activities revolve around caring for the children, providing them the basic 
needs and a stable and loving home to grow up in.  Food and supplies are either 
donated by individuals or bought in while medical care and education are procured 
from the open market. These activities seem to have a direct link to the achievement 
of the objectives but this link is in no way programmable. For example, providing a 
home and the basic necessities ensures that the children grow up in a safe 
environment. Also, the expenditure on good quality schooling translates to good 
quality education for the children but one cannot claim that this has a direct 
correlation to success in life. Neither can one establish by how much CS6’s 
achievement could be raised by for example, a 25% increase in spending. One may 
conclude that the variable P in CS6 has a low value.  
 
7.3.1.3 How much of economic rationality is involved in decision-making in 
African NGOs? (E) 
Concerning the role of economic rationality in decision making (E), all of the three 
African NGOs studied use all of their resources in achieving their charitable 
objectives. Attaining an improved economic position has not been seen to influence 
decision-making in the areas of programme design and implementations. The 
decisions made are not weighed in terms of economic impact. In CS6 for example, 
when one HIV positive child was taken ill, considerable resources were expended on 
medical care with adverse impact on the resources available for basic necessities in 
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the home. Though the child died, the management believed they made the right 
decisions and claimed ‘the life of every child is precious- we won’t spare any 
resources to save a child’s life’ (CS6/IV10/10). The endogenous variable E could 
therefore be taken to have low values in all the African NGOs. 
 
All these taken together suggest that the endogenous variables in the African NGOs 
have low values and there will be a sociological divide if accountability in the African 
NGOs is based only on the provision of traditional accounting information. The 
conclusion here is therefore consistent with those from the UK NGOs- that traditional 
accounting alone is insufficient for the NGO’s accountability needs.  But with the 
African NGOs not subject to any structured financial reporting framework or any 
reporting standards that address the specific accountability needs in NGOs, the 
sociological divide is not acknowledged or addressed. Table 7.2 below summarizes 













Table 7.2- The Sociological Divide in African NGOs 
 CS4 CS5 CS6 
Type of NGO Development & Welfare Advocacy Welfare  
Objectives Providing safe water and 
promoting hygiene & 
sanitation 
Prevention and 
resolution of conflict 
Providing orphans 
with a chance to 
succeed in life 
Indicators of the 
achievement of  the 
objectives  
Number of  users given 





No of children 
cared for  
How measurable are the 
Objectives (O)? 
Medium Low Low 
Activities Building water points, 
latrines and hygiene 
promotion 
Education , training 
and mediation 
Providing a home, 
medical  and 
education 
Link between activities 
and objectives achieved 
Medium Weak Medium 
How programmable are 
the activities (P)? 
Medium V. Low Low 
Economic rationality used 
in decisions (E)? 
Low V. Low Low 









7.3.2 A Theoretical Analysis of  Accountability Practices in African NGOs 
The main components of accountability in CS4, CS5 and CS6 have some overlaps 
with the forms of practices observed in the UK NGOs. While some of the practices 
such as statutory reporting and annual reporting/strategic review are weaker in the 
African NGOs, communal accountability appears to be practiced to a greater extent 
notably in CS6.  Altogether, the 8 accountability practices already identified were in 
use to different extents in the African NGOs as described in the following paragraphs. 
1. A weak system of statutory financial reporting: This is in the form of a simple 
Income and Expenditure account with no further adaptation to reflect the 
special nature of the NGOs’ objectives and activities. There are no statutory 
guidelines on how the reports should be prepared. Transactions and balances 
on the various funds of the NGOs are not clearly separated. The reports 
contain very little or no narrative element that explains the activities and the 
achievements of the NGOs. They give very little or no information on how the 
NGOs have performed in delivering their various services and achieving their 
objectives. This form of practice could be described as a simple form of type 
A process-based accountability. The usefulness of this report in promoting 
accountability is very limited because of the existence of the sociological 
divide already identified.  
2. Statutory narrative reporting: This is an extension of the statutory reports in 
the form of trustees’ reports that explains the activities of the NGOs and the 
achievement of its objectives. This is not used by any of the African NGOs as 
the regulatory framework does not require it. 
3. Financial reporting to donors: These are prepared in forms determined by the 
funders, mainly the Institutional donors, according to the individual grant 
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reporting requirements. Because these are prepared in line with the contractual 
requirements for the individual grants as set out by the donors, the practices 
here are similar to those in the UK NGOs as the funding sources are identical. 
But CS6 receives no contractual grant funding and does not practice this form 
of reporting.  
4. Narrative reports or Performance reports to funders: These highlight the 
achievements of programmes against objectives and are prepared along with 
the grant financial reports for funders in line with the grant contract 
conditions. These are used by CS4 and CS5 who receive restricted funding 
from Institutional donors and INGOs. The practices here are also similar to 
those in the UK NGOs. This form of accountability could be categorized as 
type B. But CS6 does not practice this form of accountability as it receives no 
grant funding. 
5. Annual reports and strategic planning review: The annual reports contain 
narrative accounts of the NGOs’ activities and achievement of its strategic 
objectives. It is in more detail than the statutory reports and it focuses more on 
the objectives and impact achieved in relation to them. This is used 
prominently only in CS4 that is an affiliate of CS3.  It is disseminated mostly 
to donors and is often used as a marketing or fundraising material.  
Notwithstanding the fact that beneficiaries are consulted in the process of its 
preparation, this cannot be claimed to be a full form of communal 
accountability of type C but rather another form of type B aimed at the needs 
of contractual stakeholders. CS5 claims to carry out strategic planning and 
review but there is no evidence of any structured process of reviewing and 
reporting on the implementation of the strategic plans. CS6 has a strategy that 
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is integral to its work. It publishes a report on its activities and strategy but this 
is not a formal process that happens in predetermined cycles as in CS4 and the 
UK NGOs. The reports are prepared at irregular intervals based on needs and 
the full essence of the process is not captured in a single document. 
6. Programme evaluation and impact studies- In CS5, these are carried out at the 
request of the restricted grant donor for programmes funded by their grants. It, 
therefore, focuses only on the area of CS5’s involvement in the individual 
programmes and not the entire organization’s activities. In CS4, evaluation is 
carried out as an internal process by its parent NGO, CS3 as part of its global 
evaluation of its country programmes. Notwithstanding that evaluators seek 
the views of beneficiaries on project outcomes, all these forms of evaluation 
could be categorized as more of type B than C. 
7. Participation of non-contractual stakeholders: This is used as a form of 
accountability to this stakeholder group which includes mainly the 
beneficiaries and the community. This form of accountability is discretionary 
and can take different forms. The practices observed involve the participation 
of the non-contractual stakeholders in the area of needs assessment, location 
and management of program facilities. CS3 and CS4 involve their 
beneficiaries in decisions relating to the location and maintenance of the water 
facilities which they provide to them and incorporate information relating to 
this participation in their Annual Reports. This level of participation is 
considered sufficient to qualify as a form of accountability under this category. 
But CS6 goes further in demonstrating accountability of this form by 
involving its beneficiaries and the community in its work and incorporating 
their views and needs in its strategy and activities. Its engagement with this 
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stakeholder group is continuous and integral to its strategy and processes. To 
support the process, the donors (mainly individuals and groups from the 
community) are encouraged to meet the beneficiaries (the children) and 
discuss their needs. This direct communication between the donors, the NGO 
and the beneficiaries to discuss the needs is a unique feature of the communal 
form of accountability practice in CS6. It is the absence of this direct contact 
between the beneficiaries and the donors in the contractual form of 
accountability that ‘needs assessment’ and ‘programme evaluation’ which are 
part of the contractual form of accountability seek to address. 
8. Financial accountability to the non-contractual stakeholders: This form of 
accountability as practiced in CS3 involves providing information to the non-
contractual stakeholders on the unit cost of the NGOs’ services and relating 
this to its use of resources. CS6 goes further than this to involve the 
participation of the non-contractual stakeholders in decisions relating to the 
allocation and utilisation of resources of the NGO. Only CS6 practices this 
form of accountability. CS6 prepares its budget based on its needs and present 
it to donors not as a monetary budget but a basket of needs. The donors then 
decide on which needs they consider most important and they go on to meet 
those needs either directly by providing the resources (e.g of food, clothing, a 
school bus or direct sponsorship of a child’s education) or by providing the 
finance. In this way, the non-contractual stakeholders are involved in resource 
allocation thereby influencing the NGO’s strategy and how it is implemented. 
All donations received in cash or in kind are recorded and a major part of the 
use of accounting information here is in resource allocation. The management 
of the NGO makes the decision but the beneficiaries input into the decision by 
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communicating their needs which are then reflected in the operational 
decisions. 
 The practices observed in the African NGOs vary significantly and are therefore 
shown separately for each of CS4, CS5 and CS6 in Figures 7.3 to 7.5 below.  
 
Figure 7.3- Accountability practices in CS4 
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 348 
Figure 7.4- Accountability practices in CS5 
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Figure 7.5- Accountability practices in CS6 
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7.3.3 Analysis of the Stakeholders’ Information needs in African NGOs 
There are several stakeholders involved in the African NGOs.  As with UK NGOs, 
these stakeholders could be categorized as contractual and non contractual. The 
composition of these stakeholder groups is similar to those for UK NGOs.  But in 
addition, African NGOs have another important group of stakeholders- the foreign or 
International NGOs (INGOs). These are NGOs based in the developed world but 
whose beneficiaries are mostly in Africa or other less developed parts of the world. 
These INGOs need local knowledge, skills and presence to deliver services to their 
beneficiaries. They therefore work through the local NGOs by giving them 
contractual grants to deliver on specific services, an arrangement often referred to as 
‘partnerships’. Or in some cases, these INGOs have actually been involved in 
establishing the local NGOs purposely to help implement their programmes locally. In 
both arrangements, the INGOs have the contractual rights to demand accountability 
from the local NGOs and could be described as contractual stakeholders in them. In 
reality the INGOs serve as intermediaries through which the Institutional donors as 
well as individual donors based in the developed world channel financial aid to 
beneficiaries and local NGOs based in the developing countries. 
 
In CS4 the parent NGO, CS3 falls into this group of stakeholders (INGO). CS3 
supplies 80% of CS4’s funding and plays a major role in its management and the 
development of its strategy. In the same manner, CS1 provides funding to CS5 under 
a different form of arrangement it calls ‘partnership’. CS1 lists CS5 as one of the over 
150 ‘partners’ it works with globally. The relationship here is more flexible. It 
involves CS1 cooperating with CS5 to carry out specific activities relating to their 
areas of common objectives. CS1 has no permanent contractual ties with CS5 but only 
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contracts for the delivery of those specific activities for which it provides the fund. In 
this way CS1 also serves as an intermediary since it received those funds from 
Institutional donors, Foundations and individuals all based in the developed world. 
The interest of the INGOs as stakeholders is in ensuring that the ‘partners’ or 
‘affiliates’ carry out the activities that help further their objectives and strategies. 
Because of this, INGOs play a major role in shaping accountability practices in the 
African NGOs. For example, the practices observed in CS4 are a reflection of the 
practices in CS3. 
  
The second groups of contractual stakeholders in African NGOs are the Institutional 
donors who sometimes bypass the INGOs to provide funding directly to local NGOs. 
Some of these Institutional donors have established offices or embassies in the 
developing world through which local NGOs sometimes make direct funding 
applications to them. In CS4 the Institutional donors provide about 20% of the 
funding directly as contractual grants. Some African NGOs rely almost wholly on the 
funding from these two stakeholder groups. Together, the Institutional donors and 
INGOs provide 100% of CS4’s funding and 95% of CS5’s. The exception is CS6 that 
receives no funding from these two stakeholder groups. CS6 relies wholly on the non-
contractual stakeholders for its funding. The needs of the Institutional donors remain 
the same as discussed under UK NGOs. They are mostly interested in financial 
information to demonstrate the appropriate use of funds for the purposes specified in 
the contract and performance reports to ensure that the intended programme 
objectives are met. 
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The third major group of contractual stakeholders is the government and the 
regulatory authorities. But the complex role of this stakeholder in African NGOs 
means that the government may be categorized in both the contractual and the non-
contractual stakeholder groups. This is exemplified in CS4 that works with 
government agencies and the Uganda Water and Sanitation ministry in providing the 
technical support for delivering water and sanitation services to communities. As CS4 
assists the government to meet its obligation in this area, the government may be 
viewed as a beneficiary of its activities. The position of the government as a 
stakeholder in CS6 is similar to that in CS4. The government has the primary 
responsibility to care for orphans and abandoned children through its Ministry for 
Youths and Social Development. But it is unable to meet its obligation to a large 
section of this group. It therefore actively encourages the NGOs that attempt to do so. 
The role of the government in CS5 is not significantly different from that in CS4 and 
CS6. Though CS5 renders no services that are of direct financial benefit to the 
government, its work on prevention and resolution of conflict is of indirect benefit to 
the government as it promotes peaceful co-existence in communities. The government 
supports its work. Government officials and departments participate in CS5’s peace-
building workshops, seminars and other initiatives. One may conclude that to the 
extent that NGOs’ activities do not conflict with the interest of the government, the 
government supports their work and benefits from it. But the government also holds 
the power to regulate NGOs. This regulatory power is used in a way different from 
that of the UK regulators. The regulators have placed more emphasis on the power to 
register and deregister NGOs rather than on enforcing accountability. This emphasis 
is aimed at ensuring that NGOs’ activities benefit the government and do not conflict 
with its interest. The government’s role as a regulator or contractual stakeholder in the 
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African NGOs is therefore a weak one as the power to regulate the NGOs is not 
exercised. This is evident in the system of statutory regulation and compliance that are 
yet undeveloped.  The information needs of the regulators as contractual stakeholders 
is therefore very little leaving the accountability practices in the African NGOs to be 
determined mostly by the needs of the other contractual stakeholders, the Institutional 
donors and INGOs. 
 
However, CS6 is in a different situation. The organization has not accessed any 
funding from Institutional donors or INGOs. The effect of this is that there are no 
influential contractual stakeholders in CS6 and therefore no contractual accountability 
demands on the organization. This leaves CS6 free to develop practices that suits its 
needs and those of its stakeholders who are mainly non-contractual stakeholders. 
 
The next stakeholder group in the African NGOs are the non-contractual stakeholders. 
Generally there are two main stakeholders in this group. The first are the 
beneficiaries. This group has little influence on the NGOs’ activities. CS4 claims that 
their needs are central to the design of its programmes. As in CS3, these needs are 
ascertained by CS4 through research and through consultation. The consultations 
centre on deciding the location of the facilities to be provided and the arrangement for 
their maintenance.  But the beneficiaries do not influence the actual design of the 
facilities or the decision as to whether the project should be embarked on in the first 
place. Their influence is therefore weak. In the case of CS5, the beneficiaries are the 
communities that have potential or actual experience of conflict. CS5 also claims that 
the beneficiaries input into the design of its programmes. The consultation with 
beneficiaries occurs by way of research and feedback from CS5’s collaborative work 
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with the community and not by way of a structured system of involvement of the 
beneficiaries in programme design. The situation is, however, different in CS6 where 
the beneficiaries are a more important stakeholder group. They are the vulnerable 
children abandoned by their parents and whose survival and future depends on the 
organization. They do not make decisions but they have an open, though informal 
channel of communication with the decision makers and the funders. Their needs 
seem to take priority in the organization’s strategy and activities.  
 
The second group of non-contractual stakeholders in African NGOs is the community 
and individual supporters or donors. CS4 receives no income from this group as all of 
its income is provided by contractual stakeholders. In CS5 only about 5% of its 
income is generated as unrestricted income but this is mainly from consultancy work 
and bank interest and CS5 receives no income from individual donors. The non-
contractual stakeholders are, therefore, of less importance in CS4 and CS5. But CS6 
again is in a different position. The community is a major supporter of its work. This 
group consists of individuals, voluntary associations, clubs and commercial 
organizations.CS6 relies on the goodwill of this stakeholder group for all of its 
funding which are given as unrestricted donation of cash or supplies. Unlike in CS4 
and CS5, this stakeholder group could be considered as influential in CS6. But 
considering the context in which the organization operates, the general level of 
poverty in Nigeria, means that this source of funding is low and accounts for the low 
level of funding available to the organization.  
 
The information needs of the non-contractual stakeholders are different from those of 
the contractual stakeholders. Because they do not have any body to report or account 
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to, the non-contractual stakeholders are less interested in financial reports. They are 
more interested in ensuring that the NGOs’ activities achieve the desired impact. They 
also want to be involved in determining the needs of the beneficiary and participating 
in the NGOs’ activities aimed at addressing those need.  
 
In conclusion, the relative influences of the contractual and non-contractual 
stakeholders vary and relate mainly to the level of funding they provide to the NGOs.  
One may conclude that while the main influential stakeholders in CS4 and CS5 are 
the Institutional donors and the INGOs, in CS6 the community is the most influential 
stakeholder. The implications of this is that the main form of accountability practices 
observed in CS4 and CS5 are the contractual forms while there is a distinctive 
absence of these forms of practice in CS6. The practices observed in CS6 are mainly 
communal type involving methods required to meet the needs of the non-contractual 
stakeholders. The next section presents a structuration theory analysis of 
accountability in NGOs. 
 
7.4 A Structuration Theory Analysis of Accountability in NGOs 
Because of the nature of the endogenous variables in NGOs, there is a sociological 
divide that means accounting information alone does not meet the organizations’ 
accountability needs. This necessitates the use of additional means of accountability 
aimed at addressing the information needs of the stakeholders that traditional 
accounting information does not. The involvement of multiple stakeholders with 
different information needs implies that there are variations in the practices that could 
emerge in attempt to satisfy these needs. The type of accountability practices that 
actually emerge is dependent on the social context in which the NGOs operate. The 
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dynamics of this social context marked by the interaction between the stakeholders 
involved and their relative influence is analyzed using structuration theory. This 
theory suggests that the interaction is shaped by the structure of signification, 
legitimation and domination operating within that social context. A Structuration 
theory analysis of the social context in which UK NGOs operate was presented in 
Chapter 5 based on analysis of the data from CS1.  This section summarizes the main 
conclusions from that analysis while the next section extends the analysis to include 
findings from the additional two UK NGOs, CS2 and CS3. Sub-section 7.4.2 then 
extends the analysis to African NGOs in order to obtain a fuller description of the 
social context in which NGOs operate generally. 
 
The main conclusions from Section 5.6 are that the signification structure in CS1 sees 
the achievement of programme objectives defined by certain stakeholders as more 
important than economic efficiency. It also sees financial reporting as important but 
only in ensuring that the programme objectives are delivered. The system of 
accountability therefore goes beyond the provision of financial information to include 
several other approaches that focus on the implementation of the activities and the 
achievement of objectives defined largely by funders and to some extent by the 
regulators. There is limited involvement of the beneficiaries in this process. But while 
the system of accountability for the implementation of the activities and the 
achievement of objectives are fairly developed, methods of involving beneficiaries are 
only talked about conceptually but not implemented in practice. The domination and 
legitimation structures more directly reflect the unequal influence of stakeholders in 
shaping the practices that emerge. The most influential stakeholders in CS1 are the 
Institutional donors and the regulatory authorities through the Charity Commission. 
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The influence of the Institutional donors derives from the control of the source of 
CS1’s financial resources. The regulatory authorities’ influence derives from the use 
of its ‘authoritative resource’ in regulating charities and in dictating the form of 
accountability practiced. But the beneficiaries and the community do not play an 
active role in the domination and legitimation structures. Consultation with 
beneficiaries is dependent on availability of funds and the whole process is 
compromised when there are limited funds available. Methods of accountability to 
this group of stakeholders are therefore not widely practiced in CS1. As a result, the 
dominant form of accountability practiced in CS1 is types A and B aimed at the needs 
of the Institutional donors and the regulators. 
 
7.4.1 A structuration theory analysis of accountability in CS2 and CS3 
A structuration theory analysis of CS2 produces similar results to that obtained for 
CS1. The signification structure is similar to those in CS1 as the need to demonstrate 
delivery of services and achievement of objectives is seen to be as important as 
financial accountability. Performance based methods of accountability (type B) are 
therefore as prominently used as the process based methods (type A). The funding 
structure in CS2 is similar to that in CS1 as 85% of its funding comes from 
contractual funders who are mainly government bodies. The legitimation and 
domination structure in CS2 is influenced mainly by the donors and the regulatory 
authorities. As in CS1, CS2 expends considerable efforts mainly on preparing reports 
to the donors and in statutory reporting. But there are two contextual differences 
between CS1 and CS2. The first is in engaging with beneficiaries. Both consider this 
as important but CS2 goes a little further than CS1 by organizing its beneficiaries into 
a user group and opening a channel for them to bring up their views. But their 
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expressed views are subjugated to the constraint of finance and the desires of the 
contractual donors. One may conclude that CS2’s beneficiaries are closer to the 
organization and receive more information about its activities than CS1’s. But their 
influence in shaping the organization’s activities or practices is no greater than in 
CS1. The second contextual difference is that while CS1 operates internationally, CS2 
operates only in the UK. Practices in CS1 could potentially influence or be influenced 
by practices in the overseas NGOs or partners that it works with. But CS2 is insulated 
from this type of influence and its practices are determined only by the contextual 
variables operating in the UK.  These two contextual differences do not significantly 
change the accountability pattern from that observed in CS1. Accountability practices 
in CS2 are mainly types A and B consisting of financial and narrative reporting to the 
funders and the regulators. One may conclude that the analysis of CS2 produced 
results that are consistent with findings from CS1. 
 
CS3 operates within the same context as CS1 and CS2 and the signification structure 
is broadly the same. But the legitimation and domination structure is different because 
of the difference in the funding structure. The bulk of CS3’s funding (64%) comes as 
unrestricted donations from individual givers. The Institutional donors that provide 
about 36% of its funding are therefore not as influential as in CS1 and CS2. Though 
they still have a significant influence on CS3’s accountability practices, their reduced 
influence has meant that CS3 is able to venture into more areas of accountability 
beyond those required by the Institutional donors. These other methods, involves 
mainly the inclusion of some practices that lean towards types C and D accountability. 
For example, through its Annual Reports, CS3 attempts to demonstrate the 
participation of the beneficiaries and the community in its programming decisions. In 
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its Annual Reports, it provides information on the various initiatives to involve the 
community in the delivery of its programmes. For example, in the 2008/09 annual 
report, it lists as some of its initiative to involve beneficiaries: a ‘Pump Parts Banking’ 
that enabled remote communities in Ghana to fix their water facilities promptly as 
they can now purchase pump parts and store them for use locally (CS3/AR/09:12). It 
also reports on its Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) across its West Africa 
programmes that ‘focus on motivating communities to construct low-cost toilets and 
adopt hygienic defecation practices’ (CS3/AR/09:13).  CS3 supports the communities 
and award them the ‘open defecation-free status’ when targets are achieved. These are 
examples of how CS3 attempts to demonstrate the involvement of the non-contractual 
stakeholders in its activities. 
 
CS3 also attempts to incorporate some financial accountability to the non-contractual 
stakeholders, particularly the individual donors and supporters, in its Annual reports. 
It lists examples of the cost of its services. For example, under ‘What your money 
buys’ it lists: 
 ‘£5 could pay for a bag of cement to build a latrine slab in Ghana; £15 can 
 enable one person to access safe water, improved hygiene and sanitation; £50 
 is enough for 2 days of hygiene education training in a village in Tanzanian; 
 £100 could pay a Mason to build a hand-dug well in Nigeria; £385 could pay 
 for a school sanitation block for 150 boys and girls in India’ (CS3/LT/10) 
 
This information is given voluntarily though CS3 has no contractual obligation to do 
so. This type of accountability that ventures into type D is practiced because of the 
increased importance of the individual non-contractual donors in CS3. But it does not 
go far enough to allow the user to verify the information against the total resources 
utilized and the output achieved. 
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Although CS1 and CS2 also produce Annual Reports, the information contents are 
mostly focused around the needs of the funders. CS2 goes someway in establishing a 
user forum but does not implement the feedbacks that don’t fit into the donors’ 
objectives neither does it provide as much information to help the users and 
supporters evaluate its work and achievements..  
 
 The conclusion from this observation is that where the proportion of the funding from 
contractual stakeholders is reduced, their influence on the legitimation and 
domination structure is also reduced and NGOs are more able to develop their own 
means of accountability if they so choose. Accountability practices in CS3 is therefore 
observed to involve types A and B to the funders and the regulators, some elements of 
type C practices demonstrating involvement of the community and the beneficiaries 
and some attempt towards type D practices involving some financial accountability to 
the community and the beneficiaries. The next sub-section extends the structuration 
theory analysis to include the findings from the African NGOs 
 
 7.4.2 A Structuration Theory Analysis of Accountability in African NGOs  
The social context in which African NGOs operate is similar to those of the UK 
NGOs in some respect but markedly different in others. The contextual differences 
are most pronounced in three major areas. The first has to do with the level of 
individual giving to NGOs. This is much lower than in the UK because of the low 
level of per-capita income in Africa. The second difference is the dual role of the 
government as a beneficiary and regulator of NGOs’ activities. Related to this is the 
ineffective use of the government’s ‘authoritative resources’ in regulating NGOs. The 
third is the involvement of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) 
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as a major stakeholder in African NGOs. These contextual differences have some 
impact on the structure of signification but more pronouncedly in the legitimation and 
domination structures. 
 
7.4.2.1 The Signification structure in African NGOs 
The signification structures reflect those values that are of fundamental importance 
within the context of the African NGOs. This is related to the objectives of the 
organizations and the collective interpretation of the stakeholders involved on what 
counts as important. In African NGOs, the major stakeholders are, just as with the UK 
NGOs, the Institutional donors, the government, the community and the beneficiaries. 
But in addition, African NGOs have another group of stakeholders- the INGOs. CS1 
and CS3 fall into this category of stakeholders related to CS5 and CS4 respectively. 
The INGOs provide the African NGOs with funding for specific projects. Because the 
INGOs themselves receive funding mostly from Institutional donors, their 
accountability needs are similar to those of the Institutional donors who they have to 
report to.  The objectives of the African NGOs remain the same as in UK NGOs- 
responding to the needs of beneficiaries. But this objective is mediated by the 
stakeholders involved through the interpretive schemes which may vary slightly. 
While the Institutional donors and INGO interpret this to mean achieving the greatest 
impact possible with the available resources, the beneficiaries and the community see 
it in terms of achieving the greatest impact by directing resources to where it is mostly 
needed. Meeting needs is therefore core to the shared meaning but while the 
Institutional donors see the available resources as the constraint, the beneficiaries and 
the community see how the resources are deployed as the constraint.  But because of 
the active involvement of the Institutional donors who influence the NGOs’ objectives 
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through the grant approval process (see section 5.5.2.1) the signification structure in 
CS4 and CS5 is not significantly different from that in the UK NGOs. It therefore 
places importance on the use of resources in addition to responding to the needs of 
beneficiaries. The slight difference in the signification structure in African NGOs 
could be attributed to the influence (or lack of influence) of the second group of 
contractual stakeholders, the government as the regulators. Unlike in the UK, African 
governments are not keenly interested in probity in the use of NGOs’ resources. This 
is because the government rather than supplying funding to the NGOs look to them 
for support in meeting needs in areas where they are failing. The role of ensuring 
probity in the use of funds, performed by the UK regulatory authorities, is therefore 
missing in the African NGOs’ context. The influence of the African government on 
the signification structure is towards service delivery and ensuring that resources are 
deployed where it is mostly needed in meeting the needs of the beneficiaries rather 
than towards probity in the use of resources. Concerning the other non-contractual 
stakeholders, probity in the use of resources demonstrated through formal financial 
reporting seems to be of less importance to them as they supply little or no funding to 
the NGOs. But ensuring the involvement or participation of the wider stakeholders in 
the delivery of NGOs’ services to ensure that resources are deployed to where they 
are mostly needed are more important values to them. One may conclude that meeting 
the needs of the beneficiaries is a common value to all the stakeholders and central to 
the signification structure. But probity in the use of resources seems to be of varying 
level of importance to the different stakeholders. The INGOs and the Institutional 
donors hold this to be more important than the beneficiaries and the community who 
hold their involvement to be more important. The government appears to be aligned 
towards the beneficiaries. 
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But the signification structure in CS6 is different from those in CS4 and CS5 as it is 
not influenced by the Institutional donors and INGOs who are not involved in this 
NGO. The overriding importance of the humanitarian imperative remains central to 
CS6’s objectives and strategy and the overriding objective therefore remains focused 
around the needs of beneficiaries. This signification structure is internalized and not 
sustained by the Institutional donors and INGO who, unlike in CS4 and CS5, play no 
part in determining the objectives of programmes delivered by the NGO. 
 
 The legitimation and domination structures have played a major role in determining 
the focus of accountability practices in African NGO. This structure takes different 
forms in CS4 and CS5 on one hand and CS6 on the other. While the legitimation and 
domination structure in UK NGOs is influenced by the contractual stakeholders 
mainly the funders and the regulators, in the African NGOs the regulators do not 
exercise their ‘authoritative’ powers. The INGOs and the Institutional donors, through 
their funding relationship with the African NGOs have therefore played the dominant 
role in the legitimation and domination structures particularly in CS4 and CS5. The 
next sub-section examines this influence in more detail. 
 
7.4.2.2 The influence of the funding relationships on the legitimation and 
domination structures in African NGOs.  
The nature of funding of the African NGOs can only be understood when examined 
within the context of their relationship with the INGOs and the Institutional donors. 
All three UK NGOs studied carry out activities aimed at direct service delivery to 
their beneficiaries. While CS2 operates only in the UK where all of its beneficiaries 
are located, CS1 and CS3 have most of their beneficiaries based overseas. While CS2 
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is able to deliver its services directly to its beneficiaries who are located within its 
community, CS1 and CS3’s are constrained to deliver their services in one or both of 
two ways. The first is by working through their affiliates or partners, mainly local 
NGOs in Africa or other developing parts of the world providing them with grants to 
carry out activities aimed at delivering services to their beneficiaries. The second way 
is by delivering these services directly to their beneficiaries. This way is less cost-
effective and poses logistical challenges and security risks. Where the security risks 
are above some thresholds set by the INGOs, this second way is abandoned in favour 
of the first which is the more prominent way adopted by CS1 and CS3. 
 
 CS1 and CS3 receive their income mainly as contractual grants from Institutional 
donors or as unrestricted donations from individuals. Parts of these funds are given as 
grants to their affiliates or partners. But these partners or affiliates in addition to 
funding received from the INGOs also receive funding directly from the Institutional 
donors that fund those INGOs. This funding relationship, illustrated in Figure 7.6 has 

















           
           
           







The funding to the INGOs from the Institutional donors comes with contractual grant 
conditions that impact on the practice of accountability in the NGOs that receive 
them. CS1 and CS3 use only part of the funds for direct service delivery to the 
beneficiaries of their work while a significant portion is given as grants to local NGOs 
to deliver services to the target beneficiaries. CS1 spends about 25% of its income in 
this way- as grants to the local NGOs to carry out specific programmes- while CS3 
spends about 50% of its income in this way. The grant conditions given to the INGOs 
by the Institutional donors are in turn transmitted to these NGOs as sub-contract 
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 But CS6 is in a different position. It receives no funding from Institutional donors or 
INGOs. CS6 relies mainly on the support of the community who are interested in its 
work.  Its objectives, activities and strategy are therefore free of the influence of the 
Institutional donors and this impact not only on the signification structure, but also on 
the legitimation and domination structures in the NGO. The absence of the 
Institutional donors and INGOs in the legitimation and domination structure has the 
effect that the structure allows for more opportunities for the non-contractual 
stakeholders to influence the practices. The influences on the structure are the direct 
influence by the community that provides the funding and support that sustains its 
work and the indirect influence by the beneficiaries whose needs are central to the 
NGO’s objective. The needs of these stakeholders mainly involve the opportunity to 
participate in the programmes and the activities of the NGO. How this need is 
addressed by the accountability practices is analyzed in Section 7.4.3  
 
7.4.2.3 The influence of the statutory authorities on the legitimation and 
domination structures in African NGOs. 
The second component of the legitimation and domination structure in NGOs is the 
regulatory framework established by the statutory authorities. This second component 
affects the general context of the overall accountability practices. Unlike in the UK 
where the regulatory authorities have developed a specific standard of reporting for 
NGOs, African NGOs operate under a different context marked by the absence of 
such regulation or standard. In Uganda and Nigeria the regulators (or governments) 
do not make any challenging accountability demands from NGOs. The NGOs are 
required to operate under the general reporting framework prescribed by the local 
company laws. The reporting requirements for NGOs under this framework are a 
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simple Income and Expenditure accounts with no mandatory narrative reports. No 
NGO-specific reporting standard has been issued to guide its preparation. Though 
there is a statutory body responsible for the supervision of NGOs in Uganda (the 
NGO Board), its role has been mainly to ensure that NGOs are properly registered 
and their activities are legitimate and not contrary to the government’s interests. 
Monitoring of compliance with the requirement to file annual returns is not done and 
the returns filed with the Board are not scrutinized. The Board is not adequately 
resourced and lacks the capacity to regulate accountability practices in the NGOs. As 
a result of the weakness of the statutory reporting framework in Uganda, the only part 
of the contractual accountability that is prominently practiced in CS4 and CS5 is the 
one driven by the needs of the Institutional donors and by the INGOs.  
 
In the case of CS6 that operates in Nigeria, there is a complete absence of any form of 
regulation of its practices. The regulators do not make any statutory accountability 
demands on the NGO and do not exert their influence on the legitimation and 
domination structure. Unlike in Uganda, in Nigeria, there is no statutory body charged 
with the specific task of regulating NGOs and no NGO-specific reporting standard is 
in use. Statutory reporting requirements are therefore weak and there is no monitoring 
of compliance. As a result of this, the regulators do not play any part in the 
legitimation and domination structure in CS6. Because the Institutional donors or 
INGO also do not play any part in this, the legitimation and domination structure in 
CS6 is largely determined by its supporters and donors drawn from the community. 
This reflects in the accountability practices as no form of type A or B accountability is 
being practiced by CS6.  
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7.4.3 The influence of the signification, legitimation and domination structures 
on accountability practices in African NGOs.  
The signification, legitimation and domination structures in African NGOs have a 
major impact on the accountability practices observed. Two out of the three African 
NGOs studied rely on the Institutional donors and INGOs for their funding. This 
results in the significant influence of these stakeholders on the entire structures of 
signification, legitimation and domination in the two NGOs. The accountability 
practices in these NGOs therefore tilt towards the needs of these stakeholders. 
Because in addition to the need to demonstrate performance, these stakeholders hold 
demonstration of probity in the use of resources important, financial reporting of the 
process type A has remained a prominent part of the NGO’s accountability practices. 
This is in addition to practices aimed at demonstration of services delivery (type B) 
that all the other stakeholders also consider as being very important.  CS4 and CS5 
both receive funding from the INGOs as well as directly from the Institutional donors 
who fund the INGOs. The reporting requirements for these two sources of funding are 
consistent as most of the funding is ultimately from the Institutional donors. The 
financial part involves mainly Income and Expenditure reports against the approved 
programme budget and the justification of any variance. Each report focuses on the 
particular grant and transactions relating to individual grants are reported separately to 
the donors. The overall NGO’s financial report covering all of the NGO’s activities 
are then prepared under the statutory framework in the country. But because of the 
weak nature of statutory reporting, the reports are very weak in relevant information 
content. Because the overall framework for aggregating and disaggregating the 
financial data is unreliable, one cannot be sure that the individual grants transactions 
are truly kept separate and not double-counted. The Institutional donors and INGOs 
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(CS1 and CS3) do not compel the African NGOs they fund (CS4 and CS5) to prepare 
their statutory reports in line with the UK standard. They appear to be satisfied to 
have the reports prepared to their specific requirements rather than in line with the UK 
statutory framework. As a result, type A and B accountability is the prominent form in 
CS4 and CS5 that relies almost exclusively on Institutional donors and INGOs for 
their funding.  But this type A and B accountability is exclusively defined by the 
needs of the Institutional donors as understood and defined by INGOs.  
 
In addition to types A and B practices, CS4, because of its link to CS3, also practices 
some elements of communal form of accountability. CS4 is involved in carrying out 
CS3’s programmes and is at the forefront of its engagement with the beneficiaries and 
the community. CS4 is integrated into CS3’s system of annual reporting and its 
method of reporting on this engagement is the same as for CS3. Though practices in 
this area do not go far enough to be considered as communal accountability (types C 
and D), one may conclude that there is some attempt at this form of practice in CS4. 
 
Because it does not receive funding from any contractual stakeholder, CS6 is free of 
any imposed contractual accountability requirements. Its legitimation and domination 
structures are not influenced by these stakeholders. It is also not influenced by the 
regulators who do not exercise the power to regulate NGOs. The non involvement of 
these two stakeholders reflects in the absence of type A and B practices in the NGO. 
CS6 is therefore able to respond to the accountability needs of the non-contractual 
stakeholders. These stakeholders place greater importance on the NGO’s effectiveness 
in achieving objectives and their participation in its activities. They place little 
importance on financial reports or narrative reports in any format. The legitimation 
 369 
and domination structure therefore reflects the importance of sustained engagement 
and participation of the beneficiaries and the community. The focus of CS6’s 
accountability practices reflects these needs. CS6 has developed its own communal 
forms of accountability involving mainly types C and to some extent D, both rendered 
through engagement and participation rather than through formal written reports.  The 
way it is practiced involves openness, accessibility and sharing of information with 
the beneficiaries and the community and responsiveness to their feedback in its 
activities and strategy. These practices can be categorized as types C and D but the 
line of distinction between the two is blurred. Some of the practices serve the 
purposes of financial accountability to the non-contractual stakeholders (type D) but 
these practices are not clearly separable from the type C practices as it is in the form 
of involving the stakeholders in its financial planning, budgeting and resource 
allocation. CS6 communicates its main strategy and plans to all stakeholders formally 
through its publication and informally through continuous engagement particularly 
during visits and events at the orphanage. Included in the plans are the financial 
resources needed to achieve them (or a form of budget). The financial plans or 
budgets are not closed or signed off annually but kept open for discussion and input 
by the all the stakeholders including the beneficiaries and the community. Donations 
by the community though unrestricted in form are aimed at specific needs identified 
in the budget. In this way, the stakeholders are indirectly involved in the approval of 
the budget and in resource allocation, a main component of financial accountability in 
CS6. The process is open and the community is engaged in it and given the 
opportunity for active participation in whatever areas they want to be involved. Some 
of the supporters input into its programme and activities by suggesting new ideas and 
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initiatives while some have adopted or sponsored particular children from the 
orphanage. 
 
Figure 7.7 brings together the findings to depict the general structure of accountability 
in all of the six NGOs studied.  The structure of accountability practices in CS2 and 
CS6 are different because they each operate within only one country but findings 
from them have been included for completeness. The practice of accountability to 
beneficiaries and the community occurs in only three of the six NGOs. The practices 
are weak or not well developed and have therefore been shown in dotted lines for CS3 
and CS4 but sufficiently established in CS6 where they are shown as full forms of 
accountability.  
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7.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The main findings from the analysis of all the 6 case studies could be summarised in 
the following: 
1. Because of the nature of NGO’s objectives and activities, there is a 
sociological divide that means traditional accounting alone is insufficient for 
NGOs’ accountability. Based on the findings from all the NGOs studied one 
may conclude that this limitation is recognised as accountability in NGOs 
generally goes beyond the process based methods focusing on accountability 
for the use of resources using traditional accounting methods and extends to 
performance based methods measuring the achievement of objectives.  
2. Many stakeholders are involved in NGOs. Their obligations to some of them 
are contractual while to the others non-contractual. Each stakeholder has 
different objectives, values and information needs. To avoid an information 
divide whereby the needs of some stakeholders are not met, NGOs use 
multiple system of accountability. Eight practices, grouped into the four 
generic types A, B, C and D identified in the theoretical model, were found to 
be in use each suited to the needs of particular stakeholders. 
 
3. Because of their influence on the legitimation and domination structures, 
NGOs’ choice of accountability practices has tended towards the needs of the 
contractual stakeholders mainly the regulators and the Institutional donors.  
But where the influence of these stakeholders is reduced, NGOs have been 
free to develop their own means of accountability which have tended towards 
the communal forms. 
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4. The needs of the regulators and the Institutional donors are not exactly the 
same.  In the UK where both of these stakeholders exert their influence on 
NGOs’ choice of accountability practices, two systems of types A and B 
accountability operate in parallel: one to the Institutional donors in forms 
suited to their varied needs, the other to the statutory authorities under a well 
structured and standardized regulatory regime.  But the regulators’ influence is 
confined to national boundaries. While it is strong in the UK it is weak in 
Africa.  
5. In the African NGOs, the contractual stakeholders mainly the Institutional 
donors and INGOs play a prominent role in shaping the accountability 
practices because of the total reliance of the NGOs on them for funding. The 
choice of accountability practices is mainly the A and B types but due to the 
absence of a proper regulatory framework for statutory reporting, these are 
limited to that component required to satisfy the information needs of the 
Institutional donors and INGOs. But the only African NGO studied that does 
not rely on Institutional donors and INGOs for funding has been free to 
develop its own form of accountability practices which is mainly the 
communal form types C and D. 
 
6. The Institutional donors’ influence cut across national boundaries. Due to the 
north-south interdependence of NGOs’ activities in the areas of funding and 
service delivery, most African NGOs depend on INGOs and Institutional 
donors for funding. The donors have used their control of funding to influence 
the choice of NGOs’ accountability towards those that meet their needs.  But 
they have not influenced African NGOs operating where there are weak 
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statutory reporting frameworks to comply with UK statutory rules. It appears 
that the Institutional donors do not consider the UK statutory reports relevant 
to their needs. 
 
 In conclusion, the weak structure of statutory reporting in the African NGOs has 
implications for accountability in the UK NGOs because of the interdependent nature 
of the funding, service delivery and accountability. A large part of the funding raised 
by UK NGOs goes towards delivery of services to beneficiaries through NGOs in 
Africa who receive funding from different INGOs and Institutional donors as 
contractual grants. But the contractual accountability demands focus on each funder’s 
particular information needs. The same data is used to report to the different funders 
but under a weak overall system of aggregation of the data and reporting. This means 
that no one stakeholder takes a proper look at the overall accountability picture.  
Under this scenario, the system cannot detect if grants from different donors are 
accounted for using the same underlying transactions data leading to double-counting.  
Accountability reports prepared by UK NGOs under a fairly well structured system 
incorporate substantial information prepared by the African NGOs under the weak or 
unregulated reporting framework. There is high possibility that accountability reports 
from UK NGOs may have been compromised through the input of unreliable source 









 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction, Research Objective and Research Approach. 
This chapter reviews the initial research question and examines how far the key 
findings answer this question. It begins by summarising the key issues from the 
critical review of the literature on accountability, the research questions this raises and 
the research approach adopted. Section 8.2 summarises the various theories on 
accountability used in previous research, highlighting their merits and limitations. It 
then discusses a middle range theory of alternative forms of accountability developed 
for use in the investigation. Section 8.3 discusses the empirical insights gained from 
the research and examines their significance. This begins with a discussion of the 
nature of the endogenous variables in NGOs and how this suggests that traditional 
accounting alone is insufficient to demonstrate NGOs’ accountability. It then 
discusses the nature of the exogenous variables and how this has necessitated the use 
of multiple methods of accountability practices. It summarises the eight forms of 
practices observed.  Section 8.4 discusses a structuration theory analysis of the 
accountability practices observed and concludes that through their influence on the 
legitimation and domination structures, Institutional donors are a dominant influence 
on NGOs’ accountability practices in the UK and in Africa, tracing some of the 
problematic implications of this dominance. Section 8.5 examines the limitations of 
the study while Section 8.6 presents the contribution of the study, the policy 
implications and recommendations for the future direction of research and policy on 
accountability in NGOs. 
 
 375 
8.1.1 The Research Question 
 The critical review of the literature on accountability found that it is extensive and 
has been approached from different disciplinary perspectives. A large part of the 
research in the literature focus on both the public and the private sectors with 
accountability being explained in different ways and using different theories. But the 
different framework and theories have been inadequate in describing accountability in 
a range of other organizational types falling outside these two sectors. Included in this 
are NGOs where research has been limited and not based on any of the widely used 
frameworks and theories identified in the literature. The literature on NGOs’ 
accountability has therefore lagged behind those on private and public sectors and has 
been backed with little rigorous empirical research or theoretical foundation.  The key 
research question could be summarised very broadly as: How do NGOs practice 
accountability and what is the theoretical basis for the practice? To answer this 
question, the study developed a framework that addressed the range of issues involved 
in NGOs’ accountability and provided a theoretical basis for understanding these 
practices. 
 
8.1.2 The Research Approach 
The exploratory nature of the research question influenced the choice of the research 
approach adopted. This research approach is based on a range of ontological, 
epistemological and methodological assumptions. Ontology and epistemology are 
linked to the use of ‘theory’ leading to different assumptions about the relevance of 
‘prior theories’ for any empirical investigation (Laughlin 1995: 66). While a comtean 
(rationalist) approach involves the use of a prior-defined theory and a rigidly 
structured investigative process that aim to discover broad generalisations, a Kantian 
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(phenomenological) approach dispenses with starting with a defined theory or tightly 
structured investigative process but uses an inductive approach where the theory is 
developed from the data.  Laughlin (2004: 272) argues that each research approach 
embodies a coherent and logical view on the role of theory and methodology. He 
argues for a middle position that takes the ontological stand that agrees with the 
Comtean view that some generalisation of an objective world that allows broad 
understanding of relationships is possible but  differs from it in that it maintains that 
such generalizations can only be ‘skeletal’ as important details will vary according to 
different contexts. Middle range thinking maintains that a prior theory, in skeletal 
form, could be used to commence an investigation and then ‘fleshed’ out with 
understanding gained from empirical studies in particular contexts. The study adopted 
this ‘middle range thinking approach’ because it allowed the investigation to begin 
with an initial theory developed from what  was already known from the literature and 
based on a careful examination of the relevance and limitations of existing theories. 
Consistent with this research approach the investigation was carried out in six NGOs, 
three in the UK and three in Africa. Data collection commenced in one of the UK 
NGOs used as the lead case study. The initial findings were used to ‘flesh out’ the 
skeletal theory. The study used qualitative data collection methods of documentary 
analysis and interviews in 5 of the six case studies but extends this to include 
participant observation in the lead case study.   
 
8.2 Existing Theories of Accountability 
Various theories have been used in the study of accountability, each having its 
benefits and limitations. The study examined the agency theory model in which the 
principal owns the ‘asset’ that the agent manages on his or her behalf.  Accountability 
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of the agent is mainly towards the principal who has the contractual rights to demand 
accountability. As a result, the objectives of the principal influence the action of the 
agent and accountability is measured in terms of the agent’s performance against this 
objective. Because of the nature of the objectives the accountability system uses 
predominantly traditional accounting. Though the model has been widely applied in 
private sector accountability, its failure to recognise the existence of other important 
stakeholders apart from the shareholder has limited its usefulness in organizations 
where there are more than a single important stakeholder such as in the public sector 
and NGOs. 
 
The study also examines the stakeholder theory of accountability and identified the 
donors or funders, the beneficiaries of NGO’s activities, the government and the 
community as the stakeholders in NGOs. The study uses Jawahar and McLaughlin’s 
(2001) and Emerson’s (1962) suggestions that organizations prioritize the needs of the 
stakeholders who provide the most critical resources needed for the organizations’ 
survival over those of the others to explain why, in private sector organizations, the 
needs of the shareholders are taken to be of overriding importance over those of other 
stakeholders. It concluded that this is not wholly applicable in NGOs because there 
are other important stakeholders who may not provide resources to the organisation 
but whose lives are nonetheless profoundly affected by the organisation. Having 
found neither of these two theories adequate, the study proceeded to develop an 
alternative theory of accountability by abstracting some useful elements from relevant 




8.2.1 A Middle Range Theory of Alternative Forms of Accountability 
The development of the alternative theory began by examining Stewart’s (1984: 15-
16) idea of accountability as involving two strands: the giving of account in an 
appropriate form or ‘language’ and the ‘holding to account’ involving the exercise of 
the power to demand an account. He described the accountability relationship as a 
‘bond’ where the one who holds to account has necessary authority and power to do 
so but as a ‘link of account’ where accounts are given without the power to hold to 
account. Stewart (1984: 15) describes the form or language used in accountability as 
the ‘base of accountability’ and identified 5 bases. Three of these bases are fiscal 
accountability which measures whether money has been spent according to budget, 
process accountability which measures whether prescribed processes have been 
followed and programme accountability which measures whether defined outcomes 
have been achieved. These have been described by other researchers broadly as 
‘managerial accountability’ (Robinson, 1971; Sinclair, 1995).  Sinclair (1995: 222) 
summarised managerial accountability as that which requires those with delegated 
authority to be answerable for producing outputs or the use of resources to achieve 
objectives. The study categorised this form of accountability as ‘Process based’. The 
other two bases that Stewart (1984) identified relate to measuring the achievement of 
organizational objectives. The study categorised these as ‘Performance based’. The 
form of giving account was therefore summarised into two broad categories: 
1. Process based that measures the use of resources and output achieved 
2. Performance based that measures performance against defined objectives. 
 
Concerning the form of holding to account Roberts (1988) distinguished between a 
‘hierarchical’ form where expectations are clearly defined by the one that holds to 
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account and a ‘socialising’ form where these expectations are subject to negotiation 
between the one that renders accounts and the one that holds to account. Laughlin 
(1990) developed these further into the ‘contractual’ (or the ‘hierarchical’) form 
where ‘action expectation and information demand and supply are tightly defined and 
clearly specified’ and ‘communal’ (or socializing) forms where ‘expectation over 
conduct, and information demands and supply are less structured’ (Laughlin 1996: 
229). The proposed theory adopted this idea and categorised the form of holding to 
account into a: 
 Contractual form where there is an obligation to render account with the 
expectation  clearly defined  
 Communal form where there is no contractual obligation to render accounts 
but accounts are rendered voluntarily and the expectations are not 
contractually defined  
 
The two dimensions of accountability, the form of giving accounts which could be 
process or performance, and the holding to account which could be of a contractual or 
communal form, were built into a framework of possible approaches to accountability 
called ‘the accountability space’. This resulted in four accountability possibilities, 
labelled A, B, C, and D which are reproduced here as Figure 8.1with an indication of 







Figure 8.1- The Accountability Space 
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The existing literature on accountability was categorised according to this framework 
and it was observed that most of the existing practices and research into these 
practices is concentrated in segments A and B. There is little research on practices 
that could be categorised as C or D. The study then developed a theory to explain how 
certain endogenous variables, relating to the nature of the organizations, exogenous 
variables relating to the stakeholders’ information needs and the social context in 







8.2.2 A Middle Range Theory of the Variables Influencing Accountability 
Practices 
When the process based approach to accountability in the contractual form (type A) is 
in operation, traditional accounting is the major form of accountability. This will 
satisfy the accountability needs in certain limited organizational contexts but will be 
inadequate in other contexts. This is because of three endogenous variables identified 
in the study as O, P and E. They are: 
1. The extent to which the organization’s objectives are clear, specific or 
measurable (O). 
2. The strength of the cause-effect relationship between the objectives and the 
activities of the organization or in other words, the extent to which the 
activities required in achieving the objectives are programmable (P).  
3. The degree to which the organisational objectives and activities are economic 
in nature (E).  
The study abstracted from the work of Thompson and Tuden (1959) that suggests that 
when the organisational objectives are clear and undisputed, and the consequences of 
action known (that is if the activities required in achieving those objectives are 
programmable), there is a high potential for decision making by computation.  
Traditional accounting, which by its nature provides quantitative information, will 
satisfy accountability needs in such organizations.  Based on this, the study argued 
that the first two variables that affect the adoption of accounting practices in 
organisations are certainty of organizational objectives (O) and the extent to which the 
activities required to achieve the objectives are programmable (P). Concerning the 
third variable (E), because the history and development of accounting is rooted in 
commercial practices, accounting information is considered more suitable to making 
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economic decisions. As a result, the study argued that the adoption of traditional 
accounting practices in an organisation depends on the degree to which the objectives 
or the activities carried out to achieve them are economic in nature.  These three 
variables together determine whether traditional forms of accounting will meet the 
accountability needs in the organization. These variables take on low values where: 
 The organizational objectives are not clear or specific or measurable (low O) 
 The activities have no programmable link with the achievement of the 
objective (low P) and  
 The nature of the objectives are not economic (low E) 
In this situation, traditional forms of accounting will be inadequate for accountability. 
Exclusive reliance on it for accountability will create a sociological divide (ds) the 
size of which is inversely proportional to the product of the three endogenous 
variables:  
ds           1  .                               
            O*P*E 
But where the endogenous variables O, P and E take on high values (i.e where the 
organizational objectives are clearly defined and measurable; the activities needed to 
achieve them have a programmable link with the achievement of the objectives; and 
the objectives are mainly economic in nature) the sociological divide (ds) will be 
small. In this context, relying on traditional accounting as the main form of 
accountability will be adequate for the organization’s accountability provided that it 
also satisfy the information needs of all the stakeholders. In between these two 
extremes are other possibilities such as a high O but low P and E (for example where 
the organizational objectives are specific and measurable but those objectives are not 
economic in nature and the activities required to achieve them have no programmable 
link with the objective). Here there may be a medium sociological divide. Traditional 
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accounting will still be inadequate for full accountability in this context. Indeed, 
traditional accounting could only be perceived as an adequate form of accountability 
only in organizations where the sociological divide is very small. 
. 
The second set of variables affecting the choice of practices is the exogenous 
variables relating to the composition of the stakeholders, their relative influence and 
information preference. The model categorises the stakeholders in organizations as 
contractual stakeholders (those having formal contracts with the organization and the 
authority to demand accountability) and non-contractual stakeholders (those whose 
stake in the organization are not defined by any formal contract and have no authority 
to demand accountability). It abstracts from Freeman’s (1984) definition of 
stakeholders in organizations to identify the determinants of stakeholders’ influence 
as the Impact (how much the organization’s activities affect them) and the Power 
(how much changes they can make in the organization). It conceptualises the 
Influence of the stakeholders in organizations as a product of these two variables: 
 
Stakeholders’ Influence = Impact x Power 
 
It then suggests that where some stakeholders have information needs that are not 
satisfied by the organization’s chosen practices it creates an information divide, i, 
represented as the divergence between the organizations’s chosen accountability 
practices and the information needs of the particular stakeholders: 
 
i = Organization’s accountability practices – Stakeholders’ information needs 
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The actual choice of practices constitutes the accountability system (or structure) in 
any organization. Where the chosen practices satisfy the information needs of the 
stakeholders there will be no information divide. The organization will then be 
deemed accountable. This may not necessarily be the outcome in every organization 
as the choice process is influenced by the social context in which the organization 
operates. This social context is analysed using structuration theory.   
 
At the core of structuration theory is the ‘duality of agency and structure’: that agency 
and social structure interact in the production and reproduction of social systems 
(Giddens, 1984: 162). The theory suggests that social systems (or structure) and social 
actions (human agency) mutually mediate and constitute each other. Giddens (1984: 
3) sees human agents as knowledgeable and suggests that the ‘knowledgeability is 
reflexive in form and exists on three levels. The first, the level of unconsciousness 
relates to the motives behind human action. The second level, practical consciousness, 
is the tacit stacks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of social 
activities. Discursive consciousness, the third level, involves knowledge which actors 
are able to express on the level of discourse (Giddens, 1984: 44-45). According to 
Giddens, practical consciousness is the most important of the three as, being 
contextually bound, it shapes people’s understanding of the world. How the system is 
created, sustained or recreated over time is explained by the three structural 
properties- signification, domination and legitimation.  
 
Signification refers to the underlying meanings of the practical activities that social 
actors carry out while drawing upon their stock of knowledge (practical 
consciousness) reflexively. The constitution of social system is linked to these 
fundamental meanings as understood by the social actors. These are reflected in the 
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organised sets of codes or rules on which the system is founded. It is these rules that 
structure social systems by ‘sustaining, termination and reforming of encounters’ 
(Giddens 1984: 22-23). The process by which this results in the reproduction of the 
system is through the operation of the other two structural properties. ‘Domination’ is 
the process by which some social actors (or stakeholders) influence the course of 
evolution of social systems by reason of their control of ‘allocative’ resources.  
‘Legitimation’ relates to the sanctioning of conduct. The sanction could be positive 
connected with reward, or negative in form of punishment. Through the power of 
control over resources and the power of sanction, powerful stakeholders influence 
which of the evolving organizational practices gain legitimacy thereby becoming a 
part of the enduring structure. This study views organizational accountability as a 
social system supported by a structure consisting of certain rules and practices 
developed by the stakeholders based on their understanding of the context embedded 
in their practical consciousness. The practices that gain ‘domination’ and 
‘legitimation’ are those preferred by the more powerful stakeholders involved.  
    
The empirical work identifies the various practices of accountability in the 6 NGOs 
studied. It investigates the endogenous and exogenous variables in the NGOs and the 
existence of the sociological and information divides. It then explains the choice of 
the observed practices using structuration theory. The initial skeletal theory was 
modified and fleshed out with these empirical details as the study progressed and is 






8.3 Empirical Insights  
The analysis of the 6 case studies yielded a number of insights into NGOs’ 
accountability practices. Some of the findings are consistent across all the 6 case 
studies. Some other findings are particular to the 3 UK NGOs and some to the 3 
African NGOs. There are however findings that are unique to each case study. These 
findings are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
8.3.1 The nature of the endogenous variables in NGOs suggests that traditional 
accounting alone is insufficient for NGOs’ accountability. 
The study found that the nature of NGO’s objectives is predicated on the principle of 
humanity in which economic rationality plays no part. It also found that the objectives 
are not quantifiably defined. NGOs’ activities are found to bear no programmable link 
to the achievement of their objectives as it is difficult to link those activities to 
measurable achievement of their stated objectives. The endogenous variables in 
NGOs are, therefore, found to take on low values and what has been referred to as the 
sociological divide is large. As a result the relevance of traditional accounting 
practices in NGOs’ accountability is limited. In recognition of this large sociological 
divide, not actually described as such by practitioners, it was observed that NGOs’ 
accountability do indeed go beyond the provision of  traditional accounting 
information and incorporate other practices focusing on accountability issues that 
traditional accounting information cannot address. The significance of this finding is 
that while some conceptualise organizational accountability to mean the rendering of 
financial accounts, this model offers a basis for explaining why that may appear  
sufficient in some organizations but not in others. It explains why traditional financial 
reporting may be deemed an appropriate form of accountability in the private sector 
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but inadequate in other areas such as the public sector (Mayston, 1993), religious 
organisations (Laughlin, 1988), Universities and Hospitals (Bourn and Ezzamel, 
1987) etc. This result is significant for NGOs as concern has been raised about NGOs’ 
accountability before Bird and Morgan-Jones’ (1981) research, that identified the 
problem of NGOs’ accountability in terms of the inadequacy in financial reporting in 
the traditional accounting sense. In spite of the progress made in improving financial 
reporting in UK NGOs, concerns about NGOs’ accountability continue to be raised. 
This finding suggests that the solution to those concerns go beyond improving 
financial accountability using traditional accounting methods. It is consistent with 
findings from recent research. Rahaman et al (2010) in a study of 3,000 NGOs and 
CBOs involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS found that while accounting practices 
enabled the coordination of the geographically dispersed  NGOs, it also undermined 
the prevention and treatment activities due to its inflexibility to address community 
specific emergent health needs. Goddard and Assad’s (2006) study of a Tanzanian 
NGO found that formal accounting mechanism is used by the NGO only for gaining 
legitimacy and credibility with the donors but not for internal decision making or 
accountability for their mission. The NGO thinks formal accounting constrains their 
ability to fulfil their mission and lobbied to have the requirements relaxed. 
 
 8.3.2 The nature of the exogenous variables in NGOs means that accountability 
necessarily involves the use of multiple methods. 
The study finds that a number of stakeholders are involved in NGOs. Their 
obligations to some of them are contractual while to the others non-contractual. In the 
contractual category are the Institutional donors and the government while the non-
contractual stakeholders are mainly the beneficiaries, the individual donors and the 
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community. Each stakeholder has different objectives, values and information needs. 
The findings show that the diverse nature of the stakeholders’ composition in NGOs 
could potentially result in an information divide in relation to particular stakeholders’ 
needs if NGOs’ accountability practices do not meet these varied needs. The need to 
meet the varied information needs has resulted in the use of multiple methods of 
accountability falling into all the segments of the accountability space. Eight practices 
grouped into the four generic types A, B, C and D in the theoretical model were 
identified to be in use, each suited to the needs of particular stakeholders. None of the 
NGOs practice all of these accountability methods. Rather, each NGO practices a 
number of these depending on the social context in which each operate.  The observed 
practices are summarised in Table 8.1 and explained in the following paragraphs. 
 















1 Statutory financial reports- A           
2 Statutory narrative reports- B          
3 Donors financial reports- A            
4 Programme narrative reports- B            
5 Annual report on strategy- B            
6 Programme evaluation- B           
7 Stakeholder participation - C        
8 Stakeholder participation in  
resource utilisation decisions- D 
o       
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1. A system of statutory financial reporting: This is in line with the regulatory 
framework operating in the country where the NGO is based. In the UK the 
regulatory framework is based on a NGO specific reporting standard, the 
SORP. Monitoring of compliance is strong and the practice is seen to be 
prominent in all three UK NGOs. But in Uganda and Nigeria, the statutory 
financial reporting framework is based on prescriptions of the local company 
laws. There is no NGO specific reporting standard to guide its preparation and 
monitoring of compliance is weak. This form of practice categorised as type A 
accountability is prominently used in CS1, CS2 and CS3. But only CS5 
among the 3 African NGOs prepare statutory reports. CS4 and CS6 do not 
prepare statutory financial reports.  
 
2. Narrative reporting extension of statutory reports: This is in the form of 
trustees’ reports that explains the activities of the NGOs and the achievement 
of its objectives. It is mainly used in the UK NGOs where it is part of the 
statutory reporting requirements and its information content specified by the 
SORP.  This type B form of accountability is not used by any of the African 
NGOs. CS5’s statutory reports contain very little narrative element as this is 
not a statutory requirement. 
 
3. Financial Reporting to Donors: This details the grant income and 
expenditure in forms determined by the donors according to their individual 
needs. This is also type A in form but these are different from the statutory 
financial reports as they are prepared in line with the contractual requirements 
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for the individual grants and its form and content specified by the funder. The 
practices here are similar across the NGOs that use them as it is determined by 
the funders. CS6 receives no contractual grant funding and does not practice 
this form of reporting.  
 
4. Programme Narrative Reports: These highlight the achievements of 
programmes against objectives and are prepared along with the grant financial 
reports for funders in line with the grant contract conditions. These are also 
categorised as another form of type B practices used by the NGOs that receive 
funding from donors. CS6 does not practice this form of accountability as it 
receives no grant funding. 
 
5. Annual reports and Strategic Planning: The annual reports contain narrative 
accounts of the NGOs’ activities and achievement of its strategic objectives. It 
is in more detail than the statutory reports and focuses more on the objectives 
and impact achieved in relation to them. This is used prominently in the UK 
NGOs and in CS4 that is an affiliate of CS3.  It is also used as a marketing or 
fundraising material and aimed mostly at the information needs of the donors 
(both Institutional and individual donors). Because beneficiaries are 
sometimes consulted in the process of its preparation, this practice is claimed 
to be a form of communal accountability of type C. But the study does not 
categorise it as a full form of communal accountability, type C.   
 
6. Programme Evaluation: these are carried out by all the NGOs except CS6. In 
CS1, CS2, and CS5, these are carried out at the request of particular donors for 
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programmes funded by them. It therefore, focuses on individual programmes 
and not the entire organization’s activities. The evaluations are carried out by 
parties external to the NGOs. But in CS4, evaluation is carried out as an 
internal process by its parent NGO (CS3) as part of its global evaluation of its 
country programmes. Notwithstanding that evaluators sometimes seek the 
views of beneficiaries on project outcomes, most of the evaluation could be 
categorized as type B as they are demanded and paid for by the donors. Only 
in CS3 where the evaluations are at the instance of the NGO and covers issues 
of effectiveness of all of its programmes could one consider it as performing 
some type C accountability. 
 
7. Participation of non-contractual stakeholders: Only CS6 demonstrates 
significant practice of accountability of this form. CS6 involves its 
beneficiaries and the community in its work and incorporates their views and 
needs in its strategy and activities. Its engagement with this stakeholder group 
is continuous and integral to its work.  CS3 and CS4 involve beneficiaries in 
their activities but to a limited extent as they do not affect decision making in 
the NGOs. But this participation to some extent counts as a limited form of 
type C accountability. 
 
8. Financial accountability to non-contractual stakeholders: Only CS6 
demonstrates type D accountability for the use of resources to the non-
contractual stakeholders. This is mostly in the form of involving them in 
resource allocation decisions. CS6 prepares its budget based on its needs and 
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presents it to donors not as a monetary budget but a basket of needs for the 
donors to decide on which needs are most important to them to meet. 
 
8.4 A structuration theory analysis of NGOs’ accountability 
The study applied structuration theory to examine how the interaction between the 
stakeholders and the social context in which NGOs operate shape the choice of 
accountability practices adopted. This section summarises the general context in 
which NGOs operate and how the signification, the legitimation and domination 
structures operate to shape the forms of accountability practices observed. 
 
The study finds that the bulk of the resources utilised by the NGOs studied are 
derived from the global north.  This part of the world is wealthy with high GDP per 
capita, good infrastructure, presence of Institutional donors and a skilled workforce. 
There is a comparatively higher level of individual giving to NGOs. But only one of 
the UK NGOs studied has its beneficiaries here. The rest (2 out of 3 studied) have 
their beneficiaries in the developing world or the global south. This part of the world 
is characterised by low GDP per capita, widespread poverty and needs and 
vulnerability to disease and natural disasters. The two NGOs having most of their 
beneficiaries in the developing world operate as International NGOs (INGOs) 
delivering their services either directly to their beneficiaries or mostly through the 
southern based NGOs by giving them grants to deliver specific services to the target 
beneficiaries. Most southern based NGOs (2 of the 3 studied) rely on the grants from 
INGOs as a major source of funding in addition to the funding they raise directly from 
the Institutional donors. The INGOs in turn are funded mostly by the same 
Institutional donors who provide some funding directly to the southern based NGOs. 
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This cooperation between northern and southern based NGOs affects the composition 
of the stakeholders and the interaction between them. While the government is a 
contractual stakeholder in all the NGOs analysed and the Institutional donors in 5 of 
the 6 NGOs, the African NGOs that rely on the INGOs for funding have them as 
additional contractual stakeholders. The influence of the interaction between these 
stakeholders on the accountability system is analysed by examining the structural 
properties of the system.   
 
 
8.4.1 The signification structure in NGOs 
The signification structure in NGOs relates to the nature of the NGOs’ objectives and 
reflects the importance of the ‘humanitarian imperative’ that holds the need to save 
lives and relief human suffering as being of fundamental importance. All the 
stakeholders involved see the delivery of services and the achievement of objectives 
as being of overriding importance over economic efficiency in NGOs’ activities. But 
in addition to this, two of the stakeholders, the Institutional donors and the regulatory 
authorities (in the UK only) also see probity in the use of resources as important. 
While all the stakeholders see the involvement of the beneficiaries and the community 
as important, the beneficiaries and the community themselves hold this as particularly 
important. The signification structure in the UK NGOs reflects these values. But it is 
slightly different from that in two of the African NGOs (CS4 and CS5) and 
significantly different from that in CS6. The main difference results from the role of 
the government in the African NGOs and UK NGOs. In the UK, the government ‘co-
opt charities as a willing ally in the provision of public services, often on a contract 
basis. As a consequence, significant amount of public money flowed into the sector’ 
(Hyndman and McMahon, 2011: 169) In contrast, African governments do not fund 
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the NGOs but rely on them for providing (to the beneficiaries) some of the public 
services for which they are normally responsible. Their influence on the signification 
structure is related to their roles. In the UK, as the government’s funding to the 
charity sector increased it became more involved in the tightening of regulatory 
controls on charity accounting and reporting: 
While it was relatively passive during the 1980s, since then government has 
increasingly exerted its influence in a variety of ways....Its influence has been 
partly  coercive (in creating the regulatory framework; through legislation, 
requiring SORP compliance; and as an increasingly important resource 
provider exercising a direct disciplining effect on those charities to whom it 
provides funds) and partly persuasive (Hyndman and McMahon, 2011: 172) 
 
 But the interests of the African governments are more aligned with that of the 
beneficiaries. They consider issues of participation in resource allocation decisions as 
more important than the emphasis on probity in the use of resources that the INGOs 
and Institutional donors hold very important. CS6 does not receive any funding from 
the Institutional donors or the INGOs. As a result, these two stakeholders do not 
influence the signification structure in CS6. The structure is influenced only by the 
needs of the beneficiaries and the community. Because of this signification structure, 
accountability in NGOs, in general,  involves a combination of different practices 
focusing not only on probity in the use of resources but also on ensuring that the 
activities are carried out and the objectives achieved and, to some extent, the 
beneficiaries and the community are involved.  But some of the practices have gained 
more prominence than others due to the influence of the domination and legitimation 
structures. 
 
8.4.2 The Domination and Legitimation Structure in NGOs 
The domination and legitimation structures in UK NGOs and those in African NGOs 
are similar in some respects but slightly different in others. In the UK NGOs, the 
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domination and legitimation structures are influenced by the Institutional donors and 
the regulators. This is because the Institutional donors control most of the funding to 
the UK NGOs. The regulators’ influence on the legitimation and domination 
structures in UK NGOs derives from their power to regulate NGOs. This power is 
actively exercised in making statutory accountability demands and in monitoring 
compliance. As a result of their role in the legitimation and domination structure these 
stakeholders have influenced NGOs’ accountability practices to serve their needs. The 
choice of accountability practices in UK NGOs has tended towards those that serve 
the needs of these two contractual stakeholders, mainly the types A and B.  But the 
needs of the regulators and the Institutional donors are not exactly the same.  Two 
forms of types A and B practices have therefore developed each serving mostly the 
needs of only one of these two influential stakeholders. The first is driven by the 
statutory authorities and consists of a system of statutory financial reporting with 
narrative reporting. Up to 1989, this was dominated by a framework based on the 
private sector model. This created an information divide as the approach did not meet 
the needs of other important stakeholders. In recognition of this, the regulatory 
authorities have since modified this form of financial reporting. This has involved 
taking into account concepts such as fund accounting, de-emphasising the importance 
of the net surplus and substantial improvement in the narrative elements of the 
statutory reports. This has gone some way in reducing the information divide as the 
reports are now more meaningful to the stakeholders involved than the earlier 
versions. But this is not enough to satisfy the information needs of some stakeholders, 
including those of the Institutional donors and the beneficiaries. The second element 
of the contractual accountability practiced is that driven by the Institutional donors 
who provide the NGOs with funding as contractual grants. The grants are given with 
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specific accountability demands in form of financial reporting, programme narrative 
reporting and in many cases, monitoring & evaluation. But these reports are different 
in form from those prescribed by the charity SORP. The practices are not standardized 
but specific to the donors’ needs. With implicit recognition of the sociological divide, 
the donors’ requirement in financial reporting does not go beyond demonstrating that 
funds have been properly utilised in the authorised manner. Its method of dealing with 
issues of achievement of objectives is more comprehensive than the regulators’ 
attempt to incorporate it under the UK Statutory narrative reports (the trustees’ 
report). It involves programme narrative reporting but in more detail than required by 
SORP and in a format that ties reporting to the original activity plans and objectives. 
It also involves a system of monitoring and evaluation whereby independent 
professionals report on the effectiveness of the activities carried out. 
 
But while the regulators’ influence on the legitimation and domination structure is 
strong in the UK it is weak in Africa. In the African NGOs, the regulators do not 
exercise their power in enforcing a regulatory framework for statutory reporting. 
Statutory reporting in the African NGOs is still mainly undertaken in line with the 
prescriptions of the local company laws and no sector-specific standard is imposed.  
Because of the weak role of the African government in regulating NGOs, the INGOs 
and the Institutional donors are the main influence on the domination and legitimation 
structure because of the total reliance of the NGOs on them for funding.  The 
accountability practices observed in two of the African NGOs (CS4 and CS5) are 
mainly types A and B but only in the form required to satisfy the information needs of 
the Institutional donors which are broadly the same. The legitimation and domination 
structure in CS6 is different from the remaining two African NGOs. In addition to the 
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absence of a strong regulatory regime, CS6 is also free of the influence of the INGOs 
and the Institutional donors. The legitimation and domination structure is therefore 
entirely determined by the non-contractual stakeholders- the beneficiaries and the 
community. 
 
In addition to the contractual form of accountability types A and B, the communal 
forms of accountability are also used by some NGOs. This addresses to an extent 
issues that are important within the signification structure that are not addressed by 
types A and B. But this form of accountability is not being widely practised by NGOs. 
This is due to the dominance of the contractual stakeholders in the legitimation and 
domination structure and the weak influence of the stakeholders whose needs this 
form of accountability practice is most suited to serve. CS6 is the only NGO studied 
that practices any significant form of communal accountability.  CS6 has been able to 
do so because there are no contractual stakeholders involved. The few practices in 
CS3 and CS4 that are of the communal form have developed because the influence of 
the Institutional donors on the legitimation and domination structure is less than in the 
other NGOs. One may conclude that the dominant influence on NGOs’ accountability 
practices is the involvement of the Institutional donors followed by the regulators 
where there is a strong regulatory regime. But the strongest influence is that of the 
Institutional donors arising from the control of the bulk of the funding to NGOs. 
Figure 8.1 below combines Figure 7.1 and 7.2 to highlight how the observed 
accountability practices are closely linked to the structure of funding in NGOs. It 












          
          
          








8.5 Limitations of the study 
The study developed a theoretical model of 4 possible approaches to accountability 
practices and suggests that depending on certain endogenous and exogenous 
variables, accountability in organizations necessarily involves practices falling into 
one or more of these approaches. The study finds that NGOs’ practices in A and B are 
well developed and structured but practices in C and D remain largely undeveloped, 
unstructured and not well researched. The study provides some insight and empirical 
details on NGOs’ practices in all these areas. But the details concerning type C and D 
are not sufficient to provide a comprehensive description of what this form of 
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accountability involves across different organizations. This limitation may be as a 
result of the sampling strategy which means that only one of the 6 cases selected has 
this form of accountability as its main practice.  Further research should seek to 
explore other organizations where this form of accountability practice is the dominant 
form. 
 
The study used mainly UK and African NGOs as case studies. This brings out the 
similarities and differences in the social contexts in which the NGOs operate. It 
highlights some important findings in terms of how the funding relationships between 
the UK and African NGOs affect accountability practices across the NGO sector. But 
there may well be other contextual insights that could be gained by expanding the 
sample to include NGOs in other developed and developing parts of the world that 
this study did not cover. 
 
8.6 Contribution, Policy Implication and Future Researches 
The study brings out a number of findings that have wider implications for the theory 
and practice of accountability in NGOs and for future research and policy in the field. 
Three of these are particularly important and discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
First, the study shows that traditional accounting financial reports alone cannot 
address the accountability needs in NGOs. It introduced the model of the endogenous 
variables to develop the idea of the ‘sociological divide’ that explains to what extent 
traditional accounting can be relied on for accountability in particular organizational 
contexts. This model dispels the misleading notion that accountability in 
organizations can be viewed exclusively in terms of traditional financial accounting 
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and reporting. This has broad implications for how accountability is perceived in 
organizations particularly in NGOs. Prior to the 1980s when financial accounting and 
reporting in NGOs was largely poor and undeveloped, concerns about accountability 
in NGOs was focused mainly around ensuring financial probity. In the following 
decade, the efforts to improve accountability focused largely on improving statutory 
financial accounting and reporting. Since the 1990s, there have been significant 
changes in the UK regulatory environment and the standards of statutory reporting. 
These changes include the development of the SORP and the improvement in the 
governance of NGOs. These improvements have resulted in the comparability of 
NGOs’ accounts, improved disclosure and relevance of the information contents. 
These have led to improvements in accountability in the NGO sector (Hyndman and 
McMahon, 2011: 173). But the improvements have not eliminated the sociological 
divide. This is evident in the fact that in spite of the improvements, the debate on 
NGOs’ accountability has not ended and other methods of accountability are used 
alongside the traditional accounting financial reports. This raises some doubt as to 
whether the prospect for more improvement in NGOs’ accountability lie in further 
improvement in the system of statutorily defined financial accounting and reporting.  
 
The study also developed the idea of an information divide to describe the gap in 
accountability that results when the organizational practices do not satisfy the 
information needs of particular stakeholders. The concept of an information divide is 
useful in explaining the multiple accountability practices observed in NGOs where 
multiple stakeholders with varied information needs are involved. An information 
divide will result if NGOs’ accountability practices focus on meeting the needs of 
only a section of the stakeholders. But the practices observed in 5 of the 6 NGOs 
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studied focus more on the needs of the influential stakeholders, mainly the regulators 
and the Institutional donors. Only 2 of these 5 NGOs, practice some limited form of 
accountability to other stakeholders such as the beneficiaries and the community 
whose needs are not necessarily the same as those of the two influential stakeholders. 
The limited practice here is because these stakeholders do not have the power to hold 
NGOs to account. Kilby (2006) finds that there is little incentive for NGOs to be 
accountable in this way: It is not required by regulation and where the NGOs’ values 
conflict with those of their beneficiaries NGOs fear that a shift in their accountability 
towards beneficiaries could weaken their control and divert them away from their 
public benefit role. The contribution of this study is that it provides a broader 
framework, the ‘accountability space’, for understanding the range of issues and 
approaches involved in NGO accountability and the potential for an information 
divide with regards to accountability for the needs of the non-contractual 
stakeholders. It also adds to the empirical details on how accountability to the non-
contractual stakeholders (types C and D practices) are operationalised in actual 
NGOs.  While the study has used the model to explain the accountability practices in 
particular NGOs, the model could be applied in other situations. Future research can 
adopt the framework in relation to other organization types such as public sector or 
religious organizations in order to bring out more empirical details on the various 
components of accountability practices particularly in such areas as type C and D that 
are presently under-researched. Future policy makers can use the understanding of the 
full ramification of organization’s accountability that the model provides in 
developing a coherent system of practices that could be applied widely across NGOs.  
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The second area of contribution of the study is in adding some empirical details to the 
literature on the influence of Institutional donors in dictating the form of NGOs’ 
accountability practices, an issue which has already been noted in the literature. 
Previous studies have traced the source of this influence to the funding relationship 
between the donors and the NGOs and noted the effect to be the emphasis on the use 
of resources in NGOs’ accountability (Edward and Hulme, 1996; Najam 1996; Nelson 
and Dorsey, 2003; Ebrahim 2005; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007).  O’Dwyer and 
Unerman (2007: 447) noted the absence of research into the nature of this influence 
within the context of specific NGO - Donor accountability relationships.  They 
examined how a particular donor-led initiative (entitled Multi- Annual Programme 
Scheme or MAPS) attempted to shift emphasis from the sole focus on the use of 
resources to accountability for broader societal impacts such as impact on the 
beneficiaries and the community. Though this idea conceptually addresses the issue, 
the mechanism by which it could be operationalised was not properly articulated by 
the donor. The donor suggested ‘partnership, mutual accountability, learning and 
sharing experiences through enhanced dialogue’ as mechanism by which this 
accountability may be demonstrated but this left many NGOs struggling to understand 
how they might operationalise this (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007: 463). O’Dwyer 
and Unerman concluded that little substantive change occurred in the Donor-NGO 
accountability relationship and encouraged other researchers to examine similar 
accountability relationships in other specific contexts. This study contributes in this 
area by providing more empirical details on the Donor-NGO accountability 
relationship and how certain forms of accountability are operationalised in specific 
NGOs. The study shows that the Institutional donors influence NGOs’ accountability 
across national boundaries because NGOs in the developed and the developing world 
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rely on them for funding. It traces this influence to the global polarisation of needs 
and means whereby most of the funding for NGOs’ work is derived from the 
developed world but most of the needs for their services are in the developing world. 
A significant part of the funding to both UK NGOs and those in Africa is directly or 
indirectly from the Institutional donors in the form of grants given with specific 
accountability requirements that have influenced practices in all the NGOs that 
receive the funding towards the types A and B form of accountability designed to 
meet the donors’ needs. These practices are not suited to rendering accountability to 
the non-contractual stakeholders. But they remain dominant in NGOs’ practices. 
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) finds that while certain hierarchical form of 
performance reporting using metrics designed by the influential donors are not 
suitable for measuring performance against other stakeholders’ needs and may in fact 
hinder an NGO’s ability to achieve its mission, NGOs may nevertheless adopt such 
practices to remain viable and relevant. The study found that only the few NGOs that 
are not dependent (or wholly dependent) on the Institutional donors for their funding 
have been free to develop their own forms of accountability practices which have 
involved some communal forms of accountability. It therefore concluded that the 
more the dependence on Institutional donors for funding, the less the tendency to 
venture into communal forms of accountability.  This can explain O’Dwyer and 
Unerman’s (2007: 466) findings that the MAPS initiative did not substantially change 
NGO’s accountability practices. Notwithstanding the fact that the donors often 
encourage NGOs to embrace communal accountability, their involvement in NGOs 
appears to be a part of a range of factors hindering the development of this form of 
accountability practices.  Edwards and Hulme (1996: 969) suggests that NGOs who 
wish to remain effective and accountable should diversify their funding sources. The 
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findings corroborate this as the lower the proportion of NGOs’ funding that is tied to 
Institutional donors, the more they are able to develop accountability practices that are 
more appropriate to their situation.  
 
NGOs’ accountability should, therefore, reflect more broadly the needs of their 
stakeholders. This essentially will involve going further than traditional accounting 
practices to account for the use of resources (type A) and the demonstration of the 
achievement of their programme objectives (type B) These are domains of contractual 
accountability in which the Institutional donors and statutory regulators currently play 
an important role. Due to the importance of other stakeholders in NGOs, 
accountability of the communal form is essential and NGOs should be encouraged to 
develop better practices in this area. This study has shown that the Institutional donors 
are not the most suited to lead on this. This practice should develop internally within 
NGOs. Other researchers have suggested ways by which NGOs can involve 
beneficiaries (a major non-contractual stakeholder group) Wellens and Jegers, (2011) 
suggests that this could be ‘via surveys, via advisory bodies, via participating in 
annual general meetings’ but notes that ‘the effectiveness of these mechanisms is 
rarely investigated’ (Wellens and Jegers, 2011). This study contributes to the 
knowledge of how one of these mechanisms operates in a particular NGO. The 
mechanism involves stakeholders’ participation in the identification of their needs and 
the design and implementation of programmes to address those needs. This is the 
domain of type C form of communal accountability. Furthermore, NGOs should 
involve stakeholders in resourcing and resource allocation decisions. This will make 
NGOs’ work more effective as other stakeholders such as the beneficiaries and the 
community have legitimate interest in the effective utilisation of the NGOs’ resources. 
There are no standard mechanisms by which this type D accountability is 
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implemented in practice as only few NGOs have any form of practices in this area. 
But sharing financial information with stakeholders and giving them the opportunity 
to participate in decision making relating to financing is an essential ingredient in this. 
Future research should aim to investigate more specific instances of communal forms 
of accountability practices (types C and D) in NGOs and the mechanism by which 
they are, or could be, implemented.  
 
The third area of contribution of the study is in providing more empirical details on 
the importance of statutory regulations in promoting NGOs’ accountability while also 
highlighting its limitations. The important role of the government in promoting 
accountability in UK NGOs through statutory regulations has been highlighted by 
previous research (Hyndman and Mcmahon, 2011). This has led to improved statutory 
financial reporting in UK NGOs. But a large part of the funding raised by UK NGOs 
is spent through NGOs in Africa who then make financial returns to the UK NGOs. 
These reports, prepared under weak systems of statutory regulation are then 
incorporated into the UK NGOs’ statutory financial reports. The contribution of the 
study is in drawing attention to this limitation resulting from the weakness of the 
statutory regulation of NGOs in Uganda and its entire absence in Nigeria. The study 
traces the cause of the weak regulation of NGOs in Africa to a fundamental reversal 
of role whereby the governments are beneficiaries of African NGOs rather than 
benefactor or funder as in the UK. They therefore have little interest in statutory 
regulation of accountability practices. 
  
The study finds that though the influence of the Institutional donors on NGOs 
operating in Africa presents an opportunity to promote statutory regulations where 
there is no country-level regulations, this opportunity is not utilised. The UK based 
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Institutional donors and INGOs have only required the specific information relating to 
their grants in the forms suitable to their needs and have not attempted to influence 
the African NGOs to prepare reports in line with the UK regulations. This raises a 
question as to how much support the Institutional donors give to the system of 
statutory regulation. It appears that the Institutional donors do not provide support for 
promoting statutory regulations possibly because of their limited involvement in its 
development. This finding raises questions as to whether the regulatory authorities 
alone are able to achieve the changes necessary for further improvements in 
accountability practices across the sector. Future research may investigate how better 
involvement of the Institutional donors in developing the statutory reporting 
framework could affect their level of support for it.  
 
Finally, and by way of conclusion, the study finds that the existing forms of 
accountability practiced by NGOs which are mostly contractual in form (types A and 
B) are an essential part of NGOs’ accountability. But NGOs need to do more by 
responding to other stakeholders’ needs not addressed by these existing practices. 
NGOs need to practice more of communal accountability by ensuring the 
participation of non-contractual stakeholders in decisions relating to the design and 
implementation of the programmes that affect them. These stakeholders should also 
participate in resourcing and resource utilisation decisions relating to programmes that 
affect them. While this study provides some empirical details into how this is 
operationalised in a few case studies, future research should investigate the 
mechanism by which this is done in other NGOs and the possibility of developing the 
practices into a coherent approach that could be widely adopted by NGOs.  
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       Appendix 1- CS1 Strategic Objectives 2001-2004 
1. Seek ways to enable minority communities and indigenous peoples to voice 
their concerns and advocates for their rights 
2. Through advocacy, media and publishing activities, bring about changes in 
areas of  CS1’s interest and work 
3. Through media and publishing activities inform the wider public of the 
situation of minorities and of the need and ways to protect and promote their 
rights 
4. Achieve higher impact among specific advocacy audiences and decision 
makers at international fora 
5. Within the advocacy work, Prioritize work at global fora including the UN and 
undertake work at regional fora to ensure a geographical spread of the 
activities. 
6. Promote the interpretation and implementation of existing international 
covenants, declarations and mechanisms relating to minority rights, rather than 
the adoption of new standards 
7. Work with local partners to find ways to improve implementation of the 
relevant standards 
8. Support others to pursue legal cases under international complaints procedures 
on minority rights issues 
9. Support/strengthen the capacity of minority-based human rights organizations 
to promote the rights of their communities 
10. Encourage coordinated and  targeted action as part of a rights-based approach 
to development by supporting alliances and coalition among minority-based 
organizations  
11. Use opportunities offered by new technologies for communication, outreach 
and awareness raising 
12. Analyze its work, articulate progress and develop new initiatives in this area 
13. Accept invitation to work as consultants to programmes reaching audiences or 
areas which would be difficult for CS1 to reach on its own 
14. Promote new thinking and new dialogue by key actors on minority rights 
issues  










Targets – one year 
 
 













representatives or staff in 
minority or indigenous 
organisations report that 
they have gained skills, 
knowledge or confidence 
to carry out advocacy on 
behalf of their 
community.  
90 of them go on to use 
these skills. 
25 community 
representatives or staff in 
minority or indigenous 
organisations carried out 
an advocacy  
Decision makers refer 
publically to minority 
and Indigenous 
communities, consult 
them more and take 
more of their views 
into account. 
 MRG partners 
continue to have access 
to decision makers and 
carry out effective 
advocacy. 
3 occasions where 
MRG or partners have 
influenced improved or 
new national 
constitutions,  
UN Neelan Tiruchelvam 
Training** 
UN Treaty Body Training 
SEE Advocacy and Rights 
Training 
FCNM training* 
SEE Training for Trainers 
ACHPR training** 
ITP skill share events 
EU member state anti-
discrimination training 
Training manuals* 
Training events for Pastoralist 
women, elders, MPs and 









2.a 3 occasions where 
MRG and partners 
have influenced 
national legislation, 
or altered a govt 
policy or practice. 
20 2.2 20 occasions where 
MRG and partners’ 
influence has altered 
national legislation or 
govt policy or practice 
focusing on:  
- protecting land 
and property rights 
- education reform 
 
MRG Campaigns on protecting 
land and property rights, 
education reform, and 
challenging discrimination 
against minority and indigenous 
women.** 
UNDM national advocacy 
projects** 
 





       
 
10 sets of conclusions or 
recommendations from 
international mechanisms 
that strongly raise issues 
affecting minority and 
indigenous communities. 
 
Positive precedents in    
 minority rights case-
law 
New or stronger 
international minority 
rights mechanisms 
including in the field of 
conflict prevention. 
Support partners to produce 
shadow reports, attend and 
lobby, and linked advocacy** 
Legal cases* 
Campaign for minority input to 
NEPAD and AU** 











10 dialogues between 
members of minority 
communities and 
development decision 
makers (including PRSP 
processes). 
 
Ten devt donors/actors 
including the World 
Bank report that MRG 
has helped them 
develop new policies,  
MR and D training for 
development actors** 
Donor/minority dialogues** 
Consultancy support for 
development agencies* 









5 partners run practical 
cross community projects 
 Increased media 
coverage 
400,000 visits and 50,000 
publications downloaded 
from website 
5 partners report    
decreased 
intercommunity 








Media work, website, e-bulletin* 








 Cases where abuses of 
minority rights may lead 
to conflict are identified, 
publicised and recom-





understand and accept 
the link between 
abuses of minority 
rights and future ethnic 
violence  
MRG campaign on minority 
rights in the prevention of 
conflict and genocide* 
Early warning – media and 
advocacy** 
Conflict micro casestudies** 
High level seminar** 
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Appendix 3 CS1- Restricted Programmes Implemented in 2008 and the contributing 
donors 
 Programme Title/Objectives Contributing Donors Amount 
1 African  Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Project:  to 
develop the skills and capacity of  minorities to advocate for their 
rights at the ACHPR  
UK Dept for International 
Development 
Cordaid Block grant 
146,497 
2 Poverty Reduction Strategy Process: Seek to address the 
deficiencies in current poverty reduction strategies that make it 
less beneficial to minorities or even increase inequalities. 
Activities include research, workshop and training 
Irish Aid  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 
92,620 
3 Batwa Programme: to build the leadership capacity of the Batwa 
people (a marginalized group) and support them in establishing an 




4 Endorois Project: Support the Endorois community to challenge 
their eviction from their ancestral land at the African Commission 
for Human Rights and raise awareness of their plight.  
Baring Foundation 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 
40,147 
5 Pastoralist Programme: To train Pastoralist women and elders in 
participation and representation in civic and political life as a way 
of reducing poverty and conflict.  
Dan Church Aid 
Irish Aid 
97,053 
6 Uganda NUREP programme European Commission 11,798 
7 Religious Minorities in Asia Irish Aid 
Cordaid Block grant 
CAFOD 
84,614 
8 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples training Swedish Development Cooperation 
Cordaid Block grant 
6,000 
9 South East Europe Programme Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
The King Baudouin Foundation 
UK Dept for International 
Development 
Cordaid Block grant 
245,501 
10 Development Education – Hungary European Commission 90,581 
11 UN Advocacy programme- Hungary Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 9,734 
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12 Other Europe programmes: FCNM training, INFOCOM, Roma 
Portal 
Council of Europe; Cordaid 
European Commission 
10,177 
13 Minorities and Conflict Prevention UK Dept of International Development 48,721 
14 Conflict Prevention- Nepal Taiwan Foundation for Democracy 
Alan Nesta Ferguson Trust 
Cordaid Block grant 
30,692 
15 Conflict East Africa Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 16,000 
16 Iraq Refugees report Reuben Foundation  




17 Iraq project Cordaid Block grant 12,614 
18 Iraq/Somalia Project European Commission 6,090 
19 Strategic Communications Programme: Provide a database of 
information that helps minorities claim their rights and helps 
policy makes understand their needs  thus preventing conflict 
European Commission 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 
105,068 
20 Turkey Anti discrimination programme European Commission 
Cordaid Block grant 
93,445 
21 Legal cases Project: to support minorities to bring cases against 
the state challenging minority rights abuses to establish positive 
precedents in international minority rights law. Cases involve 
minorities in Turkey, Bosnia, Botswana, Chagos Island 
Sheri Rosenberg foundation 
Cordaid Block grant 
Open Society Institute 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
University College London 
96,033 
22 Minority Women project Irish Aid  
Canadian International Development 
Agency 
Cordaid Block grant 
103,505 
23 Others Consultancies CCFD, EC, ICTJ, SDC 8,737 





Appendix 4 CS1- Income sources 2005-2008 
 2008 %  2007 %  2006 %  2005 %  
  £    £    £    £   
Incoming resources         
Voluntary income         
TBH Brunner Charitable Trust          1,000             1,000            1,000             1,000   
Christian Aid               -             20,000          20,000           20,000   
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland      100,000           62,293          60,656           47,664   
Open Society Institute               -                     -                   -             10,000   
The Sigrid Rausing Trust      120,000         120,000        100,000                  -     
ICCO               -             29,625          26,553           26,893   
Lee Foundation        10,000           10,000          10,000             7,000   
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs      140,098         104,994        110,881         111,144   
The Pilkington General Charitable Trust          1,500                   -              1,000             1,000   
The Eva Reckitt Trust          1,000             1,000            1,000                  -     
Swedish Intl Dev Cooperation Agency      184,248         173,450        222,963         221,889   
Doen Foundation        55,601           13,786                 -                    -     
Alan and Babette Sainsbury          5,000           10,000                 -                    -     
S. Rosenberg               -               4,632                 -                    -     
Joffe Charitable Trust               -               2,500                 -                    -     
Rathbone Trust Company          2,000             2,000                 -                    -     
Cordaid      150,009           82,970                 -                    -     
From Institutional donors, foundations etc      770,456  96%       638,250  96%      554,053  94%       446,590  91% 
Individual donations (incl W.Jacobs & Lev)         11,335             3,558            6,717           12,701   
Total Voluntary Income (Unrestricted)      781,791         641,808        560,770         459,291   
Income from charitable activities         
Investment income (Unrestricted)          4,471             3,951            4,136             5,230   
Publications (Unrestricted)        10,727           12,110            7,501           19,780   
Consultancy (Unrestricted          7,330             5,226          13,955             6,654   
Total Unrestricted Income      804,319  100%       663,095  100%      586,362  100%       490,955  100% 
         
Unrestricted Income      826,848  30%       684,382  31%      611,954  27%       522,619  27% 
Restricted Income ( Advocacy & Projects)   1,899,226  69%    1,498,016  69%   1,609,507  71%    1,384,415  72% 
Other income -Cost recovery        45,642           22,997          57,341           44,329   











Appendix 5- Logical Framework for the project South East Europe: Diversity and 
Democracy- Phase 3 




To eliminate discrimination 
and ensure minority 
protection by contributing to 
the inclusion and effective 
participation of minorities in 
Southeast Europe in the 
economic and social 
development processes 
 
   
PURPOSE: 
To utilize the opportunities 
provided by the EU accession 
process in order to 
mainstream effective minority 
and minority women’s 
participation in political and 




1. Representation of members of 
minorities and minority women in key 
political and developmental programs 
and strategies at all levels is clearly 
agreed and implemented. 
2. The position of minorities, in SEE 
countries is strengthened and benefits 
from inclusion in political and 
developmental processes are recorded. 
 
1. Official governmental and 
EU documents and statistics 
2. Reports by international 
organizations, authorities and 
NGOs 
3. Media coverage 
4. Partner programme 
monitoring reports 
1. Regional political 
stability  
2. National governments 
committed to meeting EU 
accession criteria   
3. Comprehensive data 
disaggregated by ethnicity 
and gender is available 
OUTPUTS: 
1. Minority communities, 
civil society organizations, 
European Union and 
governments jointly identify 
and use opportunities for 
minority and civil society 
input into the EU policy in 
SEE through the EU’s 
reporting procedures. 
In Serbia, partner input considered by policy 
makers and referred to in EU country reports  
In Croatia, minority organizations successfully 
advocate for implementation of the 
Constitutional Law for Protection of Minority 
Rights  and fulfilment of relevant international 
treaties commitments; 
In Kosovo, partner is consulted by local and 
international officials on status talks; 
recommendations are taken forward by 
authorities. 
 
-EU annual country reports 
- Partner programme 
monitoring reports 
- Feedback from 
government officials during 
monitoring visits 
- Feedback from EC   
- Media coverage  
- Public statements by 
government officials. 
1. EU interested and 
willing to consider and 
react on inputs 
2. Relevant governmental 
and EU stakeholders open 
for communication and 
cooperation 
3. Civil society and 
minority organizations 
interested and capable for 
a long term cooperation. 
ACTIVITIES: 
Activity 1-Advocacy  
Regional: 
3 strategic advocacy planning 
meetings to develop 
programme witth specific 
aims and deliverables for 




participate at 2 relevant 
international fora annually 
(HDIM, Strasbourg, Geneva)  
 
1 shadow report on relevant 
international treaties and 




9,099 GBP per activity. CS1 and partner 
advocacy expertise; meeting design. Time: 3 
wks planning, 2 wks follow-up by each 




756 GBP per visit; Partner advocacy expertise. 
Previous research/advocacy publications. 
Interventions. Time: 3 wks per partner pa 
 
3,472 GBP per report; Partner research 
expertise, knowledge of relevant instruments 
and mechanisms. Input by research team. 
MRG feedback and support.  
SOURCES OF INFO: 
 
 





- meeting report 
- advocacy targets 
- interventions 
 
- shadow reports 
- media launch 










Appendix 6- Extract from a European Commission Call for Proposal 
 
General Objective of the Programme 
To contribute to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule 
of law and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, consistent 
with the EU’s foreign policy as a whole. 
 
General Objective of the call (Objective 2 of the EIDHR Strategy Paper 
2007-2010) 
‘Strengthening the role of civil society in human rights and democratic reform, 
in facilitating the peaceful conciliation of group interests and in consolidating 
political participation and representation’ 
  
Actions: Proposed action must contribute to the empowerment of 
underrepresented groups and enhance political participation and representation 
of such groups 
 
Types of Activities: Organization of discussion for a (seminars, conferences, 
round tables) to improve dialogue between Civil Society Organizations and 
decision-makers; Awareness-raising, lobbying activities etc 
 
Expected Results: increased capacity of local civil society organizations to 
support resolution of conflicting interests or sources of deep-seated conflict or 
potential violent conflict. 
 
Size of Grants: Minimum €500,000 and Maximum €1,500,000. A grant may 
not be for less than 50% or more than 80% of the total eligible cost of the 
action 
 
Duration: 12 – 36 months 
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